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P r o f e s s i o n
Notice to Readers
Pages 136 and 137 contain a paragraph describing a meeting 
between AICPA officials and spokesmen for petitioners in a 
lawsuit filed against the AICPA. The author states that four persons 
were present, namely, AICPA Chairman Stanley Scott, AICPA 
President Wallace Olson and Petitioners Eli Mason and Alan Brout. 
Actually, there were six persons present at the meeting, namely, 
AICPA Treasurer Harry Mancher, Petitioner Ronald Hertz in 
addition to the four named in the book.
In the same paragraph, the author states, "The two men refused to 
withdraw their petition unless the AICPA agreed to pay their legal 
fees and to hold a mail ballot on division issues." It has now been 
established that in an effort to explore various alternatives for 
settlement of the lawsuit a number of options had been discussed; 
however, the petitioners state that by participating in the meeting 
they were not putting forth either payment of legal fees or a mail 
ballot on division issues as conditions for withdrawal of the lawsuit 
which they believe may be inferred.
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Preface
At  the time arrangements were being made for my retirement from the Institute, William Gregory, who was then serving 
as AICPA chairman, asked that I write a history of the profession 
during the 1970s. Although the task was not well defined, the 
general idea was to carry forward from where John L. Carey had 
ended volume 2 of The Rise of the Accounting Profession. The AICPA 
Board of Directors endorsed the chairman's suggestion, and with 
considerable reservations I agreed to try to live up to the high 
standard that had been set by Mr. Carey.
Early in my employment at the Institute, I was forcefully 
reminded by the head of one of the large CPA firms that the 
AICPA is not the profession. He was right, of course; but the 
Institute, as the coordinating organization for collective decisions 
at the national level, is widely regarded as the profession's 
authoritative voice. Accordingly, for the sake of convenience, 
this book has been written as though the AICPA and the 
accounting profession were one and the same.
Although CPAs follow a variety of careers in public practice, 
education, government, and industry, this history focuses almost 
exclusively on the Institute's efforts to serve the interests of CPAs 
in public practice. I have not attempted to cover all that might 
be included because to do so would result in an unreadable 
tome. Neither have I dealt with the technical aspects of practice 
or major areas of service, such as federal taxation and manage­
ment advisory services, except to the extent necessary to discuss 
important events affecting the profession. Rather, I have de­
scribed in some depth those developments that I consider to 
have been most significant. The responsibility for the selection
of subjects and the judgments that are expressed are entirely 
mine.
During the period covered by this book, thousands of CPAs 
participated in the Institute's programs as officers or as members 
of committees or the governing bodies. For purposes of brevity, 
I have named only a few of them, and I apologize for not 
identifying all those who devoted so much of their time and 
talents in behalf of the profession.
Another omission has been a discussion of the important part 
played in the profession's affairs by the state societies of CPAs, 
some of which publish their own histories. Failure to deal with 
their role as a separate subject reflects only the desire to avoid 
duplication and to restrict the proportions of this book.
Finally, I owe a debt of gratitude to several members of the 
Institute's staff who assisted by commenting on portions of the 
manuscript or arranging for its publication. I particularly want 
to thank Donald Schneeman, who urged me to accept the 
assignment and provided invaluable assistance in carrying it out. 
He was a close associate during my term of service with the 
Institute and was a participant in most of the events that I have 
described.
I am saddened by the fact that Bill Gregory did not live to 
see the results of one of the many actions taken during his 
administration. His death early in 1981 deprived the profession 
of one of its most popular leaders. I am grateful to him for 
sponsoring this opportunity for me to record a portion of the 
history of the accounting profession. To quote Bill, "I am proud 
of being a certified public accountant."
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CHAPTER 1
An Overview of the Profession 
1969-1980
Th e  1960s ended amid indications that the coming decade would be a turbulent time for the public accounting profession. 
Although the profession's leaders were aware of the eroding 
public confidence in the work of auditors and in the reliability of 
financial statements, few CPAs foresaw the extent of the changes 
that the profession was about to undergo.
During the 1970s the profession achieved a new maturity, in 
which it realized more fully than before the responsibilities 
imposed by the securities acts of the thirties. Until then the 
profession had tended to devote most of its attention to the 
needs of management. Practitioners recognized that they had 
responsibilities to shareholders, credit grantors, and other third 
parties, but these obligations were ill-defined. Throughout the 
seventies hundreds of liability lawsuits against CPA firms, the 
actions of an activist SEC, investigations by Congress and gov­
ernmental agencies into the profession's performance, and AICPA 
activities served to define the responsibilities of independent 
auditors and to improve financial reporting.
Third-Party Liability Issues
Today, the emphasis on assistance to management has been 
overshadowed by the specter of liability to third parties. Indeed, 
some CPAs would assert that the pendulum has swung too far 
toward an adversarial relationship between independent auditors 
and management, thereby hampering the conduct of effective 
audits.
The impetus for independent auditors to be more responsible
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toward shareholders and third-party users grew out of a period 
of widespread speculation in the securities markets in the late 
1960s. A new breed of promoters and managers took advantage 
of inadequacies in accounting principles to inflate reported earn­
ings, to build conglomerates, and to promote real estate and 
franchising ventures. A flood of new securities issues was snapped 
up by investors in a fever of speculation.
Ultimately, the speculative bubble burst, and numerous in­
vestors suffered severe losses. Many of them turned to their 
lawyers to salvage what they could through litigation, and 
auditors became prime targets of class-action liability suits. The 
plaintiffs alleged that financial statements were misleading and 
that the auditors had failed to meet their legal responsibilities to 
shareholders and credit grantors. The truth of such allegations 
was often less important to plaintiffs than the fact that the 
auditors' liability insurance offered the only available source of 
financial recovery.
The profession was ill prepared to meet this onslaught. CPAs 
had not previously encountered managements that used account­
ing principles to create instant earnings through what became 
known as the "front ending" of revenue and the "rear ending" 
of expenses, nor had they dealt with the large volume of complex 
corporate mergers and acquisitions or the intricacies of real estate 
and franchising ventures.
Although during the 1960s the AICPA had been planning for 
the future, the principal emphasis had been directed toward 
achieving a better internal structure to fit the enhanced size and 
status of the profession. The growing problems in the securities 
markets and their effect on practitioners caught the profession 
off guard.
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Standard Setting
The profession's response in the early 1970s focused on the need 
to set standards in order to narrow the available alternatives in 
accounting principles. The profession had recognized this need 
as early as 1959, when the Accounting Principles Board was 
established to succeed the committee on accounting procedures.
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By 1969 the work of the Accounting Principles Board had come 
under widespread criticism. Some critics alleged that the board 
was not acting swiftly enough and that its pronouncements left 
much to be desired; management, on the other hand, felt ag­
grieved by the burden of complying with the expanding reporting 
and disclosure requirements and objected to its lack of partici­
pation in the standard-setting process.
The setting of accounting standards had gained great attention 
in the financial pages of newspapers and business periodicals in 
conjunction with news of major business failures and lawsuits 
against CPA firms. Financial reporters were sharply critical of 
auditors' performance, and they questioned the right of a private 
professional organization to set accounting standards and to 
impose them on the entire business community.
The AICPA responded in 1971 by appointing two blue ribbon 
committees composed of both members and nonmembers of the 
profession. One, known as the Wheat committee, was charged 
with studying how and by whom accounting principles should 
be established. The other, referred to as the Trueblood commit­
tee, was directed to study and report on the objectives of financial 
reporting.
The Wheat committee issued its report in March 1972, rec­
ommending that an independent foundation and standard-set­
ting board be established outside the AICPA and that it be 
sponsored by the various organizations whose members had a 
strong interest in financial accounting and reporting. This rec­
ommendation was approved and implemented during 1972, 
giving birth to the Financial Accounting Foundation, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Advisory Council, and the Financial Ac­
counting Standards Board (FASB), which succeeded the Account­
ing Principles Board.
The Trueblood committee issued its report in October 1973. 
Its conclusions formed the basis of an FASB project to establish 
a conceptual basis for financial accounting. The project was still 
in process in 1981.
Concurrently, the AICPA completely overhauled its code of 
professional ethics. The revised code was adopted by a vote of 
the membership early in 1973. It contained a new rule 203, which 
mandated that AICPA members comply with the accounting
standards established by the FASB. This was a significant step 
because it explicitly brought the standards directly under the 
profession's disciplinary machinery for the first time.
The SEC adopted a policy of reliance on the FASB for the 
development of accounting standards. Nonetheless, the SEC and 
the chief accountant seemed to undermine the FASB's role by 
issuing a host of Accounting Series Releases requiring registrants 
to include new types of disclosures in their financial statements.
A major CPA firm sued the SEC, challenging the legality of 
its policy of reliance on the FASB. The challenge, which was 
based on an alleged failure to comply with the Federal Admin­
istrative Procedures Act, ultimately proved unsuccessful.
The oil embargo in 1974 and the ensuing energy crisis attracted 
the attention of Congress to the financial accounting practices of 
companies in the petroleum industry. The fact that their financial 
statements were not comparable because of the application of 
alternative accounting methods resulted in a directive in the 1975 
Energy Act that the SEC see that uniform accounting standards 
were established for the industry. Although the SEC waited for 
the FASB to act, it ultimately took a position different from that 
of the FASB, thereby overruling the private sector's standard- 
setting body.
Several other developments during the decade further eroded 
confidence in the accounting profession and the standard-setting 
process and increased the calls for governmental intervention. 
Among these developments were the Equity Funding fraud, the 
bankruptcy of Penn Central, and a series of other highly publicized 
bankruptcies of major corporations. Other factors were the illegal 
corporate political contributions, improper payments, and foreign 
bribes that were revealed as an outgrowth of the Watergate 
investigations. The large number of major corporations involved 
and the fact that the improprieties were not brought to light by 
the independent auditors raised serious questions about the 
reliability of financial statements. Finally, as might be expected, 
the FASB's own pronouncements were sometimes highly contro­
versial. Most notable perhaps was Statement of Financial Ac­
counting Standards no. 8, dealing with accounting for transactions 
in foreign currency and the translation of foreign currency finan­
cial statements.
In October 1976 a congressional subcommittee, in an oversight
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report on the federal regulatory agencies, recommended that the 
SEC establish a basis for uniform accounting standards. In 1977 
and again in 1978 congressional hearings inquired into the 
propriety of the SEC's reliance on a private-sector body for the 
development of accounting standards.
Investigation of Auditor Performance
The same events that caused the concentration on accounting 
standards also gave rise to intensive investigations of auditor 
performance. Early in 1976 a Senate subcommittee began an 
extensive study of the profession, which led to a highly critical 
staff report called The Accounting Establishment. Beginning in April 
1977, public hearings were held; and in November 1977 a sub­
committee report was issued, which contained a long list of 
recommended reforms.
Meanwhile, a House of Representatives subcommittee was 
also directing its attention to the profession. Following public 
hearings early in 1978, the subcommittee chairman introduced a 
bill proposing the establishment of a federal statutory organiza­
tion to regulate accountants practicing before the SEC. Under 
the bill, the organization would be subject to the oversight and 
control of the SEC. This action was followed by additional public 
hearings in July.
A major participant in the public hearings was the Commis­
sion on Auditors' Responsibilities, which had been appointed by 
the AICPA in October 1974. The commission, composed of 
members and nonmembers of the profession, had completed its 
study in November 1977 and issued its final report early in 1978. 
The report addressed a wide range of questions and contained 
many recommendations to improve auditor performance. Many 
of these recommendations were incorporated in the Senate sub­
committee report.
In addition to the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities, 
many members of the profession made written submissions and 
gave oral testimony to the two congressional subcommittees. 
Not all of them were complimentary to the profession, and most 
suggested a variety of reforms.
All this scrutiny made it clear that the profession would have
to expand its system of self-regulation. Otherwise, there would 
be a considerable risk that legislation would be enacted, with the 
support of the SEC, establishing additional federal regulation of 
the profession.
Not all members of the profession agreed with the AICPA's 
opposition to any new form of federal governmental regulation. 
Some members supported legislation to require registration of 
CPAs or CPA firms with the SEC, and others proposed a more 
elaborate scheme of regulation. Nevertheless, a large majority of 
the AICPA Board of Directors and Council believed they were 
reflecting the view of most practitioners by opposing federal 
regulatory legislation.
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A New Structure for Self-Regulation
By July 1977 the AICPA's chairman and president had formulated 
a series of proposed actions designed to be responsive to the 
many recommendations that had been made. They proposed 
establishing two divisions for CPA firms to permit regulation of 
firms as entities, adding three non-CPA public representatives 
to the Institute's Board of Directors, and opening policy-making 
meetings of the Council and senior committees to the public.
One division for CPA firms was to be for SEC practice, and 
the other for private companies practice. These were subse­
quently designated as sections of a single division for CPA firms 
when they were established by action of the Institute's governing 
Council.
A key feature of both sections was the requirement for 
member firms to have their systems of quality control reviewed 
by a group of peers every three years. This was the outgrowth 
of peer review programs that had been evolving since the early 
1970s, both on a voluntary basis and as a sanction imposed by 
the SEC under its disciplinary proceedings.
A key enforcement feature of the SEC practice section was 
the establishment of a public oversight board composed of five 
prominent public members to oversee and report publicly on the 
section's activities. This was intended to provide the pressure of 
public scrutiny on member firms needed to ensure their contin­
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ued participation and compliance with the section's require­
ments.
All of the proposed actions were approved, with minor 
modifications, at a historic meeting of the AICPA Council in 
September 1977, and steps were taken immediately for their 
implementation. All was not harmonious, however. A small 
number of members were so opposed to the establishment of 
the division for CPA firms that they instituted legal action 
challenging the authority of the Council's action. By mid 1978 
the court decided against the petitioners' claims, and both sec­
tions continued in operation.
The SEC had been a principal participant in the congressional 
hearings, arguing that new regulatory legislation should not be 
considered until the profession had a chance to implement its 
expanded program of self-regulation. During the balance of the 
decade, the SEC used the threat of congressional intervention to 
keep pressure on the profession. In annual reports to Congress, 
the SEC repeatedly expressed the view that the profession had 
made progress toward self-regulation but that more must be 
accomplished. This was the status at the end of 1980, although 
by that time the interest of Congress had largely dissipated as a 
result of changes in its membership and the structure of its 
committees.
Through a combination of bold action and fortuitous circum­
stances, the profession had coped successfully with an unprece­
dented period of congressional investigation. Some practitioners 
felt that the new self-imposed regulation went too far and was 
unnecessary. They believed that the profession could have lob­
bied effectively to defeat any proposed legislation.
The validity of this contention is difficult to evaluate. In the 
judgment of the AICPA's officers and governing bodies, the 
possibility of failure was far too high to pursue a course of 
defending the status quo. In addition, many members believed 
that reforms were needed, as is evidenced by their testimony 
before Congress and by the reports of several AICPA committees 
relating to the profession's regulation.
However one judges the appropriateness of the actions taken 
in 1977 and 1978, there is little doubt that the great majority of 
CPAs were strongly opposed to federal legislation that would
have imposed additional regulation, and the fundamental fact is 
that the profession successfully avoided such legislation during 
this period.
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Professional Competition
Financial reporting standards and auditor performance were not 
the only concerns that stimulated interest in the profession at the 
federal governmental level during the decade. The government 
also became involved in the areas of competition between CPA 
firms.
The Department of Justice embarked upon a campaign at the 
outset of the 1970s to strike down the competition prohibitions 
contained in the codes of ethics of various professional groups. 
Investigations were commenced, and lawsuits alleging violations 
of the federal antitrust laws were either threatened or actually 
filed. In general, the department achieved its objective through 
both consent decrees and litigation. The genesis of this entire 
effort was the concern for consumer protection that was cham­
pioned by Ralph Nader and other activists.
The AICPA's ethical rules prohibiting competitive bidding, 
advertising, and solicitation became an early target of the de­
partment's campaign. After extensive negotiations and careful 
consideration of outside legal advice, the AICPA entered into a 
consent decree in 1972 to not enforce its prohibition of competi­
tive bidding. The members subsequently supported this action 
by voting in favor of a revised code of ethics that lacked the 
prohibition.
Because of the consent decree on competitive bidding, the 
Department of Justice decided not to take further action at that 
time regarding other AICPA rules that were viewed as being 
anticompetitive; however, the department reopened its file in 
1976, and by 1979 the Institute's members had voted the repeal 
of rules prohibiting advertising, solicitation, encroachment on 
the practice of other CPAs, and employment of personnel of 
other CPA firms without prior notice. These actions were taken 
after outside legal counsel had advised that the AICPA had very 
little chance of successfully litigating to retain the prohibitions.
The elimination of the prohibition against uninvited solicita­
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tion of a specific client proved to be highly unpopular among 
practitioners because it spurred competitive tactics that were 
widely viewed as unfair. Some Institute members believed that 
the legality of the prohibition should have been litigated, and in 
October 1980 a special committee was appointed to consider 
whether the prohibition should be restored. Accordingly, the 
issue remained active in the 1980s.1
Scope of Services
Another issue that attracted the interest of government involved 
the range of services that is appropriate for CPA firms. During 
the decade the SEC questioned the propriety of certain types of 
management consulting engagements, such as executive recruit­
ing for a fee. The scope-of-services issue was pressed by the SEC 
in 1970 and again in 1978-79, when it published two Accounting 
Series Releases (ASRs 250 and 264). The releases required proxy 
statement disclosures of certain nonaudit services provided by 
auditors and described criteria for determining an auditor's 
independence. Also, a Senate subcommittee held a public hearing 
on the issue in August 1979, but no further action was taken by 
that body.
Two independent bodies studied the scope-of-services issue 
and reported their conclusions during the decade: the Commis­
sion on Auditors' Responsibilities and the public oversight board 
of the SEC practice section. Several Institute special committees 
also addressed the difficult questions relating to scope of services. 
The conclusions reached by these various groups were not wholly 
satisfactory to the SEC, but for the time being an uneasy hiatus 
was reached, pending what would be revealed by the SEC's 
newly adopted disclosure requirements.2
The question of appropriate scope of services is likely to 
continue to be raised because of the difficulty of determining 
whether the judgments of auditors are influenced by their per­
1. Based upon the advice of independent legal counsel, the committee, in a September 
1981 report, recommended against seeking reinstatement of a prohibition of uninvited 
solicitation of a specific client.
2. In 1981, the SEC, in keeping with the Reagan administration emphasis on deregulation, 
withdrew ASRs 250 and 264 on the grounds that they were no longer deemed necessary.
formance of management consulting services for their audit 
clients.
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Professional Specialization
Closely related to the scope-of-services issue was the question of 
the need for formal recognition of specialization within the 
profession. Several Institute special committees addressed this 
question during the 1970s, but their conclusions failed to gain 
the acceptance of the Institute's membership and governing 
bodies. At the end of 1980 it appeared that CPAs and the Institute's 
governing bodies were not ready to embrace formal accreditation 
of specialists or to admit non-CPA specialists to some form of 
associate membership in the AICPA.
Advancement of Accounting Education and 
Minority Participation
In addition to the changes brought about by governmental 
pressure and public criticisms, many significant developments 
were initiated from within the profession. These developments 
were less spectacular but were important nonetheless.
For example, during the decade the Institute adopted a policy 
of support for programs and schools providing professional 
accounting education. In 1969 the Institute Council had agreed 
to urge state boards of accountancy to require a five-year college 
education, and to drop requirements for practice experience, as 
a prerequisite for obtaining a CPA certificate. During the following 
years the Institute developed proposed standards for programs 
of professional accounting education. Also, working in conjunc­
tion with the American Accounting Association, the Institute 
persuaded the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Busi­
ness to establish accreditation of such programs. When accredi­
tation is fully implemented, it is expected to enhance the pre­
entry education of future members of the profession.
The Institute was just as concerned about continuing educa­
tion after entry into the profession. In May 1971 the AICPA 
Council passed a resolution urging the state boards of account­
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ancy to adopt mandatory continuing professional education re­
quirements for licensed practicing CPAs. By 1981 a total of forty 
states had taken such action, and a high proportion of the 
activities of the AICPA and the state societies was devoted to 
the availability of educational courses for practitioners.
The Institute also began a program to bring members of 
minority groups into the profession. In 1969 a fund was estab­
lished to provide financial aid to minority college students ma­
joring in accounting and to assist in the development of minority 
faculty members. During the next ten years, over $2,500,000 was 
raised and spent to achieve an integrated profession.
International Standards
Significant actions also were taken in the international field. 
Following an international congress in Sydney, Australia, in 
1972, the AICPA joined with eight other national institutes to 
establish the International Accounting Standards Committee 
(IASC), based in London, to set international accounting stand­
ards. By the end of 1980, thirteen international accounting stand­
ards had been issued for application to international financial 
reports. They represent an important effort to improve reporting 
by multinational corporations. Nevertheless, it will take many 
years to achieve full compliance with accounting standards on 
an international basis.
The report of a working party to the congress in Sydney led 
to the establishment of the International Committee for the 
Coordination of the Accounting Profession (ICCAP) in 1972. It 
consisted of representatives of eleven countries. During the next 
five years it developed a proposed constitution for its successor, 
the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). The new 
federation was formally established at the next international 
congress, held in Munich, Germany, in October 1977. At the end 
of 1980, the federation, based in New York, had seventy-six 
member bodies from fifty-eight countries and was engaged in a 
variety of activities to promote international harmonization, in­
cluding the establishment of international auditing standards. In 
the years ahead, the federation should serve as a structure for 
achieving a truly international profession.
12 AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROFESSION 1969-1980
Institute Service by Members Not in Practice
An important event that attracted only limited attention at the 
time it occurred was the modification of the Institute's bylaws in 
1978 to permit members not in public practice to serve as AICPA 
officers or members of the trial board. Because nearly 46 percent 
of the Institute's members are nonpractitioners, it can be expected 
that the chairman and other officers may be drawn from their 
ranks in the future. When this occurs, the AICPA will have 
achieved its long-term goal of full participation by all segments 
of the profession.
Association With Unaudited Financial Statements
A final development worthy of special note was the appointment 
of a new senior Institute committee to establish standards for the 
association of CPAs with unaudited financial statements of pri­
vately owned businesses. Its first pronouncement, Statement on 
Standards for Accounting and Review Services no. 1, was issued 
in December 1978. This pronouncement defined for the first time 
two specific types of unaudited financial statement engage­
ments—reviews and compilations—and prescribed procedures 
and reports for both. The provision for differing levels of assur­
ance points the way toward the tailoring of standards and 
engagements to fit the increasing variety of unaudited data with 
which CPAs are becoming associated.
These, briefly, have been the most salient occurrences of the 
1970s, an uncomfortable period during which the profession 
made sweeping adjustments to meet new circumstances that 
resulted mainly from social, political, and business developments 
in the prior decade. It is to the profession's credit that it was able 
to accomplish this transition through its own actions rather than 
through government fiat. Although external duress was involved, 
CPAs acted responsibly to redress the deficiencies that were 
identified by the scrutiny of members of the profession and 
outside parties.
The remainder of this book describes these developments in 
more detail. It is arranged by subject matter and is written from 
the perspective of the author, who was a participant during the 
entire period. The reader is cautioned to keep this in mind, since 
it is virtually impossible for anyone heavily involved in the affairs 
of the profession to be wholly objective, especially during such 
a time of great change.
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CHAPTER 2
The Impact of Litigation Against 
Auditors
Th e  plethora of civil liability and criminal lawsuits against CPA firms that began in the late 1960s and reached a peak early 
in the 1970s had a tremendous impact on the profession. Because 
the litigation involved major business failures, it attracted the 
attention of the financial press to auditors and accounting stand­
ards. The business failures also alerted the SEC, which brought 
enforcement and disciplinary proceedings against CPAs and their 
firms with increasing frequency, and Congress, which began to 
consider regulating the profession. This activity permanently 
altered the practice of public accounting.
The effects of litigation were the root causes of most of the 
changes that occurred in the profession during the 1970s. Audi­
tors' responsibilities were broadened and more sharply defined 
by court decisions and SEC rulemaking. The establishment of 
financial accounting and reporting standards took on far greater 
importance, a development that led to the creation of the Finan­
cial Accounting Standards Board and to a host of detailed 
accounting and disclosure rules. This was perceived by many 
practitioners as an excess of standards, and it aggravated an 
already widening gulf between the large CPA firms auditing 
most publicly traded corporations and the rest of the practicing 
profession. The changed practice environment led to the estab­
lishment of a division for CPA firms with a separate section for 
SEC practice and to the imposition of peer reviews, which 
contributed, in turn, to increased internal disharmony within the 
profession.
It would be an overstatement to say that the lawsuits against 
CPA firms were the sole cause of the changes in the profession 
that occurred during the 1970s. To a great extent, the insurance
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coverage of CPA firms, the actions of the SEC, the outcry in the 
press, and the effects of such events as the energy crisis and 
revelations of improper corporate payments were both causes and 
end results of litigation against auditors. But, it is indisputable 
that the lawsuits, in their turn, brought about important changes.
If one wishes to fully understand the profession's history during 
the 1970s, a study of the lawsuits against CPA firms is imperative. 
Space limitations and my lack of legal expertise make a definitive 
study of litigation against CPAs impracticable. What follows is a 
layman's account of how the AICPA participated in various lawsuits 
as a friend of the court by filing amicus curiae briefs on important 
issues affecting the responsibilities of auditors.
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Continental Vending
The first such brief in the 1970s related to the Continental Vending 
case, in which two partners of Lybrand, Ross Brothers and 
Montgomery (later Coopers and Lybrand) were convicted of 
criminal fraud. The point at issue involved the question of what 
disclosures were required in financial statement footnotes about 
transactions between affiliated corporations and their officers. 
The profession had not established clearly defined rules for 
dealing with such related-party transactions, and the auditors in 
the case defended themselves on the grounds that they had 
complied with the profession's standards and had no intent to 
commit fraud. On the basis of the facts, however, the auditors 
were found guilty.
A subsequent appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals was denied, 
and the defendants filed a writ of certiorari with the U.S. 
Supreme Court. The Institute filed an amicus curiae brief early 
in 1970 in support of the writ. It argued that the lower court had 
erred in determining that independent auditors had a duty to go 
beyond compliance with the profession's standards.
The writ was denied by the Supreme Court on March 30, 
1970, putting the profession on notice that it could not rely solely 
on compliance with standards as a defense in litigation.
Needless to say, the profession was shocked by the outcome 
of this case. Few, if any, CPAs believed that the defendants had 
failed to meet their civil responsibilities as auditors, much less
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been guilty of criminal conduct. "There but for the grace of God 
go I" was the almost universal reaction. Clearly, the words fairly 
presents in the auditor's opinion had taken on new meaning, and 
the larger firms began to tighten their procedures to guard against 
becoming embroiled in similar litigation.
The Continental Vending case contributed to concern about 
what the profession viewed as excessive auditor exposure to 
liability under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. Section 11 
placed the burden of proof in liability claims against auditors 
and other experts on the defendants, who had to show that they 
had acted with "due diligence." Because public offerings of 
securities involve huge sums of money, the potential exposure 
to liability is overwhelming.
The specter of CPA firms bankrupted by losses in liability 
suits caused the Institute's Board of Directors, with the help of 
legal counsel, Covington and Burling, to consider seeking legis­
lative relief. A study was made, and memorandums were pre­
sented to the chief accountant and general counsel of the SEC in 
September 1970. These measures were spearheaded by Ralph 
Kent, who had taken over as head of Arthur Young and Com­
pany. The proposal for legislative relief failed to win the com­
mission's support, and section 11 remains intact; nevertheless, 
the exercise alerted the commission to the problem and produced 
a more sympathetic attitude toward a limitation on liability when 
such a limitation was later included in a recodification of the 
securities acts proposed by the American Law Institute.
1136 Tenant's Corporation v. Max Rothenberg &
Company
The next amicus curiae brief filed by the Institute involved the 
1136 Tenant's Corporation v. Max Rothenberg & Company. The 
Rothenberg firm had prepared accounting records and unaudited 
financial statements for the client, 1136 Tenant's Corporation. 
The CPA firm was charged with civil liability for failing to discover 
a defalcation by the corporation's managing agent. Much to the 
astonishment of the profession, the CPA firm was found to be 
legally liable, and the judgment was affirmed on April 8, 1981, 
by the Appellate Division of the New York Trial Court.
When the New York Society of CPAs decided to file a brief 
in the appeal of this case, the AICPA, against the advice of legal 
counsel, decided to participate. It was argued that CPAs had 
little, if any, responsibility for errors in unaudited financial 
statements with which they were associated.
The trial court placed great emphasis on its construction of 
the tacit terms of the engagement of the CPA firm. There was 
no engagement letter, and the firm had billed for "audit serv­
ices." The court concluded that one of the implied objectives of 
such an engagement was to guard against losses through defal­
cation.
The initial decision was upheld, and the profession had 
learned another important lesson: The legal responsibilities for 
CPAs associated with unaudited financial statements were ap­
parently greater than was previously thought.
The case led to requirements by many CPA firms that their 
clients sign letters spelling out the terms of their engagements. 
The case also prompted the AICPA to appoint a committee to 
develop a guide for use by CPAs in the preparation of unaudited 
financial statements. For the first time, the AICPA suggested 
review procedures for nonaudit engagements in a guide that 
would later be superseded by pronouncements of the accounting 
and review services committee.
In their concern about the filing of briefs in cases in which 
the facts are somewhat unfavorable, the AICPA Board of Direc­
tors reexamined and finally reaffirmed its criteria for participation 
in litigation as a friend of the court. Under guidelines set in 1968, 
the board had decided that it would file briefs only in cases 
whose issues would have broad impact on the accounting profes­
sion. It would not seek to defend the position of CPA defendants 
and would not enter a case before the appeal stage. As a result 
of 1136 Tenants, the board further resolved to consider whether 
the general facts in a case would make amicus curiae participation 
undesirable.
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Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath &
Horwath
The next case in which the Institute considered filing a brief was 
that of Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath in 1974.
In this case audited financial statements were used in connection 
with a private placement of securities of a corporation that 
subsequently went bankrupt. At issue was the adequacy of 
factual disclosure regarding a purported sale of real estate. The 
judge in the District Court, Southern District of New York, found 
the auditors liable for damages under the antifraud provisions 
of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC 
rule 10b-5.
One aspect of the case was particularly troubling. The auditors 
had qualified their opinion on the basis of the questionable 
collectibility of the amounts receivable from the sale of real estate, 
which were material to the financial statements. The judge held 
that an intent to mislead could be inferred from the mere fact 
that the auditors' opinion was qualified.
Although the judge's opinion seemed to go well beyond the 
normal auditor's disclosure obligations, on one item not dis­
closed—namely, the net worth of the purchaser of the real 
estate—the court's position seemed to be sound. Because the 
AICPA board did not feel it could take issue with this part of 
the decision, it decided not to file an amicus curiae brief in the 
appeal of this case. The board believed that to file a brief and 
remain silent on this critical point would hurt the defendant's 
case. Although the inference of intent to mislead drawn from an 
unqualified auditor's opinion was of considerable concern, the 
board felt that this point could be successfully overturned in 
other cases with different facts.
The Institute also declined to participate in a later petition for 
a rehearing of the case because the decision of the appellate court 
was partially based on different grounds than that of the trial 
court and was less objectionable from the standpoint of the 
profession.
National Student Marketing Corporation
The Institute filed several amicus curiae briefs in 1975. One was 
filed when a partner and an employee of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell 
and Co. involved in the audit of National Student Marketing 
Corporation appealed a trial court decision that found them 
guilty of criminal fraud. The case centered on audited and 
unaudited financial statements included in a National Student
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Marketing Corporation proxy statement dated September 27, 
1969. The unaudited financial statements later proved to be 
materially incorrect. The Institute's brief addressed only a single 
point, as follows:
The trial court did not instruct the jury on the lesser responsibilities 
of independent accountants with respect to unaudited financial 
statements and, by failing to do so, may well have led the jury to 
consider independent accountants to have the same responsibility 
for unaudited financial statements as the responsibility spelled out 
to the jury with regard to audited financial statements.
The appellate court specifically affirmed the appropriateness 
of the trial judge's charge to the jury but recognized that the 
independent accountant does not in ordinary circumstances have 
a duty to investigate the fairness of unaudited financial state­
ments with which he may be associated. Nevertheless, the court 
suggested that, where the surrounding circumstances are suffi­
ciently "suspicious," there does arise a duty to investigate the 
unaudited statements. The court affirmed in part and reversed 
and remanded in part the conviction of the two accountants.
Initially, the AICPA Board of Directors concluded that the 
profession could live with the appellate court's opinion regarding 
unaudited financial statements; however, under heavy pressure 
from the defendant's legal representatives, the board subse­
quently agreed to file a brief in connection with a petition to the 
U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The brief argued that 
clarification was needed since the appellate court's opinion con­
tained conflicting conclusions about unaudited financial state­
ments. It affirmed the trial judge's charge to the jury but also 
drew a distinction between audited and unaudited financial 
statements. The Institute also argued that an accountant should 
not be criminally liable merely because he has knowledge of 
suspicious circumstances regarding unaudited financial state­
ments.
The defendant's petition was denied by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, and once again a criminal conviction of independent 
auditors was left standing.
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Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst
A far more important case was that of Olga Hochfelder et al. v. 
Ernst & Ernst. In this case the auditors were charged with 
negligence and noncompliance with generally accepted auditing 
standards for not detecting and reporting an alleged inadequacy 
of a small brokerage firm's internal accounting controls. The 
plaintiffs, who had funds in an escrow account maintained by 
the president of the brokerage firm, sought to recover losses in 
a civil damage suit under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 and the SEC's rule 10b-5.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed a 
district court summary judgment in favor of the auditors, Ernst 
and Ernst. The appellate court held that liability for damages in 
a civil suit under the act can be predicated on negligence and 
that an auditor can be held liable on the basis of negligent failure 
to comply with generally accepted auditing standards. This 
decision contradicted a number of lower-court decisions and 
imposed a lower standard of proof for auditors as aiders and 
abettors under rule 10b-5 than the standard for those whose 
direct fraud they were accused of assisting. This was profoundly 
disturbing since auditors are almost always among the unwitting 
victims of fraud committed by their clients.
When the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review the case, the 
AICPA filed an amicus curiae brief, which argued that liability 
for damages may not be imposed upon an auditor for aiding and 
abetting his client's violation of rule 10b-5 in the absence of 
knowledge of the client's fraudulent conduct and solely on the 
basis of negligent auditing. This time the Institute's brief was a 
success because the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of 
the appellate court. The Supreme Court held that scienter must 
be pleaded to sustain civil liability under section 10(b) and rule 
10b-5. (Scienter was defined by the court as a mental state 
involving intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.)
This was a major victory for the profession, and there was a 
great feeling of comfort when the decision was announced early 
in 1976. The profession's satisfaction was offset, however, by the 
strong dissatisfaction of the SEC and members of Congress. 
Congressman John Moss and Senator Thomas Eagleton, among 
others, subsequently advocated the enactment of legislation to
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eliminate proof of scienter as a requirement to sustain civil 
damage claims against auditors under the securities acts. Never­
theless, the Hochfelder decision remains intact, and there is no 
indication that it will be overturned by legislation.
United States and Shea v. Coopers & Lybrand
Another issue arose in 1975 when the Internal Revenue Service 
attempted to gain access to auditors' income tax accrual work­
papers. The Internal Revenue Service brought suit in the U.S. 
district court in Colorado, seeking to enforce its subpoena of all 
the workpapers and files of Coopers and Lybrand relating to its 
audit of the financial statements of Johns-Manville Corporation 
for 1971 and 1972. The auditors, who had not prepared the 
company's tax returns, had complied in part with the subpoena 
but declined to provide workpapers or testify concerning the 
audit program and a tax pool analysis file with related papers.
The district court decision in United States and Shea v. Coopers 
& Lybrand et al. supported the position of Coopers & Lybrand 
and denied the petition of the Internal Revenue Service. As 
expected, the Internal Revenue Service appealed the decision in 
early 1976.
The federal taxation executive committee and several CPA 
firms urged the Institute board to file an amicus curiae brief in 
connection with the appeal. The tax committee was unalterably 
opposed to opening the tax accrual files of auditors to the scrutiny 
of the Internal Revenue Service because this would cause clients 
to withhold important tax information from their auditors. Such 
a result would not only make it more difficult to audit the 
propriety of tax accruals but would also lead to a transfer of tax 
planning engagements from CPAs to tax attorneys, whose con­
fidentiality was legally protected. The board shared these con­
cerns, and a brief was filed with the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit in September 1976.
In February 1977 the appellate court affirmed the decision of 
the district court. For a time it appeared that the government 
would appeal the decision to the Supreme Court, but this did 
not occur. Apparently, the Internal Revenue Service decided to 
turn its attention to cases in which the facts were more favorable 
to its position.
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United States and Murphy v. Arthur Andersen &
Company
The Coopers and Lybrand case had established an important 
precedent, but it did not stop the Internal Revenue Service from 
continuing to seek access to auditors' complete workpapers and 
files relating to income tax accruals and tax planning. The issue 
was again addressed in United States and Murphy v. Arthur Andersen 
& Company in 1979, when the Internal Revenue Service sought 
to enforce its subpoena of the tax accrual records of the auditors 
of Good Hope Industries in the U.S. district court in Massachu­
setts. In responding, Arthur Andersen and Company cited the 
decision in the Coopers & Lybrand case and argued that the material 
it was withholding met the "not relevant" test under the standards 
previously enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court. It asserted 
that the files in question were not used to prepare tax returns 
(although in this case the auditors had prepared the client's tax 
returns) and were therefore not relevant to the purpose of the 
Internal Revenue Service.
The district court ruled in favor of the Internal Revenue 
Service in July 1979. In doing so, it placed great emphasis on 
interpretation of the statutory language, "may be relevant," and 
refused to adopt the reasoning in the Coopers & Lybrand case. 
When Arthur Andersen and Company decided to appeal the 
decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the 
AICPA filed an amicus curiae brief supporting the firm's position.
Meanwhile, to avoid being found guilty of contempt of court, 
the firm complied with the I.R.S. demands. As a result, the 
appellate court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the 
issue had become moot through compliance with the subpoena. 
In effect, the court said that a precondition of appellate review 
in a case of this sort was submission by the appellant to charges 
of contempt of court. This "catch 22" position left the district 
court decision unreviewed. After consideration, however, the 
CPA firm decided not to seek certiorari from the U.S. Supreme 
Court.
During 1980 and into 1981, internal revenue auditors increas­
ingly sought access to CPAs' tax accrual workpapers. However, 
when Roscoe Egger, a top partner of Price Waterhouse, was 
appointed commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service in 1981, 
revised guidelines were issued to I.R.S. agents requiring them
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to take a series of steps before, as a last resort, they request 
access to the independent auditor's tax accrual workpapers. This 
action may relieve some of the pressure, but the matter has not 
been resolved. Further litigation or legislation will no doubt occur 
before a final disposition is achieved.
Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Internal Revenue 
Service
Meanwhile, back in 1975, another case involving an issue relating 
to tax practice was Tax Analysts and Advocates et al. v. Internal 
Revenue Service. The plaintiffs were seeking public access, under 
the Freedom of Information Act, to approximately 160,000 un­
published private letter rulings issued by the Internal Revenue 
Service. This time, the Institute found itself at least partially 
supporting the position of the I.R.S.
In agreement with the Internal Revenue Service, the Institute 
filed an amicus curiae brief with the U.S. district court in the 
District of Columbia without waiting for an initial decision and 
an appeal. The brief urged that the identifying details in the 
unpublished rulings requested by the plaintiffs be deleted in 
certain circumstances, such as when a clearly unwarranted in­
vasion of personal privacy would otherwise result. The Institute 
pointed out that the service's prior regulations had assured 
taxpayers and their advisers that the parties involved in private 
letter rulings would not be publicly identified. Taxpayers and 
their advisers had relied on such assurances, and a retroactive 
reversal of that policy would damage the public's confidence in 
the self-assessment system. The brief argued further that the 
Freedom of Information Act did not require that the identifying 
information be made public. In taking this position, the Institute 
was not advocating governmental secrecy or opposing publica­
tion of the private letter rulings but was attempting to forestall 
retroactive identification of the parties involved.
The district court ruled in November 1975 that the private 
letter rulings must be disclosed but conceded that "decisions on 
appropriate deletions to be made in the vast number of docu­
ments sought herein must be made by the Internal Revenue
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Service and, eventually, reviewed by this Court where neces­
sary." Although the court granted a stay in the proceedings to 
await the outcome of a related case, the private letter rulings 
were eventually made public with some deletions (determined 
administratively by the Internal Revenue Service).
Felix Kaufman v. Chief Judge Edelstein
A final case that surfaced in 1975 and resulted in the filing of a 
brief by the AICPA was Felix Kaufman v. Chief Judge David N. 
Edelstein. Mr. Kaufman, a partner and national director of man­
agement consulting at Coopers and Lybrand, sought to quash a 
subpoena to appear as an expert witness for the United States in 
an antitrust suit, United States v. I.B.M. Mr. Kaufman had no 
prior professional relationship with I.B.M. In a memorandum 
opinion, Judge Edelstein of the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York ruled that Mr. Kaufman was 
compelled to testify as an expert witness in the case. He based 
his ruling on the grounds that the testimony would be "highly 
productive and of assistance to the Court in the trial."
This ruling concerned all professionals since the decision 
articulated a lower standard than that long upheld in the courts: 
namely, whether the testimony of a particular witness is neces­
sary for disposition of a case. Without the higher standard, 
professionals could be forced almost indiscriminately to testify 
against their will as expert witnesses.
In January 1976 Mr. Kaufman filed a petition for a writ of 
mandamus in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 
seeking an order to Judge Edelstein to quash the subpoena. The 
Institute filed a supporting brief, arguing that a disinterested 
professional should be compelled to give expert testimony only 
if others of like qualifications are unavailable and the testimony 
is needed to reach a just result.
The petition was denied by the appellate court in April 1976, 
but the opinion was not completely clear about the standard it 
was applying in the denial. It concluded that the trial judge had 
not abused his right to exercise discretion and held that the 
district court had the power to issue a subpoena, at the request
of a party to civil litigation, requiring an expert to testify. It 
remains to be seen whether the sweeping nature of this opinion 
will be applied by district courts in the future.
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Touche Ross v. SEC
During this period the Institute received many other requests to 
participate in litigation as a friend of the court. The AICPA Board 
of Directors declined these requests because the cases did not 
involve issues of broad importance to the profession or because 
the facts were unfavorable. One case in which the Institute 
declined to participate is worth mentioning: Touche Ross & Co. v. 
Securities and Exchange Commission.
On October 12, 1976, Touche Ross and Company brought an 
action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York to enjoin the SEC from bringing a public administrative 
proceeding against the firm pursuant to SEC rule 2(e). The firm 
challenged the legality of rule 2(e) and the holding of public 
proceedings under it.
The SEC had long contended that it had implied authority 
under the securities statutes to sanction professionals, but this 
had not been tested in the courts prior to this case. Thus, the 
firm's complaint struck at the heart of the commission's authority 
to regulate accountants practicing before it.
The commission moved for dismissal of the case on the 
grounds that the petitioner had failed to exhaust its administra­
tive remedies by making a motion before the commission itself. 
The district court granted the commission's motion, and the firm 
filed an appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit. On May 10, 1979, the appellate court affirmed the 
decision of the lower court.
Shortly thereafter, Touche Ross agreed to a settlement under 
the rule 2(e) proceeding covered in Accounting Series Releases 
no. 153 and 153A. Among other things, the firm agreed not to 
seek judicial review of the appellate court decision and agreed 
to the performance of a peer review during 1979 under terms 
specified by the SEC.
Since the litigation was decided on procedural grounds, the 
legality of rule 2(e) remained untested. The Institute was ex­
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tremely wary of becoming involved in this issue, partly because 
it seemed politically unwise to be challenging the SEC's authority 
at a time when its support was vital to the Institute's attempts 
to forestall legislation that would impose additional regulation 
on the profession. Equally important was the fear that if the 
Touche Ross suit were successful it would almost certainly trigger 
new legislation to grant the SEC explicit authority to regulate the 
profession. Such legislation might prove to be more stringent 
than the existing implied authority. In short, the case appeared 
to be a no-win situation, and some observers faulted Touche 
Ross for subordinating the interests of the profession to its own 
immediate interests.
The AICPA was sympathetic, however, to the firm's objec­
tions to public proceedings. Public proceedings would improp­
erly damage the reputation of a respondent CPA firm that is 
ultimately exonerated of the charges brought against it. Although 
the dismissal of the case left this matter unsettled, the commis­
sion subsequently backed away from a policy of public proceed­
ings.
Edward S. Redington and SIPC v. Touche Ross &
Co.
The Institute did participate in a different case involving Touche 
Ross and Company, Edward S. Redington, Trustee and Securities 
Investor Protection Corporation v. Touche Ross & Co. This case 
involved the liquidation of a brokerage firm, Weis Securities, 
whose officers had allegedly executed a scheme to conceal the 
firm's dire financial condition and whose auditors were Touche 
Ross and Company. The trustee in the liquidation and the 
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) sued the audi­
tors for damages incurred by the customers of the brokerage firm 
on the grounds that the firm's erroneous financial statements 
prevented the SIPC from taking timely action to avoid customer 
losses.
The District Court of the Southern District of New York 
dismissed the case. The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, which reversed and remanded 
the case to the district court. Touche Ross then petitioned the
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U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari, which the Court granted. It 
was at this juncture that the AICPA filed an amicus curiae brief 
in support of the position taken by Touche Ross.
The legal question at issue was whether a private right of 
action for damages could be judicially implied under section 17(a) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in behalf of brokerage 
house customers against accountants in the absence of any 
allegation that the customers purchased or sold securities in 
reliance on the brokerage firm's financial statements. The appel­
late court had concluded that there was such an implied right, 
and this had far-reaching consequences for CPAs auditing all 
types of clients in addition to brokerage firms. In this instance 
the damages being claimed had been incurred not by investors 
in the audited firm but by its customers, and there was strong 
reason to doubt that section 17(a) was intended to cover such 
circumstances.
On June 18, 1979, the U.S. Supreme Court held that there 
was no implied private cause of action for damages under section 
17(a), thereby reversing the judgment of the appellate court. This 
represented an important victory for the profession in preventing 
a serious expansion in its exposure to legal liability.
Adams et al. v. Standard Knitting Mills and Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell and Co.
Another case in which the AICPA participated successfully was 
Adams et al. v. Standard Knitting Mills, in which Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell and Co. was a codefendant. Peat, Marwick had audited 
the financial statements of Chadbourne, a hosiery manufacturer, 
which were included in a proxy statement with respect to a 
merger with Standard Knitting Mills. The plaintiffs, in behalf of 
the shareholders of Standard Knitting Mills, sought compensa­
tion under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
and rule 10b-5 for damages incurred in connection with the 
merger. The grounds for the complaint were allegations that the 
auditors failed to comply with generally accepted auditing stand­
ards with an intent to deceive. Included among the charges was 
an allegation that the auditors had a duty to report deficiencies 
in Chadbourne's internal controls in the audit report.
On May 19, 1976, the U.S. District Court of the Eastern
District of Maryland found in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered 
the award of damages. Included in the district court's opinion 
was the conclusion that the auditors had acted "wilfully with 
intent to 'deceive' and 'manipulate' "  because they were aware 
of material weaknesses in Chadbourne's internal controls and 
failed to report them in their report on the financial statements. 
This clearly called for a response by the Institute since the 
profession had long contended that it was not responsible for 
auditing or reporting on internal accounting controls as a part of 
its reporting on audits of financial statements. Furthermore, the 
profession had consistently maintained that proper audits could 
be performed even though such controls might be lacking.
Peat, Marwick appealed the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit, and the AICPA filed an amicus curiae brief 
addressing the internal control issue. Fortunately, on May 2, 
1980, the appellate court reversed the district court decision on 
the issue of the auditing firm's liability. In doing so, the court 
acknowledged that auditors might bring weaknesses of internal 
accounting control to the attention of management but that they 
are not necessarily obligated to inform the stockholders. This 
was a particularly welcome result because the SEC had been 
pressuring the Institute to require its members to comment on 
internal accounting control weaknesses in their reports on audits 
of financial statements.
In July 1980, shortly after the appellate court's decision, the 
Institute's Auditing Standards Board issued Statement on Audit­
ing Standards no. 30, Reporting on Internal Accounting Control. The 
statement stopped well short of any obligation to report on 
internal accounting controls to shareholders in connection with 
audits of financial statements. However, in Statement on Audit­
ing Standards no. 20, issued in August 1977, the board's prede­
cessor committee had established a requirement to communicate 
to senior management and boards of directors or their audit 
committees material weaknesses in internal accounting controls 
detected during the course of audits of financial statements.
Cases Not Involving Accountants
On two occasions in 1980 the Institute sought permission to file 
briefs in support of petitions for writs of certiorari although
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accountants were not involved as participants in the cases. These 
cases involved interpretations of the liability sections of the 
securities statutes that had significant bearing on the profession's 
exposure to liability.
In Ross et al. v. A. H. Robins Company, Inc., et al. the interplay 
between sections 18 and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 was in dispute. This was important because section 18 
requires plaintiffs to prove that they relied on filings with the 
commission to sustain claims for damages, whereas under section 
10(b) such reliance is presumed if a material misrepresentation 
was established or the market price of publicly traded stock was 
affected.
In this case a district court dismissed an action under rule 
10b-5 on the grounds that the conduct could have involved a 
violation of section 18 and under such circumstances section 18 
provided the exclusive remedy. The U.S. court of appeals re­
versed this decision, and the AICPA sought permission to file a 
brief when the defendants petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to 
hear the case. A brief was not filed because the Court denied 
the defendant's petition for review.
A somewhat similar action occurred in Peter E. Aaron v. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, in which the question at issue 
was whether proof of scienter was necessary for the SEC to 
obtain an injunction against stock fraud. This question had been 
left open by the Hochfelder case, in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
determined that scienter was necessary to sustain damages under 
rule 10b-5. The issue was of concern to CPA firms because they 
had been the targets of numerous injunctive actions brought by 
the SEC during the 1970s. If proof of intent to defraud was 
necessary, it would be more difficult for the SEC to sustain such 
injunctive actions.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in 
March 1979 that the SEC need not prove scienter in its enforce­
ment actions. The Institute filed an amicus curiae brief with the 
U.S. Supreme Court when a writ of certiorari was granted in the 
case. The brief argued that under section 21(d) of the 1934 act 
the SEC was required to prove scienter to sustain an injunction 
restraining acts or practices in violation of section 10(b) and rule 
10b-5. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate 
court, contrary to the position taken by the AICPA.
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Effect of the Litigation
During the 1970s the Institute was only on the periphery of the 
litigation affecting accountants' liability, since its participation 
was not as a defendant but as a friend of the court in a relatively 
small number of lawsuits. The large national CPA firms, how­
ever, were defendants in literally hundreds of class-action and 
other civil-damage suits, which took a heavy toll in the diversion 
of partner time, legal fees, and rapid escalation in premiums and 
deductibles for liability insurance. Often, millions of dollars of 
damages were being claimed, and there was a real fear that one 
or more CPA firms might be bankrupted by the litigation.
The threat of severe financial damage and even bankruptcy 
caused CPA firms to tighten their policies and procedures to 
minimize the exposure to liability suits. New criteria for accept­
ance of clients, internal inspections of operating offices, inde­
pendent engagement reviews, and heavy emphasis on liability 
risks in partner and staff training programs were among the 
steps taken by the firms. Acquisition and retention of clients 
became less important, and avoidance of lawsuits became an 
urgent priority. The concern about litigation led CPA firms to 
exhibit a better balance between service to clients and protection 
of the users of financial statements, a basic shift that was probably 
the most important development of the decade.
The lawsuits emphasized that the profession was indeed 
"public." This message was greatly reinforced when Congress 
carried out its inquiries about the profession and the SEC prom­
ised to more vigorously fulfill its oversight responsibilities. By 
that time, the CPA firms had already taken the steps necessary 
to avoid exposure to new litigation and had become acutely 
aware of their responsibilities under the securities acts. If any 
vestiges of complacency remained, they were eradicated by the 
actions of Congress and the SEC.
The profession would no doubt have preferred to avoid the 
painful legal liability experiences encountered during the 1970s. 
In retrospect, however, they helped the profession to reach a 
maturity that was necessary to meet the demands of a changing 
society. It was fortunate that the profession was able to adjust 
quickly, before the damage to its credibility became great enough 
to destroy public reliance on independent auditors.
CHAPTER 3
The Federal Government 
Examines the Profession
Mu c h  of the profession's attention during the 1970s was centered on developments in Washington involving prin­
cipally Congress, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
General Accounting Office, the Internal Revenue Service, the 
Department of Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission.
A More Effective Washington Office
At the outset of the decade, the Institute's Washington office 
was ill-prepared to cope with the increased governmental pres­
sures. The office was a small space shared with the National 
Automotive Dealers Association and located far from the center 
of governmental activities. The director of the Washington office 
devoted most of his energy to monitoring proposed legislation 
and regulatory agency rules that might affect the profession. He 
issued a steady stream of memorandums urging the AICPA's 
officers to act on virtually every new development, however 
trivial. His efforts proved ineffective, largely because of the lack 
of discrimination and the high volume of alerts, and partly 
because those officers were located in New York and were 
burdened with other duties.
As a result, the Institute could not cope effectively with 
legislative proposals that threatened the profession's interests. 
For example, the Institute failed in its attempt to forestall legis­
lation creating the Cost Accounting Standards Board to establish 
uniform standards of accounting for the costs of negotiated 
defense contracts.
It became increasingly clear that the Washington office needed
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a strong director with considerable authority who would act in 
conjunction with committees that worked closely with the various 
agencies and branches of government. Marshall Armstrong, who 
was then serving as AICPA president, ordered the staff to 
prepare a summary of all of the Institute's Washington activities 
for study by the board of directors. This document was prepared 
and discussed during the course of 1971. Walter Oliphant, who 
succeeded Mr. Armstrong as president in October 1971, ap­
pointed a special committee to develop recommendations to 
improve the effectiveness of the Washington office.
Wholesale changes were implemented during the first half of 
1972. Gilbert Simonetti, Jr., director of the federal taxation divi­
sion, moved from the New York office to head the new effort as 
vice president in charge of federal government relations. Other 
experienced staff members were also transferred to Washington, 
and the Washington office received responsibility for staffing the 
federal taxation division and all committees and task forces 
maintaining liaison with the various governmental agencies. The 
office was moved to 1620 I Street, less than two blocks from the 
White House and readily accessible to all major governmental 
activities affecting the profession. The staff was quickly expanded 
to a total of about twenty-five, structured to cover the many 
segments of the executive and legislative branches of govern­
ment. A new federal government relations executive committee 
was appointed, along with subcommittees to deal with the 
General Accounting Office, federally assisted programs, and 
several other special areas of government. The office began 
issuing a weekly newsletter to report concisely on new devel­
opments in the federal government that had a bearing on the 
profession.
By 1973 a completely revamped operation was functioning. 
Mr. Simonetti was making good progress toward establishing 
the necessary relationships to obtain vital information on a timely 
basis and to exercise influence in behalf of the profession. The 
capability of the office improved steadily during the following 
years, and I, as the Institute's new full-time, paid president, 
began devoting an increasing portion of my attention to the 
growing demands in Washington.
Early in 1976, the AICPA Washington office entered a tem­
porary hiatus when Mr. Simonetti left to join the Washington
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office of Price Waterhouse and Company. The firm's offer to Mr. 
Simonetti reflected the fact that many of the largest CPA firms 
had awakened to the need for strong representation in Washing­
ton and were seeking candidates for their staffs.
A special committee was appointed to seek a replacement. 
After an extensive search, the committee selected Theodore A. 
Barreaux, who was then director of congressional relations for 
the chairman of the SEC. Although only thirty-three years old, 
Mr. Barreaux brought to his new position a wealth of contacts, 
expertise, and political judgment that were to prove invaluable 
in the succeeding years. Mr. Barreaux became vice president for 
federal government relations on May 10, 1976.
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Increased Involvement With the Executive Branch
The profession had long maintained close relations with the SEC, 
the IRS, and the General Accounting Office, but its contacts with 
the White House and the departments of the executive branch 
had been minimal, and its dealings with Congress had been 
confined to the expression of views on proposed tax legislation. 
This began to change in the early part of the decade when events 
forced the Institute to become more active.
Changes at the SEC led to greater interest in the profession. 
Andrew Barr, chief accountant of the SEC, retired after many 
years of service and was replaced by John C. Burton. In addition, 
for the first time a CPA commissioner was appointed: James 
Needham, the partner in charge of the New York office of A. M. 
Pullen and Company. The new lineup took a strong interest in 
the profession's performance and launched several initiatives to 
improve the quality of financial reporting.
Maurice Stans, a former president of the AICPA, had become 
the commerce secretary under President Nixon. Mr. Stans ar­
ranged for the AICPA to receive a government grant to promote 
the ownership of businesses by minority groups. Also, when the 
Nixon administration imposed wage and price controls on the 
economy, Mr. Stans enlisted the aid of the Institute to form a 
group of CPAs to assist with the development of control guide­
lines.
This trend continued when William Seidman, head of Seid­
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man and Seidman, joined President Ford's administration as a 
White House economic advisor. The Institute maintained close 
relations with Mr. Seidman and consulted with him on various 
matters.
Other steps were taken to maintain good relations with the 
White House. A group of leading CPAs participated in a White 
House conference on national issues. CPAs were recruited in 
every state to act as advisors to both parties in the presidential 
election campaign in 1976. A committee of CPA experts was 
appointed to advise President Carter on certain personal income 
tax matters. Some of these activities were coordinated through 
Richard Harden, CPA, a member of the AICPA and a prominent 
member of the White House staff. Working relations were also 
established with the new Reagan administration.
Congress and Accounting Standards for Oil and 
Gas Companies
Although relations with the executive branch improved, relations 
with Congress became ever more troublesome. In the early and 
mid 1970s, for the first time, Congress and the profession became 
embroiled over matters other than tax legislation. The major 
factor during this period was the drive to reform the securities 
markets, which resulted from the rash of broker-dealer failures 
beginning in the late 1960s. The first serious conflict, though, 
had its origin in the energy crisis of 1973 and 1974. The House 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, which oversees 
the SEC, began investigations of the oil and gas industry. 
Subcommittee Chairman John Moss discovered, to his dismay, 
that the major oil companies were not using uniform accounting 
standards in preparing their financial statements, making finan­
cial statistics for the industry unreliable.
On June 24, 1975, during the late stages of the development 
of the Energy Conservation and Oil Policy Act of 1975 (H. R. 
7014), Congressman Moss introduced an amendment to correct 
the lack of accounting uniformity. The amendment mandated 
that the General Accounting Office establish uniform accounting 
standards for oil and gas companies and perform audits of 
companies engaged in the petroleum industry.
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This action caused great alarm at the AICPA, the FASB, and 
the SEC. The Institute wrote a letter of protest to Mr. Moss on 
July 1 4 , 1975, and enlisted the assistance of the state CPA societies 
in contacting the various members of the House Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce Committee, which was considering the leg­
islation. The FASB, SEC, and GAO also filed objections to the 
amendment.
The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, which finally 
emerged from a conference committee on October 31, 1975, 
contained few of the objectionable features of the Moss amend­
ment. It did, however, direct the SEC to see that uniform 
accounting standards were established within twenty-four months 
for the oil and gas industry. The act authorized the SEC to rely 
on the FASB for this purpose but required the commission to 
seek public comment on any proposal before taking final action.
The Institute emerged from this skirmish with a qualified 
victory, but it was only the beginning of a continuing series of 
encounters with Congressman Moss and other members of 
Congress.
Congressional Oversight of the SEC
During this period the House Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations conducted a study of federal regulatory agencies, 
including the SEC, which touched upon corporate accountability 
and accounting and auditing matters. In conducting its hearings 
in the spring of 1976, the subcommittee invited a single CPA 
witness, Professor Abraham J. Briloff, to testify on accounting 
and auditing matters. Professor Briloff was a well-known critic 
of the profession with a knack for colorful phrasemaking. His 
testimony before the subcommittee was consistent with previous 
attacks on the effectiveness of the FASB and the work of the 
large CPA firms.
Upon learning of Professor Briloff s testimony, Theodore 
Barreaux and I met with a leading congressional staff member, 
Carolyn Emigh. We demanded to know why no other repre­
sentative of the profession had been invited to testify and 
suggested that the subcommittee was confusing accounting
standards with auditing standards and the responsibilities of 
auditors to detect fraud.
Nevertheless, the subcommittee refused to allow testimony 
by additional witnesses. Ms. Emigh blamed the AICPA for not 
responding to the published announcement of the subcommittee 
hearings. Although she was technically correct, the announce­
ment was misleading in that it related to matters of SEC over­
sight. Furthermore, it was inexcusable for the subcommittee not 
to seek other viewpoints.
The subcommittee issued its final report, Federal Regulation 
and Regulatory Reforms, in October 1976. Chapter 2 of the report, 
dealing generally with the SEC and corporate accountability, 
contained two extremely objectionable statements relating to the 
setting of accounting standards: "The FASB has accomplished 
virtually nothing toward resolving fundamental accounting prob­
lems," and "Considering the FASB's record, the SEC's continued 
reliance on the private accounting profession is questionable."
In a seven-page letter to Congressman Moss, FASB Chairman 
Marshall S. Armstrong objected to these statements and criticized 
the testimony of Professor Briloff. He also complained of not 
being given an opportunity to appear before the subcommittee 
to provide a rebuttal. Predictably, Mr. Armstrong's strongly 
worded letter drew no concessions from Congressman Moss. 
Professor Briloff responded in a speech on November 4, 1976, 
which was equally uncompromising.
The AICPA decided that entering this fray would not be very 
productive and elected to await a response to the subcommittee 
from the SEC.
Mr. Moss summarized the chapter 2 recommendations in a 
speech that he delivered on July 25, 1977:
Our report included recommendations that publicly owned corpo­
rations adopt and enforce codes of conduct; that independent 
auditors attest to the quality of internal controls and the quality of 
enforcement of those controls; that corporate boards review and 
approve the corporation's code of business conduct and system of 
internal controls; that corporations have audit committees, and that 
such committees have available to them independent advisors.
We also concluded that the SEC should play a more active role 
. . . with respect to the setting of accounting principles and the 
establishment of auditing standards. My Subcommittee concluded 
that the SEC should prescribe a framework within which the private
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sector would set principles and standards. The SEC would establish 
parameters within which the private sector determines accounting 
principles and sets auditing standards. The SEC would suggest 
priorities based upon national and international needs. And the 
SEC would exercise in a much more vigorous fashion its oversight 
of proposed principles and standards and the operation of those 
already in place, exercising its right of pre-emption when necessary.
Mr. Moss went on to explain why his subcommittee had 
become concerned about the profession:
Congressional interest in accounting has built up over the better 
part of a decade. It began with the great scandals that have shaken 
our country over the past few years—Equity Funding; Penn Central; 
Four Seasons Nursing Homes; and National Student Marketing 
readily leap to mind. In all of those situations publicly-owned 
companies went bankrupt and caused substantial harm to investors 
with no prior warning from their independent auditors that any­
thing was amiss. Those of us in Congress began to wonder where 
the auditors were during the period those companies were headed 
for their falls.
Interest was further aroused as we began to study particular 
industries and experienced difficulty working with the accounting 
methods used. In the securities industry, for example, we found 
certain capital rules that allowed firms to arrive at 8 or 9 different 
net capital ratios depending upon the methods they employed. This 
helped lead to the demise of over 100 brokerage firms in the late 
1960s with resultant harm to their customers. We felt compelled to 
legislate in this area in the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975.
As the energy problem became clearer to us, we discovered that 
we were unable to obtain reliable data concerning companies in­
volved in the energy industry. As a result, I proposed a provision 
in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act calling for certain uniform 
accounting procedures.
But the largest impetus to study the accounting profession came 
with the disclosure of the illegal and improper payments made by 
some of our nation's largest and most prestigious corporations. 
Bribery, illegal political contributions, kickbacks, slush funds and 
secret bank accounts were matters that independent auditors either 
did not discover or did discover but chose not to publicly disclose.
Correspondence between the SEC and Mr. Moss subsequently 
revealed that the impact of the report would be more moderate 
than was initially feared. Nevertheless, it was sufficient to stim­
ulate great concern at the SEC and the AICPA about the potential 
for unwanted legislation, and the report ultimately led to further 
subcommittee hearings on the profession early in 1978.
Corporate Governance and the Improper Payments 
Scandal
Meanwhile, also in the spring of 1976, the Senate Commerce 
Committee conducted hearings on corporate rights and respon­
sibilities. The hearings focused on proposals contained in the 
Ralph Nader organization report, Federal Chartering of Corporations, 
a portion of which dealt with the appointment and rotation of 
auditors. On June 16, 1976, the AICPA testified in opposition to 
mandatory rotation of auditing firms and provided an analysis 
of the nature of auditor independence.
The hearings did not lead to proposed legislation, but they 
were indicative of the concern about corporate responsibilities 
and behavior that had resulted from recent scandals regarding 
improper corporate payments. The scandals surfaced in 1974 
when the Watergate investigations revealed that illegal political 
contributions had been made by some of the largest blue chip 
corporations. Then came the discovery of unrecorded slush funds, 
secret bank accounts, and other devices to hide foreign and 
domestic bribes and kickbacks by over 200 major companies. The 
cry went up, "Where were the auditors?" and the financial press 
had a field day criticizing the corporate world and the profession.
The profession was ill-prepared to respond because it had 
been generally unaware that the practices existed. Most of the 
improper transactions went unrecorded and involved the collu­
sion of top company officials. Such transactions are difficult, if 
not impossible, to detect in a normal audit of financial statements. 
Those transactions that were recorded generally were misclassi­
fied in the books and were not sufficiently material in amount to 
be caught in the net of the auditor's tests. Even when they were 
detected, no action was taken because the amounts involved had 
no material effect on the company's financial statements. Unfor­
tunately, the public was unwilling to accept these explanations.
The SEC, a presidential task force, and Congress all scrambled 
to find a legislative panacea to prevent such corporate misbehav­
ior in the future. Senators William Proxmire, Harrison Williams, 
and Frank Church and Congressman Bob Eckhardt were among 
the first to propose specific legislation, while the SEC worked 
feverishly to cope with the problem through investigations, 
enforcement proceedings, and a program of amnesty for corpo­
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rations making voluntary disclosures. In a May 12, 1976, report 
to the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, 
the SEC proposed its own legislation to amend section 13(b) of 
the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act. This proposal provided 
that it would be a criminal offense for registrants to perform 
certain acts relating to internal control systems, the maintenance 
of books and records, the falsification of books and records, or 
the misleading of independent auditors.
The accounting language of all the initial legislative proposals 
was so vague and sweeping that AICPA officers opposed the 
bills. Nevertheless, the Senate passed a composite bill containing 
the SEC's accounting provisions on September 15, 1976, by a 
vote of eighty-six to zero. The bill died in the last days of the 
ninety-fourth Congress when the House Subcommittee on Con­
sumer Protection and Finance failed to secure a quorum to act 
on a companion bill. This represented a temporary victory for 
the AICPA, which was seeking a delay in order to modify the 
language of the bills. By this time it was clear that some form of 
legislation eventually would be adopted.
In January 1977 Senator Proxmire introduced a new bill 
(S.305), which again included the offensive accounting language 
proposed by the SEC. The AICPA's representatives tried once 
again to have the accounting provisions deleted. The attempt 
failed; however, over the strong objections of the SEC, they 
gained the support of Senator Proxmire and ultimately Congress­
man Eckhardt for suggested modifications in the accounting 
section of the bill. These modifications were the only ones to be 
adopted by the conference committee and incorporated in the 
final bill, which was enacted early in December 1977. Thus, the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 omitted any reference to 
either the falsification of books and records or misrepresentations 
to independent auditors. The act incorporated the AICPA's 
suggestions for the language dealing with systems of internal 
control and the maintenance of books and records.
The new legislation caused widespread fears that the account­
ing provisions would result in criminal charges without regard 
to intent or traditional concepts of materiality. Because the 
appropriateness of internal accounting control systems is largely 
a judgmental matter and clerical errors in accounting records are 
inevitable, it was feared that hordes of corporations and individ­
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uals would be convicted of violating the new law. To make 
matters worse, the SEC adopted rules, effective March 23, 1979, 
which made it clear that falsification of books and records and 
misrepresentations to auditors by officers and directors would 
not be tolerated.
Fortunately, the SEC exercised restraint in applying the new 
law. It was invoked in only a few cases, which involved other, 
more egregious acts. In January 1981 Chairman Williams indi­
cated that the SEC would apply the law sparingly and only in 
combination with other violations of the securities acts.
This was where the matter stood early in 1981. The practical 
effect of the legislation was to generate engagements of CPA 
firms to review and report on corporate systems of internal 
accounting controls, but the real significance of the scandals was 
the damage done to the reputation of corporate officials and 
auditors. Investigations of the profession and demands for re­
forms in corporate governance continued throughout the late 
1970s.
Another response to the scandals was the action of the 
Internal Revenue Service in April 1976: The service instructed its 
auditors to require corporate officers and independent auditors 
to answer eleven questions designed to elicit information leading 
to disallowance of deductions for income tax purposes. The 
profession strongly resisted this provision on the grounds that 
clients would become less cooperative and would thereby impair 
accountants' ability to conduct independent audits. After a series 
of meetings and letters, the IRS agreed to modify its policy and 
to accept a carefully worded representation by the audit partner 
in charge that he knew of no improper payments based on his 
best recollection, without referral to the audit working papers. 
The IRS and the larger CPA firms gradually worked out solutions 
to the problem on a case-by-case basis, and eventually the matter 
was resolved by concessions from both sides.
Metcalf Subcommittee Study of the Accounting 
Establishment
The loss of credibility resulting from the improper payments 
scandals helped motivate the Senate Subcommittee on Govern­
ment Operations, chaired by Senator Lee Metcalf, to conduct a
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study of the profession in 1976 and 1977. On May 7, 1976, 
Senator Metcalf sent a letter to the AICPA requesting answers to 
a number of questions about the Institute and its activities. This 
was followed by a questionnaire directed to CPA firms and 
others who had extensive knowledge about the profession.
During the following months the subcommittee's staff gath­
ered a great deal of data about the profession. On December 7,
1976, an advance copy of a 1,760-page staff report entitled The 
Accounting Establishment was released to the AICPA. The report 
subsequently was released to the public and was almost as 
damaging to the profession as the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor was to the U.S. Navy in 1941. In general, the facts and 
data contained in the report were accurate, but the conclusions 
drawn from the information were often either greatly exaggerated 
or completely off the mark.
In his covering letter, Senator Metcalf stated the following:
In particular, I am disturbed by two of the study's major findings. 
The first is the extraordinary manner in which the SEC has insisted 
upon delegating its public authority and responsibilities on account­
ing matters to private groups with obvious self-interest in the 
resolution of such matters. The second is the alarming lack of 
independence and lack of dedication to public protection shown by 
the large accounting firms which perform the key function of 
independently certifying the financial information reported by major 
corporations to the public.
Based upon its analysis of all the information reviewed during 
the course of this study, the subcommittee staff has prepared several 
recommendations which are designed to restore confidence in the 
integrity and usefulness of corporate financial reports, and help 
fulfill the intent of the Federal securities laws. I believe these 
recommendations serve as sound guidelines for action by Congress 
to achieve necessary reforms of accounting practices.
The report contained sixteen recommendations for reforms 
that would transfer complete control of the profession's affairs 
to the federal government. According to the subcommittee's 
staff, either the General Accounting Office or a separate board, 
similar to the Cost Accounting Standards Board, should establish 
financial accounting standards for publicly owned companies; 
Congress should establish comprehensive accounting objectives 
and abolish percentage-of-completion, inflation, and normalized 
accounting methods.
The report suggested that auditing standards should be set
by the GAO, the SEC, or federal statute and that the federal 
government should define the responsibilities of independent 
auditors to require assurance on the fairness of financial state­
ments and on the completeness and accuracy of corporate rec­
ords. If independent auditors cannot provide such assurance, 
the government should seek alternative methods of performing 
that function. The report suggested that the SEC should pro­
mulgate and enforce standards of conduct for auditors practicing 
before it and that it should specifically prohibit direct or indirect 
representation of clients' interests and performance of manage­
ment advisory services for clients. The federal government should 
employ audit firms only to conduct audits and not for manage­
ment advisory services.
The report recommended that Congress consider ways to 
increase competition between CPA firms, whether by requiring 
the rotation of auditors or by having more than one firm on the 
ballot for election by shareholders of SEC registrants. The Federal 
Trade Commission and the Department of Justice were urged to 
investigate the possibility of antitrust violations in the supply of 
accounting and auditing services and to act to relieve excessive 
concentration in the supply of such services to publicly owned 
corporations.
The report also urged that the fifteen largest CPA firms be 
required to file annual financial statements with the SEC and 
that periodic quality reviews of CPA firms auditing publicly 
owned companies should be made by the GAO, the SEC, or a 
special audit inspection agency. It was proposed that the SEC 
should impose equal sanctions on large and small CPA firms 
and that Congress should enact legislation to repeal the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in the Hochfelder case, which limited 
the circumstances under which auditors would be legally liable. 
Finally, the report recommended that federal employees should 
not serve on AICPA committees.
Anyone familiar with the profession will recognize that these 
recommendations struck at the heart of virtually everything that 
CPAs viewed as crucial.
The AICPA was in the forefront of the profession's reactions. 
On January 17, 1977, Chairman Chetkovich released a statement 
to the press disputing the conclusions of the staff report and 
suggesting that the recommended changes would impair rather
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than improve the quality of financial reporting. Other steps were 
taken in anticipation of the subcommittee hearings, which were 
expected to be held in April: The Institute retained several special 
legal counsels whose congressional experience could prove help­
ful; visits were paid to key members of the Senate Government 
Operations Committee, including Senators Jackson, Nunn, and 
Percy, to discuss the AICPA's concerns about the staff report; A. 
A. Sommer, Jr., a prominent securities lawyer and a former SEC 
commissioner, was engaged to help draft an in-depth response 
to The Accounting Establishment.
Senator Nunn requested the AICPA's and the Financial Ac­
counting Foundation's comments on the subcommittee staff's 
report and recommendations. Accordingly, on March 28, 1977, 
the Institute sent Senator Nunn a summary letter and an accom­
panying memorandum of comment, both of which were repro­
duced in a pamphlet distributed to all members of the AICPA. 
The pamphlet, entitled The Institute Responds, contained a ringing 
defense of the profession's record, as well as arguments against 
adoption of the subcommittee staff's recommendations.
Metcalf Subcommittee Hearings
The AICPA benefited from certain other steps that it had taken 
in 1976. Experience with Congressman Moss had convinced the 
Institute officers and board of directors that they should improve 
their ability to deal with Congress. A program had been orga­
nized through the state societies to identify CPAs who had close 
personal acquaintance with key members of Congress and who 
could be called upon to communicate the profession's views. 
This became known as the key person program. Beginning in 
January 1977, AICPA staff members would meet annually with 
coordinators from the state societies to inform them of develop­
ments at the federal level and to enlist their assistance in dealing 
with Congress. The AICPA board also approved the establish­
ment of a political action committee (PAC), a political fund­
raising entity authorized by newly enacted laws governing fed­
eral elections. An initial appeal to AICPA members yielded over 
$60,000 to be used for contributions to the re-election campaigns 
of incumbent members of Congress who served on committees
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having some relationship to matters involving the profession. 
Although the funds were used sparingly, they proved very useful 
in recognizing members of Congress who were sympathetic to 
the profession's views. Finally, because it had become apparent 
that quick action was often necessary with respect to congres­
sional initiatives, a special committee was formed to act in behalf 
of the board of directors when an issue could not await convening 
of the board.
All of these precautionary steps were brought into play when 
the Metcalf subcommittee held hearings in April, May, and June
1977. The first witness was Congressman Moss, followed by 
Professor Chatov from the School of Management, State Univer­
sity of New York at Buffalo, both of whom sharply criticized the 
profession. The other witnesses on the first day were the AICPA's 
representatives, including Messrs. Chetkovich, Barreaux, and 
myself. The following individuals testified during the course of 
the hearings:
M a r sh a ll  S. A rm strong , FASB
A lva  O. W ay  III, FA F Board of Trustees
G ordon  A n d er sen , CPA, Veltkamp, Dore & Co.
N o rm a n  J. E llio t t , CPA, N orm an  J. Elliott & Co.
Robert  A. Sa t in , CPA, Local Practitioners Action Forum 
Th o m as  S. W a tso n , Jr ., CPA, Watson, Rice & Co.
Jo h n  C. B ieg ler , CPA, Price Waterhouse & Co.
Jam es  F itzpa tr ic k , E sq ., A rnold & P orter  
Robert  H a l f , Robert H alf Personnel A gencies, Inc. 
Th eo d o re Ba r r y , T heodore Barry & A ssociates  
W il l ia m  R. M et t e , Jr ., C PA , A lexander G rant & Co.
J. B. D r esselh a u s , CPA, Associated Accounting Firms Inter­
national
Irving  Kellogg , C PA , Kellogg & A n d erson  
N o rm a n  H . Stavisky , C PA , Stavisky, Shapiro & W hyte  
W a lt er  E. H a n so n , C PA , P eat, M arw ick, M itchell & Co. 
Ru d o lph  J. P a ssero , N ational Society of Public A ccou n tan ts  
C h a r les  T. H o rn g ren , C PA , A m erican A ccounting A ssn.
T. R. L il l e y , Financial Analysts Fedn.
C h a r les  C . H o r n bo stel , Financial Executives Inst.
W il l ia m  M. Y o ung , Jr ., National Assn. of Accountants 
H a rvey  Ka p n ic k , CPA, Arthur Andersen & Co.
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Eli M a so n , CPA, Mason & Co.
W il l ia m  S. Ka n a g a , CPA, Arthur Young & Co.
N o rm an  A u er b a c h , C PA , C oopers & Lybrand  
E lm er  B. Sta a ts , C ost A ccou n tin g Standards Board  
A r th u r  Sc h o en h a u t , C ost A ccounting Standards Board  
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The testimony of Chairman Williams and the other SEC 
commissioners was significant because it staked out a position 
that simultaneously placed severe pressure on the profession to 
initiate changes and urged Congress to defer consideration of 
regulatory legislation. To persuade Congress to hold off, the 
commission had to promise that it would become more aggressive 
in its oversight, which was a tacit admission that it had been lax 
in meeting its oversight responsibility. Chairman Williams dis­
cussed the subjects of independence, accounting and auditing 
standards, and discipline and suggested how improvements 
could be accomplished. His testimony is summarized in the 
following quotation:
The crux of the Commission testimony this morning has several 
dimensions:
1. Time is running and the need for substantive progress is great.
2. It is desirable that the establishment of accounting and auditing 
standards continue to be primarily a private sector responsibility 
with active SEC oversight. No one knows the problems better 
than the profession, or is able to deal with them if it is motivated 
to do so.
3. The Commission has not always been diligent in pressing to 
secure timely address and resolution of accounting issues. It 
intends to pursue a vigorous program in the future as it has for 
the past period of years.
Mr. Williams concluded by indicating that the commission 
would submit an annual report (beginning July 1, 1978) to the 
subcommittee analyzing the progress being made by the com­
mission and the profession. The following statement is taken 
from the commission's written submission:
Some witnesses have suggested that a legislative restructuring of 
the accounting profession, designed to place it more closely under 
federal control, is necessary. While this may ultimately prove to be 
the case, there are certain specific steps which the profession and 
the Commission should take, within the framework of the profes­
sion's present structure, which could obviate the need for increased 
federal regulation. Accordingly, the Commission recommends that 
the profession be given some fixed period of time, probably one 
year, to initiate positive and effective action. At that time, Congress 
should review whether the profession has demonstrated the capa­
bility to unite voluntarily behind constructive responses to the 
challenges it faces or whether legislative action is necessary.
The CPAs who appeared before the subcommittee were far 
from uniform in their positions. Most opposed portions of the 
staff recommendations, and nearly all suggested changes in the 
profession. In general, representatives of the smaller firms agreed 
with the report's conclusions that the large CPA firms controlled 
the AICPA and the profession, and they complained about what 
they considered to be unfair competitive practices. Representa­
tives of large firms tended to dispute the staff's conclusions about 
the profession and appeared to vie with each other in suggesting 
programs for improvement. Unfortunately, no consistent pattern 
of recommended changes arose; by the time the hearings had 
concluded, the CPA witnesses had suggested virtually every 
imaginable reform.
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The most surprising testimony was that of John Biegler, head 
of Price Waterhouse, who called for legislation to require CPA 
firms practicing before the SEC to formally register with the 
commission. Such firms would also be required to have a quality 
review every three years and to file annual financial statements 
with the SEC. Under the proposal, the requirements for smaller 
firms could be made less stringent, and information relating to 
the business affairs of clients would be confidential.
This proposal outraged other large firms, and the Institute's 
officers and directors were almost equally dismayed. Furthermore, 
most firms objected to further control by the SEC, and several of 
them were adamantly opposed to making public their financial 
statements.
Some observers suspected that the Price Waterhouse proposals 
were partially motivated by the fact that the firm had been singled 
out for criticism by the subcommittee's staff because it had audited 
several large companies that had made improper payments. Those 
who were closely acquainted with the firm's top partners, how­
ever, were convinced that the firm sincerely believed that the 
proposed legislation was the best long-run solution and had a 
good chance of being adopted without unwanted amendments— 
a view apparently based on the premise that any voluntary 
regulatory program would prove ineffective.
The testimony of Harvey Kapnick, head of Arthur Andersen 
and Company, was also somewhat surprising. He suggested that 
the profession be given a year to develop a better self-regulatory 
system within the framework of the AICPA. Previously, Mr. 
Kapnick had been quite critical of the Institute, and he was 
generally regarded as a maverick bent on taking unilateral action. 
His public pledge to support a new effort within the Institute 
was a welcome note at a time when it was badly needed.
The Profession's Response
As the hearings continued in May and June, it was clear that the 
profession could not stand pat, since the risk that both the SEC 
and members of Congress would conclude that legislative reforms 
were necessary was too great. Furthermore, nearly all the large 
firms had implied that changes were necessary.
By the end of May, Chairman Chetkovich and I had sifted
through the many recommendations and had developed a com­
prehensive program of proposed changes. Included in that pro­
gram were proposals to establish two divisions for CPA firms 
within the AICPA, to add three public members to the Institute's 
Board of Directors, to open meetings of the AICPA senior 
committees and Council to the public, and to mandate the 
publication of names of members found guilty of violating the 
code of professional ethics. Other proposals would repeal pro­
hibitions on advertising and on employment offers to staff 
members of other CPA firms.
By October 1977 a program of far-reaching changes had been 
approved by the Institute Council, and the profession was 
embarked on a course that had the qualified approval of the 
SEC. Congressman Moss, however, remained unconvinced; in 
speeches and correspondence, he expressed strong reservations 
about many aspects of the new SEC practice section of the 
division for CPA firms and continued to push for a greater role 
for the SEC. On November 16, 1977, Mr. Moss summed up his 
reservations in a speech before an Intermountain Accounting 
Seminar in Utah:
I am on record as having stated that I would hold Subcommittee 
hearings this fall if I were not satisfied with the results of the AICPA 
Annual Meeting. It is clear that I am not totally satisfied. However, 
I have been advised by the AICPA that between now and January 
the Executive Committee, the Peer Review Committee, and the 
Public Oversight Board and their respective staffs will be in place 
for both the SEC and Private Practice Sections of the Division. In 
addition, their rules and regulations should also be in place. I will 
expect a visible trail of progress to be evident at that time and, 
consequently, I have rescheduled my hearings for late January.
But the final countdown is on. If after our January hearings I 
am not convinced that the AICPA's self-regulatory measures will 
be effective and the SEC is not actively and aggressively exercising 
its legislative authority to monitor the accounting profession and 
protect the public, I shall not hesitate to introduce the legislation I 
have drafted that would require them to do so.
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This statement was made shortly after the report of the Metcalf 
subcommittee was issued on November 4, 1977, summarizing
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the conclusions and recommendations reached on the basis of 
the hearings held during the preceding May and June. The 
report, concluding that smaller CPA firms have interests and 
needs that often differ greatly from those of larger firms, claimed 
to apply only to that segment of the profession serving publicly 
owned corporations. It recommended that there be "sensible 
provisions to ease compliance with standards and procedures for 
accounting firms with only a few publicly owned corporate 
clients."
The report concluded that an organization of accounting firms 
should be established, comprising all firms that serve, or want 
to serve, as independent auditors for publicly held corporations. 
Membership would be mandatory. The member firms' annual 
financial statements would be made public, and teams including 
nonaccountants would conduct quality reviews of member firms 
every three years. Reports on the quality reviews would be 
supplied to the SEC, which would be responsible for oversight 
of the organization. The organization itself would have the power 
to impose sanctions for substandard performance. Disciplinary 
proceedings against member firms should not await the outcome 
of litigation.
The report recommended several actions relating to auditing. 
A new standard-setting process should be established, featuring 
due process, a broad representation of interests, and sufficient 
staff and funds. The standard auditor's report should be im­
proved, and the partner in charge of an audit should sign the 
report. Auditors should be held legally liable for simple negli­
gence, with no limit to the amount of their liability. Among other 
things, auditors would be expected to monitor the abuse of 
perquisites by corporate executives and report all illegal activities 
to audit committees and appropriate government authorities; all 
publicly held corporations would be required to have independ­
ent audit committees. Finally, audit personnel should be rotated 
from year to year.
The report proposed measures to increase auditor independ­
ence. It proposed confining management advisory services to 
computer and systems analyses that are necessary for improving 
internal control procedures and suggested that the SEC should 
impose restrictions in this area. In addition, the report maintained 
that audit firms should not place their employees with clients.
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The subcommittee concluded that the profession's restraints 
on advertising should be removed, and it recommended the 
establishment of professional schools of accounting.
The report concluded with these words: "The amount of time 
for achieving reforms is not unlimited. Therefore, the subcom­
mittee expects the accounting profession and the SEC to act in a 
timely manner to implement the policy goals in this report."
Many of the subcommittee's recommendations were strongly 
opposed by the Institute's governing bodies. There was grave 
concern within the profession that the Moss subcommittee would 
use the report as a form of checklist during its hearings in 
January 1978. In response, the AICPA decided to prepare a 
progress report emphasizing all the initiatives that it had taken. 
Accordingly, Report of Progress—The Institute Acts on Recommen­
dations for Improvements in the Profession was published on January 
30, 1978. This was submitted to the Moss subcommittee and 
included as a part of the record of its hearings held in January, 
February, and March 1978.
Moss Subcommittee Hearings
Hearings began on January 30, 1978. The witnesses on the first 
day were as follows:
Sen a to r  P er c y , Metcalf subcommittee 
Sta n ley  Sco tt , AICPA 
W a l l a c e  E. O lso n , AICPA 
W a lt er  H a n so n , SEC practice section
Do n ald  N e e b e s , Peer review committee of SEC practice section 
Jo h n  M cC lo y , Public oversight board 
Ra y  Ga r r et t , Jr ., Public oversight board 
H a rvey  Ka p n ic k , Arthur Andersen & Co.
It was a cold January day, and the draft from windows behind 
the hearing panel apparently aggravated the condition of Mr. 
Moss, who was recovering from a bout with influenza. Those 
familiar with Mr. Moss's normal aggressiveness attributed his 
uncharacteristic docility on that day to the state of his health. 
Indeed, he became ill and failed to appear on the next two days, 
when the hearings were chaired by other members of the sub­
committee.
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The principal interrogator on the first day was the head of 
Mr. Moss's staff, James Nelligan, who had developed a strong 
interest in the profession. The bulk of his questioning was aimed 
at discrediting the workability and effectiveness of the new 
AICPA Division for CPA Firms and the public oversight board 
of the SEC practice section. The testimony of the representatives 
of the AICPA, the SEC practice section, the public oversight 
board, and Arthur Andersen and Company was directed toward 
defending the Institute's program of self-regulation and urging 
that no legislation be introduced until the profession's initiatives 
had been given time to succeed.
In subsequent testimony, members of the Securities Exchange 
Commission also recommended postponement of any legislation. 
The commission, however, criticized the SEC practice section on 
several counts, maintaining that quality reviews of one firm by 
another lacked credibility and that the public oversight board 
should be given line authority over quality reviews and sanctions 
to offset the influence of the large firms. They also suggested 
that work performed outside the United States should be subject 
to quality reviews. The SEC should be given full access to quality 
review working papers; disciplinary cases should not be delayed 
pending the outcome of litigation; and the AICPA should require 
that, in order for an SEC registrant to be audited, the registrant 
must have an audit committee. SEC Chairman Williams also 
indicated that he expected various procedural matters to be 
resolved promptly so that quality reviews would begin during
1978. He closed by stating that if the Institute's program did not 
meet the commission's expectations, it would recommend some 
form of regulatory legislation.
Other witnesses who appeared at the hearings were—
E l i M a so n , M ason & C om pany  
Jo seph  A l a m , A lam , M orris & C om pany  
A la n  Br o u t , Brout & C om pany  
C h a r les  Ka is e r , H arris K err Forster & Co.
N o rm an  A u er b a c h , Coopers & Lybrand 
Pro fesso r  Joh n  C. Burto n , Columbia University
Messrs. Mason and Burton offered their own plans for regu­
lation of the profession, which would entail legislative imple­
mentation. Messrs. Alam, Brout, and Kaiser criticized the AICPA 
and the division for CPA firms and complained about what they
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considered to be unfair competition on the part of the large CPA 
firms. Mr. Auerbach defended the performance of management 
advisory services by auditors and expressed concern about the 
impact of various proposals on the ability of smaller firms to 
compete. He also urged that a small full-time panel be established 
under the Financial Accounting Foundation to set auditing stand­
ards.
Chairman Moss closed the hearings on March 3, 1978, with a 
promise that a report on the hearings would be prepared. He 
was clearly unimpressed with what the profession had accom­
plished and expressed great concern about the competitive prob­
lems of the smaller CPA firms and what he believed to be the 
excessive power and control of the large firms. He finished by 
promising to introduce legislation to regulate the profession.
The Moss Bill (H.R. 13175)
Mr. Moss proved to be a man of his word. On June 16, 1978, he 
introduced the public accounting regulatory bill (H.R. 13175), 
which proposed the establishment of a National Organization of 
Securities and Exchange Commission Accountancy (NOSECA). 
Under the provisions of the bill, the NOSECA would be estab­
lished under the rule-making authority of the SEC and would be 
under SEC oversight. Membership in the NOSECA would be 
mandatory for all CPA firms practicing before the SEC unless 
they had no more than five SEC clients, none of which had total 
assets in excess of $5 million. The NOSECA would be governed 
by a five-member board appointed by the SEC—two members 
from CPA firms, two from outside the profession, and one not 
engaged in public practice. It would employ a staff and assess 
sufficient dues to operate on a self-financing basis. The organi­
zation would require members to submit information, including 
lists of their SEC clients and the annual financial statements of 
their firms; would require quality reviews of member firms every 
three years; and would conduct investigations and disciplinary 
proceedings and impose sanctions in cases involving noncompli­
ance with auditing and accounting standards.
In addition, the bill would require the SEC to compile lists of 
needed auditing and accounting standards, to set priorities, to
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monitor the progress of bodies designated by the commission to 
set such standards, and to take independent action when nec­
essary. Each SEC registrant would be required to establish an 
audit committee composed of independent directors. The bill 
would allow CPA firms to audit SEC clients across state lines 
without being licensed in the different states.
Under the provisions, a CPA firm would be legally liable to 
private parties for damages resulting from reliance on the firm's 
audit report if the firm was negligent in preparing the report. 
Foreign accounting firms performing audits included in filings 
with the SEC would be subject to the same membership and 
liability provisions as domestic firms.
The legislation would have placed both the standard-setting 
bodies and CPA firms practicing before the SEC more squarely 
under the direct authority of the commission and would have 
diluted the authority of the state boards of accountancy and 
substantially weakened the AICPA. Registration with the SEC 
was only a short step from national licensing and federal control 
of the CPA examination, and the NOSECA disciplinary proceed­
ings would almost certainly replace those of the AICPA. The 
possibility of such legislation was a frightening prospect to nearly 
everyone connected with the profession, with the exception of 
those practitioners who would welcome more governmental 
regulation of the large firms in the dubious belief that the smaller 
firms would not be affected.
The bill, cosponsored by Mr. Moss and four congressmen on 
his subcommittee, was referred to the House Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Fortunately for the profession, 
the committee spent the balance of 1978 dealing with President 
Carter's program to solve the country's energy crisis. As a result, 
the Moss bill remained stuck in committee and died with the 
expiration of the ninety-fifth Congress at the end of 1978.
Additional Moss Subcommittee Hearings
After receiving the SEC's first annual report, which described the 
issues that needed to be resolved before the SEC could give its 
unqualified approval to the AICPA's self-regulatory program, Mr. 
Moss scheduled another day of hearings. On July 28, 1978, he
opened the hearings by questioning the effectiveness of the 
Institute's self-regulatory measures and, in particular, its peer 
review program.
In the June 2 letter, the SEC Chairman stated:
“From the beginning, we have urged that an effective peer 
review program required rigorous standards of quality control and 
a process characterized by independence both in appearance and 
fact. Unfortunately, over the past several weeks, we have seen an 
increasing rigidity in the Institute's approach to these important 
objectives."
In addition to these strong views, the Chairman added that the 
profession's self-regulatory program "now stands perilously close 
to being reduced to a self-serving effort conducted behind closed 
doors."
How the Institute's increasing rigidity in opposition to meaning­
ful self-regulation can be interpreted by the SEC as sufficient 
progress is somewhat mystifying.
Clearly, the commission's strategy of keeping strong pressure 
on the profession was coming dangerously close to making 
untenable its posture of continuing support for the Institute's 
program. It was mainly through the adept testimony of the 
witnesses that such a result was avoided.
The witnesses during this final day of Moss hearings were as 
follows:
D on ald  N eeb es , Peer review com. of the SEC practice section
W il l ia m  L. C a r y , Public oversight board
Ray  Ga r r ett , Jr ., Public oversight board
Jo h n  D. H a r p e r , Public oversight board
A r th u r  M. W ood , Public oversight board
H aro ld  M. W il l ia m s , SEC
C la r en c e  A. Sa m pso n , SEC
The bulk of the questioning was carried out in behalf of the 
subcommittee by James L. Nelligan. Mr. Neebes described in 
detail the progress that had been achieved in implementation of 
quality reviews and resolution of the issues raised by the SEC. 
The public oversight board members gave details about the 
operations of the board and its progress to date. The SEC 
chairman devoted most of his responses to extricating the com­
mission from the corner it had painted itself into by the severity 
of its criticisms.
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At 1:45 p . m . the hearings were quietly adjourned with no 
indication of what might follow. It later proved to be the point 
at which the peak of congressional interest had passed. Con­
gressman Moss did not seek reelection and Senator Metcalf died 
in December 1977. However, it was not the last of the congres­
sional hearings about the profession.
Eagleton Subcommittee Hearings
After the death of Senator Metcalf, there was some confusion 
about the fate of his subcommittee. Eventually, it was discharged, 
and its responsibilities were assigned to various other panels. 
Those matters pertaining to accounting and auditing were as­
signed to the subcommittee on governmental efficiency and the 
District of Columbia of the Senate Committee on Governmental 
Affairs. This subcommittee was chaired by Senator Thomas 
Eagleton, who had played a prominent role in dealing with the 
accounting and auditing problems of the financially beleaguered 
District of Columbia. The reassignment included the transfer to 
the subcommittee's staff of John Chesson, who had authored the 
Metcalf staff study, The Accounting Establishment.
Senator Eagleton, assisted by Mr. Chesson, promptly launched 
a new investigation of the profession. On April 3, 1978, he 
mailed questionnaires to the AICPA and a number of CPA firms. 
The one directed to the AICPA contained fifty-four questions 
mainly regarding actions taken in response to the recommenda­
tions of the Metcalf subcommittee. After receiving responses to 
the inquiries, Chairman Eagleton scheduled hearings for August 
1 and 2, 1979.
In meetings with Senator Eagleton before the hearings, AICPA 
representatives determined that his principal interests were 
threefold: legal liability of auditors on the basis of negligence, 
limitations on management advisory services by auditors, and 
the duty of auditors to report criminal or illegal acts. These 
interests were the main focus of the questions directed to the 
witnesses by Mr. Eagleton during the course of the hearings.
SEC Chairman Harold Williams was the first witness. He 
expressed the SEC's continuing qualified support for the profes­
sion's self-regulatory program. He also explained the commis­
sion's position regarding the three issues identified by Mr. 
Eagleton. In general, Mr. Williams' testimony was supportive of 
the profession and less critical than in earlier hearings. Senator 
Eagleton was visibly dissatisfied with the chairman's responses 
and, at one point, accused the SEC of having a "ho-hum 
attitude."
The second group of witnesses were the representatives of 
the AICPA, who once again explained the profession's progress 
toward implementation of its self-regulatory program.
The next witness was Ray Garrett, Jr., vice chairman of the 
public oversight board, who related the actions taken to date by 
the board and reviewed the results of its study of the impact of 
management advisory services on the independence of auditors. 
Mr. Garrett gave very lucid answers to questions about auditors' 
independence and legal liability, and his obvious expertise seemed 
to have a considerable effect on Senator Eagleton.
The succeeding witnesses addressed questions relating to 
their particular interests, including the prohibition of manage­
ment advisory services by auditors, the setting of accounting 
standards, the Federal Trade Commission study of the profes­
sion, the competitive problems of practitioners in smaller firms, 
and accounting standards for state and local governments. Of 
prime interest to the AICPA was Paul Turley's report on the 
Federal Trade Commission investigation of the profession begun 
in March 1977. After studying the profession's actions to remove 
restrictions on advertising, solicitation, encroachment, competi­
tive bidding, and other business activities, the FTC staff had 
concluded that direct governmental intervention was unneces­
sary. Although the AICPA previously had general information 
about the study, this was the first official word about its scope 
and conclusions.
The hearings were adjourned on August 2, 1979, with no 
indication of what further action the subcommittee might take. 
Sometime later, Mr. Chesson, who had played such a leading 
role in the congressional investigations of the profession, left the 
subcommittee staff for other employment. As a result, no report 
on the hearings was issued, and Senator Eagleton was diverted 
by other, more urgent matters.
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Relief and Continued Vigilance
By the end of 1979, it was apparent that the period of high 
congressional interest had come to an end, at least for the time 
being. Only the SEC's promise to file annual progress reports 
with Congress remained as a potential source of renewed activity.
By early 1981 there was reason to hope that the reports would 
be discontinued. Chairman Williams resigned, effective March 1, 
1981, and the commission's staff showed signs of becoming 
weary of preparing annual reports. The new administration 
under President Reagan was dedicated to a philosophy of dereg­
ulation, and it seemed unlikely that the changed Congress would 
initiate new investigations of the profession in the near future.
Nevertheless, the profession knew that it must continue to 
exercise strong self-regulation and to maintain good relations 
with Congress. The AICPA Board of Directors had this in mind 
when it authorized a program, proposed by me, to hold periodic 
breakfast meetings with state delegations of senators and con­
gressmen, one state at a time. The first such breakfast was held 
at the Capitol building on March 22, 1979, with members of 
Congress from Maryland. Key CPAs from the Maryland society 
were present, and the participants offered to assist Congress in 
the areas of the profession's expertise. By the end of 1980, more 
than twenty states had been covered. All of the congressional 
delegations seemed pleased, and several requests for assistance 
resulted from the effort. The AICPA hoped that the profession 
could, over time, position itself as a friend of government and 
find a way to contribute its skills toward solving some of the 
difficult problems facing the nation.
At the moment, all was calm on the Washington front with 
respect to the profession. The storm that began in 1974 and lasted 
until the fall of 1979 had been weathered, but it had left a great 
deal of change in its wake: quality reviews by peers, a structure 
to regulate CPA firms, removal of virtually all restrictions on 
competition, operation in the "sunshine," and the inclusion of 
public members on the Institute's Board of Directors and Council. 
The profession had come to a much clearer understanding of 
what is expected of it and had gained maturity in dealing with 
the federal government.
CHAPTER 4
The Setting of Accounting 
Standards
The Accounting Principles Board
Wh en  the Accounting Principles Board was established to succeed the accounting procedures committee in 1959, there 
was great hope that the new structure would satisfy the growing 
concern about the reliability of financial reporting and the avail­
ability of alternatives among generally accepted accounting stand­
ards. For a variety of reasons, these expectations were not fully 
met.
One limiting factor was the lack of consensus about the 
board's objectives. One group of CPAs believed that the board 
should establish only broad accounting principles, leaving their 
application in specific circumstances to CPAs' professional judg­
ment. They believed that the development of detailed rules 
would reduce auditing to a mechanical function rather than a 
professional activity. Other accountants believed that specific 
rules were required if the number of alternative accounting 
treatments was to be reduced and financial statements were to 
be prepared on a comparable basis.
This sharp difference about the desirable degree of specificity 
in accounting standards led to a bitter debate at the May 1964 
meeting of the Institute's governing Council. It was proposed 
that the board's opinions be made enforceable, but supporters 
of a "broad principles" approach viewed enforceability as an 
additional step toward the elimination of professional judgment 
in the financial reporting process. A shattering split within the 
profession was narrowly averted when the Council adopted the 
following compromise resolution:
RESOLVED, That it is the sense of this Council that audit reports of
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members should disclose material departures from Opinions of the 
Accounting Principles Board, and that the president is hereby 
authorized to appoint a special committee to recommend to Council 
appropriate methods for implementing the substance of this reso­
lution.
A special committee was subsequently appointed, and its 
report defined generally accepted accounting principles as those 
that had substantial authoritative support. The report stated that 
opinions of the Accounting Principles Board constituted substan­
tial authoritative support and that substantial authoritative sup­
port could exist also for accounting principles that differed from 
opinions of the Accounting Principles Board. The report advo­
cated that members disclose in their reports, or require the entity 
to disclose in financial statement footnotes, departures from 
Accounting Principles Board opinions and, where practicable, 
the effects on the financial statements. This procedure would be 
followed only if a member was satisfied that the accounting 
principle being applied had substantial authoritative support; 
otherwise, a qualified or adverse opinion would be required.
The committee's recommendations were approved by the 
Council in October 1964. This action increased the authority of 
the Accounting Principles Board but stopped short of making its 
opinions enforceable under the code of professional ethics. The 
concept of substantial authoritative support, which had its origin 
in SEC Accounting Series Release no. 4, issued in 1938, was 
sufficiently broad and flexible to be adopted by Council without 
a dissenting vote.
Another factor contributing to the APB's ultimate downfall 
was the early undermining of its authority by the SEC. In January 
1963, the SEC issued Accounting Series Release no. 96, overruling 
APB Opinion no. 2, which required the deferral of investment 
tax credits over the useful lives of the assets to which they 
applied. The SEC release allowed either deferral or immediate 
recognition of the tax credits. The APB was forced to issue APB 
Opinion no. 4 to bring its prior opinion into conformity with the 
policy adopted by the SEC. Because this was a hotly contested 
accounting issue at the time, the SEC action was widely viewed 
as a serious blow to the authority of the APB.
A much more serious problem, though, was the continued
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use of diverse accounting methods. The boom in corporate 
mergers and acquisitions during the late 1960s highlighted the 
fact that widely differing financial results could be achieved 
through use of either the pooling or the purchase accounting 
method. Also, the manner in which goodwill was calculated and 
accounted for in business acquisitions provided opportunities for 
the manipulation of earnings. These problems attracted a great 
deal of critical attention in the financial press.
During the 1960s many companies engaged in what became 
known as "shopping for accounting principles." If a company's 
auditors refused to issue an unqualified opinion because they 
disagreed with management's accounting treatments, the com­
pany sought other auditors that might be more agreeable. In 
determining compliance with generally accepted accounting prin­
ciples having substantial authoritative support, auditors often 
reached different conclusions. This rather embarrassing differ­
ence in the exercise of professional judgment was made possible 
by the leeway built into the concept of substantial authoritative 
support. Auditors were content to determine whether manage­
ment had complied with generally accepted accounting princi­
ples, and they refused to make subjective judgments about 
whether financial statements were fair or not misleading on an 
overall basis.
The shopping practices contributed to widespread discontent 
with the quality of financial reporting and the manner in which 
accounting standards were being established. Some leaders of 
the profession publicly criticized the APB. They were joined by 
a chorus of financial reporters, financial officers in industry, 
financial analysts, and academicians. Some critics called for 
establishment of an accounting court to settle accounting dis­
putes. Others deplored the ad hoc approach to dealing with 
individual accounting issues and called for the development of a 
basic set of accounting principles or concepts to serve as a 
consistent framework for the setting of individual standards.
By 1969 it had become clear that the elimination of financial 
reporting abuses required accounting standards consisting of 
specific, enforceable, detailed rules. The APB had long since 
adopted a specific rulemaking approach. What remained was the 
problem of explicit enforceability. At its May 1969 meeting,
Council authorized a mail ballot of the AICPA membership on 
the following amendment to rule 202(e) of the Institute's code of 
professional ethics:
In expressing an opinion on representations in financial statements 
which he has examined, a member or associate may be held guilty 
of an act discreditable to the profession if:
• he fails to disclose in his report, when material in effect:
1. the omission of any generally accepted auditing procedure 
applicable in the circumstances; or
2. the use of any accounting principle which departs from 
generally accepted accounting principles because it lacks 
substantial authoritative support, in which case he must also 
either qualify his opinion or give an adverse opinion as 
appropriate; or
3. unless otherwise disclosed in the financial statements, the 
use of any generally accepted accounting principle which 
differs from an Opinion of the Accounting Principles Board 
but which has other substantial authoritative support.
Disclosure must be made in his report or in the financial 
statements of the approximate effect of the departures under (2) 
and (3), or a statement made as to the impracticability of determining 
such effect.
Approval by two-thirds of those voting was required for 
adoption, and the amendment failed by a vote of 66.1 percent 
for and 33.9 percent against. Apparently, a considerable minority 
still clung to the belief that the exercise of professional accounting 
judgment would be unduly circumscribed by the proposed 
amendment. Because of the amendment's importance to the 
future credibility of the APB, the AICPA Board of Directors 
considered resubmitting it for another ballot. The board decided 
against resubmission because it was considering a complete 
revision of the code of professional ethics, including a new rule 
that would require compliance with APB opinions.
Another problem, which surfaced in 1970, was the establish­
ment by Congress of a Cost Accounting Standards Board to set 
cost standards for settling government defense contracts. This 
was viewed at the time as a serious dilution of the profession's 
influence over accounting standards. This fear later proved to be 
largely unwarranted, and the APB was essentially unaffected.
In the face of these threats, pressures, and uncertainties, the 
Accounting Principles Board struggled to restore confidence in
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its efforts. In 1969 the APB appointed a subcommittee of its own 
members to review the board's operations. In October 1970 Philip 
Defliese, head of Lybrand, Ross Brothers and Montgomery (later 
Coopers and Lybrand), became chairman of the APB. Mr. Defliese 
was a strong leader who recognized the need to expand the 
board's due-process procedure to give a greater voice to the 
issuers of financial reports. Unfortunately, his statements to the 
press and his efforts to spur the board to quicker action caused 
turmoil within the board itself. At the same time the technical 
vice president of the Institute, Leonard Savoie, was engaging in 
similar activities in an effort to make the board more effective 
and less vulnerable to criticism. Disagreements between the two 
men only exacerbated the situation.
The Trueblood and Wheat Committees
Finally, in January 1971 Marshall Armstrong, president of the 
Institute, convened a special meeting of thirty-five leaders of the 
profession representing twenty-one accounting firms to discuss 
the setting of accounting standards. After two days of intensive 
discussions, the participants agreed that two small, blue ribbon 
committees, composed of both members and nonmembers of the 
profession, should be commissioned to study the following 
questions:
1. How and by whom should financial accounting standards be 
established?
2. What are the objectives of financial statements?
This recommendation was promptly approved by the AICPA 
board, and by March 1971 the two groups had been appointed.
While these events were taking place, the American Account­
ing Association was also proposing to appoint a commission to 
study the manner in which accounting standards should be set. 
The association invited the AICPA to cosponsor the effort. The 
AICPA Board of Directors declined the invitation in view of its 
decision to take independent action.
The committee charged with examining the objectives of 
financial statements was chaired by Robert Trueblood, head of 
Touche Ross and Company and a former president of the
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AICPA. Serving with him on the committee were the following 
people:
Ric h a r d  M. C yer t , Carnegie-Mellon University
Sid n ey  D av id so n , Graduate School of Business, U. of Chicago
Jam es  D on  E d w ard s , College of Business Administration, U.
of Georgia 
O scar  S. Ge l l e in , Haskins & Sells 
C. Reed  Pa r k er , Duff, Anderson & Clark, Inc.
A n d r ew  J. Re in h a r t , The Singer Company 
H ow ard  O. W a g n er , Jewel Companies, Inc.
F ra n k  T. W esto n , Arthur Young & Company
The committee worked for more than two years, issuing its final 
report, Objectives of Financial Statements, in October 1973. The 
report generated very little controversy, and the AICPA com­
mended the committee's conclusions to the FASB. Included were 
a number of concepts regarding the users of financial statements 
and their needs, which served as a springboard for the FASB's 
conceptual framework project in succeeding years.
The committee appointed to study how and by whom ac­
counting standards should be established was chaired by Frank 
Wheat, a partner of a leading Los Angeles law firm, Gibson, 
Dunn and Crutcher, and a former commissioner of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. Also serving on the committee were 
the following people:
Jo h n  C. Bieg ler , Price Waterhouse & Co.
A rn old  I. L e v in e , J. K. Lasser & Co.
W a l la c e  E. O lso n , Alexander Grant & Company 
Roger B. Sm it h , General Motors Corp.
Tho m as  C. P ryo r , White Weld & Co.
David  So lo m o n s , Wharton School, U. of Pennsylvania
At the outset, the committee members held widely differing 
views, ranging from the belief that the profession alone should 
set accounting standards to the position that standard setting is 
an essentially legislative process that belongs in the province of 
government. In between was the view that the process should 
remain within the private sector but should include participation 
by issuers and users of financial statements.
The committee interviewed spokesmen for the various interest
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groups and viewpoints, held public hearings, and observed the 
APB in action. After these extensive inquiries, it went into 
executive sessions to formulate its conclusions.
By this time the thinking of the committee members had 
converged on several important points. Belief was now over­
whelming that the process should remain within the private 
sector and should not be taken over by government. The mem­
bers realized that, to ensure the broad support necessary for a 
standard-setting body, provision must be made for due-process 
procedures and the participation of all groups having an interest 
in financial statements, particularly issuers and users. Finally, it 
was clear that non-CPAs viewed the APB as a captive of the 
public accounting profession, and they suspected board members 
of being unduly influenced by the makeup of their firms' clien­
teles.
These considerations formed the basis for the committee's 
recommendations. It proposed an independent Financial Ac­
counting Foundation to finance and oversee a standards board. 
The foundation was designed to attract broad-based support and 
to demonstrate that standard setting is not under the exclusive 
control of the public accounting profession. To maximize its 
objectivity and to ensure that adequate time was devoted to the 
task, the foundation would oversee a Financial Accounting Stand­
ards Board (FASB) composed of seven full-time paid members. 
The committee also recommended a Financial Accounting Stand­
ards Advisory Council, composed of representatives of various 
interest groups, to warn of emerging accounting problems and 
to advise the standards board on its agenda and priorities. A full 
explanation of the committee's reasoning is eloquently presented 
in the report, written largely by Messrs. Wheat and Solomons.
Formation of the FASB
The Wheat committee issued its report in March 1972, during 
Walter Oliphant's term as president of the AICPA. Mr. Oliphant 
was a strong leader and organizer who immediately acted to 
implement the recommendations. At a historic meeting on April
10 and 11, 1972, the Institute's Board of Directors approved the 
Wheat committee report and appointed a committee to establish
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the recommended foundation, standards board, and advisory 
council. The committee was chaired by Marshall S. Armstrong 
of George S. Olive and Company, and its members included 
John C. Biegler of Price Waterhouse and Company; Winston 
Brooke of Brooke, Freeman, Berry and McBrayer; LeRoy Layton 
of Main LaFrentz and Company, and John Lawler of the AICPA. 
The board set a target date of July 1, 1972, for establishing the 
foundation and January 1, 1973, for achieving an operational 
FASB.
Within less than a month, at the May 1 to 3 AICPA Council 
meeting in Boca Raton, Florida, approval was accorded the Wheat 
committee report and a green light given to the board's actions. 
Although support for the recommendations was overwhelming, 
it was by no means unanimous; some council members, among 
them Richard Baker, head of Ernst and Ernst (later, Ernst and 
Whinney), denounced the profession's surrender of its existing 
control of the standard-setting body.
The Wheat committee had anticipated and attempted to 
mitigate this reaction by providing that the foundation's trustees 
would be elected by the AICPA Board of Directors. Although 
adopted initially as a palliative to AICPA members, this provision 
of the bylaws was later changed in response to objections by 
other participating interest groups.
By the end of 1972, much had been accomplished. Organi­
zations representing financial analysts, financial executives, aca­
demicians, investment bankers, and CPAs had agreed to become 
sponsoring members of a Financial Accounting Foundation and 
to raise funds for its operations. The eight largest CPA firms had 
each pledged $200,000 a year for five years in support of the new 
FASB. Articles of incorporation and bylaws were adopted and 
filed for the Financial Accounting Foundation, and trustees were 
elected. Marshall Armstrong was appointed as the first chairman 
of the FASB, and the process of employing a staff and obtaining 
office space had begun.
The Accounting Principles Board wound down its activities 
and issued its last opinion, Disclosure of Lease Commitments by 
Lessees, in June 1973. On June 30, 1973, the APB went out of 
existence.
In December 1973 the FASB issued its first Statement of
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Financial Accounting Standards, Disclosure of Foreign Currency 
Translation Information.
During the transition period it became apparent that the 
AICPA would need a new committee to prepare official Institute 
responses to FASB proposals and to advise the FASB at an early 
stage about accounting problems being encountered in practice. 
To meet this need, the Institute appointed a new accounting 
standards executive committee (AcSEC) in November 1972. Some 
of the larger firms objected to the duplication of effort: respond­
ing to the FASB on their own behalf and contributing manpower 
to prepare responses in behalf of the AICPA. Ultimately, however, 
firms recognized that official positions on accounting matters had 
to be taken on behalf of the organized profession. Also, it was 
evident that the AICPA needed to continue issuing auditing and 
accounting guides for special industries, and an accounting 
standards committee was necessary to deal with the accounting 
aspects of these guides.
Meanwhile, the Institute voted on a restated code of profes­
sional ethics. The revised code, adopted early in 1973, included 
a new rule 203:
A member shall not express an opinion that financial statements 
are presented in conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles if such statements contain any departure from an account­
ing principle promulgated by the body designated by Council to 
establish such principles which has a material effect on the state­
ments taken as a whole, unless the member can demonstrate that 
due to unusual circumstances the financial statements would other­
wise have been misleading. In such cases his report must describe 
the departure, the approximate effects thereof, if practicable, and 
the reasons why compliance with the principle would result in a 
misleading statement.
As authorized by rule 203, Council passed a resolution at its 
May 1973 meeting designating the FASB as the body "to establish 
such principles." This action, for the first time, explicitly brought 
compliance with accounting standards under the disciplinary 
machinery of the profession. It settled the dispute that had 
aroused so much passion in the preceding years and put in place 
the final piece of the present standard-setting structure.
In retrospect, the changes that occurred in the setting of 
accounting standards over the brief span of three years were
truly remarkable. The profession and its leaders deserve praise 
for their willingness to surrender the profession's exclusive 
jurisdiction over the standard-setting body and to share it with 
other interest groups. Although some CPAs still argue that this 
was a serious mistake, few dispute the boldness of the steps 
taken. By its actions, the profession kept the standard-setting 
process within the private sector, and without the new structure 
there is serious doubt whether the congressional challenges that 
were to follow could have been successfully met.
70 THE SETTING OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
FASB Relations With the SEC
The FASB, however, did not live happily ever after. Its troubles 
began almost immediately when the SEC, under Chairman Wil­
liam Casey and the new chief accountant, John C. Burton, 
expressed its intention to deal directly with accounting disclosure 
matters, although it would continue to rely on the FASB to deal 
with accounting measurement. In effect, the SEC announced 
that it would preempt a substantial portion of the FASB's role. 
During the years that Mr. Burton served as chief accountant, an 
unprecedented number of Accounting Series Releases were is­
sued, many of which dealt with accounting disclosure matters.
The FASB made every effort to maintain close communications 
and good working relationships with the SEC, and, eventually, 
closer cooperation was achieved. To demonstrate its support for 
the FASB, the commission, on December 20, 1973, issued Ac­
counting Series Release no. 150, which reaffirmed the SEC's 
policy of reliance on the private sector:
The Commission intends to continue its policy of looking to the 
private sector for leadership in establishing and improving account­
ing principles and standards through the FASB with the expectation 
that the body's conclusions will promote the interests of investors.
In Accounting Series Release No. 4 (1938) the Commission stated 
its policy that financial statements prepared in accordance with 
accounting practices for which there was no substantial authoritative 
support were presumed to be misleading and that footnote or other 
disclosure would not avoid this presumption. It also stated that, 
where there was a difference of opinion between the Commission 
and a registrant as to the proper accounting to be followed in a 
particular case, disclosure would be accepted in lieu of correction 
of the financial statements themselves only if substantial authorita­
tive support existed for the accounting practices followed by the 
registrant and the position of the Commission had not been ex­
pressed in rules, regulations or other official releases. For purposes 
of this policy, principles, standards and practices promulgated by 
the FASB in its Statements and Interpretations 1 will be considered 
by the Commission as having substantial authoritative support, and 
those contrary to such FASB promulgations will be considered to 
have no such support.
Arthur Andersen Sues the SEC
In December 1974 and April 1975 the SEC exposed for comment 
two securities acts releases (ultimately issued together as Ac­
counting Series Release no. 177 on September 10, 1975), which, 
among other things, would require an independent auditor to 
express an opinion about whether, when a registrant made a 
change in its accounting method, the new method was preferable. 
Virtually all practitioners and CPA firms strongly opposed the 
requirement because it would force them to make subjective 
judgments about the fairness of financial statements. They be­
lieved that there were no reliable criteria for judging fairness and 
that an auditor's responsibility should only be to ensure compli­
ance with generally accepted accounting principles. One CPA 
firm, Arthur Andersen and Company, felt so strongly about the 
issue that it filed suit to enjoin the SEC from adopting the 
preferability requirement.
The head of the firm, Harvey Kapnick, was a strong-willed, 
outspoken critic of both the SEC and the FASB, which may 
explain, in part, why the firm's suit also challenged the legality 
of the SEC's policy of reliance on the FASB. The complaint alleged 
that this reliance constituted an unlawful delegation of authority 
by a statutory body and that Accounting Series Release no. 150 
had been adopted without the due process required under the 
Federal Administrative Procedures Act.
This challenge endangered the continuing viability of the 
FASB, and both the Financial Accounting Foundation and the 
AICPA filed amicus curiae briefs in opposition to the plaintiff. 
The SEC, of course, filed a vigorous rebuttal.
While the litigation was in progress, the commission issued 
Accounting Series Release no. 177 in its final form. Since other 
CPA firms did not choose to join in the litigation on the side of
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Arthur Andersen, they elected to comply with the release. As 
compliance became accepted practice, the litigation was rendered 
moot except as a challenge to SEC reliance on the FASB.
The court declined to impose a temporary restraining order 
on the SEC, and after long delays Arthur Andersen and Company 
finally withdrew its complaint. By that time members of Congress 
were questioning whether the SEC should be relying on a private- 
sector body to set accounting standards. Presumably, the firm 
concluded that the preferability issue was a lost cause and that 
pursuit of its petition might result in the establishment of a 
governmental standard-setting body.
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The IRS Booking Requirement
Another problem confronting the FASB involved an IRS proposal 
that had first been made in 1971. The Internal Revenue Service 
proposed requiring taxpayers to use the same accounting treat­
ments for their books and financial statements as they used for 
income tax purposes. This was commonly referred to as a booking 
requirement. If the requirement were adopted, the Internal Revenue 
Service would effectively be able to establish financial accounting 
standards, since few corporations were likely to forego favorable 
tax treatments.
Representatives of the AICPA, FASB, and SEC attempted to 
persuade the IRS not to impose its proposed booking requirement. 
Although the IRS never completely abandoned its position, it 
modified its requirements to the extent that it would not appear 
to be establishing accounting standards.
The Role of AcSEC
During the first years of their existence, considerable friction also 
arose between the FASB and the newly established AICPA 
Accounting Standards Executive Committee. Members of AcSEC 
felt a strong need to provide CPA firms with guidance on emerging 
accounting problems so that auditors would be following a 
uniform accounting treatment. The AICPA was still concerned 
about forestalling the practice of shopping for accounting prin­
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ciples. Many CPAs felt that the FASB had such a full agenda that 
it was unlikely to deal on a timely basis with the emerging 
problems, which were usually of an urgent and highly specialized 
nature. Furthermore, the FASB's due-process procedures almost 
precluded fast action. AcSEC, therefore, began issuing Statements 
of Position on accounting issues, which were intended to provide 
timely interim guidance to auditors until the FASB took official 
action. Similar pronouncements were also issued by AcSEC to 
cover the accounting portions of the AICPA's new and amended 
auditing and accounting guides for special industries.
While the FASB was not particularly disturbed by these 
activities, many of its constituents, particularly members of the 
Financial Executives Institute, raised strong protests. In their 
view, the AICPA was continuing to set accounting standards in 
defiance of the general agreement that there should be only one 
private-sector standard-setting body, the FASB.
The FASB attempted to find a satisfactory compromise by 
devising procedures for a special screening committee to review 
emerging problems and to determine whether they should be 
dealt with by the FASB or left to AcSEC for disposition through 
Statements of Position. Although this was less than a complete 
resolution of the issue, it was sufficient to quiet the controversy 
for a while.
The Marketable Equity Securities Issue
Typical of the urgent problems being encountered by auditors in 
the field was the question of when to write down investments 
in securities when it appeared that their market values had been 
permanently depressed below cost. In December 1974 the country 
was in the midst of a deep recession. Stock market prices had 
suffered a steep decline; huge real estate ventures were on the 
verge of bankruptcy, and banks faced heavy losses on their loans 
to real estate investment trusts (REITs). Auditors of major banks 
and insurance companies were confronted in January 1975 with 
the write-down question for both securities and loans receivable, 
and accounting standards provided no clear answers.
Because major banks and insurance companies had huge 
amounts at risk, the problem ultimately led to discussions among
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AcSEC, the FASB, the SEC, congressional banking committees, 
and the chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, Arthur Burns. 
The political pressures from members of Congress, the Federal 
Reserve Bank, and the bank associations were so intense that 
neither AcSEC nor the SEC saw fit to impose a conservative 
write-down requirement that would be charged to earnings. 
Instead, the SEC issued Accounting Series Release no. 166 on 
December 23, 1974, requiring disclosure of the details of loan 
loss provisions. It also requested the FASB to determine in the 
following year what further action should be taken.
Eventually, the FASB issued its Statement of Financial Ac­
counting Standards no. 12, which prescribed the accounting 
treatment to be accorded marketable equity securities. Except 
where the decline in market value of individual securities was 
deemed to be permanent, the board stopped short of requiring 
that unrealized losses on noncurrent portfolios be charged to 
earnings.
The magnitude and urgency of this problem increased CPA 
firms' concern about the need for an effective means of dealing 
with emerging accounting problems on a timely basis. This may 
well have been one of the factors leading to strong public criticism 
of the FASB in 1975 and 1976, especially by Harvey Kapnick of 
Arthur Andersen and Company. In a speech in New Orleans, 
Mr. Kapnick challenged the leadership of Chairman Armstrong 
and called on the AICPA to reconstitute the Wheat committee to 
review the operations of the Financial Accounting Foundation 
and the FASB. The Institute's board officially declined to take 
such action and expressed its full confidence in the Financial 
Accounting Foundation to oversee the FASB.
The FAF Structure Committee
In view of this growing unrest in the private sector and threatening 
statements from Congress, the Financial Accounting Foundation 
trustees decided that a reappraisal was in order. Accordingly, a 
committee, chaired by Russell Palmer, head of Touche Ross and 
Company, was appointed to review the structure and operations 
of the foundation, the FASB, and the Financial Accounting 
Standards Advisory Council. The committee recommended a
number of changes. The Financial Accounting Standards Advisory 
Council should be reconstituted and chaired by a separate part- 
time, paid chairman. The research staff should be consolidated 
under a research director. The election of foundation trustees by 
the AICPA Board of Directors should be discontinued and replaced 
with a new procedure. The requirement that at least four members 
of the FASB be CPAs should be dropped. Finally, the voting 
requirements for board decisions should be changed from five 
out of seven votes to a simple four-vote majority. These recom­
mendations were promptly implemented.
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Congressional Interest in Accounting Standards
The committee issued its report in April 1977, and its timing 
could not have been more fortuitous. It coincided with the 
initiation of congressional inquiries into the performance of the 
public accounting profession and the structure for setting ac­
counting standards. The House of Representatives Subcommittee 
on Oversight and Investigations, chaired by Congressman John 
E. Moss, led the way in October 1976 with a report on its oversight 
of the SEC. The report included the following recommendation:
To the maximum extent practicable, the SEC should prescribe by 
rule a framework of uniform accounting principles. In instances 
where uniformity is not practicable, the SEC should require the 
independent auditor to attest that the accounting principles selected 
by management represent financial data most fairly. He should also 
prescribe supplemental data to permit a translation from one set of 
assumptions to another, thereby permitting comparability among 
companies in a particular industry.
Mr. Moss later elaborated on the intent of the recommenda­
tion:
My subcommittee concluded that the SEC should prescribe a frame­
work within which the private sector would set principles and 
standards. The SEC would establish parameters within which the 
private sector determines accounting principles and sets auditing 
standards. The SEC would suggest priorities based upon national 
and international needs. And the SEC would exercise in a much 
more vigorous fashion its oversight of proposed principles and 
standards and the operation of those already in place, exercising its 
right of pre-emption when necessary.
Congressman Moss also introduced a proposed amendment 
to the 1975 Energy Act directing the General Accounting Office 
to develop a uniform method of accounting for the petroleum 
industry. After strenuous efforts by representatives of the FASB, 
AICPA, and SEC, Congress adopted a revised version of the 
amendment that required the SEC to see that a uniform method 
was established within twenty-four months. The revised amend­
ment explicitly recognized that the SEC might look to the FASB 
for this purpose.
The FASB met the two-year deadline only to be overruled by 
the SEC. The commission issued Accounting Series Release no. 
253 calling for footnote disclosure of financial data on oil and gas 
reserves and announcing its intention to require the reserve 
recognition accounting method in the future. Under this method 
the changing current value of reserves is reflected directly in the 
financial statements. The FASB, which had elected a successful- 
efforts method in its FASB Statement no. 19 was left with little 
choice but to defer the effective date of compliance with the 
successful-efforts method. This was necessary to put nonregis­
trants on the same footing as SEC registrants.
Many supporters of the FASB saw these events as a serious 
threat to the body's authority. In reality, these developments 
were more a reflection of the strong political pressures exerted 
by the independent oil companies, which bitterly opposed a 
change from full costing to successful-efforts accounting. In any 
event, the SEC went out of its way to reaffirm that it did not 
intend to depart from its long-standing policy of looking to the 
FASB to set accounting standards. Furthermore, on February 4, 
1981, the commission decided to abandon its proposal to require 
adoption of a reserve recognition accounting method and to 
support the FASB's effort to develop a comprehensive package 
of disclosures for oil and gas companies.
The FASB was also under pressure from another congressional 
panel: the Senate Subcommittee on Government Operations, 
chaired by Senator Metcalf, which conducted investigations in 
1976 and 1977. In its final report, the subcommittee urged a 
number of actions to improve the standard-setting process and 
warned, "If the present standard-setting system is to become 
more responsive, the SEC must more vigorously oversee the 
systems on behalf of the public."
76 THE SETTING OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
OTHER CRITICISMS OF THE FASB 77
Other Criticisms of the FASB
In addition to the attacks from the government, the board faced 
sharp criticism from all sectors of its constituents in connection 
with a number of its pronouncements. Anyone interested in the 
controversies that were generated by particular standards should 
read the board's newsletters, as well as articles written in the 
financial press.
The board's first, formative period came to an end on Decem­
ber 31, 1977, when Marshall Armstrong stepped down as chair­
man, although he would continue as a consultant through 
September 1979. Mr. Armstrong had performed the monumental 
task of establishing the board and dealing with all of its early 
problems. His critics felt that he had been too rigid and too 
concerned about protecting the jurisdiction of the FASB. If he 
was guilty of these charges, they were certainly understandable 
in light of all the threats that the board faced. On balance, his 
record was truly distinguished. Donald Kirk, who had served as 
a member of the board from its inception, became chairman on 
January 1, 1978.
Disclosure of Soft Information
During the mid and late seventies, the maturing FASB was faced 
with several particularly complex issues. One of these was the 
need for disclosure of "soft information."
The Securities and Exchange Commission considered requiring 
a number of new disclosures, some of which could be considered 
"soft information" because they did not lend themselves to 
objective audit verification. Disclosure of forecasts and data on
oil and gas reserves and the effects of changing prices were 
examples of soft information.
The FASB discussed requiring that these types of disclosure 
be made within annual financial reports but outside the defined 
parameters of financial statements. In effect, this would remove 
them from the scope of an independent audit of the financial 
statements. It would leave the AICPA Auditing Standards Board 
and the SEC with the burden of determining the extent to which 
independent auditors would be responsible for reviewing the
disclosures made outside financial statements. This approach 
also would exempt most small, closely held companies from 
compliance with the disclosures since they generally do not issue 
annual financial reports.
On February 23, 1978, the FASB added to its agenda a project 
to consider the establishment of guidelines that would require 
reporting entities to make some disclosures outside the defined 
limits of financial statements. The board had concluded that its 
charter authorized it to deal with the broad scope of financial 
reporting rather than just the narrower limits of financial state­
ments.
Because AICPA rule of conduct 203 applied only to financial 
statements, the Institute was now faced with the question of 
whether any FASB disclosure requirements outside financial 
statements should be made enforceable. On the recommendation 
of the Institute's board, the Council passed a resolution on May 
8, 1979, designating the FASB as the body under rule of conduct 
204 to set standards for such disclosures. This action made the 
standards on disclosures outside financial statements enforceable 
for all AICPA members in public practice. Their responsibilities 
as independent auditors regarding such disclosures were to be 
defined in standards to be established by the Auditing Standards 
Board.
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The Small, Closely Held Companies Issue
Another issue facing the FASB was the grounds well of objections 
from practitioners serving small, closely held companies. The 
costs of applying the newly established accounting standards 
and disclosure requirements to their clients seemed to exceed 
the benefits to potential users of the audited financial statements. 
Often, these practitioners were forced to justify fees that were 
unduly high because they were required to apply complicated 
accounting treatments that neither their clients nor their clients' 
creditors understood or wanted.
As early as 1974, the AICPA began addressing this problem, 
and an AcSEC task force was appointed to study possible 
solutions. The task force issued a discussion paper on the subject
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on March 31, 1975, which was widely discussed by practitioners 
in every state and at various AICPA meetings.
The responses indicated that a considerable majority opposed 
the establishment of exceptions to accounting principles that 
would create what were pejoratively labelled "big GAAP" and 
"little GAAP." Many practitioners feared they would be viewed 
as second-class CPAs and would suffer a competitive disadvan­
tage if lesser standards were required for their smaller, closely 
held clients. Others were concerned that competing practitioners 
serving closely held clients were not being disciplined for failing 
to comply with all the standards and were therefore able to 
perform audits for lower fees. On the other hand, a majority was 
clearly troubled by the problems of applying the more complex 
standards established to meet the needs of users of the financial 
statements of publicly traded companies.
After considering these conflicting views, the task force rec­
ommended that certain disclosure requirements should not be 
regarded as part of generally accepted accounting principles and, 
therefore, should not be required of companies not registered 
with the SEC. At a meeting on February 8, 1977, the task force 
urged the FASB to draw such a distinction in imposing disclosure 
requirements. It recommended, however, that the same account­
ing measurement standards should apply to all companies, 
without exception.
The FASB initially took no position on the task force's sug­
gestions. When it seemed apparent that the FASB would not 
take action on the recommendations, a letter (dated June 24, 
1977) was sent in behalf of the AICPA Board of Directors 
inquiring about the FASB's intentions. An inconclusive response 
from the FASB on July 6, 1977, buttressed the belief that it was 
generally unsympathetic to the task force's recommendations. 
This perception was supported in a subsequent speech by the 
chairman of the FASB and an indication in FASB Statement no. 
14 that the board neither rejected nor accepted the recommen­
dations of the task force.
In a meeting on November 7, 1977, the AICPA Board of 
Directors decided that more aggressive action was necessary to 
achieve a satisfactory solution. It authorized the AICPA chairman 
to meet with the FASB to discuss the matter. If the FASB then 
failed to act, a proposal would be made to the Institute's Council
in May 1978 to give the Accounting Standards Executive Com­
mittee authority to establish relief from disclosures for closely 
held businesses. Such authority would be granted by an amending 
resolution under rule 203 of the code of professional ethics.
This action apparently had its intended effect. The subject of 
accounting principles for closely held companies was discussed 
at some length at a symposium on financial accounting and 
reporting held at Seaview, New Jersey, on November 19 through 
21, 1977. Some of the FASB members who were present partici­
pated in the discussion.
In April 1978 the FASB issued statement no. 21, exempting 
companies not registered with the SEC from compliance with 
APB Opinion no. 15 and FASB Statement no. 14, which required 
disclosures, respectively, of earnings per share and of financial 
data on business segments. This major breakthrough persuaded 
the AICPA Board of Directors that further action was unneces­
sary.
Considerable concern remained, however. Some practitioners 
felt that relief should be granted from some of the more complex 
measurement standards, such as those relating to the capitaliza­
tion of leases.
In November 1978 a special committee was appointed to 
study the problems of smaller and medium-sized accounting 
firms. In its final report, issued in October 1980, the committee 
recommended consideration of a comprehensive basic accounting 
method for small, privately held companies. In reporting on 
financial statements that are based on such a method, independ­
ent auditors would refer to the defined, comprehensive, basic 
accounting method rather than to generally accepted accounting 
principles. As of 1981 the committee's suggestion was under 
study, but no conclusions had been reached.1
The final word on this subject has not been written. The 
profession has refused, at least so far, to adopt a policy of 
exempting small and privately held companies from some of the 
more burdensome measurement standards. The problem can
1. In a discussion paper issued on December 28, 1981, the AICPA Special Committee on 
Accounting Standards Overload tentatively recommended that the FASB study the needs 
of users of financial statements of small businesses and reexamine certain of its pro­
nouncements with a view toward simplifying GAAP to render them more cost-effective 
to small, nonpublic businesses. The paper also presented a proposal for wider use of the 
income tax basis of accounting in appropriate situations.
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only get worse as the volume and complexity of accounting 
standards increase.
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Accounting Standards for State and Local 
Governments
Yet another thorny issue that arose during this period involved 
accounting standards for state and local governments. The severe 
fiscal crisis encountered by the city of New York, along with 
threats of similar difficulties in other cities, alarmed members of 
Congress. Various legislators worried about the lack of regulation 
of securities sales by state and local governments and about the 
inadequacies of these bodies' financial reports. The lack of uni­
formity and the deficiencies in the financial statements of gov­
ernmental units were also of great concern to the comptroller 
general and the U.S. General Accounting Office, which had 
responsibility to monitor the auditing of cities and states receiving 
revenue-sharing funds and other federal grants amounting to 
more than $80 billion a year.
Some accounting standards did exist in the form of the 
governmental accounting and financial reporting principles de­
veloped by the National Council of Governmental Accounting 
(NCGA), a group sponsored by the Municipal Finance Officer's 
Association (MFOA). These principles were contained in Govern­
mental Accounting, Auditing, and Financial Reporting, often referred 
to as the "blue book," which was published in 1968. Also, the 
AICPA Committee on Governmental Accounting and Auditing 
had issued an industry audit guide, which incorporated the 
NCGA standards within its accounting recommendations. There 
was no mechanism for enforcing compliance with these stand­
ards, however, and studies by several of the national CPA firms 
revealed that they were not being consistently followed.
Senator Harrison Williams, a member of the Senate Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs Subcommittee on Securities, pro­
posed legislation in 1978 to require cities and states that offered 
their securities for sale to the public to register with the SEC. 
This met with stiff opposition from state and local government 
officials, and the proposal was replaced in 1979 by a new one,
which would have established a federally financed governmental 
accounting standards board under the combined supervision of 
the SEC chairman, the comptroller general, and the secretary of 
the Treasury.
Meanwhile, the Financial Accounting Foundation Structure 
Committee suggested that the FASB should devote attention to 
this aspect of accounting standards. The FASB responded by 
commissioning Professor Robert Anthony to conduct a research 
study on accounting for nonprofit entities. After the study was 
completed in May 1978, the FASB developed a conceptional 
framework for accounting for nonprofit entities, which was 
adopted and issued as Statement of Accounting Concepts no. 4, 
Objectives of Financial Reporting by Nonbusiness Organizations. The 
statement left open the question of whether governmental units 
should be encompassed by such objectives.
The prospect of standards being set for state and local gov­
ernments by either the FASB or a federally funded standards 
board met with strong opposition, particularly from government 
representatives. The SEC felt that Senator Williams' proposal did 
not provide sufficient enforcement. The General Accounting 
Office was silent about the proposed legislation, but Comptroller 
General Elmer Staats stated his support for reconstitution of the 
NCGA as an independent, private-sector standard-setting body. 
The National Association of State Auditors, Controllers, and 
Treasurers (NASACT), the MFOA, and the NCGA also opposed 
the FASB's assumption of this role. They thought that the FASB 
was too committed to applying a commercial accounting model 
to government. Government officials were convinced that a 
different model was necessary to deal with the unique character­
istics of government.
The AICPA officers and Board of Directors viewed the con­
troversy with alarm. They worried that a federal accounting 
standards board might lead to a government takeover of all 
accounting standards. Furthermore, they believed that the NCGA 
was too dominated by government representatives to be able to 
set objective accounting standards. As a consequence, the board 
urged the Financial Accounting Foundation to convene a study 
group composed of members of the various interest groups to 
develop a proposal that would have general support.
With some reluctance, Financial Accounting Foundation Pres­
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ident Alva Way called a meeting on July 17, 1979, which was 
attended by representatives of the foundation, the FASB, the 
MFOA, the NCGA, the NASACT, the General Accounting Office, 
and the AICPA. The government representatives clearly would 
not accept the FASB's assumption of the standard-setting role. 
Instead, they shared a strong sentiment for a separate, small, 
full-time governmental accounting standards board sponsored 
by either the Financial Accounting Foundation or a similar private 
foundation.
After several more meetings, the group met with the foun­
dation's board of trustees on February 12, 1980, to determine 
whether the foundation would agree to sponsor a separate 
standards board along the proposed lines. The foundation re­
sponded in a letter dated March 13, 1980, indicating unwilling­
ness to sponsor a separate board but stating that it would 
consider supporting a structure that met certain criteria and that 
offered reasonable prospects for improved financial reporting by 
state and local governmental units.
A formal committee, the governmental accounting standards 
board organizing committee (GASBOC), was formed, and Robert 
Mautz, a professor at the University of Michigan, was persuaded 
to act as chairman. The committee included representatives of 
the MFOA, the NCGA, the NASACT, the General Accounting 
Office, the AICPA, and the Financial Accounting Foundation. 
Seven associations of state, county, and municipal officials sent 
representatives to the committee's meetings. By the end of 1980, 
the committee had completed a report recommending the estab­
lishment of a five-member, full-time governmental accounting 
standards board and a part-time advisory council under a new 
foundation, all of which would be virtually identical to the 
Financial Accounting Foundation, the FASB, and the Financial 
Accounting Standards Advisory Council. The report was pub­
lished on February 16, 1981, in preparation for public hearings 
to be held in Philadelphia on May 4 and 5, 1981. It left unresolved 
the manner in which the FASB and the proposed Governmental 
Accounting Standards Board would coordinate their activities and 
deal with questions of jurisdiction (for instance, standards for 
private-sector and government-owned nonprofit entities, such as 
utilities, hospitals, and universities, that perform similar opera­
tions).
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The issue of accounting standards for government is inescap­
ably controversial. Many CPAs would prefer to see all accounting 
standards set by a single body, the FASB, but people in govern­
ment have indicated that this would be unacceptable. Any 
attempt by the FASB to impose standards on government can be 
expected to meet with powerful opposition and to embroil the 
FASB in politics.
Future developments will determine whether the various 
groups with conflicting interests can successfully join forces to 
support an effective structure to set accounting standards for 
state and local governments.2
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The AICPA's Audit and Accounting Guides
Finally, during the late 1970s friction again developed between 
the FASB and the AICPA, this time in connection with the 
AICPA's auditing and accounting guides. In 1978 a Financial 
Accounting Standards Advisory Council committee, appointed 
to study the activities of AcSEC, recommended that the FASB 
assume full responsibility for the accounting portions of the 
special-industry guides. This was partly inspired by an SEC 
recommendation, contained in the commission's 1978 report to 
Congress, that a means be found to make the guides enforceable. 
The SEC had been disturbed by the fact that some CPA firms 
were not complying with the guides.
Both AcSEC and the AICPA Board of Directors expressed 
serious reservations about the likelihood that the FASB would 
maintain the guides on a timely basis. Nevertheless, they agreed 
to defer to the FASB. In Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards no. 32, issued in September 1979, the FASB announced 
its intention of assuming responsibility and declared that the 
accounting recommended in existing guides would be viewed as 
preferable to other alternatives until such time as the guides 
were modified by the FASB. Because of the provisions of Ac­
2. In a final report dated October 13, 1981, the GASBOC recommended that a separate 
standards board be established under the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF). The 
FAF trustees endorsed the GASBOC recommendations with certain reservations regarding 
operating details, and, early in 1982, appointed an advisory committee to develop specific 
proposals for implementation.
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counting Principles Board Opinion no. 20, the FASB's action 
enhanced the enforceability of the guides in those instances in 
which companies decided to change from one accounting method 
to another. By the end of 1980, the FASB had made only limited 
progress in reviewing the guides, and there were lingering 
doubts within the AICPA about whether the FASB would fulfill 
the responsibility it had assumed.
In the meantime, AcSEC had agreed to replace its Statements 
of Position with issues papers that would be submitted to the 
FASB for consideration. An uneasy truce was in effect.
The history of accounting standard setting during the 1970s was 
one of rapid and far-reaching changes in structure, a great deal 
of improvement in the quality of financial reporting, and contin­
uing vigilance to retain the process in the private sector under 
the FASB. On balance, the FASB has been successful in the face 
of enormous difficulties, representing a unique experiment in 
self-regulation.
CHAPTER 5
The Responsibilities of Auditors
Prio r  to the 1970s, the AICPA Committee on Auditing Pro­cedures defined the responsibilities of independent auditors 
in its Statements on Auditing Procedure. Even though the com­
mittee had been engaged in this work for more than thirty years, 
the flood of litigation against CPA firms in the early 1970s 
demonstrated that the appropriate role and responsibilities of 
auditors were by no means clear.
In many instances litigants and critics of the profession's 
performance did not distinguish between the adequacy of ac­
counting principles and the responsibilities of auditors. As a 
result, much of the public's attention focused on the setting of 
accounting standards, leaving the SEC, the courts, and the 
profession to sort out what could appropriately be expected of 
auditors.
Nevertheless, by the early 1970s there was a growing belief 
that independent auditors were not performing their roles satis­
factorily. Many users of financial statements considered an aud­
itor's opinion a guarantee that the financial statements were fully 
reliable. This attitude was reinforced by frequent stories in the 
business press. Many of the articles asserted that auditors had a 
duty not merely to determine compliance with generally accepted 
accounting principles but also to evaluate the overall fairness of 
financial statements. Seldom was it recognized that well executed 
management fraud can be extremely difficult if not impossible to 
detect.
The Equity Funding Case
It was in this environment that the story of Equity Funding's 
collapse hit the headlines in March 1973. The huge losses by
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investors in the company's securities, closely following a series 
of other business failures, dealt a shattering blow to the credibility 
of independent auditors. Everyone asked, “Where were the 
auditors?"
The AICPA Auditing Standards Division considered what 
actions to take to deal with this problem. Before the division 
reached a decision, however, SEC Chairman Bradford Cook 
summoned representatives of state insurance commissions, ac­
tuaries, life insurance companies, and the AICPA to a meeting 
in Washington on April 30, 1973, to discuss what went wrong at 
Equity Funding. Ernest Hicks, chairman of the auditing standards 
division and a partner of Arthur Young and Company, and I 
represented the Institute. During the course of the meeting, SEC 
officials pressured the AICPA representatives to reexamine aud­
itors' responsibilities to detect fraudulent transactions. One com­
missioner expressed the view that independent audits are of little 
value if they cannot be expected to uncover the type of massive 
fraud that occurred at Equity Funding.
I concluded that we could not afford to leave the meeting 
without giving some assurance that the profession would take 
appropriate action. We agreed, therefore, that the AICPA would 
immediately conduct a study of the Equity Funding case to 
determine what, if any, corrective action the profession should 
take. The meeting adjourned with the promise that a follow-up 
meeting would be held within three or four months to determine 
what progress was being made to prevent similar problems in 
the future.
This was promptly reported to AICPA President LeRoy Lay­
ton, who fully agreed that a study should be conducted. At a 
meeting on May 4, 1973, the AICPA Board of Directors approved 
the appointment of a special committee to study the issue of 
whether auditing standards should be changed in the light of 
Equity Funding. The committee was specifically directed not to 
pass judgment on whether the auditors involved in the case had 
complied with the profession's standards; that determination was 
to be left to the professional ethics division, which would follow 
its normal due-process procedures.
Recognizing that the study's findings might be used in liti­
gation, I notified the heads of the two principal CPA firms affected 
by the action being taken. While both would have preferred to
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avoid a special review of the case, they fully understood the need 
for the AICPA to act immediately. They agreed to cooperate to 
the extent permitted by the advice of their respective legal 
counsels.
On May 7, 1973, the AICPA Council was advised of the 
board's action, and the Institute issued a press release announc­
ing the authorization of the special committee.
Marvin L. Stone, a former president of the Institute, was 
persuaded to chair the committee. Shortly thereafter, the follow­
ing members were appointed to serve with him: J. T. Arenberg, 
Jr., a partner of Arthur Andersen and Company and an expert 
on insurance companies; Leo Burger, a partner of McGladrey, 
Hansen, Dunn and Company and a former member of the auditing 
procedures committee; Robert C. Holsen, partner of Ernst and 
Ernst and a former member of the auditing procedures commit­
tee; and A. E. MacKay, a partner of Main Lafrentz and Company, 
a CPA, and a lawyer. Assisting the committee were three mem­
bers of the staff: myself; Donald Schneeman, the general counsel; 
and Donald Adams, AICPA director of computer services. The 
Institute's legal counsel, David Isbell, a partner of Covington 
and Burling, also participated in the committee's deliberations, 
as did Andrew Barr, retired chief accountant of the SEC and an 
AICPA consultant, and Robert Harden, the head of his own firm 
and an expert on audits of life insurance companies.
The committee did not seek to audit the financial statements 
involved in the fraud, nor did it examine the audit working 
papers of the CPA firms that had audited Equity Funding. It did, 
however, gather extensive information about the nature of the 
fraud from the auditors appointed by the bankruptcy court and 
from the trustee's reports. The committee also interviewed key 
individuals, such as the conservator appointed by the court, and 
examined some of the records of the Equity Funding entities.
The committee concluded that the fraud could have been 
detected by the application of existing auditing standards and 
procedures. It also stated that, with minor exceptions, no changes 
in such standards were necessary in the light of the Equity 
Funding case and that the profession's position regarding audi­
tors' responsibility to detect fraud was sound. Nevertheless, the 
committee urged that the standard relating to the detection of 
fraud be restated in more positive terms to avoid public misun­
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derstanding. The existing standard specified that the audit of 
financial statements was not designed to detect fraud, although 
fraud might be uncovered in the application of auditing proce­
dures.
True to its charge, the committee flatly denied having at­
tempted to assess fault on the part of the auditors. By reaffirming 
the adequacy of auditing standards, however, the committee 
could not avoid calling into question the performance of Equity 
Funding's auditors. This dilemma made the committee's work 
especially difficult and controversial. Several AICPA members 
urged the board of directors to terminate the study without 
issuance of a report. Heated debates took place within the 
committee itself. Ultimately, two committee members dissented 
to the publication of the report prior to the end of litigation on 
the grounds that the rights of litigants might be unfairly affected. 
There was also concern that additional information might come 
to light during the litigation that would have affected the com­
mittee's conclusions.
On two separate occasions the board considered the objections 
being raised to the issuance of a report, and on both occasions 
the board reaffirmed its original authorization and charge to the 
committee. Final approval for publication was given on February 
27, 1975, subject to clearance by the auditing standards executive 
committee (AudSEC) regarding any inconsistencies with its official 
pronouncements. This action followed appearances before the 
board by representatives of the two auditing firms involved and 
an oral report by Chairman Stone that the committee had com­
pleted its work and wished to be discharged. Mr. Stone stated 
that a majority of the committee believed that immediate publi­
cation of the report would be in the best interest of the public 
and the profession.
Clearance by the auditing standards executive committee was 
not completed until mid 1975, and in late June the heads of the 
two firms that had been the principal auditors of the Equity 
Funding entities again objected to publication of the report. Their 
letters to AICPA Chairman Philip L. Defliese asserted that a 
professional association should not engage in activities that 
would be detrimental to the interests of one or more of its 
members. They argued that the report was too late to accomplish 
any public good and could only harm the two firms.
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The board concluded that the interests of individual firms 
should not be permitted to stand in the way of the greater good 
of the profession. As a result, the report was finally published.
The Institute's action was a courageous and appropriate 
response to the news reports and articles criticizing the effective­
ness of independent auditors. It was, however, too little and too 
late to halt the adverse publicity or to reverse the erosion of 
public confidence in the profession. Something more had to be 
done.
The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities
Concern about the profession's deteriorating image had led to a 
proposal that the AICPA Board of Directors meet with a group 
of the profession's leaders to explore what might be done to 
cope with the problem. President Layton convened such a 
meeting in Atlanta on October 12, 1973.
The discussion at the meeting covered a number of questions 
but focused mainly on the fact that public expectations of auditors 
exceeded what the profession considered appropriate. Ivan Bull, 
head of McGladrey, Hansen, Dunn and Company, suggested 
that a public commission be appointed to study the proper 
responsibilities of auditors. This idea gained broad support, and 
by the end of the meeting there was general agreement about 
the size and makeup of a proposed commission and the nature 
of the study to be conducted. The participants hoped that an 
impartial report would reduce the gap in understanding between 
the public and the profession about what independent auditors 
could reasonably be expected to achieve.
Following the meeting, a detailed proposal and charge was 
prepared. This was reviewed by the board on January 3, 1974, 
and a revised version was approved on February 20. The board 
agreed that the chairman of the commission should be a non- 
CPA, and it authorized Samuel A. Derieux, who had become the 
Institute chairman, to begin contacting potential candidates to 
serve on the commission.
The recruiting process proved to be more difficult than antic­
ipated, and it was not until October that a full complement of 
three practicing CPAs, one academician, and three non-CPAs
was in place. Manuel F. Cohen, former chairman of the SEC and 
a partner of Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering, a Washington law 
firm, agreed to serve as chairman of what became known as the 
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities. Serving with him 
were Walter S. Holmes, Jr., chief executive officer of C.I.T. 
Financial Corporation; LeRoy Layton, CPA, and head of Main 
Lafrentz and Company; William C. Norby, financial analyst and 
member of Duff, Anderson and Clark (investment researchers); 
Lee J. Seidler, CPA, professor of accounting at New York Uni­
versity; Kenneth W. Stringer, CPA, a partner of Haskins and 
Sells and a former member of the auditing standards executive 
committee; and John J. van Benton, CPA, head of George S. 
Olive and Company.
The commission spent its first several months interviewing 
representatives of various interests and defining the issues. It 
also engaged several researchers to gather and analyze facts and 
to prepare reports on a number of the more important questions 
relating to the performance of independent auditors.
In September 1975 the commission issued a paper, Statement 
of Issues: Scope and Organization of the Study of Auditors' Responsi­
bilities. It presented a series of questions about the issues under 
consideration, and it invited individuals and organizations to 
submit position papers, research results, and other information 
relevant to the commission's study.
The study progressed slowly, partly because the commission 
had to await the results of the several research projects that it 
had initiated. It was not until April 1977 that a Report of Tentative 
Conclusions was published. The report served as a basis for public 
hearings held in Washington, D.C., beginning on June 21, 1977.
It was a great tragedy that Chairman Manuel F. Cohen died 
suddenly on June 16, 1977, and could not see the results of the 
project to which he had devoted so much time and effort. His 
keen interest and balanced leadership had contributed heavily to 
the success of a very difficult study. The profession is indebted 
to him for his willingness to undertake the task.
Professor Seidler, who had been deputy chairman, assumed 
Mr. Cohen's responsibilities for the duration of the study. He 
worked closely with Douglas R. Carmichael, the commission's 
research director, in drafting the commission's tentative and final 
reports.
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The Report of Tentative Conclusions contained a long list of 
recommendations. Since these would all require a response by 
the profession, as well as by other groups, a special AICPA 
committee was appointed in March 1977 to consider just what 
actions should be taken by whom. Samuel A. Derieux acted as 
chairman of this project, and the eight other committee members 
included representatives of the key senior committees affected 
by the commission's recommendations.
At its first meeting, on March 28, 1977, the committee decided 
that the AICPA should not testify on its own behalf at the 
commission's public hearings in June but, instead, should await 
the commission's final report. The committee also decided to 
seek the views of AICPA Council members on the major issues 
at the spring meeting on May 10, 1977. In addition, the committee 
offered suggestions on how to respond to possible questions 
about the commission's recommendations that might arise during 
the course of U.S. Senate subcommittee hearings scheduled for 
June.
The committee divided the commission's conclusions into 
three broad categories: (1) recommendations requiring auditing 
standards executive committee study and implementation, (2) 
policy questions requiring decisions by the AICPA Board of 
Directors, and (3) policy questions requiring decisions and im­
plementation by other organizations or, alternatively, by the 
AICPA Board of Directors.
In July 1977 the committee offered its conclusions about those 
policy questions requiring decisions by the AICPA board. At a 
meeting on July 21, 1977, the board considered the committee's 
recommendations and took several actions. First of all, it re­
quested the auditing standards executive committee to give early 
consideration to the development of an improved auditor's re­
port. It also approved the appointment of special committees to 
do the following:
• Develop appropriate guidelines for management reports on 
their responsibility for financial statements.
• Study the structure of the auditing standards executive com­
mittee and consider how auditing standards should be re­
structured to give more attention to the special needs of 
practitioners serving nonpublic companies.
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• Develop a model statement of conduct that could serve as the 
basis for corporate policy statements on employee conduct.
• Develop criteria for the evaluation of internal accounting 
controls.
• Study the circumstances under which names should be pub­
lished in connection with disciplinary hearings and actions.
The board approved the appointment of a standing committee to 
develop analyses of types of fraud and methods of detecting 
them. It approved actions to inform non-CPA accounting edu­
cators about professional developments. And, also, it requested 
the accounting standards executive committee to study the fea­
sibility of developing criteria for determining under which 
unusual circumstances the application of generally accepted ac­
counting principles may result in financial statements that are 
misleading.
In addition, the board approved in principle the desirability 
of several new reports and services. These included management 
reports on their responsibilities for financial statements, reports 
by the management of SEC companies to their audit committees 
or boards of directors on systems of internal accounting controls, 
and a new service whereby auditors would review what man­
agement has done to ensure compliance with policy statements 
on employee conduct and report their findings to the audit 
committee or board of directors. The board approved in principle 
the periodic publication of statistical summaries of all disciplinary 
matters pending before the professional ethics division and the 
publication of the names of all AICPA members found guilty of 
charges by a disciplinary trial board. Similarly, it approved in 
principle actions to encourage the establishment of independent 
audit committees and the development of an ethical rule to 
prohibit both the recruitment of directors and the placement by 
CPA firms of former employees in such positions.
All of these decisions were in response to specific recommen­
dations by the commission and were based on the suggestions 
of the special committee. Some of the commission's recommen­
dations were not adopted, and others were implemented in 
modified form.
Overall, most members of the profession, including the AICPA
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governing bodies, reacted favorably to the commission's tentative 
report. Nevertheless, there was significant opposition to many 
specific recommendations. This apparent contradiction probably 
resulted from the fact that the commission's report was not as 
critical of the profession as many CPAs anticipated it might be.
The commission completed its work in November 1977 and 
published its final Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations early 
in 1978. After considering a large number of responses to its 
tentative report and public hearings, the commission made few 
changes in its preliminary conclusions. Thus, the actions of the 
AICPA board remained unchanged.
On November 3, 1977, the board acted on the suggestions of 
the special committee regarding the remaining commission rec­
ommendations. It requested the accounting standards executive 
committee to consider whether financial statements should in­
clude a separate note on uncertainties and, if so, to request the 
FASB to require it. It approved the appointment of a special 
committee to develop models of reporting on litigation in finan­
cial reports. It requested the special committee on management 
reporting to deal with a requirement for publicly traded compa­
nies to disclose information relating to auditor changes similar 
to the requirement in SEC Form 8-K. Lastly, it approved the 
concept that auditors be approved by corporate audit committees 
or boards of directors and that auditors be present and available 
to answer questions at the annual meetings of shareholders.
In its final report, the commission stated that it had inter­
preted its charge "to be a mandate to study all aspects of the 
independent audit function and to provide recommendations to, 
and for the benefit of, all groups interested in [it], including 
users of financial statements, management, auditors, and regu­
latory bodies." The commission fulfilled this charge, and it 
probably helped reduce the gap that existed between what the 
public expected of auditors and what auditors could and should 
reasonably expect to accomplish.
It would be unrealistic, however, to expect that the gap can 
ever be totally eliminated; the public is likely to always want and 
expect more than auditors can reasonably provide within practical 
limitations.
The report and testimony by the members of this prestigious, 
independent commission probably helped mollify the Senate
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Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management. Like­
wise, the commission's report was cited in proposals and state­
ments by the SEC. Equally important was the influence that the 
commission had on the attitudes of public accountants and the 
fact that it caused the AICPA to take actions that it might 
otherwise not have taken.
The Institute had responded to a credibility crisis by the 
appointment of the commission. Three years later it had a report 
that was generally well received but that contained a number of 
recommendations with which it could not agree or that it could 
not implement by itself. Nevertheless, on balance, the exercise 
had been beneficial. It had blunted the more extreme criticisms 
of the profession and had moved the profession toward the 
assumption of additional responsibility.
Formation of the Auditing Standards Board
The commission's report included a suggestion that the AICPA 
Auditing Standards Executive Committee be restructured, pre­
sumably to speed up the standard-setting process and to make 
it more objective. Curiously, the report acknowledged that "the 
auditing standards-setting process has worked reasonably well" 
but went on to recommend replacing it with a smaller, full-time, 
compensated committee with a larger budget and staff. The report 
did not provide a rationale for the need for a change.
The AICPA Board of Directors appointed a special committee 
to deal with this proposal. It was composed entirely of former 
elected heads of the AICPA and was chaired by Walter J. 
Oliphant, former head of Arthur Andersen and Company. Serv­
ing with him were Ivan O. Bull, Philip L. Defliese, Samuel A. 
Derieux, and Louis M. Kessler.
The committee began its work on August 30, 1977. Following 
customary procedures, it sought the views of a wide range of 
individuals who had reason to be interested in the setting of 
auditing standards. Interviews were held, questionnaires were 
circulated, and public hearings were held in New York City on 
February 2 and 3, 1978. The committee also made an intensive 
study of how well the auditing standards committee had func­
tioned in the past.
By late February 1978, the committee had reached tentative
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conclusions and drafted a report. It recommended the retention 
of the part-time standard-setting body, but it suggested renaming 
the body the Auditing Standards Board. The board should 
comprise fifteen members, not all of whom should necessarily 
be members of the AICPA. The adoption of standards should 
require nine affirmative votes. Board members should be paid 
for their time if they devote at least 50 percent of their time to 
the work of the board. This reimbursement should be automatic 
rather than upon request. The committee also suggested the 
establishment of an advisory council, consisting of from twelve 
to eighteen members drawn from various interest groups, to 
monitor and provide suggestions on the work of the board. 
Finally, the committee urged that the auditing standards staff 
should be expanded, that it include a director of research, and 
that it be headed by a well paid executive director.
These proposals were reported to the AICPA Board of Direc­
tors on March 2, 1978. The board postponed any action until it 
could obtain the views of Council members at a series of regional 
meetings later in the month. Those meetings revealed strong 
support for most of the committee's recommendations. The 
proposal to permit non-AICPA members to serve on the auditing 
standards board, however, was overwhelmingly opposed.
The Institute's general membership reflected a diversity of 
opinion about the committee's conclusions. Some members and 
a few of the large firms favored a full-time, paid board, while 
others preferred a full-time, paid chairman with part-time board 
members. In fact, at one point some committee members had 
favored a full-time chairman.
On May 6, 1978, the AICPA Board of Directors acted on the 
committee's recommendations. It endorsed the committee's re­
port with a few exceptions: The Auditing Standards Board should 
comprise solely AICPA members; the advisory council should 
consist of not more than nine members, and the chief staff officer 
should be a vice president for auditing. Also, the board concluded 
that reimbursement for the time and expenses of Auditing 
Standards Board members should be under the existing Council 
policy for expense reimbursement and should be made only 
upon request.
The board sought the immediate approval of the Council at 
its meeting on May 10, 1978. The Council debated a resolution
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to adopt the committee's report with the modifications proposed 
by the board. Amending motions regarding the size, voting, and 
compensation of the new Auditing Standards Board all failed, 
although the Council did adopt an amendment to restore the 
size of the proposed advisory council to between twelve and 
eighteen members, as recommended by the committee. The 
resolution was adopted, marking another major milestone in the 
profession's history.
Following the Council's action, the board adopted a policy of 
compensating members of the Auditing Standards Board for 
their time, up to a maximum of 1,000 hours a year, at $25 an 
hour. The board hoped that this would encourage members from 
smaller firms to serve on the standards board.
The committee's final report was published as an AICPA 
booklet in May 1978. Readers interested in the rationale under­
lying the recommended changes in the structure of the audit- 
standard-setting process are referred to that report.
In August 1978 a committee was formed to nominate members 
to serve on the new Auditing Standards Advisory Council, and 
by January 1979 a fourteen-member advisory council had been 
appointed. The first chairman was Alan B. Levenson, a partner 
in the Washington law office of Fulbright and Jaworski and a 
former head of the SEC Corporation Finance Division. Included 
on the council were representatives of various interest groups 
outside the profession, as well as four CPAs engaged in public 
practice. It was the committee's belief, supported by the AICPA 
Board of Directors, that at least a few practicing CPAs should be 
included to provide expert knowledge about auditing matters.
The council was particularly influential in pressing the Audit­
ing Standards Board to develop a proposal for a revised auditor's 
report. However, the proposal, issued as an exposure draft on 
September 10, 1980, met with overwhelming opposition, and no 
changes were made in the existing form of auditor's report.
It is too soon to judge whether the restructuring of the 
auditing-standards-setting process was sufficiently beneficial to 
warrant the effort. There is certainly reason to doubt whether 
changes were necessary. In 1978, though, the climate in Wash­
ington seemed to dictate that the AICPA should not completely 
reject the suggestions of the Commission on Auditors' Respon­
sibilities on this matter.
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Recodification of the Securities Laws
Over the years there have been few objections to the AICPA's 
setting of auditing standards. The auditing standards division 
has maintained close working relationships with the chief ac­
countant of the SEC, and any differences have been resolved 
without major confrontations. Few, if any, informed observers 
would assert that there are serious gaps in existing auditing 
standards. Any criticisms are generally directed at the perform­
ance of individual auditors rather than at the standards with 
which they are expected to comply.
Nevertheless, in 1973, when John C. Burton was chief ac­
countant of the SEC, a serious attempt was made by him to 
obtain explicit statutory authority for the SEC to set auditing 
standards. This came about in connection with a proposed 
recodification of the federal securities statutes under the spon­
sorship of the American Law Institute (ALI).
The authority of the SEC to set auditing standards under the 
present securities statutes is unclear. The law explicitly grants 
the SEC authority to specify the required form of auditor's report 
but is silent with respect to the auditing procedures to be 
followed. To clarify this matter, Mr. Burton convinced Professor 
Louis Loss, the person drafting the ALI recodification, to include 
explicit authority regarding auditing standards in the language 
of the proposed recodification. Provision was also made for the 
SEC to set requirements for practice before it by accountants.
The AICPA vigorously opposed these proposed changes since 
the provisions were obviously designed to give the SEC more 
direct control over the auditing function. AICPA personnel met 
during 1973 and early 1974 with Professor Loss, Mr. Burton, and 
A. A. Sommer, Jr., one of the SEC commissioners, in an attempt 
to persuade them to agree to deletion of the provisions. David 
Isbell of Covington and Burling, the AICPA's legal counsel, was 
particularly helpful in these negotiations. Mr. Isbell presented 
the AICPA's views at meetings of the American Bar Association 
and the ALI.
After extended discussions Mr. Sommer was persuaded that 
it would be better not to include the new language in the 
securities laws recodification. He apparently recognized that it 
would damage the generally constructive relationships between
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the SEC and the profession and decided that it was unnecessary 
to be more explicit about the commission's authority to regulate 
auditors' performance.
Professor Loss acceded to this view and deleted the contro­
versial language from the draft of the recodification. A footnote 
was included to explain the modification, indicating that the 
intention was to leave the SEC's existing authority unchanged. 
Thus, the SEC's control over auditing standards would remain 
unclear until it was tested in the courts.
The ALI recodification included other sections that would 
have a direct bearing on auditors' exposure to legal liability. One 
provision would limit the liability of experts, including auditors, 
under certain conditions. To monitor the proposed changes 
affecting auditors, the AICPA appointed a special committee 
composed of the house counsels of the large firms. This group 
conveyed a number of suggested changes to Professor Loss 
during his development of the pertinent sections of the recodi­
fication.
The recodification proved to be a long and difficult process. 
Not until late 1980 did the SEC reach tentative agreement with 
Professor Loss on various changes it believed were necessary. 
By then significant segments of the securities bar were saying 
the project's time had come and gone. Few people had any 
enthusiasm for a sweeping revision of the securities statutes. 
Legislation had not been introduced by early 1981, and the 
inauguration of the Reagan administration and a Congress ded­
icated to deregulation made the introduction of such legislation 
even more doubtful.
The Question of Audit Committees
Another matter involving auditing standards and the statutory 
authority of the SEC was the proposal to require all SEC com­
panies to establish audit committees composed of outside direc­
tors. During the 1970s the SEC sought to improve corporate 
governance and accountability. In a May 11, 1976, letter, the SEC 
urged the New York Stock Exchange to impose an audit com­
mittee requirement on its listed companies, a requirement that 
the exchange adopted effective July 1, 1978.
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Harold Williams, who became chairman of the SEC in 1977, 
sought to extend this mandate to other SEC registrants. He urged 
in congressional hearings in 1977 and 1978 that the profession 
make the existence of an audit committee a necessary condition 
for the issuance of an unqualified opinion on financial statements. 
A similar proposal had been made by Harvey Kapnick, head of 
Arthur Andersen and Company, who suggested that the AICPA 
adopt either an auditing standard or a rule of ethics on inde­
pendence to impose an audit committee requirement.
The pressures from the SEC led to a proposal that the Institute 
appoint a special committee to consider the adoption of an audit 
committee requirement. On September 1 6 , 1977, the AICPA Board 
of Directors authorized the appointment of such a committee to 
be chaired by Robert D. Neary, a top partner of Ernst and Ernst 
(now Ernst and Whinney). Two months earlier the board had 
adopted a policy statement, consistent with the AICPA's rec­
ommendation adopted in 1967, urging Institute members to 
encourage corporations to establish audit committees.
The special committee began its work by distributing an issues 
paper seeking the views of all interested parties. It also held a 
public hearing on May 31, 1978. Most respondents, while favor­
ing audit committees, believed that a requirement by the AICPA 
was unnecessary, and they questioned the Institute's authority 
to impose such a requirement. The opinion of the Institute's legal 
counsel was that the AICPA's authority was dubious at best.
Virtually all CPA firms smaller than the eight largest were 
very vocal in opposition to the AICPA's advocacy of audit 
committees. They felt that audit committees were causing com­
panies to replace their smaller firm auditors with nationally 
recognized firms. Allegedly, a competitive disadvantage of the 
smaller firms resulted primarily from the outside directors' belief 
that their safest course of action was to retain only the most 
widely known auditing firms for protection from criticism in the 
event of an audit failure.
The committee concluded that an audit committee require­
ment was not necessary either to auditor independence or to the 
conduct of independent audits. Since auditors could report di­
rectly to boards of directors, the existence of audit committees 
was not imperative. On September 21, 1978, the committee 
reported its conclusion to the board, and the board concurred.
When the AICPA informed the SEC of its decision, Chairman 
Williams expressed keen disappointment. He apparently had 
hoped that the profession would accomplish what the SEC might 
not have the legal authority to do through its own rule-making 
procedures under the securities statutes. Many observers be­
lieved that an audit committee requirement by the SEC would 
not withstand legal challenge.
Meanwhile, to counteract possible discrimination on the basis 
of size, the Institute's board issued a policy statement on July 
13, 1978, urging audit committees and corporate boards not to 
use size as a principal criterion when selecting auditors. This 
action may have provided some comfort to the aggrieved CPA 
firms, but it did not solve the long-standing problem of displace­
ment of smaller firms by larger ones. Nothing short of statutory 
authority for a governmental agency to appoint the auditors of 
corporations might solve the displacement problem, which con­
tinues to nag the profession. Such a cure would almost certainly 
be worse than the inequity it was intended to eliminate. In the 
end, the profession will probably have to become resigned to 
living with the discomforts of competition in a free enterprise 
system.
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SEC Requirements Regarding Auditors
During the 1970s the SEC imposed other requirements related to 
auditors. Now, when a client changes accounting methods, the 
auditor must provide an opinion regarding the preferability of 
the new accounting method. This requirement is contained in 
Accounting Series Release no. 177.
The SEC also proposed that registrants should disclose certain 
types of information relating to auditors. Two such proposals, 
neither of which was adopted, would have required disclosures 
in proxy statements of auditors' fees and information regarding 
civil and criminal litigation and administrative disciplinary pro­
ceedings against auditors. One important disclosure requirement 
was imposed by the SEC beginning in 1971. It mandated that 
registrants describe, on SEC Form 8-K, certain disagreements 
about the application of accounting principles when there is a 
change in auditors. The former auditor must furnish a letter to
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the commission stating whether he agrees or disagrees with the 
registrant's representations. This requirement was designed to 
discourage the practice of shopping for accounting principles. 
The rules, which were modified in 1974 and again in 1976, have 
generally worked well.
Accounting and Review Services
Another development of major significance to auditing had its 
origins in a 1975 letter from the Connecticut Society of CPAs to 
the Institute, recommending that a separate senior committee be 
established to set guidelines for engagements involving unau­
dited financial statements. Many smaller firms serving predomi­
nantly small, privately held clients believed that the auditing 
standards executive committee was too preoccupied with the 
problems of auditing the large, publicly traded companies regis­
tered with the SEC. As a result they believed that engagements 
involving unaudited financial statements were receiving too little 
attention and were being saddled with inappropriate standards.
The board was reluctant to authorize a separate committee 
because of the potential jurisdictional conflicts that might arise. 
Nevertheless, there was sympathy for the problems being raised, 
and on October 10, 1975, the board directed that a subcommittee 
of AudSEC be established to deal with unaudited engagements. 
The new unit was designated the accounting and review services 
subcommittee in order to avoid any confusion about the circum­
stances under which CPAs were associated with unaudited 
financial statements. We decided to seek a prominent CPA from 
a smaller firm who had no prior service with AudSEC to chair 
the new subcommittee. This would provide a clean break with 
past efforts to deal with unaudited engagements. William R. 
Gregory, head of a local firm in Tacoma, Washington, and later 
to become chairman of the Institute, fit the criteria and agreed 
to serve as chairman of the new nine-member subcommittee.
Beginning in 1976 the subcommittee defined two specific types 
of services involving unaudited financial statements: compilation 
and review. The committee developed specific procedures and 
accompanying accountants' reports for both types of engage­
ments, and the draft of a first Statement on Standards for
Accounting and Review Services (SSARS) was exposed for com­
ment.
As might be expected, the new approach of providing differ­
ent levels of assurance on defined types of engagements involv­
ing association by CPAs with financial statements attracted a 
great deal of attention and controversy. Bank lending officers, 
through the Robert Morris Associates, objected to various aspects 
of the proposals on the grounds that they would be confused 
and shortchanged by the differing levels of assurance. Some 
CPAs opposed the concept of limited assurance on the reliability 
of financial statements. Other CPAs worried that clients would 
substitute review engagements for full audits. Because of the 
many comments and objections, a final statement was not pub­
lished until December 1978.
By that time the status of the subcommittee had changed. It 
had become increasingly obvious that many local practitioners 
strongly supported a separate senior committee status to deal 
with accounting and review services. On July 21, 1977, the board 
recommended to Council that a senior committee on accounting 
and review services be established. This recommendation was 
approved by Council on September 17, 1977.
The creation of the new senior committee presented the 
potential for serious jurisdictional disputes between it and AudSEC. 
Both committees dealt with the association of CPAs with unau­
dited financial statements, depending on the nature of the client 
and the context within which the financial statements appeared. 
Predictably, disputes arose between the two committees almost 
immediately. A joint task force succeeded in resolving some of 
the issues, but others required decisions by the board of directors. 
The board directed that association with unaudited financial 
statements of any entity controlled by a publicly traded company 
should fall under the jurisdiction of AudSEC.
As the date for publication of SSARS no. 1 approached, the 
accounting and review services committee suddenly realized that 
there was no provision for the enforceability of its standards 
under the Institute's rules of conduct. To remedy this oversight, 
the committee urged the board to endorse its designation by 
Council resolution as the committee to promulgate technical 
standards enforceable under rule 204 of the rules of conduct for 
accounting and review services. This proposal was approved by
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the board on March 1, 1979, and by the Council on May 7, 1979. 
Thus, members of the AICPA became subject to discipline for 
failure to comply with the committee's pronouncements on 
standards.
The committee published SSARS no. 2, dealing with compar­
ative financial statements, in October 1979, and it had several 
additional matters under consideration during 1980. By early 
1981, however, it was becoming apparent that the committee's 
task was limited. The need for more attention to nonaudit 
engagements had abated, and there was reason to question 
whether the committee would continue to be necessary in the 
future.
New Statements on Auditing Standards
During the 1970s the auditing standards committee and its 
successor, the AICPA Auditing Standards Board, addressed a 
great number of auditor-responsibility issues, many of which 
resulted in the publication of new Statements on Auditing Stand­
ards. Several of these issues demand at least limited discussion.
Lawyers' Representation Letters. One such issue involved lawyers' 
representation letters. The lawyers of audit clients became alarmed 
about their exposure to liability for representations made to 
auditors regarding their clients' contingent legal liabilities. After 
extended debate and negotiations between individual law and 
CPA firms, and between the AICPA and the American Bar 
Association, compromise procedures were developed. In January 
1976 AudSEC issued SAS no. 12, Inquiry of a Client's Lawyer 
Concerning Litigation, Claims, and Assessments, describing proce­
dures to be followed.
Responsibility of Auditors to Detect Errors and Irregularities (Fraud). 
Another issue involved auditors' responsibility to detect errors 
and irregularities. The report on the Equity Funding case caused 
AudSEC to issue SAS no. 16 in January 1977 to define more 
clearly the responsibilities of auditors for the detection of fraud.
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Reports by Auditors on Interim Financial Statements of SEC Registrants. 
The SEC, in Accounting Series Release no. 177, adopted a 
requirement for certain large registrants to disclose selected 
quarterly financial data in notes to their financial statements in 
their filings with the commission. The release required inde­
pendent auditors to review and report on the data, following 
proposed review and reporting procedures. The large CPA firms 
and the AICPA generally objected to this new responsibility. The 
SEC prevailed in its requirement but deferred to the profession's 
standards for review and reporting procedures. Those standards 
were contained in SAS no. 10, issued in December 1975, and in 
SAS no. 13, issued in May 1976. Both were superseded by SAS 
no. 24, Review of Interim Financial Information, published in March
1979.
Reports by Auditors on Internal Accounting Controls. Other standards 
involved auditors' reports on internal accounting controls. The 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 required SEC registrants 
to maintain systems that are adequate to meet certain specified 
objectives, and this requirement generated client requests for 
reviews of their internal accounting control systems by their 
independent auditors. A special AICPA committee developed 
proposed criteria for evaluation of internal accounting controls. 
In August 1977 AudSEC issued SAS no. 20, requiring auditors 
to report any material internal accounting control weaknesses 
detected during the course of audits to the clients' boards of 
directors or audit committees. Subsequently, in July 1980, AudSEC 
adopted SAS no. 30, which set standards for reviews and reports 
on systems of internal accounting control that are performed by 
auditors in connection with various types of defined engage­
ments.
Supplementary Information Disclosures in Financial Reports. During 
the decade the SEC and the FASB imposed requirements for the 
disclosure of various types of supplementary information in the 
footnotes to financial statements and in financial reports outside 
the financial statements. These disclosures were covered in 
several pronouncements. Statements no. 18 and 21 dealt with 
footnote disclosures regarding, respectively, replacement costs 
and segments of a business. Statements no. 27 and 28 dealt with
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disclosures outside financial statements regarding the effects of 
changing prices, and statements no. 27 and 33 provided guidance 
regarding oil and gas reserve disclosures.
Reviews by Auditors of Client Financial Forecasts. During the decade, 
the SEC reversed its long-standing policy prohibiting the publi­
cation of financial forecasts by registrants and began to encourage 
the disclosure of such information. The AICPA Accounting 
Standards Executive Committee developed recommended pro­
cedures for reporting, and the management advisory services 
executive committee issued procedures for the development of 
forecasts. Although AudSEC did not prepare auditing standards, 
it did issue a Guide for a Review of a Financial Forecast in the fall of 
1980. The publication of financial forecasts and auditors' reports 
on reviews remains extremely rare even though the SEC provided 
legal liability safe harbor provisions in its release.
Without question, the responsibilities of auditors were signifi­
cantly expanded during the decade. New duties were imposed 
in relation to such things as interim financial statements, internal 
accounting controls, opining on the preferability of accounting 
principles, and disclosures of a variety of supplementary financial 
information. Much of the pressure for these changes originated 
with an aggressive SEC, which was responding to a rash of major 
business failures and a consequent loss of confidence in financial 
reporting. Other pressures grew out of litigation against auditors 
and court decisions that tended to extend the responsibilities of 
the profession.
Because of the huge amounts of liability at stake, the profes­
sion moved deliberately if grudgingly to meet the public's rising 
expectations but resisted the more extreme demands for auditors 
to provide greater assurance on the reliability of financial state­
ments than is reasonably possible. The trend of the 1970s toward 
more auditor responsibility is expected to continue because of 
continuing growth in the public's demands for accountability. 
Thus, the profession will have an opportunity to play an increas­
ingly important role, providing it judiciously accepts the respon­
sibilities that the public seeks to impose.
CHAPTER 6
Ethics and Enforcement
Prio r  to the 1970s the principal emphasis of the profession's disciplinary effort had been directed toward the restriction of 
what were viewed as unprofessional competitive practices. Rules 
such as those prohibiting advertising, solicitation, competitive 
bidding, engagement in incompatible occupations simultaneously 
with the practice of public accounting, and encroachment on the 
practice of other CPAs were based on the belief that such practices 
would erode the independence of CPAs acting as independent 
auditors. Other rules, such as the prohibition of the pirating of 
other CPA firms' employees, were intended to maintain harmony 
among practitioners in order to ensure a strong profession capable 
of fulfilling its responsibilities to the public.
Considerable emphasis was also placed on the independence 
of auditors.
Generally, the profession handled few complaints relating to 
compliance with accounting and auditing pronouncements. In­
deed, the rules of conduct did not explicitly require AICPA 
members to follow the opinions of the Accounting Principles 
Board.
Drastic changes took place during the 1970s. Virtually all 
prohibitions against competitive practices were repealed under 
heavy pressure from the U.S. Department of Justice, and the 
enforcement of compliance with the profession's technical stand­
ards achieved paramount importance. Largely, the importance 
of these changes paralleled that of the developments in the 
setting of accounting standards. The shift in disciplinary empha­
sis was less visible to the public because it was mainly an 
intraprofessional matter; nevertheless, it was an important de­
velopment because it represented a drastic departure from the
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profession's traditional beliefs about competitive practices, and 
portions of the internal turmoil caused by the changes were still 
present at the end of the decade.
Compliance With Accounting Principles and 
Practice in Corporate Form
The upheaval began in 1969 with the struggle to make compliance 
with generally accepted accounting principles enforceable under 
the code of professional ethics. The Institute's membership voted 
on a new rule 202(e), which would have required compliance 
with Accounting Principles Board opinions.
On the same mail ballot was another provision to allow CPA 
firms to practice in corporate form under certain prescribed 
conditions. Professional corporations had become very popular 
because of their possible income tax advantages. As a result, 
there was considerable pressure within the public accounting 
profession to repeal the Institute's prohibition of corporate prac­
tice. At the insistence of the Institute's Board of Directors, the 
professional ethics committee developed a new rule 406 prescrib­
ing the circumstances under which practice as a professional 
corporation would be permissible.
The membership approved the proposal to allow CPAs to 
practice in corporate form but rejected the proposal to require 
compliance with opinions of the Accounting Principles Board. 
The latter proposal, actually, was endorsed by a majority of 
members, but it narrowly failed to receive the necessary two- 
thirds vote.
Revision of the Code of Professional Ethics
The Council did not authorize a second vote on the proposal 
because a complete review and restatement of the code of 
professional ethics was already underway. In 1965 Thomas Hig­
gins, former chairman of the AICPA Committee on Professional 
Ethics, had described the code as one of the most poorly written 
pieces of professional literature and had called for a complete 
restatement in positive rather than negative terms. In October 
1968 Thomas Flynn, who then served as chairman of the ethics
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committee, responded by arranging for the appointment of a 
special committee to revise the code. I was appointed chairman, 
and Mr. Higgins served as a member of the study group.
The special committee labored on a complete revision of the 
code for over three years. A final version was approved in March 
1973 by a mail ballot of the membership.
The new code included rules that explicitly required AICPA 
members to comply with the Institute's pronouncements on 
generally accepted auditing standards and with accounting prin­
ciples promulgated by bodies designated by the Institute Council. 
These rules removed any doubt that the profession would enforce 
technical standards as part of its system of self-regulation.
The restated code also included other important innovations. 
It contained a forepart, "Concepts of Professional Ethics," which 
expressed the underlying philosophy for the rules of conduct 
that followed. The concepts of integrity, objectivity, and com­
petence were specifically addressed. Peer reviews of professional 
practices were officially recognized and exempted from the re­
strictions relating to the confidentiality of client information. 
Prior rules on advertising and solicitation were combined. Finally, 
the code differentiated the applicability of the rules to members 
within and outside public practice.
Federal Antitrust Actions
Naturally, these innovations generated controversy. One major 
issue was whether the code should continue to include a rule 
prohibiting members from engaging in competitive bidding.
Several years earlier, in 1966, the AICPA was informed by 
the Department of Justice that ethics rule 3.03, prohibiting com­
petitive bidding, would very likely be deemed to be in restraint 
of trade. Following the advice of legal counsel, the board had 
adopted a policy of not enforcing the rule, and a statement to 
that effect was included in the code of professional ethics.
Following this action the Department of Justice obtained 
consent decrees relating to similar competitive bidding rules from 
the American Society of Civil Engineers and the American Insti­
tute of Architects. Having achieved its objective with these two 
organizations, the Department of Justice once again turned its
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attention to the AICPA and began an investigation early in 1971. 
A civil investigative demand required the Institute to make 
available all documents produced after January 1, 1967, relating 
to rule 3.03. By 1972 the department made it clear that it would 
carry out litigation against the AICPA unless the Institute entered 
into a consent decree not to enforce its ethical rule prohibiting 
competitive bidding.
The board was advised by legal counsel that, if the matter 
were litigated, the competitive bidding rule was almost certain 
to be found a per se violation of the federal antitrust laws. Counsel 
therefore recommended that a consent decree be entered into. 
Acting on this advice, the board authorized negotiations to obtain 
the best possible agreement under the circumstances. It concluded 
that signing a consent decree was the best course to pursue since 
a settlement resulting from negotiations might be somewhat less 
restrictive than what might result from litigation.
The board's intentions were reported to the AICPA's Council 
at a meeting in May 1972. At that time the Council was consid­
ering submission of the restated code of professional ethics to a 
vote of the Institute's members. In view of the pending negoti­
ations with the Department of Justice, the proposed code did 
not include a prohibition of competitive bidding.
This omission and the intent to enter into a consent decree 
gave rise to acrimonious debate at the meeting. The AICPA had 
long held that competitive bidding was unprofessional and would 
do serious damage to auditors' independence, and the prospect 
of abandoning this position caused great alarm. The Texas Society 
of CPAs, among others, had obtained separate legal opinions to 
support its contention that the AICPA should litigate the issue 
all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court if necessary. Motions 
were made to insert a rule restoring restraints on competitive 
bidding; however, these failed to gain the approval of a majority 
of the members of Council.
At a special meeting on May 26, 1972, the board approved 
the signing of a consent decree whereby rule 3.03, on competitive 
bidding, was declared null and void and the AICPA was enjoined 
from any plan, program, or course of action that would prohibit 
its members from submitting price quotations for accounting 
services to any person seeking such services. The board issued 
a press release, which stated that the AICPA did not concede
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the validity of the government's complaint, and pointed out the 
prior voluntary abstinence from enforcing a prohibition of com­
petitive bidding.
The consent decree did not deal with other rules, such as 
those prohibiting advertising and solicitation, even though the 
Department of Justice had expressed concern about them during 
the course of the negotiations. The attack on these rules was 
destined to occur several years later.
After the adoption of the restated code of professional ethics, 
the Institute no longer had a rule relating to competitive bidding. 
This was the first step in the elimination, under threat of legal 
action, of all attempts by the AICPA to restrain competitive 
practices within the profession. Having conceded by implication 
that the profession was not exempt under the federal antitrust 
laws, the AICPA recognized that it would be only a matter of 
time before its other restrictive rules would come under attack.
During the years from 1972 to 1977, the Department of Justice 
turned its attention to the other professions, including lawyers 
and doctors. Lawsuits were filed, which in some cases were 
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. The department established 
that private professional organizations were not exempt from the 
federal antitrust laws and that their prohibitions of advertising 
were in violation of the law.
Then, in 1977, the Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission simultaneously reopened the attack on the 
AICPA's rules of conduct. The Federal Trade Commission initi­
ated a broad investigation of the profession in April 1977 by 
issuing subpoenas to the AICPA, state societies, CPA firms, and 
state boards of accountancy. Generally, it sought information 
relating to entrance requirements, as well as all other practices 
that might be viewed as attempts to restrict competition.
The approach of the Department of Justice was narrower in 
scope. In a letter to the AICPA dated May 3, 1977, it requested 
files and information relating to the Institute's rule 502, which 
prohibited advertising and solicitation.
Once again the Institute's outside legal counsel, now Wilke, 
Farr and Gallagher, engaged in a dialogue with the Justice 
Department in an attempt to defend the profession's prohibi­
tions. Privately, they advised the AICPA's officers, board, and 
Council that they had almost no chance of successfully defending
rule 502 in litigation, particularly in the light of recent U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions.
The department was persuaded to delay filing a lawsuit until 
the Institute could take action to repeal rule 502. Accordingly, 
the board requested the professional ethics committee to prepare 
a proposed change in the rule, which, under the restated code, 
had combined the prohibitions of advertising and solicitation. 
The committee responded by proposing the following revised 
rule: "A  member shall not seek to obtain clients by advertising 
or other forms of solicitation in a manner that is false, misleading 
or deceptive." In addition, the committee indicated its intention 
to issue an interpretation to the revised rule; interpretation 502- 
3 provided, in part, that "a direct uninvited approach by a 
member seeking to render services to a specific potential client 
is prohibited."
These proposals were placed on the agenda of the meeting of 
Council in Cincinnati on September 17, 1977. Proposals to modify 
rule 504, prohibiting incompatible occupations, and to repeal 
rule 402, prohibiting offers of employment to employees of other 
CPAs without prior notice, were also included on the agenda. 
These were in response to public statements by the Federal Trade 
Commission that it regarded these rules as restrictions on com­
petition. Philip Defliese, former chairman of the AICPA and head 
of Coopers and Lybrand, moved that the proposed interpretation 
regarding solicitation be included in the revised rule itself. After 
considerable discussion, the Council added the following to the 
revised rule 502: "A  direct uninvited solicitation of a specific 
potential client is prohibited."
This change had the effect of retaining a direct prohibition on 
uninvited solicitation of specific prospective clients. Although 
there was considerable doubt that the Department of Justice 
would find this acceptable, there was strong sentiment within 
the Council that failure to retain the limited restriction would 
greatly damage the independence of auditors.
After modifying the proposal to revise rule 502, the Council 
approved all three proposed rule changes for submission for 
ballot by the membership as required under the bylaws. The 
changes were approved and declared effective early in 1978.
Predictably, the Department of Justice was dissatisfied with 
the continued prohibition of uninvited solicitation contained in
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the second sentence of revised rule 502. It again threatened to 
file suit against the AICPA and to include in its complaint rule 
401, which prohibited encroachment by members on the practices 
of other members.
Once again the Institute's legal representatives carried on 
discussions with the department, and the department again 
agreed to withhold legal action on the promise that the AICPA 
board would seek the repeal of rule 401 and the second sentence 
of rule 502. While the board was not in sympathy with allowing 
uninvited solicitation, it was convinced that an attempted legal 
defense would prove futile. It would be a waste of funds and 
would foreclose even informal discouragement of uninvited so­
licitation.
The proposed changes were presented to the Council at its 
meeting on October 21, 1978, in San Francisco. By this time the 
Council members had lost all patience with what they viewed as 
the unreasonable demands of the federal government, and many 
spoke in favor of litigating the issue to the Supreme Court if 
necessary. This mood was enhanced by the argument of Philip 
L. Defliese that the prohibition should be legally defensible on 
the grounds that uninvited solicitation would destroy the inde­
pendence of auditors, which is so vital to their role and distin­
guishes them from other professions. He failed to explain, 
however, how the prohibition could be made to apply only to 
audit engagements and not to other services for which inde­
pendence is not essential.
By a vote of 106 to 103, the Council agreed to submit the 
proposal to a vote of the membership, but by a vote of 130 to 
sixty-nine it indicated its disapproval of the proposed deletion of 
the second sentence of rule 502. Since rule 401, prohibiting 
encroachment, had already been nullified by the permission to 
advertise, there was little opposition to its repeal.
To the astonishment of nearly everyone, the members, by a 
vote of 48,961 to 22,310, approved the repeal of the prohibition 
of uninvited solicitation effective March 31, 1979. Repeal of rule 
401 was approved by a wider margin.
Meanwhile, the Federal Trade Commission's nonpublic in­
vestigation dragged on for three years. Finally, it announced on 
September 16, 1980, that its file had been closed without further 
action. The commission stated that it was generally satisfied with
voluntary actions taken by the profession to eliminate anticom­
petitive restrictions on CPAs.
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Continuing Controversy Over Solicitation
The removal of the restraints on uninvited solicitation met with 
a high level of consternation among many practitioners, who 
believed that the traditional professionalism of CPAs would give 
way to unrestrained selling tactics and fee cutting. It became the 
prime topic wherever CPAs came together. Some practitioners 
saw the action as a conspiracy between the AICPA and the large 
firms to put the smaller firms out of practice, while others alleged 
that the wording of the mail ballot had misled members. Some 
CPAs even expressed the suspicion that the votes had been 
miscounted and the final result misrepresented.
At the Institute annual business meeting in Boston on October
4, 1980, the members present approved almost unanimously a 
motion to appoint a special committee to consider restoring a 
prohibition on uninvited solicitation. The committee was author­
ized to engage legal counsel of its own choosing to obtain a 
separate opinion regarding antitrust aspects.1
That is where the matter stood at the end of 1980. Despite 
the profession's strong opposition to uninvited solicitation, the 
Department of Justice was unlikely to permit the profession to 
turn the clock back without a legal struggle, and the best legal 
minds specializing in antitrust law doubted that the profession 
could prevail in litigation.
Within a few brief years after adoption, large portions of a 
restated code of professional ethics had become obsolete by the 
repeal of the traditional restraints on competition. As a result of 
the new freedom the long-standing friction between the large 
international CPA firms and the rest of the practicing profession 
had intensified. Although it is not clear what effect these devel­
opments will ultimately have on the profession's unity, income 
levels, and quality of performance, intraprofessional harmony 
suffered considerably during the decade. Nevertheless, at the
1. See note 1, chapter 1.
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end of 1980 the profession appeared to be reluctantly adjusting 
to the new circumstances. Fear that unrestrained competition 
will be fatal to professionalism fails to take into account that, 
over time, CPAs are likely to exercise appropriate self-restraint 
regardless of the lack of any formal rules of enforcement.
Reviewing the Quality of Audits
As formal rules regarding competitive practices were repealed, 
the ethics committee was able to devote more of its attention to 
surveillance of the quality of practice. New procedures were 
developed to gain access to and review samples of audit reports 
for compliance with accounting and auditing standards.
During the decade the ethics committee established a program 
for reviewing the quality of CPAs' audits of federally assisted 
programs. The General Accounting Office had conducted a 
limited review of such audits and issued a highly critical report. 
Clearly, the profession had to act.
Arrangements had been made as early as 1973 for federal 
grant agencies to refer cases of substandard performance by 
independent auditors to the Institute's ethics committee. For 
various reasons, however, only a few such referrals were actually 
made over a period of several years. More aggressive action 
appeared necessary.
After meetings between AICPA personnel and representatives 
of the General Accounting Office and twelve of the more active 
federal agencies, arrangements were made for the ethics com­
mittee to draw samples of audit reports from the governmental 
files. The committee would review the reports and, when it 
discovered a substandard audit, would take appropriate correc­
tive action. This program was in the process of being imple­
mented at the end of 1980.
To complement this program, the Institute board authorized 
the ethics committee to mount a similar effort at the state and 
local governmental level in cooperation with the state societies 
through the Joint Ethics Enforcement Program. This effort was 
also in the early implementation stage at the end of 1980.
Audits by Governmental Auditors
Audits of governmental units performed by CPAs who were 
government employees proved to be another area of concern. 
Increasingly government auditors, as CPAs, were expressing 
standard audit opinions on the financial statements of govern­
mental units. The profession certainly did not wish to discourage 
CPAs from serving as auditors within government, but there 
were serious questions about whether government auditors were 
sufficiently independent to warrant use of the standard auditor's 
opinion. The AICPA Board of Directors considered this problem, 
and on March 2, 1978, it adopted a policy statement that pre­
scribed the circumstances under which government auditors 
could use the standard auditor's opinion. It placed great reliance 
on the criteria for independence that the General Accounting 
Office had established for government auditors in connection 
with audits of federally assisted programs.
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Restructuring the Disciplinary Machinery
Not only did the focus of the profession's enforcement efforts 
change during the 1970s, but the enforcement mechanisms them­
selves came under review. In 1970 the professional ethics division 
brought disciplinary actions against members of one of the large 
firms, and the head of the firm challenged the appropriateness 
of the procedures of the division and the trial board. The 
Institute's Board of Directors reacted by appointing a special 
committee to review the operations and procedures of the two 
groups. The committee reported its findings in February 1971. A 
number of suggestions for improvements were made, but no 
serious deficiencies in the operations and due-process procedures 
of the ethics division and trial board were noted. Nevertheless, 
the incident illustrated the difficulty of imposing discipline on 
members when their firms interceded on their behalf.
In 1971, independently of the foregoing challenge to proce­
dures, the AICPA restructured the professional ethics division 
to establish an executive committee and three subcommittees, 
each of which would handle all matters under a particular section 
of the code. The three subcommittees had jurisdiction over 
technical standards rules, independence rules, and all other
behavioral rules. Greater specialization, it was hoped, would 
allow subcommittee members to develop more expertise.
Attention was also given to the duplicate disciplinary machin­
ery that existed within the state societies and the AICPA. To 
eliminate the duplication, the AICPA devised a plan to integrate 
the work of the ethics committees at the state and national levels 
and to establish a single trial board division that would deal with 
each case, in behalf of both the state societies and the AICPA, 
through a single hearing. In general, the state ethics committees 
would process cases involving less significant violations, and the 
Institute's committee would deal with violations involving tech­
nical standards or having national significance.
Eventually, state societies joined forces with the AICPA in 
what became known as the Joint Ethics Enforcement Program 
(JEEP). Although later modifications were made in the joint trial 
board structure and in the operating procedures of the ethics 
committee, the JEEP was functioning quite well by the end of 
the decade.
A new disciplinary element was introduced when the division 
for CPA firms was created in 1977. Both sections of the division 
provided for the sanctioning of member firms for failure to 
comply with membership requirements, and this again posed 
the prospect of duplicate disciplinary proceedings for the same 
offense.
The division for CPA firms and the professional ethics com­
mittee worked to minimize duplication under their overlapping 
disciplinary jurisdictions. They tentatively agreed that the ethics 
committee would defer action on cases being handled by the 
division for CPA firms pending their outcome and disposition 
under that body's disciplinary proceedings. Nevertheless, the 
ethics committee reserved the right to initiate subsequent pro­
ceedings against the individual CPAs involved.
In addition, the National Association of State Boards of 
Accountancy (NASBA) was urging its state boards to mount an 
aggressive surveillance and enforcement program under their 
authority to suspend or revoke CPA certificates issued under 
their jurisdiction. Some of the state boards were also beginning 
to impose peer reviews as sanctions in disciplinary proceedings. 
These developments promised that even more duplication would 
occur.
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Concern that respondents to ethics violation charges would 
be subjected to multiple proceedings for the same offense led to 
the appointment in March 1979 of a special committee, which 
included representatives of the AICPA, NASBA, and the state 
societies. The committee was chaired by Marshall S. Armstrong, 
who had previously served as president of the Institute and as 
the first chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board. 
The group was directed to review all aspects of regulation of the 
profession and to recommend ways in which it could be made 
more effective.
After several months of deliberation and sharp debate, the 
committee issued a report on its conclusions on February 20,
1980. The report recommended that the AICPA, the state socie­
ties, and the state boards of accountancy should establish a joint 
program for seeking out substandard work for possible discipli­
nary action. Under the program, members and licensees in public 
practice should be subject to random selection for a review of 
the quality of their work. To further avoid duplication, NASBA 
should urge state boards of accountancy to rely on the JEEP to 
investigate all possible violations of rules of conduct, and the 
AICPA and the state societies should encourage the JEEP to refer 
cases warranting disciplinary proceedings to the state boards. 
The committee also recommended that disciplinary hearings 
should be open to the public and that hearing panels should 
include some public members. Finally, the report urged that 
membership in the AICPA and any state society should be 
revoked for any CPA in public practice who fails to meet 
continuing professional education requirements.
The report was submitted to the boards of the AICPA and 
NASBA for consideration. Early steps toward coordination be­
tween the JEEP and the state boards were expected, and adoption 
of an affirmative program of sample reviews was to be further 
explored. In view of previous actions by the Institute's board and 
Council, implementation of the recommendations regarding con­
tinuing professional education and public disciplinary hearings 
appeared unlikely.
The suggestion that the profession's disciplinary proceedings 
be conducted publicly had been made by the Commission on 
Auditors' Responsibilities in 1977. A special committee appointed 
to consider this recommendation concluded in March 1978 that
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notices of disciplinary hearings and the names of the accused 
should be published and that the hearings should be open to 
the public. In addition, the committee recommended that the 
names of all respondents found guilty by a trial board be 
published. Publication of such names should no longer be left to 
the discretion of the trial board.
Both the board and the Council declined to adopt these 
recommendations, although they did agree to the mandatory 
publication of the names of all members found guilty as the 
result of a trial board proceeding. Most members feared that the 
publication of allegations against a CPA before they had been 
proven in a disciplinary hearing would damage the CPA's rep­
utation irrevocably, even if a finding of innocence were subse­
quently published. Many members of the board and the Council 
also believed that a public hearing would inhibit the disciplinary 
process because of the tendency toward greater formality under 
such circumstances.
The proposal to conduct the profession's disciplinary actions 
"in the sunshine" was thus squarely addressed and rejected in
1978. Nevertheless, if the profession's system of self-regulation 
again falls under critical outside investigation, it is open to 
question whether the privacy of disciplinary proceedings can be 
successfully defended.
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All in all, strenuous efforts were directed toward the development 
of a more effective system of regulation of the profession, with 
greater coordination between the various jurisdictions to avoid 
unnecessary duplication. The structure to sanction CPA firms as 
entities, the affirmative program to seek out instances of sub­
standard work through sample reviews of audits in both the 
governmental and private sectors, and the proposals to combine 
investigations and disciplinary proceedings were separate actions 
under an overall program to meet the profession's responsibility 
to regulate itself. Future experience will determine whether the 
initiatives were adequate to achieve effective self-regulation or 
whether additional actions will be necessary.
CHAPTER 7
The Division for CPA Firms
The Complaints of Small CPA Firms
Du r i n g  my first year as chief staff officer of the AICPA, CPAs from small firms bombarded me with complaints about the 
AICPA. In my service on Institute committees and Council, I had 
already become aware of the tensions that existed between the 
large, national firms and the rest of the practicing profession. I 
was alarmed, however, by the volume and intensity of the criticism 
being levelled at the Institute.
Many of the complaints were based on false perceptions, 
rumors, or a lack of knowledge about the AICPA's structure and 
services. Still, many practitioners expressed legitimate concerns 
about trends that were making it increasingly difficult for smaller 
firms to compete with both the larger firms and nonlicensed 
accountants.
In an article, "The House of Accounting," that I wrote in
1973, I expressed my concern about the tensions among the 
various factions within the profession. I felt that the AICPA must 
openly address these tensions and take actions to alleviate them. 
Others, including prominent members of the staff, argued that 
the stresses had existed for many years and that their causes did 
not lend themselves to ready solutions; they warned that a search 
for improvement would produce only needless debates and anger. 
I was not content, however, to treat the profession's internal 
problems with benign neglect, and during the next several years 
the AICPA took many actions aimed at achieving greater unity 
within the profession. Unfortunately, they were offset by events 
beyond the control of the AICPA, which contributed heavily to 
animosities within the profession's ranks: The repeal of compet-
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itive prohibitions at the insistence of the Department of Justice, 
the growing burden of complex accounting and reporting stand­
ards, pressure from the SEC and Congress, and the large firms' 
increasing aggressiveness all took their toll.
In late 1973 I began urging that the Institute establish a 
committee of members from smaller firms to consider ways in 
which the AICPA might be of greater assistance. The Institute's 
chairman resisted this suggestion on the grounds that it had been 
tried before with little success. In fact, he had served on such a 
committee and was convinced that it had acted like a small private 
club rather than as a source of constructive ideas. Finally, he 
agreed, however, to hold an experimental seminar for a group 
of practitioners from smaller firms who would be invited through 
the state societies.
The seminar was held in Chicago on July 11, 1974, with 
twenty-five members in attendance from twenty-two states. The 
chairman and I led the one-day discussions, which covered a 
range of subjects known to be of concern to the smaller firms. 
The session proved to be highly successful. The practitioners 
became much less critical as they learned more about the AICPA's 
activities and the practical limitations that it faced. The Institute's 
officers gained a sharper understanding of the problems of smaller 
firms and what might be done to deal with them. Most of the 
participants were genuinely pleased to have had a session with 
the Institute's top officers, and they spread the word to CPAs 
back home that the AICPA understood and cared about the 
problems of the local practitioner.
The success of the first seminar encouraged me to adopt it as 
an annual, staff-conducted event. Each year thereafter, through
1980, three regional seminars were held at locations in the East, 
Midwest, and West. The program became very popular, and 
many practitioners were eager to attend each year. Without 
exception, the seminars proved to be an effective means of 
communication through which ideas for new and improved 
services were generated and at which local practitioners could 
express their interest in service on committees. The seminars did 
not completely solve the communications problem, because they 
reached only about seventy-five CPAs each year, but they did 
help to eliminate misunderstandings.
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The Complaints of Larger CPA Firms
The smaller firms were not alone in their dissatisfaction with the 
Institute. The heads of the large firms were also restless. Some 
of them felt that the profession's progress was being impeded 
by the smaller firms' opposition to needed changes; others 
regarded the AICPA as impotent because it could do nothing to 
prevent individual firms from taking unilateral actions that af­
fected the entire profession.
One example of unilateral action occurred in 1974, when the 
SEC proposed that independent auditors review and report on 
registrants' interim quarterly financial reports. Nearly all the 
large firms strongly opposed such a responsibility on the grounds 
that users of the reports would place more reliance on their 
accuracy than would be warranted. They also worried about the 
risks of legal liability and the fact that many companies regarded 
the proposal as a means for enabling their auditors to increase 
their fees.
The debate on this issue was at its peak when Philip Defliese 
became chairman of the AICPA in October 1974. Shortly there­
after, his firm, Coopers and Lybrand, issued a statement that it 
would begin accepting engagements to review and report on its 
clients' interim financial reports. Because of competitive consid­
erations, this unilateral action effectively set the policy for the 
rest of the profession. Needless to say, this angered the heads 
of the other large firms. To make matters worse, a partner of 
Coopers and Lybrand, Kenneth Johnson, was appointed by Mr. 
Defliese to serve as chairman of the auditing standards executive 
committee, which was struggling with the issue.
I concluded that something had to be done to discourage 
firms from taking such divisive actions in the future. With the 
agreement of Mr. Defliese and the AICPA Board of Directors, I 
called a special meeting of the heads of the eleven largest firms 
to discuss how a better climate of cooperation could be achieved. 
Although the action of Coopers and Lybrand triggered my 
decision, it was preceded by a long series of similar unilateral 
public statements and policies on the part of other firms.
The meeting was held at the AICPA's New York offices on 
December 12, 1974. As might be expected, the discussions were
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less than calm. The heads of four of the eight largest firms talked 
openly about establishing an organization of the large firms 
outside the AICPA. (Much later it was revealed that the four 
firms had already discussed the idea of a separate organization.) 
Others counselled that this would be disastrous for the profession 
and warned about the possible applicability of federal antitrust 
laws.
The session concluded with an agreement that similar meet­
ings should be held in the future to seek a consensus on technical 
issues, relations with the SEC, and other matters. The Institute 
would engage special legal counsel, expert in antitrust matters, 
to attend each meeting and monitor the proceedings to ensure 
that the participants did not engage in any discussions that 
would violate antitrust laws. Stanley Robinson, a partner of 
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays and Handler, a New York law 
firm, was engaged to serve in that capacity.
Additional meetings were held during the early months of 
1975, with Chairman Defliese presiding. If nothing else, they 
provided a forum where viewpoints could be exchanged and 
complaints aired.
Meetings With the SEC
Prior to these group meetings, I had been meeting regularly with 
the heads of the large firms, one at a time, to discuss their 
complaints about the AICPA. Despite the differences, and some­
times animosities, that existed between some of these individuals, 
they all shared a deep concern about liability suits and SEC efforts 
to expand auditors' responsibilities with regard to financial re­
porting. The chief accountant of the SEC, John C. Burton, was a 
favorite target of criticism, as was the commission's enforcement 
division.
This was an unhealthy situation because it was in the best 
interest of both the SEC and the profession to maintain a 
harmonious working relationship. The chairman of the commis­
sion, Ray Garrett, Jr., also worried about the worsening relation­
ship with the profession. He agreed that periodic meetings 
should be held between the commissioners, the heads of the 
large CPA firms, and the AICPA's chairman and president.
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The first such meeting was held on June 28, 1974, in the 
AICPA's Washington office. AICPA Chairman Derieux and SEC 
Chairman Garrett presided jointly over the proceedings. The 
heads of the eleven largest CPA firms were present, as were the 
SEC's commissioners, chief accountant, and director of the en­
forcement division. The discussions explored alternatives to ex­
isting forms of enforcement by the SEC and the question of 
whether the SEC could provide auditors with the results of its 
private investigations when the information was relevant to audit 
problems.
Succeeding meetings dealt with possible relief from legal 
liability, auditors' responsibility for detection of fraud, improper 
corporate payments, disclosures of current replacement costs, 
and similar issues. A total of seven meetings were held through 
February 1976.
At one point the eight largest firms signed a joint letter, 
initiated by John Biegler, head of Price Waterhouse and Com­
pany, taking issue with some of the informal views expressed 
by SEC staff members at a meeting at which the subject of 
improper corporate payments was discussed. Chairman Garrett 
was incensed by this action because the meetings were intended 
to provide a means for free expression without any pressure to 
hold to official positions. He threatened to terminate the meetings 
but was persuaded by the firms to continue them.
Chairman Garrett was also disappointed by the CPAs' un­
willingness to examine the facts contained in the SEC's discipli­
nary files on completed cases against auditors. Such an examination 
would allow the profession to judge for itself whether the SEC's 
enforcement actions had become overzealous. The CPAs decided 
not to follow up on this offer because they feared that only a 
biased sample would be made available.
The meetings were discontinued after February 1976 because 
new federal legislation made it illegal for regulatory agencies to 
hold private meetings with private interest groups.
The meetings did not produce any striking changes in the 
policy positions of either side. They did, however, produce a 
better understanding between the SEC and a large segment of 
the profession practicing before it. The meetings also provided 
an opportunity for a unified expression of the concerns of the
major firms. In effect, the program was a forerunner of the SEC 
practice section of the division for CPA firms.
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Suggestions for Restructuring the AICPA
In addition to arranging meetings of these two constituencies 
(large firms and small practitioners), the Institute was investigat­
ing how it could better serve the various interest groups within 
the membership. A special committee chaired by Marvin Stone, 
former president of the AICPA, had been studying the impact 
of accounting services by non-CPAs. This study had been in­
spired mainly by the growing number of banks providing com­
puterized accounting services in competition with CPAs. The 
committee's report, issued in February 1973, recommended that 
the Institute embark on a program to accredit specialists.
The board declined to act on that recommendation because 
of its belief that the proposal did not have the support of the 
membership. Instead, it agreed in May 1973 to expose for 
comment my alternative proposals, which would establish divi­
sions within the AICPA along existing lines of specialization, 
such as accounting and auditing, tax, management advisory 
services, SEC practice, and general practice. The divisions would 
be governed by existing executive committees; they would issue 
publications and sponsor national conferences in their respective 
areas of expertise. Membership in the divisions would be vol­
untary and open to any member of the AICPA. A form of 
associate membership would also be available to non-CPAs 
employed by CPA firms.
Before these proposals could be acted upon, a new special 
committee was appointed to study the scope of services within 
the accounting profession and the restructuring of the AICPA in 
relation to those services. In view of this development, the board 
agreed in July 1973 to refer my suggestions to the new committee.
The special committee on scope and structure devoted over 
two years to its study and issued its final report in July 1975. 
The committee's recommendations met with strong opposition, 
and its report did not result in structural changes in the AICPA.
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The Five Advisory Groups
Yet another proposal was made to the AICPA Board of Directors 
in February 1975: that five advisory committees be appointed to 
represent constituencies within the AICPA. Advisory group A 
would represent all firms having less than fifty AICPA members; 
advisory group B would represent all firms having more than 
fifty AICPA members, except for the eleven largest firms; and 
advisory group C would represent the eleven largest CPA firms. 
The industry and government advisory group and the education 
advisory group would represent all members employed in those 
areas.
The proposal was approved, and by mid 1975 the advisory 
committees for each group had been appointed. Except for group
C, each advisory committee originally consisted of fifteen mem­
bers. The eleven firm heads who had been meeting periodically 
since December 12, 1974, became advisory group C, and an 
existing committee on management accounting became the in­
dustry and government advisory committee. The following were 
the initial chairmen of the advisory committees:
Group A—Glenn Ingram, Jr., of Glenn Ingram & Co.
Group B—Arthur Dixon of Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co.
Group C—Walter Hanson of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
Industry and Government—John Meinert of Hart Schaffner &
Marx Co.
Education—Professor C. B. Stephenson of Ohio University
The role of the advisory committees was to monitor devel­
opments affecting the profession and to advise the AICPA's 
governing bodies and senior committees of their viewpoints. 
They were supposed to act as conduits through which the views 
of their respective interest groups would be conveyed to the 
AICPA's policy-making bodies. By giving the different groups 
the means of expressing their views, the AICPA leadership hoped 
to lower the profession's internal stresses.
The establishment of the advisory committees gave rise to 
considerable controversy. One of the principal points of conten­
tion was how many firms should be included in group C. Several 
large firms felt that they would suffer competitively if they were
not included in that group. On the other hand, the largest firms 
did not want their ranks expanded to include firms whose 
practices were not substantially similar to their own. The com­
mittee was expanded to fifteen firms in May 1977.
Group A was also expanded at that time, from fifteen to 
twenty-one members, because of criticism that the original com­
mittee did not adequately represent the very small firms. The 
additional six members were all drawn from firms having from 
one to ten AICPA members.
Advisory group B was expanded in October 1975. Instead of 
representing fifteen firms with at least fifty AICPA members, it 
now included representatives of all such firms. In 1975 a total of 
twenty-two firms qualified, and there was benefit in having them 
all serve on the advisory committee.
The five advisory committees held meetings with varying 
degrees of frequency and effectiveness through mid 1977. The 
most effective of the advisory committees was group C, probably 
because it was composed of a small number of firms whose 
interests were almost identical. Although its members were often 
in sharp disagreement among themselves, the firms involved 
gave the group considerable influence whenever it spoke with 
one voice. The group played an active role in advising the 
Institute's board and senior committees of its views on key 
technical issues.
Group A also had the potential for great influence because it 
represented thousands of CPA firms across the country. How­
ever, the large number and diversity of its constituency made it 
difficult to gain a consensus of viewpoints, and the committee 
never realized its full potential. The group was also handicapped 
because the committee members, being practitioners from smaller 
firms, could devote only a limited amount of their time.
The firms in group B were generally in the awkward position 
of having interests that were similar with those of both groups 
A and C. In general, they tended to identify their interests with 
those of group C, even though they had no love for the so-called 
big eight firms, which often acquired the group's larger clients. 
Although advisory group B had difficulty in reaching a consensus 
on issues, it was at least partially successful in making its wishes 
known.
The most important achievement of the industry and govern­
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ment advisory committee was a bylaw amendment to permit 
members not in public practice to serve as AICPA officers and 
trial board members.
The education advisory committee achieved very little, and 
the committee was eventually discontinued.
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Proposals Leading to a Division for CPA Firms
Another suggestion for reorganization of the profession appeared 
in a CPA Journal article in July 1975. The author, Eli Mason, 
suggested many changes, including the restructuring of the 
AICPA and the standard-setting bodies (including the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board) and an increased role for the 
presidents of the state societies, the SEC, and the General 
Accounting Office.
Several features of the Mason plan met with strong resistance, 
particularly the suggested restructuring of the FASB so soon after 
its establishment. The most serious problem, however, was that 
federal legislation would be required for implementation of the 
proposal. At that point in time, the Institute was in the early 
stages of its long battle to ward off unwanted federal regulatory 
legislation, and Mr. Mason's suggestions were unwelcome. 
Chairman Defliese and I attempted unsuccessfully to dissuade 
Mr. Mason from pursuing his proposal through members of 
Congress. As recounted in chapter 3, he pushed his plan as a 
witness before congressional hearings. He also discussed his 
ideas with various individual members of Congress and federal 
agencies.
Despite its sharp disagreement with Mr. Mason, the AICPA 
Board of Directors directed that his article be distributed and 
discussed at the next meeting of the Council in October 1975. At 
that meeting several members expressed interest in various 
features of the plan. As a result, it was decided to appoint a 
special committee to consider once again the structure of the 
AICPA and the profession and to include the Mason proposal in 
its deliberations. The committee was chaired by Harry Mancher, 
head of S. D. Leidesdorf and Company, and consisted of repre­
sentatives of small, medium, and large firms.
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It was apparent that the developments in Washington re­
quired the new committee to act with considerable urgency. It 
began its work in December 1975, interviewed Mr. Mason and 
others, and presented its final report to the board in July 1976, 
setting a time record for a special committee on a major policy 
matter. The most important recommendation in the committee's 
report was for establishment of a structure within the AICPA to 
deal with CPA firms as entities; however, the committee did not 
offer any details about such a structure.
Only individual CPAs were members of the AICPA, and the 
Institute had no authority with respect to the CPA firms within 
which the individuals practiced. Several individuals had been 
suggesting for more than a year that, in the reality of the 1970s, 
firms were responsible for audits of at least all publicly traded 
corporations.
In accepting the committee's report, the AICPA Board of 
Directors requested me to develop the general recommendation 
more fully for later consideration. I had no enthusiasm for this 
mission because I saw no way short of legislation that the large 
firms could be persuaded to surrender part of their autonomy to 
a private regulatory body under the AICPA. All prior experience 
had indicated that they would not do this voluntarily, and 
support for a legislative initiative was out of the question. 
Therefore, I prepared a paper spelling out the reasons why the 
committee's recommendation could not be implemented. That is 
where the matter rested for the next several months.
One year later the picture had changed dramatically. The 
Metcalf staff report, The Accounting Establishment, had been pub­
lished; congressional hearings were underway, and the larger 
firms were under attack. The issue of improper corporate pay­
ments had arisen, and the SEC had begun imposing quality 
reviews on CPA firms as a disciplinary sanction. Even the most 
conservative among the heads of the large firms recognized by 
mid 1977 that the status quo could not be maintained. Advisory 
group C was aware of the growing danger of unwanted legisla­
tion, and there was renewed discussion about the establishment 
of a self-regulatory body.
The time was ripe for change. In May 1977 Chairman Chet­
kovich and I proposed that the AICPA establish two divisions
for CPA firms, one for firms with an SEC practice and another 
for firms with largely a private companies practice. The proposal 
won the immediate support of the AICPA Board of Directors.
Advisory groups A and C, with some modifications to their 
membership, served as ad hoc groups to develop charters and 
operating procedures for the two proposed divisions. The two 
groups quickly agreed on documents that were to serve as the 
constitutions of the two divisions. They were similar in their 
provisions, except that certain additional requirements were 
imposed for firms serving companies registered with the SEC.
If one person deserves to be singled out for his efforts on this 
project, it is George Catlett. A partner of Arthur Andersen and 
Company, he played a key role in the negotiations regarding the 
division for SEC practice.
Membership in the proposed divisions would be voluntary 
and open to all CPA firms that met certain requirements. For a 
firm to qualify, a majority of its members would have to be CPAs, 
and all partners be members of the AICPA. To retain its mem­
bership, a firm would have to comply with AICPA quality control 
standards. It would submit every three years to peer reviews of 
its accounting and audit practice in order to verify its compliance 
with quality control standards. Each professional staff member 
would have to complete a minimum of forty hours of continuing 
professional education per year. The firm would maintain spec­
ified amounts of accountants' liability insurance and pay its 
membership dues to the division.
Firms joining the SEC practice division would have to meet 
additional requirements. Each firm would file annually certain 
firm information, which would be open to public inspection. 
Partners in charge of SEC client audits would be rotated every 
five years, and every SEC client audit would receive a concurring 
review by a second partner. The firm would refrain from providing 
certain specified management advisory services to SEC clients, 
and it would report certain matters relating to management 
advisory services and accounting and auditing disagreements to 
the audit committees or boards of directors of its SEC clients.
Both divisions would be governed by executive committees 
of twenty-one members appointed by the AICPA chairman. Both 
would include peer review committees of fifteen members to
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establish requirements for peer reviews and to administer the 
reviews. A five-member public oversight board would oversee 
all activities of the SEC practice division.
The executive committee would have the authority to impose 
sanctions on members, ranging from remedial actions to mone­
tary fines and expulsion, for failing to comply with membership 
requirements.
The issue that proved most difficult to resolve was represen­
tation on the executive committee of the SEC practice division. 
The heads of the largest firms, especially the "big eight" firms, 
were adamant in their insistence that firms most involved with 
SEC practice should guide the destiny of that division. The 
combined practices of the eight largest firms included over 70 
percent of all SEC registrants. They were subjecting their firms 
to a regulatory apparatus that could impose severe sanctions, 
and they had to convince their own partners that they were not 
assuming unnecessary risks in relation to their self-interest. 
Considering other firms' frequent expressions of anger at the big 
eight firms, there was good reason for caution.
A compromise agreement provided that all member firms 
having thirty or more SEC clients required to file under section 
12 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act would be represented 
continually on the executive committee. This meant that, initially, 
fifteen of the largest firms would have permanent seats on the 
executive committee, and additional firms might qualify for 
permanent seats in the future.
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Establishment of the Division for CPA Firms
With the approval of the AICPA Board of Directors, Council 
members received detailed explanations of the plan, as well as 
other proposed changes, at one-day regional meetings held in 
August 1977. Because of the great number of items being pro­
posed for adoption at the regular Council meeting on September 
17, 1977, it was imperative to provide the members with an 
advance explanation of what they would be voting on and why 
the actions were deemed necessary.
Many Council members were concerned about the sweeping 
nature of the proposed changes and about the possible reactions
of their constituents. Nevertheless, an overwhelming majority 
agreed that the actions were necessary and appropriate in view 
of the congressional investigations and threat of federal legisla­
tion. At its September meeting, approximately two-thirds of the 
members of Council voted in favor of the plan to establish the 
division for CPA firms, as modified by two significant amend­
ments.
Instead of establishing two separate divisions, the Council 
voted to establish a single division for CPA firms with two 
sections, one for SEC practice and the other for private companies 
practice. This was simply a matter of semantics, but the concept 
of a single division proved to be more acceptable.
The second amendment provided that a nominating commit­
tee would be elected by Council each year from among represen­
tatives of the member firms of either section. The two committees 
would nominate firms to be represented on the respective exec­
utive committees. This was intended to prevent the executive 
committee from being self-perpetuating and was directed pri­
marily at the SEC practice section. Several Council members had 
objected to the compromise agreement about representation on 
the SEC practice section executive committee, and the amend­
ment was adopted as a partial response to this objection. As it 
turned out, the compromise later became the target of severe 
criticism during congressional hearings, leading to changes in 
the quorum and voting requirements and in the size of the 
committee to ensure that smaller firms would retain the same 
relative representation in the event that more firms qualified for 
permanent seats.
On Monday, September 19, 1977, following the Council meet­
ing, the annual business meeting of the AICPA was held. 
Previous annual meetings had been routine affairs, but this one 
was different. Several members, including Eli Mason, rose to 
speak passionately in opposition to the action of Council. They 
moved that the matter be put to a mail ballot of the membership.
It was difficult for the members to resist the pleas for democ­
racy by refusing to authorize a mail vote by the membership, 
but most were convinced that it was appropriate for the govern­
ing Council to have acted and that it would be unwise to incur 
any further delay. I pointed out that under the provisions of the 
bylaws nearly six months would be required to complete a mail
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ballot, and there was a serious risk that federal legislation would 
be enacted during the interim. By a vote of 563 to 211, the motion 
was defeated. This decision was repeatedly challenged during 
the balance of the decade by many members, most of whom 
were opposed to the division for CPA firms.
Members File Suit Against the AICPA
Mr. Mason and seventeen other members filed a petition on 
January 6, 1978, with the New York Supreme Court seeking an 
injunction to prohibit continued operation of the division for CPA 
firms and to force a membership referendum on the issue. The 
petitioners' brief alleged that a new class of membership had 
been established, an action that exceeded the authority of the 
Council under the Institute's bylaws.
The AICPA Board of Directors was unanimous in authorizing 
the Institute's law firm, Wilke, Farr and Gallagher, to defend the 
Institute's position. The board had relied on the firm's prior 
opinion that Council's action did not violate the bylaws, and it 
saw no reason to concede the issue to the petitioners. The defense 
rested mainly on the flat rejection of the argument that a new 
class of AICPA membership had been created. The Institute 
argued that it was simply a sponsor of the division for CPA firms 
and that the Council could withdraw the sponsorship at any 
time. Furthermore, the members of the division were firms and 
had none of the rights of Institute members; they could not vote 
or serve on the governing bodies or committees of the AICPA.
Before the case was tried, the assigned judge discovered that 
he knew one of the petitioners, Mr. Mason, which might be 
viewed as a basis for bias. He disqualified himself, and the case 
was reassigned to a new judge, thus causing a delay. Oral 
arguments were finally heard on April 27, 1978.
The protracted period of uncertainty about the outcome of 
the lawsuit, combined with concerns about the attitudes of 
AICPA members, caused some board members to waver in their 
resolve. There were indications that the spokesmen for the 
petitioners might be willing to withdraw their petition if the 
AICPA would make some conciliatory gestures. To satisfy those 
board members who were having second thoughts, AICPA
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Chairman Scott and I met with two of the petitioners, Eli Mason 
and Alan Brout. The two men refused to withdraw their petition 
unless the AICPA agreed to pay their legal fees and to hold a 
mail ballot on the division issue. This was reported to the board, 
which promptly rejected any further actions toward a compro­
mise settlement.
The decision of the judge was issued on July 27, 1978, and 
entered on September 11, 1978. The judge declined to grant the 
injunction sought by the petitioners.
The findings were still subject to appeal, so uncertainty about 
the petitioners' intentions continued until October 2 2 , 1978, when 
Mr. Mason called to inform me of their decision not to appeal.
The following day, at the AICPA's annual business meeting 
in San Francisco, Mr. Mason announced that the petitioners did 
not intend to pursue the lawsuit, after which he moved that a 
special committee be appointed to study the problems of smaller 
and medium-sized firms and to report its findings to the Insti­
tute's members within two years. The motion was adopted by 
an overwhelming vote, and a fifteen-member committee, chaired 
by Samuel A. Derieux, was appointed. The work of that com­
mittee will be described later in this chapter.
Public Oversight Board
In the meantime, while the lawsuit was pending, the division 
for CPA firms began to function. Candidates, largely drawn from 
the firms serving on advisory groups A, B, and C, were nomi­
nated and appointed to serve on the two executive committees, 
and initial meetings were held in October 1977. Committees were 
formed to develop the ground rules for meeting the quality 
review and continuing professional education requirements. 
Membership dues were established, and the division set the 
required amounts of legal liability insurance. Efforts were made 
to encourage as many firms as possible to join one or both of 
the sections.
High on the list of priorities was the appointment of a public 
oversight board (POB) within the SEC practice section. By Janu­
ary 1978 John J. McCloy, William L. Carey, and Ray Garrett, Jr., 
had agreed to serve on the board. Mr. McCloy, a prominent
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New York lawyer and statesman who had served in various 
capacities under several U.S. presidents, agreed to serve as 
chairman. Mr. Carey was a law professor at Columbia University 
and a past chairman of the SEC. Mr. Garrett had only recently 
been the chairman of the SEC and was now practicing law in 
Chicago. A fourth member, Arthur M. Wood, a recently retired 
chief executive officer of Sears Roebuck and Company, was 
appointed in March. A fifth member, John D. Harper, recently 
retired chief executive officer of Alcoa, was appointed in July.
One of the public oversight board's first acts was to adopt its 
own operating bylaws. Also, to avert criticism that the board 
members serve at the pleasure of the executive committee, the 
board insisted that it have the authority to appoint and discharge 
its own members and set its own compensation. The section 
agreed to this with the qualification that the advice and consent 
of the AICPA Board of Directors should be obtained in each 
instance.
The POB addressed the question of whether it should have 
line authority over the section, as urged by the SEC. It declined 
such authority in the belief that it was better to let the section's 
executive committee take the initiatives toward self-regulation, 
leaving the POB to exercise oversight and to take exception when 
it deemed necessary. The SEC was not entirely satisfied with 
this decision, but it did not press the issue further.
The POB engaged in many activities during its first three 
years. It testified at the Moss and Eagleton congressional subcom­
mittee hearings in 1978 and 1979. It studied the performance of 
management advisory services by auditors and its impact on 
their independence. It counseled the executive committee on 
procedures for dealing with major alleged audit failures, partic­
ularly those involving litigation. The POB urged the section to 
seek additional member firms and pressed for the publication of 
a membership directory; it exercised extensive oversight and 
review of the quality review program, and it published annual 
reports on its activities for the information of the SEC, Congress, 
and the public at large.
The POB was supposed to act as a neutral link between the 
SEC and the profession. Indeed, it acted as an honest broker 
between the SEC and the section when the SEC insisted that it 
be given access to quality review working papers. With its
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authority to speak publicly on any aspect of the section's per­
formance and its full access to all section records, meetings, and 
activities, the POB gave teeth to the self-regulatory program. The 
member firms practicing before the SEC would not want to risk 
public censure or the taint that would accompany resignation 
from the SEC practice section.
In its first three years, the POB fulfilled its responsibilities 
well; and much of the credit belonged to Ray Garrett, Jr. As vice 
chairman of the POB, he bore the brunt of the board's work. 
Unfortunately, he died very suddenly on February 3, 1980. After 
a series of delays, he was replaced by Robert Mautz, a professor 
at the Paton Accounting Center of the University of Michigan, a 
CPA, and a noted author and researcher on auditing and ac­
counting.
The POB's real test will come if and when it concludes that 
the section is not acting responsibly on a particular matter. If this 
does happen, it will most likely involve the handling of a 
disciplinary matter in which a major audit failure has been alleged 
against a member firm. There was every reason to believe that 
the board would meet such a test.
Membership Directory
One of the nagging problems for both sections was the fact that 
firms were slow in joining. Some, no doubt, wanted more time 
to put their procedures in order before they were subjected to 
quality reviews. Others were opposed to the division for CPA 
firms or were concerned about the costs of membership. Still 
others had long histories of nonparticipation in the profession's 
programs.
The SEC repeatedly urged that steps be taken to have all 
firms practicing before it become members of the SEC practice 
section. By 1979 nearly 99 percent of the companies listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange and approximately 92 percent of all 
companies registered with the SEC were audited by firms that 
were already members of the section. Nevertheless, approxi­
mately six hundred other firms with SEC clients had not joined. 
Each of these firms had only a few SEC clients, and some of 
them had no partners who were members of the Institute.
In an attempt to pressure firms to join, the SEC practice
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section executive committee proposed to publish a directory of 
member firms. This met with strong objections by the executive 
committee of the private companies section, which felt that firms 
not listed in the directory would suffer a serious competitive 
disadvantage. A compromise was reached whereby a division- 
wide directory would be published without designation of the 
section to which a firm belonged. Neither the SEC nor the POB 
was particularly pleased with this result, and they both registered 
their displeasure.
The question of a possible directory had been raised back 
when the Council was considering the proposal for a division 
for CPA firms. At that time the AICPA officers stated that there 
was no intention to publish a list of member firms. Therefore, 
when the sections proposed publication of a directory, they had 
to seek the consent of Council at its May 1979 meeting. Several 
members opposed the proposal, but in the end the Council 
authorized the publication of a directory by July 1980.
By the time of the May 1980 Council meeting, the proposed 
directory had become the focal point of discontent on the part of 
those firms that had not joined the division. The feelings were 
so strong and widespread that many Council members had 
second thoughts. Motions to prohibit a directory were made and 
amended and debated. By a vote of ninety-eight to ninety-one, 
the Council deferred the directory until July 1982 to give all firms 
additional time to prepare for quality reviews and to join the 
division.
Challenge by the National Conference of CPA 
Practitioners
In taking this action, the Council was aware of a March 13, 1980, 
petition by 269 members for a special meeting of the Institute to 
act on two proposals. One was to prohibit the publication of a 
directory of member firms, and the second was to prohibit the 
AICPA from using any of its funds to provide staff or other 
support to the division for CPA firms.
Nearly all of the petitioners belonged to firms that were 
members of the National Conference of CPA Practitioners 
(NCCPAP). This was an organization that had been established 
in the fall of 1978 by a group of AICPA members who had
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opposed establishment of the division for CPA firms. Organized 
principally by Eli Mason, the NCCPAP was an outgrowth of an 
informal group of practitioners in New York City that had been 
meeting periodically to discuss AICPA actions. By mid 1980 the 
NCCPAP claimed over 500 firms as members.
The Institute Board of Directors scheduled the special meeting 
for July 11, 1980, at the Conrad Hilton Hotel in Chicago. It 
selected this central location to facilitate attendance by members 
from every section of the country. Chairman William R. Gregory 
presided, and, as expected, most of the time was occupied by 
speeches in opposition to the division for CPA firms and in 
support of putting the two proposals to a mail ballot of the 
membership. When the votes were counted, however, both 
proposals were defeated. Prohibition of a directory lost by 425 to 
234 votes, and the barring of AICPA financial support for the 
division lost by 432 to 246 votes.
The AICPA was still in the process of responding to another 
NCCPAP initiative. The group had organized a petition propos­
ing that the board and Council submit three bylaw changes to a 
mail ballot of the membership. The petition was presented to 
Chairman Cummings at the Institute's annual meeting on Octo­
ber 15, 1979. If adopted, the proposed changes would accomplish 
the following:
1. Permit 500 members to put any proposed change in the bylaws 
or code of professional ethics to a mail ballot of the Institute's 
membership without the consent of Council.
2. Eliminate life membership on the Council for past elected 
presidents and chairmen.
3. Change the manner in which the Institute's nominating com­
mittee would be appointed by requiring five of the seven 
members to be nominated and elected by the membership at 
large.
Whatever one thought about the merits of these proposals, it 
was apparent that the first one was aimed at eventually elimi­
nating the division for CPA firms. The NCCPAP had apparently 
decided to try to accomplish internally what Mr. Mason and 
others were unable to do through their lawsuit against the 
AICPA.
The board had been aware that a petition relating to the
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bylaws was being circulated. At its meeting on September 21, 
1979, it concluded that a comprehensive review of the bylaws 
was overdue, since the last overhaul was in 1972. A special 
committee was appointed in October to conduct the review. John 
Meinert, a member in industry who had recently served on the 
board, was appointed chairman.
The committee concentrated initially on the three proposed 
changes contained in the petition. By February 29, 1980, it was 
able to provide an interim report on its conclusions to the AICPA 
Board of Directors. It recommended against adoption of any of 
the petitioner's three changes but suggested certain alternatives 
in the event that changes were to be made. The committee did, 
however, suggest a modification of a prior Council resolution 
regarding the manner in which the AICPA's nominating com­
mittee was appointed.
The board decided to await the reactions of Council members 
before reaching a final decision, since regional meetings had 
been scheduled for the following month. The attitude of most 
Council members proved to be that the AICPA was being 
harassed by a small number of members whose views were not 
representative of the general membership.
A considerable number of Council members did feel, how­
ever, that the bylaws should contain a referendum provision that 
could be employed if a significant number of members were 
seeking to take action on a particular issue. There were mixed 
views about how many members should be required to initiate 
a referendum without the consent of Council. Some felt that 5 
percent of the membership was appropriate, while others be­
lieved this to be too high. A great majority, however, agreed 
that the petitioners' proposal of 500 members was far too low.
The views of Council members were mixed with respect to 
life memberships on Council and the procedures for appointment 
of the nominating committee.
It was at this time that the Institute received the NCCPAP 
petition for a special meeting of the membership. Council mem­
bers expressed shock that under the existing bylaws only 200 
members out of approximately one hundred seventy thousand 
could require a special meeting to be held. They strongly urged 
that this provision of the bylaws be changed so that 5 percent of 
the total members should be required.
The views of Council members were reported at a special 
meeting of the board on April 2, 1980. As a result, the board 
resolved to urge the Council to reject all of the petitioner's 
proposals and to authorize a mail ballot on two alternative 
changes. One would increase the number of members required 
to call a special meeting of the Institute from 200 members to 5 
percent of the membership. The other change would provide 
that 5 percent of the membership could cause a proposed change 
in the bylaws or code of professional ethics to be voted on by 
the members by mail ballot without the consent of the board or 
Council. The board also recommended a modification of the 
procedures for appointment of the nominating committee. In the 
future the board would select the slate of candidates for the 
committee and its chairman for election by the Council.
These proposals were presented at the next official Council 
meeting on May 2 through 4, 1980. After extensive debate, the 
Council approved the board's recommendations, except that it 
provided in its resolution regarding the nominating committee 
that the Council would elect the chairman of the committee 
following receipt of the board's recommendation.
The proposed bylaw changes were in due course submitted 
to a vote of the membership, and in January 1981 they were 
declared approved by more than the required two-thirds margin.
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Special Committee on Small and Medium-Sized 
Firms
The AICPA had rejected the NCCPAP challenge, and the divi­
sion for CPA firms was functioning. Nevertheless, many of the 
tensions that had existed at the beginning of the decade— 
tensions that the two practice sections were partly designed to 
resolve—continued to disturb the profession. In late 1978, in a 
further attempt to resolve these problems, the Institute had 
appointed a special committee to study the problems of small 
and medium-sized CPA firms. The study was prompted partially 
by concern about the dwindling number of national firms. Two 
firms, J. K. Lasser and Company and S. D. Leidesdorf and 
Company, had recently merged into Touche Ross and Ernst and 
Whinney respectively. Two large regional firms, Wolf and Com­
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pany and Clarence Rainess and Company, had split into smaller 
local entities, and there were dire predictions that the days of all 
such firms were numbered because it was impossible to compete 
with the eight largest firms.
The committee was chaired by Samuel A. Derieux, a local 
practitioner from Richmond, Virginia, who had devoted many 
years of service to the AICPA, as chairman and in many other 
capacities. Under his able leadership, the special committee made 
a diligent study of the pressures on small and medium-sized 
firms. After considering the results of dozens of interviews, 
public hearings, member discussion forums conducted by the 
state societies, discussions with Council members, and corre­
spondence received from members, the committee prepared a 
report on its deliberations and conclusions. The report was 
summarized at the AICPA's annual meeting in Boston on October 
6, 1980, and subsequently was published as the Report of the 
Special Committee on Small and Medium-Sized Firms.
The report focused primarily on the subjects of competition, 
staff recruitment, and the burden of applying accounting stand­
ards designed for publicly traded corporations to smaller, pri­
vately held clients. The committee recognized that each firm 
bears responsibility for its own success or failure, but it concluded 
that some factors are beyond the control of individual firms and 
should be addressed by the Institute and the state societies.
In general, the report was well received, and the board 
promised to consider each of the recommendations. By early 
1981 it had begun assigning individual items to the apppropriate 
standing committees for study and implementation.
The Situation in 1981
While these events were occurring, the division for CPA firms 
continued to make progress. The private companies practice 
section executive committee had become a cohesive and effective 
group that expressed its views with considerable success. It 
began holding annual conferences for its member firms, and it 
developed better communications with its constituents.
The SEC practice section struggled with procedures for dealing 
with major alleged audit failures and disciplinary proceedings,
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and it established a special investigation committee. The section 
had backed away from its proposal to involve foreign affiliates 
directly in the quality review process, since foreign accounting 
groups had objected strongly. After extended discussions, the 
POB, the SEC, and the SEC practice section executive committee 
had agreed to a compromise on the issue of access by the SEC 
to the quality review working papers. Quality reviews of all the 
large firms had been completed by 1981.
By the end of 1980, the private companies practice section had 
1,601 member firms, and the SEC practice section had 535 
members. Five hundred thirteen firms were members of both 
sections. The division for CPA firms seemed to have become a 
permanent feature of the profession's structure. Nevertheless, 
some people still strongly opposed the existence of the two 
sections, and only time will reveal whether additional efforts will 
be made to eliminate one or both of them.
The internal stresses in the profession escalated sharply dur­
ing the 1970s. This was partially the result of the increasing 
disparity in the size of the CPA firms, but of greater importance 
was the impact of external forces. The forced removal of restric­
tions on competition and the establishment of a division for CPA 
firms contributed greatly to the dissension that existed at the 
end of the decade. Few firms were enthusiastic about the pros­
pect of quality reviews. Some CPAs believed that there should 
be a single division for firms, without two sections, and others 
were opposed to any structure for firm membership.
The division was a necessity. A self-regulatory structure for 
firms was vital to the profession's credibility. Two separate 
sections were necessary to avoid the imposition on the entire 
profession of requirements necessary for SEC practice. In addition, 
an attempt to combine the two sections carried the substantial 
risk that a separate structure for SEC practice might be established 
outside the auspices of the AICPA by the larger firms. If this 
were to occur, the AICPA might well be overshadowed, and a 
permanent split in the profession would be institutionalized.
From the outset, I knew of the risk that overt attempts to deal 
with internal problems might only make them worse. This 
possibility may have been a contributing factor in the early stages 
of the increased disharmony, but, if so, it was diminished by the 
effect of external pressures that were beyond the profession's
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control. Nevertheless, it is human nature to personalize blame, 
and the Institute's officers were the targets of considerable 
criticism.
Unbridled competition and the existence of a standards ov­
erload problem are likely to continue to divide CPAs. With little 
prospect that these factors will be eliminated, the profession may 
well have to learn to live with sharp differences within its ranks. 
The whole profession would be the poorer, however, if these 
differences were to lead to a formal split based on firm size. 
Accommodation of all interest groups under the umbrella of a 
single organization, the AICPA, remains the best alternative 
available to the public accounting profession.
With the reduction in pressures from Congress and the SEC, 
and the diminishing volume of lawsuits and adverse publicity, 
perhaps the emotions of the seventies will subside. Also, the 
new president, Philip Chenok, who took office on July 1, 1980, 
will be starting with a clean slate to work toward greater unity.
CHAPTER 8
Peer Reviews
Development of the Idea of Peer Reviews
T
h e  introduction of peer reviews of the quality controls of CPA 
firms was a long and difficult process. The notion first surfaced 
in the mid 1960s. An AICPA long-range planning committee 
presented a tentative proposal, which was explained by the 
Institute's executive director, John L. Carey, in the CPA Newsletter 
of June 1967. The resulting outburst of opposition caused the 
Institute to drop the plan at that time.
After further study, a modified approach was developed, 
whereby firms desiring confidential reviews of their auditing 
practices could obtain them under the auspices of the AICPA for 
a fee. No publicity or accreditation would be involved. The 
revised approach, which entailed reviews of specific engage­
ments relating to audited and unaudited financial statements, 
was presented to the Council in the fall of 1968. Later, the AICPA 
Board of Directors authorized a pilot program to be carried out 
in the summer of 1971.
Initially, only a few local firms availed themselves of the new 
program, but subsequently nearly fifty firms a year were seeking 
reviews. By 1976 approximately 300 firms had been reviewed.
Peer Reviews as SEC Sanctions
Meanwhile, the idea of peer reviews was being advanced in 
another quarter. John C. Burton became chief accountant of the 
SEC; as a member of the AICPA planning committee that had 
first suggested peer reviews in the 1960s, Mr. Burton had been 
one of the strongest advocates of the proposal. As chief accoun­
tant, he continued to push for the adoption of such a program.
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Mr. Burton soon had an opportunity to promote the adoption 
of peer reviews. The commission's injunctive actions against the 
large firms led to a substantial number of consent decrees, which 
in turn led to private liability suits. By 1972 the number of 
lawsuits and the amount of damages claimed had reached such 
proportions that the AICPA's elected president, Walter Oliphant, 
urged the commission to consider adopting less draconion dis­
ciplinary sanctions; otherwise, liability insurance might become 
unavailable, and one or more firms might go bankrupt. Mr. 
Burton suggested as an alternative that peer reviews be imposed 
as sanctions under rule 2(e) disciplinary proceedings. Some 
commission and staff members were skeptical of the proposal, 
but Mr. Burton succeeded in gaining agreement to give it a try.
The first opportunity arose when one of the large firms, 
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath and Horwath, was subjected to 
disciplinary action under rule 2(e) in connection with an alleged 
case of audit deficiency. The firm entered into a consent decree, 
whereby it agreed under court order to incur a review of its 
quality controls by a team of CPAs provided either under the 
auspices of the AICPA or by direct SEC appointment. A report 
on the results of the review would be submitted to the SEC.
A request to provide the review team was conveyed to the 
Institute in August 1972. The initial reaction of many of the large 
firms, as well as some members of the Institute's Board of 
Directors, was to reject the SEC's request. Several members 
argued vehemently that the AICPA and the profession had no 
business allowing itself to become an appendage of the enforce­
ment arm of a governmental agency by agreeing to participate 
in the review. On the other hand, several members worried that 
failure to participate might result in the SEC's appointment of 
reviewers who might be biased or who would lack the experience 
necessary to make fair judgments. Some members felt that it 
would be unfair to the firm involved to refuse to provide 
reviewers.
As distasteful as participation might be, there seemed little 
choice but to explore the possibility. A special five-member 
committee was appointed for this purpose, chaired by Gordon 
Murray, a former AICPA vice president and a partner of Deloitte, 
Haskins and Sells.
The committee held several meetings with SEC staff represen­
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tatives to discuss the many problems in need of resolution. There 
were no quality control standards with which to compare per­
formance; the scope of the examination needed to be defined, 
and the type of report had to be specified. In addition, there 
were grave concerns about the reviewers' and the Institute's 
exposure to liability. Questions arose about the reviewers' re­
sponsibilities to report to the SEC on any deficiencies in audits 
of the firm's specific SEC clients that were discovered as a 
byproduct of the review. Another issue was whether the review 
should go beyond quality control procedures and include evalu­
ation of individual audits and accounting judgments.
As they considered the work and responsibilities of a review 
team, the committee concluded that a superior approach would 
be a review conducted by another firm within the framework of 
a professional engagement. Responsibility then could be fixed 
on the reviewing firm, and the conduct of the review was likely 
to be more efficient.
The SEC, however, rejected the firm-on-firm alternative. The 
commission staff thought that such reviews would lack credibil­
ity.
In October 1973, after extended negotiations and considera­
tion of the advice of legal counsel, the committee reluctantly 
recommended that the AICPA comply with the SEC's request. It 
provided the board with a tentative program spelling out the 
procedures and conditions that had been worked out with the 
SEC staff. The committee also provided a draft of a letter to the 
SEC, which the board might use as a basis for a meeting with 
the commissioners. It spelled out all the problems and expressed 
grave reservations about whether such quality reviews would in 
fact result in improvement of a firm's performance. The board 
decided against arranging such a meeting with the commission.
In agreeing to supply a review team, the board recognized 
that the support of the large firms would be necessary. Accord­
ingly, a meeting with top representatives of the twenty-five 
largest firms was held on January 4, 1974. Although they had 
many reservations about complying with the SEC's request, 
nearly all the firms represented at the meeting agreed to supply 
names of partners who would serve as review team members. 
Only one of the eight largest firms declined to participate.
After this show of support, the board adopted a resolution to
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provide a team to review Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath and 
Horwath under the terms of a "Tentative Program for an Inspec­
tion of the Quality Control Standards and Procedures of an 
Accounting Firm." The board intended to consider subsequent 
SEC requests in the light of this review's results.
Haldon Robinson, a partner of Deloitte, Haskins and Sells 
and a member of the auditing standards committee, was ap­
pointed to head the review team. Despite being confronted with 
a new type of engagement, the team completed its work to the 
satisfaction of all parties involved.
Meanwhile there were indications that the SEC had initiated 
a considerable number of additional disciplinary actions against 
CPA firms. It was rumored that in due course all of the eight 
largest firms would be subjected to quality control reviews.
The rumors were mostly borne out. In 1974 the SEC issued 
Accounting Series Release no. 153, requiring the review of 
Touche Ross and Company, and in 1975 it issued Accounting 
Series Release no. 173, requiring the review of Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell and Co. In addition, several small firms were caught 
up in SEC disciplinary actions that resulted in requests that the 
Institute supply review teams. The AICPA board acceded to each 
request, and in time it became apparent that there was no turning 
back.
The AICPA was less responsive when some state boards of 
accountancy became interested in imposing reviews as sanctions. 
The Colorado state board, for example, asked the AICPA to 
provide reviews upon request. On October 11, 1975, the Insti­
tute's board declined this request on the grounds that reports on 
the results of such reviews could not be kept confidential by a 
state agency. The board's action effectively ended any attempts 
by the state boards of accountancy to have the AICPA provide 
reviews.
Voluntary Multioffice Review Program
Even before the board's decision to participate in the first SEC- 
mandated review, several of the large firms were aware, through 
their settlement negotiations with the SEC, that they might be 
subjected to reviews of their quality controls. This no doubt
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motivated several firms to begin urging, late in 1973, that the 
AICPA develop and implement a voluntary quality control review 
program for multioffice firms to supplement the already existing 
local firm program. Some believed that if the profession mounted 
its own reviews the SEC would be willing to defer to such a 
voluntary effort. This result would be preferable to the stigma 
that accompanied a review mandated by the SEC.
In view of this groundswell of opinion, President Derieux 
appointed a special seven-member committee to develop a pro­
gram for review of quality control procedures of multioffice firms. 
The committee worked at top speed, reflecting the urgency felt 
by some of the members' firms, which were in negotiations with 
the SEC. On April 27, 1974, it presented a program to the AICPA 
Board of Directors. The board immediately approved the plan 
for implementation.
The new plan called for the appointment of a seven-member 
committee to oversee and administer voluntary quality control 
reviews. A firm requesting a review would provide the committee 
with a description of its quality control procedures. A team 
would then conduct field reviews to test compliance with those 
procedures. The team would prepare a confidential report, which 
it would present to the reviewed firm. According to the plan, 
the firm could make the report available only to regulatory 
agencies, such as the SEC.
While these events were taking place, the auditing standards 
committee took action to provide guidance regarding the nature 
of quality control in a CPA firm. The committee appointed a task 
force in 1973, and its work culminated in the issuance of State­
ment on Auditing Standards no. 4 in December 1974. The 
statement identified nine elements of quality control, which were 
used as a starting point in the development of various review 
programs, beginning with the multioffice plan adopted in April 
1974. The elements included such internal administrative matters 
as the hiring and promotion of personnel and policies for ac­
ceptance and continuance of clients. Thus, SAS no. 4 provided 
the first tacit recognition that certain aspects of a firm's internal 
management should be subject to regulation. A few individuals 
regarded this step as a serious mistake, but their objections failed 
to gain acceptance.
The Institute's officers had decided not to issue a press release
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about the new program because it seemed prudent to be sure of 
its success before calling attention to it. Nevertheless, Fred 
Andrews, a leading financial reporter, became aware of the plan 
and inquired frequently about its progress. When Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell and Co. became the first firm to request a review, Mr. 
Andrews promptly interviewed the head of the firm, Walter 
Hanson, and wrote a newspaper story on the development. This 
raised objections from the committee responsible for administer­
ing the reviews, which felt strongly that publicity would create 
the impression that the first firms to pass reviews were superior 
to those that had not yet been reviewed.
Mr. Hanson rightly pointed out that such matters could not 
and should not be kept confidential, and he sought a ruling from 
the AICPA Board of Directors at its December 5, 1974, meeting. 
The board approved the committee's position, and as a conse­
quence Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Co. withdrew its request for 
a review.
Immediately thereafter the firm engaged Arthur Young and 
Company to perform a review similar to the one contemplated 
under the Institute's multioffice program. By November 25, 1975, 
that review had been completed, and a report had been issued. 
Meanwhile, the SEC mandated an additional review of the firm 
under Accounting Series Release no. 173, and the AICPA board 
agreed on July 24, 1975, to provide a team for that review.
Voluntary Quality Control Review Program for 
CPA Firms
Other developments late in 1974 would lead to the replacement 
of the multioffice program before it became fully operative. 
Having foreseen trouble in Washington, I had been considering, 
on a confidential basis, the alternatives available to the profes­
sion. One alternative was the initiation of federal legislation to 
obtain statutory regulatory authority for the AICPA, coupled 
with a limitation on the liability of independent auditors. Taking 
the initiative might be a better strategy than waging a defensive 
battle against the congressional attacks that appeared imminent. 
Because I feared that any public discussion might stimulate 
congressional action, I was very discreet in exploring the idea of
seeking legislation with the chairman of the Institute, individual 
heads of some of the large firms, small groups of Council and 
board members, and the Institute's legal counsel. While many of 
them agreed that taking the initiative might be the best strategy, 
most of the participants in the discussions opposed such a bold 
step. Some believed that drastic action was unnecessary, and 
others feared that only unneeded requirements would emerge 
from the unpredictable legislative process.
Nevertheless, Chairman Philip L. Defliese concluded late in 
1974 that the whole system of self-regulation, including the 
possibility of seeking statutory authority, should be reexamined. 
A special eight-member committee was appointed in December
1974. Included on the committee were the heads of some of the 
large firms, as well as representatives of medium and smaller 
firms. The committee chairman was Sam Derieux, immediate 
past chairman of the AICPA.
The charge to the committee suggested that it address several 
distinct questions: Is the present system of licensing and regu­
lation adequate to serve public needs in the present environment 
of public practice? If not, what changes should be considered? 
What new or improved forms of preventative machinery should 
be considered to ensure high levels of performance? Should the 
profession develop and implement a new system of self-regula­
tion of firms? If so, what form should the plan take? If legislation 
would be required to establish effective self-regulation of firms, 
should additional provisions be sought that would deal with 
other problems? If so, what proposals should be considered?
Chairman Defliese and I attended the opening portion of the 
committee's organizational meeting to elaborate on the charge. 
We both urged the committee to address the necessity for some 
form of federal accountancy board to make possible a more 
effective system of self-regulation, particularly the regulation of 
firms. We also suggested that provisions for liability relief should 
be included if a proposal requiring legislation were to be pursued.
In spite of our pleas, the committee promptly rejected any 
legislative initiative. Instead, it concluded that the profession's 
best course was to establish a system of self-regulation of firms.
In view of this conclusion, I urged the committee to move 
quickly to minimize any damage to the profession's credibility 
that may have resulted from statements made to the press by
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Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Co. when it withdrew from the 
multioffice review program. I suggested that any plan developed 
by the committee be described as an adjustment to the multioffice 
program, which was encountering severe difficulties.
When the committee began discussing alternatives for the 
regulation of firms, it was informed about earlier discussions 
between the AICPA and the SEC. One proposal, rejected by the 
SEC, had been that firms be required to register with the 
commission and to file certain information on a regular basis, 
including a report that their quality controls had been reviewed 
by another firm. The committee immediately embraced a varia­
tion of this idea, whereby firms would register with the AICPA, 
which would serve as a repository of information about each 
registered firm. To register, a firm would file a letter of intent to 
undergo a review of its quality controls by a specified date and 
every three years thereafter. A review team, rather than another 
firm, would conduct the review.
This plan had two important advantages over the multioffice 
firm review program. Because all firms could register immediately 
without waiting for completion of a review, it would deny any 
competitive edge to the first firms to be reviewed. In addition, it 
would be considerably less cumbersome to administer.
The committee developed the details and exposed the plan in 
a preliminary report to the board on May 9, 1975, and to the 
Council the following week. There were many suggestions for 
changes, and discussions with Council members, advisory groups 
A, B, and C, and member forums conducted by the state societies 
led to several revisions of the plan.
Of considerable importance was the reaction of advisory 
group C, composed of the eleven largest firms, which audited 
the great preponderance of SEC registrants. Initially, three of the 
firms adamantly opposed any form of registration with the 
AICPA. They felt that any regulation of firms should be con­
ducted by a new and separate body rather than by the Institute. 
After several discussions, group C, with the unanimous approval 
of its members, submitted an alternate plan, which would permit 
firm-on-firm reviews and under which firms would not initially 
register with the AICPA.
By February 9, 1976, the special committee had considered all
of the objections and suggestions and had submitted a revised 
proposal to the AICPA Board of Directors. Several changes had 
been made to the original plan. Since smaller firms generally 
objected to any plan that would include them, the program was 
now to apply only to firms that had an SEC practice or that 
desired to prepare for such a practice. To allay fears that firms 
would refer to themselves as "registered CPA firms," the use of 
the term registration was dropped in favor of references to 
participants. To become a participant, a firm would only have to 
file a letter of intent with the AICPA. Firms could advise their 
clients of their participation and the results of their reviews. 
Participating firms could, at their option, file copies of review 
reports with the AICPA, which would be available for public 
inspection. Firms electing not to file copies of their review reports 
could not refer to themselves as "participants." Also, the results 
of initial reviews would not be released until the end of a 
preliminary period, designed to provide time for all firms to be 
reviewed. Finally, the revised plan would permit firm-on-firm 
reviews.
The board approved the revised plan on February 19, 1976, 
and authorized presentation to Council. Finally, after nearly 
sixteen months of committee effort, the Council approved the 
revised plan with the proviso that a similar plan, modified to 
apply to smaller firms without SEC clients, be prepared for 
adoption at its October meeting. Many smaller firms had come 
full circle, from opposition to any plan that included them to a 
desire to be included because of a fear of otherwise being viewed 
as second-class firms.
The board concurred with Council's instructions, and at the 
next Council meeting, on October 23, 1976, the plan was revised 
to provide for the participation of all firms. The name was 
changed to the Voluntary Quality Control Review Program for 
CPA Firms to make it clear that the program was not restricted 
to firms with an SEC practice.
A new standing committee, the AICPA Quality Control Re­
view Committee, was appointed to administer the new program. 
The committee was chaired by Haldon Robinson, who had 
headed the review team that had performed the first SEC- 
mandated review. It conducted a survey of CPA firms to gain an
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indication of the number that intended to participate. Also, task 
forces were appointed to carry out all the necessary activities to 
implement and administer the program.
Anticipating that standards would be necessary to implement 
the new program, the AICPA appointed a special committee in 
February 1976 to develop guidelines for quality control policies 
and procedures and for reviews of compliance with those policies 
and procedures. Chaired by Robert W. Burmester, a partner of 
Arthur Young and Company who had extensive experience with 
intrafirm quality reviews, the special committee held its first 
meeting on March 4, 1976.
The committee's task proved more difficult than anticipated, 
and first drafts of the two sets of standards were not completed 
until December 1976. Because the auditing standards committee 
had issued SAS no. 4 on the nine elements of quality control, 
the drafts were subject to that committee's review before expo­
sure to the membership. This review began on January 18, 1977, 
and led to further delays. It was April 22, 1977, before a 
discussion draft, Quality Control Policies and Procedures for Partici­
pating CPA Firms, was exposed to all practice units represented 
in the AICPA. A final draft was presented to the auditing 
standards committee on August 8, 1977, to be issued as a guide 
rather than as an elaboration of SAS no. 4. By the fall of 1977 
the special committee also completed initial discussion drafts of 
guides on Performing and Reporting on Quality Control Compliance 
Reviews.
It was late in 1978 before all the necessary guidelines were 
ready for use in connection with the new voluntary quality 
control review program. By that time the division for CPA firms 
had been established, and the division became the new focal 
point for regulation of firms and reviews of quality control. 
However, since not all firms would necessarily join the new 
division for CPA firms, the separate voluntary program was 
continued to provide nonmember firms with an opportunity to 
have quality reviews. On September 17, 1977, the Council ele­
vated the status of the quality control review committee to that 
of a senior technical committee responsible for setting quality 
control standards as well as for administering the voluntary 
program. The panel, renamed the quality control standards 
committee, issued its first official pronouncement, Statement on
Quality Control Standards no. 1, on November 1, 1979. The 
committee also provided consulting services to firms regarding 
their quality control programs to assist them in preparing for 
reviews, either under the voluntary program or through the 
division for CPA firms.
Peer Reviews by the Division for CPA Firms
If the reader is confused by the chain of events, it is understand­
able; most practitioners found it difficult to stay abreast of the 
profession's efforts to mount an effective quality review program 
for the regulation of firms. If nothing else, this history should 
provide a sense of the rapidly changing circumstances during 
this period and explain events that led to the adoption of peer 
reviews by the division for CPA firms in 1977. The emergence of 
such reviews was one of several truly new developments that 
would dramatically transform the profession.
During 1976 and early 1977—after the abortive multioffice 
program had collapsed, while efforts were underway to imple­
ment the voluntary quality control review program, and before 
the division for CPA firms was established—some of the largest 
firms felt for various reasons that they could not defer reviews 
until an AICPA program became operative. One firm, Price 
Waterhouse and Company, independently arranged for Deloitte, 
Haskins and Sells to perform a firm-on-firm quality review. The 
review covered the fiscal year ended June 30, 1976, on which a 
report dated October 7, 1976, was issued. The opinion paragraph 
from that report illustrates the scope of reviews being made at 
that time:
In our opinion, the system of quality control that was in effect with 
respect to your audit practice in the United States during your fiscal 
year ended June 30, 1976 was suitable to achieve its objective. 
Consistent with the purpose of our study, we express no opinion 
concerning the professional judgments that you exercised in the 
conduct of any particular audit engagement.
The evolution of firm-on-firm reviews was largely a product 
of disciplinary pressures being applied by the SEC. Those pres­
sures, along with other factors described in chapter 7, helped 
make the leaders of the large firms more receptive to the estab­
lishment of a self-regulatory scheme for CPA firms.
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The result was the birth of the division for CPA firms. A 
principal requirement of both sections of the division was that a 
member firm have either a team or a firm-on-firm review every 
three years. The reviews would measure compliance with quality 
control standards set by the AICPA Quality Control Standards 
Committee. Peer review committees of the two sections would 
set policies and p roced u res for conducting and reporting on the 
reviews and would administer the program. Reports on the 
reviews and the quality control documents of member firms 
would be included in the files of the AICPA and would be open 
to public inspection.
Beginning in 1978, implementation of peer reviews under the 
two sections virtually replaced all preceding quality control re­
view activities. The sections' two peer review committees did 
not start from scratch, however; they benefited greatly from the 
work of prior groups in developing their policies and procedures.
The SEC Practice Section
The peer review committee of the SEC practice section encoun­
tered a number of issues during the early period of its existence. 
One of these involved the objections of the SEC to firm-on-firm 
reviews on the grounds that they lacked the appearance of 
objectivity. The public oversight board shared the SEC's concern, 
and the issue also was raised in congressional hearings.
To resolve this problem, the section agreed to appoint review 
panels to oversee the work of the reviewing firms in firm-on- 
firm engagements. The panels would consist of from one to three 
CPAs from other firms. They would issue their own reports, 
taking full responsibility for the reviews. This resulted in dupli­
cation of effort and added significantly to the costs of firm-on- 
firm reviews. Nearly all the large member firms agreed to incur 
this added burden because they believed that team reviews were 
less effective than reviews by firms. They hoped that a record of 
satisfactory reviews would eliminate concerns about firm-on-firm 
reviews, and the additional requirement for review panels could 
then be eliminated.
Another issue was the insistence of the SEC, supported by 
the public oversight board and members of Congress, that the
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peer reviews be extended to foreign firms or affiliates whose 
audits of foreign branches or subsidiaries of U.S. parent compa­
nies were included in filings with the SEC. The large firms 
generally favored such a move because it would help them gain 
the agreement of their international associates to participate in 
intrafirm inspection programs. When the professional organiza­
tions in other countries learned of the proposal to extend peer 
reviews to firms in their jurisdictions, they raised immediate and 
strong objections, particularly in Western Europe.
While attending the AICPA's annual meeting in San Francisco 
in October 1978, John Hough, executive secretary of the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales, discussed the 
matter with me. This was followed by a December meeting in 
New York attended by Mr. Hough; David Richards, president of 
the English institute; and representatives of the AICPA, including 
myself, Chairman Joseph Cummings, and Donald Neebes, chair­
man of the SEC practice section peer review committee. There 
was an exchange of viewpoints, but no agreement was reached 
at the meeting. I made it clear that the AICPA was not seeking 
to apply full reviews of overseas firms' quality controls. All that 
was being asked was for such firms to permit U.S. peer reviewers 
to examine working papers on specific audit engagements in­
cluded in filings with the SEC.
This so-called third-party access became the principal point 
at issue. The profession in England adamantly opposed such 
access, claiming that it would violate their national sovereignty 
and their duty to protect the confidentiality of client information. 
Even more important was the fear that it would lead the English 
government to impose peer reviews on the profession.
Since the English institute could not speak for the profession 
in other European countries, the AICPA arranged a group meet­
ing to discuss the issue. The meeting was held in Amsterdam 
on March 5, 1979, and was attended by representatives of 
Canada, England, France, West Germany, the Netherlands, and 
the International Federation of Accountants. The AICPA's pro­
posal that the institutes urge firms in their jurisdictions to permit 
third-party access met with almost unanimous opposition, but 
the attendees agreed to discuss the matter with their respective 
governing bodies and to report their decisions at a subsequent 
meeting.
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A follow-up meeting was held in Amsterdam on June 16, 
1979. As expected, all the institutes represented declined to 
support the AICPA's proposal. The meeting ended with the 
agreement that David Richards, as a representative of the group, 
would meet with the executive committee of the SEC practice 
section to negotiate something less than third-party access.
On September 19, 1979, Mr. Richards proposed in New York 
that peer reviewers confine themselves to reviewing the proce­
dures used by a U.S. firm to satisfy themselves that they could 
rely on the work performed by its foreign affiliate. He suggested 
that the audit practices committee of the International Federation 
of Accountants should set the standards for reliance on the work 
of other auditors in international engagements and that peer 
reviewers should use such standards as the basis for judging a 
firm's quality controls.
By this time it was clear that the AICPA could not achieve 
third-party access to working papers on engagements outside 
the United States. The AICPA had no power to impose such a 
requirement across national borders, and even the SEC's power 
to do this was both dubious and limited by other foreign policy 
considerations. In fact, in a tour of Europe at that time, SEC 
Chairman Williams had backed away from a hard position when 
confronted with the angry objections of the profession's leaders 
in the various countries. This effectively killed any possibility 
that the AICPA could achieve third-party access since its principal 
argument was that the SEC was adamant and was threatening 
to withdraw its support for the SEC practice section.
With these considerations in mind, the executive committee 
agreed in general with the arrangement suggested by Mr. Rich­
ards. It was tacitly understood, however, that U.S. firms would 
request that key portions of foreign working papers be sent to 
them and that the papers would be made available for inspection 
by peer reviewers. This is essentially the basis on which the 
matter was resolved after the peer review committee had met 
with the federation's audit practices committee in January 1980.
Thereafter, both groups issued pronouncements on the stand­
ards, policies, and procedures to be followed. The SEC and the 
public oversight board no longer pressed the issue, and the large 
firms seemed resigned to waiting until a later time to seek a 
more extensive arrangement. The large firms seem unlikely to
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have such an opportunity unless domestic pressures in other 
major countries force the profession to embrace peer reviews 
similar to those in the U.S.
The SEC practice section also was faced with the difficult 
issue of SEC access to peer review working papers. From the 
outset the SEC sought the means to satisfy itself that the peer 
review program was functioning properly; to do this, the com­
mission insisted it must have full access to review working 
papers. It refused to rely solely on the oversight of the public 
oversight board.
The section's executive committee was equally insistent that 
the SEC not have access to the peer review working papers. The 
committee feared that the SEC would not just appraise the review 
process but would examine the workpapers for opportunities for 
investigation of specific SEC registrants. The committee also 
worried that clients would refuse to allow their CPAs to make 
the working papers on their audits available to peer reviewers. 
If this were to happen, the whole peer review program would 
collapse. Furthermore, direct access by the SEC violated the 
fundamental purpose of the public oversight board, which was 
to serve as the independent link between the profession and the 
government.
The public oversight board did its best to act as an honest 
broker and bring about a satisfactory compromise. In the end it 
urged the section to grant the SEC access to only that portion of 
the peer review working papers relating to the administrative 
aspects of the review. The views of both sides were unyielding, 
and for a considerable time it appeared that the impasse might 
endanger the success of the entire self-regulatory program. In its 
first two annual reports to Congress, the SEC cited the issue, 
making its solution a condition for the commission's continuing 
support of the profession's program of self-regulation. As a result, 
the SEC staff and representatives of the peer review committee 
held a series of exploratory discussions over a period of nearly 
three years. The dispute became the subject of a number of stories 
in the press, and by 1980 the need for a solution had become 
acute.
A compromise agreement was finally reached in July of that 
year, and the SEC delayed filing its July 1 report to Congress to 
remove the matter from the list of unresolved problems. Under
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the agreement the SEC would receive access to the public 
oversight board's oversight working papers, which contain mem­
orandums summarizing review information and listing items 
noted for further consideration and investigation. This informa­
tion would provide no clues to the identity of the reviewed firm's 
clients. Thus, the confidentiality of client information would be 
retained. It was also understood that such access would apply 
only to the sixteen largest firms, beginning with reviews per­
formed in 1981. The section hoped that after a reasonable period 
the SEC would discontinue its review activities and rely on the 
public oversight board's oversight of peer reviews.
The resolution of this issue was extremely important because 
it was the last major hurdle standing in the way of the SEC's 
unqualified support of the peer review program. Of course, the 
SEC probably will never express complete satisfaction and will 
reserve the right to be critical or to withdraw its approval in the 
future.
The Private Companies Practice Section
The peer review committee of the private companies section also 
experienced many problems during the first two years of its 
existence. Fearing the possibility of being viewed as second class, 
the committee adopted nearly all the same peer review policies 
and procedures as the SEC practice section. As a result, many 
smaller firms were discouraged by the prospect of preparing 
detailed documents describing their quality control policies and 
procedures. Also, the rumored costs of reviews were considered 
excessively burdensome, and the voluminous checklists of con­
trols designed to apply to the large national firms were obviously 
not practicable for small, one-office firms or sole practitioners.
I was greatly concerned that the section's peer review program 
was inappropriate for the great majority of local firms. I was 
even more concerned that not enough firms would join the 
section because the reviews, as designed, seemed unrealistic. I 
repeatedly urged the executive and peer review committees to 
adopt a sample engagement review approach similar to that of 
the original program for local firms begun in 1971. Such an 
approach would be less burdensome and more effective in
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improving the performance of local firms. Furthermore, it would 
be more in keeping with the objectives of the private companies 
section, which was not intended to be regulatory.
The section's executive and peer review committees resisted 
these suggestions because they believed that any deviations from 
the peer review requirements of the SEC practice section would 
be unfairly exploited by the large firms. As time went on, 
however, there were increasing signs that smaller firms were 
reluctant to undergo systems-oriented peer reviews. As a result, 
the section agreed to modify its program to place greater empha­
sis on engagement working papers and less on documented 
quality control policies and procedures.
The section's peer review committee lagged behind that of 
the SEC practice section, and the first reviews of the private 
companies practice section did not begin until July 1, 1979. By 
the end of 1980 only ninety-three reviews had been completed, 
and surveys indicated that a very high percentage of the member 
firms intended to defer reviews until the third year, beginning 
in July 1981. This posed a severe problem since most of the 
reviews would be performed by teams. Arranging for a large 
number of teams would be extremely difficult because of the 
shortage of experienced reviewers, and it would require a major 
administrative effort. Clearly, the section would have to consider 
extending the time within which member firms must be reviewed.
Associations of CPA Firms
Throughout the evolution of peer reviews, beginning with the 
development of the Voluntary Quality Control Review Program 
for CPA Firms, there was a question of how to deal with 
associations of CPA firms. Associations are groups of firms that 
work together on such matters as shared technical manuals and 
training programs and engagement referrals. During the 1970s 
there were about a dozen of such associations, many of which 
required their member firms to have their practice reviewed 
periodically by other members.
When it appeared that the AICPA would begin sponsoring a 
quality control review program for all firms, the associations 
sought to have their internal reviews qualify for recognition. At
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one point the planning committee agreed to this, but it deleted 
all reference to the issue before the voluntary plan was approved 
by Council in May 1976. Nevertheless, the discussion at the 
Council meeting indicated that the omission was not intended 
to preclude the acceptance of association-sponsored reviews.
The quality control review committee appointed to administer 
the program addressed the question during the course of its 
deliberations. After obtaining information about the associations 
and after extensive discussions with their representatives, the 
committee concluded that their reviews should not be accepted 
under the program. The committee believed that the relationships 
of the firms within the associations prevented them from being 
independent of one another; thus, reviews carried out within an 
association would lack credibility.
This was a disturbing conclusion for a number of reasons. 
The Institute was encouraging the formation of associations to 
provide smaller firms with access to greater resources, and the 
committee's position was contrary to this objective. Firms within 
the associations were also alarmed about other damaging impli­
cations if they were viewed as not being independent of each 
other.
The AICPA Board of Directors sympathized with the desires 
of the associations and requested the committee to reconsider its 
position and to attempt to develop criteria that, if met, would 
permit recognition of association reviews. The committee con­
cluded that this was not possible.
The associations were incensed, and they mounted a vigorous 
campaign to persuade board members to overrule the committee. 
The issue became so emotional that David Eiger, representing 
CPA Associates, advised me that his association had authorized 
a lawsuit against the Institute if the matter was not resolved 
satisfactorily.
Although I favored finding a way to honor association re­
views, I told Mr. Eiger that neither I nor the board would be 
intimidated by the threat of legal action.
The board approved the appointment of a special committee 
to develop criteria for acceptance of association reviews, and on 
September 17, 1977, the Council affirmed its intent that such 
reviews were not to be automatically excluded under the volun­
OTHER REVIEW  PROGRAMS 165
tary plan. Finally, on March 2, 1978, the board approved criteria 
recommended by the special committee.
When the peer review committees of the division for CPA 
firms were established, the question arose once again. The private 
companies practice section promptly adopted the board's posi­
tion, but the SEC practice section deferred action because of the 
greater urgency of other matters. Despite some reluctance, the 
SEC practice section also eventually adopted the board's position. 
The issue had finally been resolved, but it may well be reopened 
if experience indicates that association reviews are not sufficiently 
reliable.
Other Review Programs
The voluntary plan adopted in 1976 also provided that state- 
society-sponsored review programs would be recognized if they 
met the specifications of the quality control review committee. A 
number of state societies began organizing programs; but before 
they could be implemented, the division for CPA firms came 
into existence. As a result, the state programs were redirected to 
fit the requirements of the private companies practice section. 
The societies were primarily interested in meeting the needs of 
the smaller local firms and had little interest in the SEC practice 
section.
In 1979 the Wisconsin Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
began requiring all of its members in public practice to submit 
samples of their reports on financial statements periodically. This 
was an extremely ambitious program, and it will be interesting 
to learn how successful it proves to be.
A variant of this approach was being discussed informally 
within the AICPA during the latter part of 1979 and early 1980. 
We were concerned about the quality of the work of many smaller 
firms that were not members of the AICPA Division for CPA 
Firms, and we believed that some monitoring system was nec­
essary. One idea was that all firms not subject to peer reviews 
should be subject to random selection for reviews of their work. 
Implementation of such a plan would require a change in the 
bylaws by a mail ballot of the membership, and there was 
considerable doubt that it would gain approval if proposed.
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The Situation in 1980
At the end of 1980 the peer review program remained voluntary 
and largely under the aegis of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms. 
The profession had made great progress in implementing an idea 
that, just a few years before, had raised an outburst of objections 
from the overwhelming majority of CPAs.
The program to review the quality controls of a wide range 
of firms still faced many problems and was too recent a devel­
opment for anyone to judge its ultimate success. There were fears 
that the first major allegation of substandard auditing by a firm 
that had passed inspection under a peer review would thoroughly 
discredit the program. In addition, the costs of reviews were 
substantial, and there were questions about whether successive 
reviews would yield sufficient benefits to justify fees that ranged 
as high as $500,000 for the largest firms. Equally disturbing were 
the administrative costs of arranging for teams to conduct reviews. 
Potentially, thousands of firms may elect to have team reviews, 
and the arrangements would require a huge staff. Members 
would very likely object to the existence of such a bureaucracy.
There is little prospect that the firms practicing before the SEC 
can retreat from periodic reviews, since the SEC is unlikely to 
allow that to happen. Nevertheless, continuing experience with 
peer reviews may lead to modifications, such as a lengthening of 
the period between reviews. The possibility that all CPA firms 
might volunteer to have peer reviews at regular intervals, how­
ever, seems remote. To make such reviews mandatory would 
pose staggering problems of logistics and costs. Even more basic 
is the question of whether a quality control systems approach is 
appropriate for the reviews of smaller firms.
In spite of these problems, there is little question that the 
profession should find a way to monitor the performance by 
CPAs in public practice. The peer review concept is sound, 
although a more practicable means of achieving it is still needed. 
One possibility would be to review the work of local firms selected 
in a random sample. This approach would impose psychological 
pressures on all firms, whether or not they were chosen for 
reviews, and the costs and administrative burdens could be kept 
within reasonable bounds. In addition, it might be better to 
evaluate the work performed by small firms rather than the 
quality controls employed by them. When all is said and done,
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there is no better way of judging performance than by looking 
at a firm's engagement working papers and the reports it has 
issued.
Peer reviews will remain an important part of the profession's 
effort to meet its responsibilities, but the manner in which they 
are imposed and carried out is likely to be improved as a result 
of future experience.
CHAPTER 9
Licensing, State Accountancy 
Statutes, and the Uniform CPA 
Examination
On e  of the important concerns of the profession is the establishment and maintenance of the requirements to be­
come a certified public accountant. During the 1970s the Institute 
dealt with a number of significant developments relating to the 
licensing of CPAs, which involves mainly two activities: the 
maintenance of state accountancy statutes and the production 
and administration of a Uniform CPA Examination.
In carrying out these activities, the Institute found it necessary 
to deal with other organizations whose objectives and actions 
sometimes differed from those of the AICPA. Two such organi­
zations were the National Society of Public Accountants (NSPA), 
a national organization of mainly non-CPA practitioners, and the 
National Association of State Boards of Accountancy (NASBA), 
a private association of state boards of accountancy.
Efforts by the AICPA Committee on State Legislation to 
improve the state accountancy statutes and to protect them from 
dilution involved the periodic updating of a model accountancy 
bill and statements of the Institute's legislative policies and the 
lobbying of state legislatures through the state societies of CPAs. 
The production and administration of the Uniform CPA Exami­
nation involved a different set of problems. While production 
and grading of the examination continued under the direction of 
the AICPA's Board of Examiners, NASBA and others began 
taking a strong interest in the appropriateness and administration 
of the examination, which led to several reviews of all aspects of 
the process. In addition, difficult questions arose regarding 
requests to provide examinations in Spanish.
In all of these activities the Institute encountered one contro-
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versy after another, within its own membership as well as with 
other interested organizations.
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Controversy with the NSPA
A principal adversary of the CPA profession in its effort to 
maintain strong licensing laws was NSPA, based in Washington,
D.C., with a 1970 membership of approximately 15,000. Begin­
ning in the late 1960s that organization stepped up its lobbying 
activities in the state legislatures to amend the accountancy 
statutes to provide for the licensing of a second class of public 
accounting practitioners who would not be required to pass the 
Uniform CPA Examination. The typical NSPA member was an 
unlicensed accountant who engaged in public practice by provid­
ing bookkeeping and tax services to clients but did not perform 
opinion audits. Such practitioners sought licensing for the usual 
competitive and prestige reasons.
As might be expected, CPAs were virtually unanimous in 
their opposition to the creation of a second class of licensed 
accounting practitioners. The profession has been striving for 
years to achieve uniformity in the accountancy statutes, whereby 
grandfathered licensed public accountants would be a dying class 
and ultimately only CPAs would be permitted to express opinions 
on financial statements. This objective was generally referred to 
as "single-class regulatory legislation."
Despite the profession's efforts toward uniformity, there con­
tinued to be a broad range of differences in the accountancy 
statutes of the various states. Some regulated only the use of the 
title "certified public accountant" but permitted anyone to ex­
press opinions on financial statements (permissive statutes). 
Others provided for the continuing recognition of another class 
of practitioners, referred to by such titles as "public accountants" 
and "accounting practitioners."
The lack of uniformity threatened to become even worse 
when the NSPA mounted its aggressive campaign to amend the 
statutes in those states where the state societies of CPAs were 
believed to be politically weak or inactive. This alarmed the 
AICPA Committee on State Legislation, and in 1969 it began
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fighting back. The committee engaged a consultant on state 
legislative affairs, Martin R. Haley, to gain expert advice on key- 
person programs, political action committees, and how to deal 
effectively with the state legislatures. In addition, it organized 
regional meetings of state CPA society representatives to discuss 
ways to protect and improve the existing accountancy statutes. 
Experience indicated that actions taken in one state legislature 
tended to spread to neighboring states, and it was believed that 
a regional "buddy" system would help head off undesirable 
legislative developments.
In reviewing 1956 and 1959 Council resolutions on state 
legislation, the committee discovered that there was no clear 
policy statement opposing the licensing of a second class of 
practitioners. To remedy this situation, the following statement 
was drafted and incorporated in a revised ten-point policy re­
garding the licensing of accountants: "The public interest does 
not warrant the licensing of a class of accountants to perform 
bookkeeping and other elementary accounting services." The 
policy statement was approved by the AICPA Board of Directors 
on March 2, 1970, and by the Council on May 5, 1970. Thereafter, 
the committee on state legislation moved aggressively to imple­
ment the policy by working closely with the state CPA societies. 
Lobbying efforts were organized in every state where the NSPA 
or others pushed legislation that ran counter to the Institute's 
stated objectives. Initiatives were also taken to amend the state 
accountancy statutes where they were deemed to be deficient.
At various times smaller state societies with limited resources 
sought financial assistance from the Institute to engage profes­
sional lobbyists to help them combat unwanted accountancy 
legislation. Over the decade the AICPA Board of Directors 
approved matching funds with those provided by the societies 
in the District of Columbia, Alaska, Rhode Island, Vermont, and 
New Hampshire.
In 1973, under the able chairmanship of the late Max Myers, 
head of his own firm in Missouri, the AICPA State Legislation 
Committee decided that an existing ten-point policy statement 
required revision to make it less repetitious and self-serving in 
tone and to reflect new objectives, such as a statutory require­
ment for continuing professional education. A new statement
was prepared, consolidating all of the policies under five points, 
and was approved by the board of directors and Council in 
October 1973:
1. The public interest warrants the licensing and regulation of persons 
professing expertise in accounting who perform professional ac­
counting services, including the expression of opinions on financial 
statements and other information upon which the public necessarily 
relies.
2. There is no such compelling need for licensing and regulation of 
persons offering record keeping and elementary accounting services 
performed at the instance of and for the benefit of employers and 
clients. Nor is licensing required in connection with the preparation 
of tax returns because of regulatory and disciplinary authority 
presently possessed by the Internal Revenue Service and other 
taxing authorities.
3. The practice of professional accountancy should ultimately be re­
stricted to certified public accountants who have demonstrated 
competency by passing the Uniform CPA Examination, by fulfilling 
educational and other requirements and by continuing to meet 
professional standards. State boards of accountancy entrusted with 
administration of public accountancy laws should be comprised of 
certified public accountants who are qualified to assess the perform­
ance of other certified public accountants.
4. The enactment of a regulatory accountancy law is not intended to 
deprive persons who are practicing public accounting as principals 
at the time of passage of the law of their means of livelihood and 
they should be permitted to register as public accountants and 
become subject to regulation. All further registration or licensing to 
practice public accountancy should be limited to persons demon­
strating their competence as certified public accountants.
5. The accounting profession serves a broad public interest as evi­
denced by the similarity of accounting needs in all political jurisdic­
tions. In order that it may serve this interest, uniform licensing and 
regulatory requirements should be established and unnecessary 
restrictions of a local character should be avoided.
One year later, on October 11, 1974, another action was taken 
at the request of the committee. The board approved a resolution 
to actively pursue a program to achieve single-class regulatory 
statutes in all those states having permissive laws at that time. 
This was not so much a change in policy as it was an expression 
of renewed determination to go on the offensive rather than 
simply to wage a defensive battle against the attempts of the
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NSPA to dilute the accountancy statutes. The efforts to imple­
ment this resolution were successful in that seven states were 
converted to single-class regulatory status during the balance of 
the decade—a surprising result because the tide of political 
opinion during that period was flowing toward elimination of 
restrictive licensing laws in the hope of benefiting consumers.
On several occasions throughout the decade there were at­
tempts on the part of the NSPA to discuss with representatives 
of the AICPA ways to avoid confrontation between the two 
organizations in the area of state legislation. On December 3, 
1970, John Lawler reported to the AICPA Board of Directors on 
a meeting attended by him and President Marshall Armstrong at 
the request of the president and executive director of the NSPA, 
which was seeking to establish a joint group to carry on formal 
discussions on cooperation. The board concluded that little could 
be gained by giving official recognition to the NSPA in the 
absence of a radical change in its legislative approach and 
declined to authorize formal discussions to take place.
This pattern was repeated on July 19, 1973, when the board 
declined a new request of the president of the NSPA to meet 
with the Institute's officers. However, when a similar request 
was received in 1975, Chairman Philip Defliese and I met with 
our NSPA counterparts. At that meeting the NSPA's represen­
tatives expressed concern about competition and damage to the 
reputation of all accountants being caused by unlicensed account­
ing practitioners whom they considered to be unqualified and 
guilty of malpractice. They sought the support of the AICPA for 
state laws requiring the registration of non-CPA public account­
ants to combat what they believed to be a common problem of 
the AICPA and NSPA. This was ironic since CPAs felt the same 
way about the members of the NSPA as the NSPA felt about 
unlicensed practitioners who were not among its members.
Mr. Defliese and I gave the NSPA no encouragement but 
agreed to report the discussion to the Institute's board on May 
9, 1975, when the board again declined to approve any actions 
aimed at seeking an accommodation with the NSPA but author­
ized the staff to maintain informal communications with the 
NSPA for whatever benefits it might provide.
This proved to be the last serious attempt by the NSPA during 
the 1970s to reach a peaceful coexistence with the AICPA.
Meanwhile, it adopted the AICPA's Statements on Auditing 
Standards, as well as the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, 
virtually intact and adopted an examination for admission to 
membership. On the surface these measures seemed to be 
commendable, but they were actually less than impressive since 
the organization lacked an effective means of enforcing the 
auditing standards and rules of conduct on its members and the 
quality of the entrance examination was subject to question.
The NSPA and AICPA clashed on another important matter: 
the U.S. General Accounting Office establishment of uniform 
criteria for the engagement of independent auditors by various 
governmental agencies to audit the increasing volume of govern­
ment grant programs. The NSPA lobbied hard both in Congress 
and at the GAO to have its members included within the GAO's 
recommendations. The AICPA, however, supported the Septem­
ber 1970 GAO policy, which stated that after December 31, 1975, 
only certified public accountants and those public accountants 
licensed before December 31, 1970, should be engaged to audit 
federally chartered, financed, or regulated private organizations. 
In 1972 this policy was incorporated in the GAO's Standards for 
Audit of Governmental Organizations, Programs, Activities and Func­
tions.
By appealing to Congress in 1975, and again in 1979, the 
NSPA moved the GAO to reexamine its policy. On both occasions 
the GAO concluded that its stance was appropriate and no 
changes were made—determinations due, in part, to AICPA- 
supplied information that refuted some of the NSPA allegations.
The relations between the NSPA and the AICPA continued 
to be adversarial. The struggle for the support of the state 
legislatures is likely to continue indefinitely since neither side 
seems disposed to change its position regarding the licensing of 
another class of accounting practitioners. It is unfortunate that 
this issue cannot be satisfactorily resolved to avoid the continuing 
expenditure of time and money, particularly since it is question­
able whether the public interest is served by the ongoing dispute.
The Model Accountancy Bill
An important part of the AICPA State Legislation Committee's 
activities has been the periodic updating and publication of a
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model state accountancy statute incorporating the Institute's 
policy positions regarding the licensing of CPAs. One important 
change in the model bill occurred in July 1974, when the AICPA 
Board of Directors endorsed proposed language that would 
permit separation of the issuance of the CPA certificate from the 
license to practice. This change arose initially to facilitate the 
enforcement of mandatory continuing professional education 
requirements whereby practitioners failing to comply would 
retain their CPA certificates but lose their licenses to practice.
At that time, the two-tier approach to licensing was already 
in use in several states where many believed it to be the best 
way to deal with yet another controversy—whether experience 
should be a requirement for becoming a CPA. By adoption of a 
dual requirement, experience could be required only for the 
permit to practice and not for the issuance of the CPA certificate, 
consistent with a policy adopted by Council in 1969 urging state 
boards of accountancy to drop experience requirements for the 
granting of CPA certificates.
Another important issue arose in the committee's 1977 model 
bill—whether review and compilation engagements as newly 
defined in SSARS no. 1 should be included among the services 
reserved for licensed CPAs. On December 6, 1979, the board of 
directors concluded that review engagements should be included 
because they provided a measure of limited assurance on finan­
cial statements. Compilation engagements, however, were re­
garded as falling within a legislative policy that held, in part, 
"There is no compelling need for licensing . . .  of persons offer­
ing record-keeping and elementary accounting services . . .  for 
clients. . . . "
The draft of the overhauled model bill was exposed for 
comment early in 1980, and on May 5 the state legislation 
committee chairman, Barry Findley, reported to AICPA Council 
on the proposed changes. A final version of the model bill was 
presented for approval of the Council on October 4, 1980.
At that meeting two amending resolutions were proposed 
and adopted. One directed the committee to include compilation 
reports as defined in SSARS no. 1 among the services reserved 
for duly registered members of the accountancy profession. The 
stated intent was to control the use of the compilation report 
and not to restrict the preparation of financial data by unlicensed
practitioners, an act that would be of dubious constitutional 
validity. The proposed amendment received strong support among 
Council members because they had encountered many instances 
in practice in which non-CPAs were issuing compilation-type 
reports in connection with financial statements. The Council 
appeared to view compilation as a professional service that 
required regulation even though this seemed to contradict its 
stated policy.
The second amendment adopted was to provide optional 
wording for use by those states desiring to retain an experience 
requirement. This carried by a vote of ninety-nine to seventy- 
six, reflecting the controversial nature of the issue. The resolution 
did not directly reverse the policy adopted by Council in 1969 to 
require five years of college education and to eliminate any 
experience requirement, but it certainly invited noncompliance. 
The policy had not received popular support in the ranks of 
CPAs, and most of the state boards of accountancy had retained 
an experience requirement for the granting of CPA certificates.
Whether these two positions will stand or be reversed remains 
to be seen. The AICPA's old adversary, the NSPA, will no doubt 
fight vigorously against any attempts to foreclose non-CPAs from 
compiling and reporting on financial statements, and its case will 
be strengthened by the fact that such engagements do not 
pretend to offer assurance of reliability to third parties. Indeed, 
the issue was already joined when, on October 29, 1980, two 
unlicensed accounting firms sued the Washington State Board of 
Accountancy to set aside its interpretation that compilations and 
reviews of financial statements by unlicensed accountants were 
prohibited under the state's accountancy statute.
The experience requirement is another matter. Many educators 
and other AICPA members will regard the Council's 1980 "op­
tional wording" as a step backward, but it may facilitate change 
to a two-tier approach to state licensing. If so, it will be a 
welcome development and should lead to removal of an experi­
ence requirement to obtain a CPA certificate.
In addition to the development of a revised model bill, the 
state legislation committee sponsored a policy change regarding 
the inclusion of lay members on state boards of accountancy. In 
earlier years the profession had opposed such appointments, but 
as lay members became more prevalent, the AICPA Board of
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Directors, with Council endorsement in May 1978, agreed to a 
proposed change whereby the Institute would neither object to 
nor encourage the state board inclusion of lay members.
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Uniform CPA Examination and the NASBA
Almost as important as the state accountancy statutes in the eyes 
of most CPAs is the uniform examination that all candidates for 
a CPA certificate are required to pass. Any such examination is 
bound to be the subject of periodic criticism and intensive 
scrutiny, and the AICPA-produced Uniform CPA Examination is 
no exception.
The first review relating to the examination during the 1970s 
was conducted by a small ad hoc committee chaired by Herman 
W. Bevis, head of Price Waterhouse and Company. That com­
mittee, which was concerned exclusively about security proce­
dures, grew out of some irregularities that came to light involving 
improper grade changes by one of the state boards of account­
ancy.
The committee reported its findings to the AICPA Board of 
Directors on July 13, 1970, and recommended that in the future 
the state boards be required to report all changes in grades from 
those proposed by the Institute's advisory grading service. On 
the basis of a review by a professional security consultant, it was 
also recommended that the AICPA arrange to do its own printing 
of the examination. The board asked that the staff implement 
these recommendations as soon as practicable; however, for 
practical reasons, the examination continued to be printed out­
side the Institute under newly invoked stringent security meas­
ures.
Subsequent reviews of the examination process came about 
as a result of interaction between the Institute and the National 
Association of State Boards of Accountancy, which for many 
years had been provided with facilities and limited staff assistance 
in the AICPA offices. The NASBA's 1972 appointment of William 
Van Rensselaer to serve as a full-time executive director was a 
budget expansion funded in part by contributions from the larger 
CPA firms under a five-year program. Eli Mason, representing 
New York in the membership of the NASBA, objected to this,
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claiming it to be improper for the "regulated" to finance the 
activities of the "regulators"—a debatable charge, since the 
NASBA was a private organization without regulatory power. 
Nevertheless, the NASBA board answered by appointing a long- 
range planning committee to develop a future course for the 
organization. During that committee's deliberations it was sug­
gested that the NASBA's operations could be funded by taking 
over the preparation of the Uniform CPA Examination, although 
the committee did not include such a recommendation in its final 
report. However, the fact that it had been considered caused the 
AICPA to reexamine its relationships with the NASBA. As a 
result the staff was directed by the Institute's board to seek ways 
to assist the NASBA in solving its financial problems.
At approximately this same time, the U.S. Department of 
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission questioned whether 
the CPA examination was being used as a device to restrict 
entrance to the profession and thereby restrain competition. Lay 
members on state boards of accountancy were also voicing doubts 
about the content of the examination and questioning whether 
the boards should prepare their own examinations. It became 
apparent that some form of continuing independent review of 
the examination process might be necessary to respond to these 
concerns. This coincided with the NASBA's need to develop a 
sound financing basis and led to a proposal that might satisfy 
both objectives.
In meetings between AICPA and NASBA officials it was 
agreed that the NASBA, through a task force composed of its 
current and past state board members, should conduct an annual 
review of all aspects of the CPA examination, for which the 
AICPA would pay a fee that would be sufficient eventually to 
eliminate the NASBA's need to obtain operating funds from the 
CPA firms.
The AICPA Board of Directors and Board of Examiners and 
the NASBA's board agreed to the proposal, and by early 1976 
the review team began its preparations to review the May 1976 
examination. Robert Elly son, a partner in the Miami office of 
Coopers and Lybrand, chaired the review team and collaborated 
with Mr. Van Rensselaer, the executive director, in drafting the 
report upon completion of the review.
The report, over sixty pages long, was presented to the
Institute's Board of Directors on July 21, 1977, by Messrs. Ellyson 
and Van Rensselaer and contained a philosophical treatise on 
the use of tests for licensing purposes, as well as a discussion of 
the purpose of state accountancy laws and the responsibilities of 
state accountancy boards.
The review team's overall conclusion was that "the policies 
and procedures of the AICPA's Board of Examiners and the 
policies and procedures of the state boards of accountancy are 
generally adequate and that they are appropriately observed." 
In wording that seemed to damn with faint praise, it went on to 
state, "While there is room for improvement in the process by 
which the Uniform CPA Examination is prepared and adminis­
tered, the present process is well conceived and conscientiously 
administered in the public interest," and listed forty-four rec­
ommendations for improvement. The drafters of the report 
maintained that they had not intended severe criticism. However, 
the Institute's staff and Board of Examiners believed that the 
tone of the report was unduly critical and was most unfortunate 
in view of the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commis­
sion attitudes. They were particularly irritated by the fact that 
many of the recommendations were for actions already in process 
before the review began or were exhortations to achieve objec­
tives that represented unattainable ideals.
The board was disappointed by this first experience, partly 
because the report seemed unfairly, even if unintentionally, to 
cast doubts on the examination process and partly because the 
NASBA's fee had been largely dissipated in consultant's fees to 
provide an unneeded treatise on examination theory. Although 
there was little enthusiasm for a repeat performance, the board 
agreed to engage the NASBA for a second-year review limited 
solely to the administrative and security aspects of the exam­
ination, which limitations were reluctantly agreed to by the 
NASBA's board.
Other developments contributed to strained relations between 
the NASBA and the AICPA, including the NASBA's development 
of its own model act for accountancy statutes and a model code 
of professional ethics, with little attempt to coordinate these 
efforts with the appropriate committees of the Institute. Thus, 
by January 1978 the relations between the two organizations had 
become even more troubled. Also, congressional hearings in 1977
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questioned whether the Institute's provision of office facilities 
evidenced control of the NASBA. The AICPA's chairman, Stanley 
J. Scott, and I met with NASBA President James Bates and Mr. 
Van Rensselaer to explore financing plans and concerns about 
some of the NASBA actions, and it was agreed that Mr. Scott 
and I would be given an opportunity at the meeting of the 
NASBA board in Albuquerque early in July 1978 to review some 
of the issues of common concern and to urge efforts to avoid 
differences in legislative and ethics policies. We suggested at the 
subsequent meeting with the board that the NASBA had a 
legitimate interest in the CPA examination and should itself 
conduct reviews on behalf of state boards of accountancy rather 
than have each board conduct its own review and then proposed 
that the NASBA's ordinary operating expenses, including pro­
vision for its own office facilities at a separate location and for 
the costs of annual reviews of the CPA examination, be financed 
by an allocation of a portion of the CPA examination fees paid 
by the state boards to the AICPA.
The NASBA's board generally agreed with this proposal, and 
at a meeting on July 13, 1978, the Institute's board authorized its 
implementation. An agreement was subsequently signed by the 
two organizations, and full reviews of the CPA examination, 
including the security measures employed by the state boards, 
were resumed on an annual basis. And, while these events laid 
to rest, at least for the immediate future, the problem of financing 
the NASBA, as well as the Institute's concerns about retaining 
the preparation of the CPA examination, they were unsuccessful 
in avoiding disparate legislative and ethics policies.
The NASBA proceeded to issue its own model code of ethics 
and model act and urged their adoption by the state boards of 
accountancy. They contained significant differences from those 
of the AICPA, some of which were not warranted by the fact 
that the state boards were statutory regulatory bodies rather than 
professional associations. This lack of uniformity was clearly 
undesirable from the standpoint of the AICPA, but there seemed 
to be no sure way to avoid it. The prospects were that such 
differences will continue to exist regardless of how much effort 
is devoted to coordination. The outlook of CPAs who serve on 
state boards is different from those serving in a leadership 
capacity within the AICPA, and it is likely to remain so. Hence,
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a degree of friction between the NASBA and the AICPA on a 
continuing basis is probably unavoidable despite the best inten­
tions of both organizations.
Further difficulties caused by the overlapping interests came 
about on April 24, 1980, when the NASBA proposed that it 
centralize and automate the grade-reporting process for the 
examination then being handled individually by the state boards 
of accountancy. The NASBA was of the opinion that centralized 
computer processing would provide savings and convenience for 
the state boards and yield a by-product of national statistics on 
grades correlated to candidate characteristics.
Although the AICPA was also in a position to provide this 
service, the NASBA representatives argued that this might cause 
some people to perceive AICPA involvement as in conflict with 
the Institute's role as the preparer and grader of the examination. 
In this instance the AICPA's board decided not to take issue 
with the proposal, although it did not concede the point on 
conflict of interest. The proposal was approved in principle, and 
a confrontation on yet another matter of common interest was 
avoided.
A Foreign-Language CPA Exam?
Other aspects of the CPA examination process became difficult 
issues during the 1970s. The large influx of Cubans in the Florida 
area put pressure on the state's legislature to provide for licensing 
examinations in Spanish. The Florida legislature passed a law, 
which, by its provisions, made it necessary to administer a 
Spanish-language CPA examination.
In May 1975 the Florida State Board of Accountancy appealed 
to the AICPA to help it meet the new legal requirements by 
providing the Uniform CPA Examination in Spanish. The Insti­
tute's board declined this request on the grounds that CPAs 
practicing in the various states must be proficient in English and 
should, therefore, be required to pass the CPA examination in 
that language. The Florida board thereupon developed its own 
examination in Spanish to comply with the new state law, and 
those few candidates who passed were subsequently qualified to 
become members of the Institute by a 1977 resolution of the 
AICPA's Board of Directors.
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The same issue arose again, however, in March 1979 when 
the Puerto Rico Society of CPAs sought a Spanish-language 
examination to comply with requirements of the Puerto Rican 
Constitution. This time the Institute's board was more sympa­
thetic because of the constitutional requirement and because 
business in Puerto Rico is carried on in the Spanish language. 
After exploring the costs and feasibility of meeting the request, 
the board of directors authorized the board of examiners to 
provide a Spanish-language translation of the Uniform CPA 
Examination for use only in Puerto Rico beginning in November
1979. The circumstances in Puerto Rico were thought to be 
sufficiently distinct from those in the fifty states to warrant 
making the exception, and the Puerto Rico Board of Accountancy 
had agreed to assume the additional costs involved.
The NASBA Board of Directors was disturbed by this action 
because it was feared that some of the states would find it more 
difficult to resist demands for a Spanish-language CPA exami­
nation, which was opposed by the state boards. However, the 
NASBA's representatives were satisfied after receiving assur­
ances from the AICPA that it would not provide such an 
examination to the states. As it turned out, a breach of security 
prevented the examination from being given in Spanish in Puerto 
Rico in 1979, and the matter was deferred until November 1980.
In view of the AICPA's favorable response to Puerto Rico, 
the executive director of the Florida Board of Accountancy again 
put forward a request in September 1979. This was declined by 
the AICPA in December 1979, for the reasons previously ex­
pressed, and again in May 1980, when it was asked to reconsider 
the matter.
The issue of providing a uniform examination in more than 
one language was a troublesome one that is likely to be raised 
again. At the end of 1980, however, there was no disposition on 
the part of the AICPA Board of Directors to respond favorably to 
requests from any of the states. To do so would involve accom­
modating the language requirements of any number of ethnic 
groups.
Licensing of Foreign CPAs
Another major issue that arose during the 1970s was the licensing 
of foreign accountants as CPAs. In 1970 the state boards of
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accountancy were individually determining whether the qualifi­
cations of applicants were sufficient to permit them either to take 
the uniform CPA examination or to be granted a certificate on 
some other basis; and although there was no uniformity in the 
way the various boards were meeting this responsibility, the 
boards were generally granting certificates to chartered account­
ants from Canada, the United Kingdom, and certain other Eng­
lish-speaking, developed countries without requiring such 
candidates to take the full CPA examination.
The AICPA International Relations Committee proposed in 
October 1971 that an international qualifications appraisal com­
mittee (IQAC) be established on a one-year trial basis, to evaluate 
the educational standards of the colleges and universities and 
the qualifying examinations of the accounting bodies in the 
countries of foreign applicants for CPA certificates.
This proposal was approved by the AICPA Board of Directors 
on February 10, 1972, and a five-member committee was ap­
pointed to function within the Institute's Examinations Division. 
By May 1973 the committee had adopted standards to be used 
for evaluating educational qualifications, and it was agreed to 
enlist the assistance of the Office of Admissions and Records of 
the University of Illinois, which had extensive experience in 
appraising foreign educational programs.
After the committee was established, the state boards of 
accountancy began requesting advice on the qualifications of 
individual foreign applicants, and the committee developed pro­
cedures for responding to these inquiries. Also, the committee 
embarked on a program intended to evaluate the profession's 
qualifying requirements country by country and compare them 
with those in the United States to determine whether they were 
comparable. The first country selected for such a study was 
Canada. It was concluded that the requirements to become a 
Canadian chartered accountant were equivalent to those of a 
CPA in the United States.
The next country studied was the Philippines. This time a 
different conclusion was reached, even though the committee 
was unsuccessful in obtaining complete information about the 
examination and grading process used to become a CPA there. 
With certain exceptions, the committee found that the CPA 
requirements of the Philippines were not equivalent to those in 
the United States, which meant that many state boards of
accountancy would require CPA applicants from the Philippines 
to take the Uniform CPA Examination before granting them a 
CPA certificate.
Obviously, this review program was potentially troublesome 
for relations between the professional bodies of the countries 
involved, and it was not long before serious problems did indeed 
arise, The first difficulty was encountered when a comparable 
committee of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 
preliminarily found that the requirements in England were not 
equal to those in Canada. This finding was subsequently modi­
fied, but not before it caused considerable harm that did not 
quite threaten to bring down the Commonwealth but was never­
theless damaging to international professional relations.
As an observer of this unfortunate experience, I concluded 
that the feasibility and desirability of the IQAC's mission ought 
to be reexamined lest the AICPA fall into the same trap. In 
discussions with my Canadian and U.K. counterparts, it was 
concluded that continuance of the program to evaluate the 
requirements in individual countries was ill advised and should 
be discontinued. Other, less inflammatory methods of dealing 
with the foreign reciprocity problem would have to be devised.
The review of the activities of the IQAC led to a number of 
changes. Responsibility for the committee was transferred to the 
international relations division, which had more intimate knowl­
edge of the profession in other countries. Also, new studies of 
other countries were deferred, and the content of letters sent to 
state boards regarding foreign applicants was modified to confine 
the representations solely to an evaluation of the applicants' 
educational qualifications.
These modifications were not in time to prevent a major 
problem, which arose in 1977 in California, where the state board 
of accountancy had been denying reciprocity to CPAs from the 
Philippines but extending it to chartered accountants from Can­
ada, the United Kingdom, and other commonwealth countries. 
The Filipino applicants appealed to California's Department of 
Consumer Affairs, which, in turn, threatened to take legal action 
against the state board because of alleged discriminatory prac­
tices. The state board defended its actions but agreed to sponsor 
a study of the feasibility of determining the equivalency of 
licensing examinations in a number of countries, including the
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Philippines. In a public hearing held on the matter it became 
apparent from the testimony of a representative of the IQAC 
that that committee's negative conclusion about the qualifications 
of Filipino CPAs had been based upon incomplete evidence, 
which was very damaging because the state board had been 
placing reliance on the committee's recommendations. Further­
more, the IQAC representative expressed the opinion that, with 
the exception of Canada, all foreign licensing examinations were 
inferior to the AICPA's examination.
The California state board's feasibility study was conducted 
in conjunction with the NASBA and with financial and staff 
assistance from the AICPA. The study group concluded that it 
was impracticable to determine equivalency of licensing exami­
nations to the AICPA's examinations, as urged by the Depart­
ment of Consumer Affairs. In the meantime a suit was filed 
against the state board of accountancy in behalf of the rejected 
Filipino applicants.
The California Superior Court ruled that the state board of 
accountancy had "abused its discretion by denying waiver" of 
the Uniform CPA Examination to applicants "who were duly 
licensed as CPAs in the Phillipines during the period 1957 
through 1977." The board was ordered to "reevaluate" applica­
tions received from an estimated 500 Filipino accountants and to 
use "the same standard as was used in evaluating applicants 
from New Zealand, India and Australia" to determine whether 
to waive the examination.
This adverse development was a stark illustration of the 
difficulties entailed in granting CPA certificates to foreign appli­
cants. The need for a workable solution was further demonstrated 
when in 1978 representatives of the Institute of Chartered Ac­
countants of England and Wales expressed great concern to the 
AICPA about the fact that a number of state boards were rejecting 
applications from English chartered accountants on the grounds 
that they did not meet the necessary educational requirements. 
Spokesmen for the English Institute were advised that it would 
be counterproductive for them to press the state boards of 
accountancy for more favorable treatment. Instead it was sug­
gested that they await the outcome of efforts by the AICPA to 
develop a satisfactory solution to the overall problem of foreign 
reciprocity. They agreed to follow this course for the time being.
At one point in the California controversy, members of the 
state board of accountancy appealed to the AICPA to develop a 
so-called mini-examination to be used as a basis for granting 
CPA certificates to foreign applicants. This approach seemed to 
have merit since it had become apparent that determining the 
equivalency of educational and examination requirements was 
virtually impossible, given the diversity of educational systems, 
customs, and legal frameworks in the various countries.
In response, AICPA Chairman Joseph Cummings appointed 
a seven-member subcommittee of the board of examiners, to be 
chaired by Michael N. Chetkovich, a past AICPA chairman, to
Recommend content specifications and administrative procedures 
for a special examination to test the competence of foreign licensed 
accountants applying to state boards of accountancy for CPA certif­
icates.
A special examination was contemplated to test areas of 
knowledge peculiar to the United States, such as taxation and 
business law. The examination would be shorter than the Uni­
form CPA Examination and would be prepared and administered 
by the AICPA as an advisory service to state boards of account­
ancy. It was hoped that this, coupled with proof by a foreign 
applicant that he was licensed in good standing in his home 
country, would eliminate the need to establish the equivalency 
of educational and examination requirements. The resulting more 
objective basis for dealing with foreign applicants would foster 
uniformity among the state boards and avoid the kind of discrim­
ination charges that had arisen in California.
The subcommittee began its work on December 20, 1978, 
amid strong objections from the NASBA, the AICPA's Interna­
tional Practice and State Legislation Committees, and the Cali­
fornia Society of CPAs. Some were opposed to a special 
examination because they believed it would be used as a means 
to gain licensing of a second class of accountants by the National 
Society of Public Accountants. Others were against providing 
reciprocity to foreign applicants because even U.S. CPAs often 
encountered difficulties in obtaining reciprocity from states other 
than the ones by which they were originally licensed. While 
most of the objectors were willing to be flexible about educational 
and experience requirements, they all believed that foreign ap­
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plicants should be required to take the full Uniform CPA Exam­
ination. This, of course, ignored the fact that it was not an 
acceptable solution to foreign applicants who were already fully 
qualified and recognized as skilled practitioners in their home 
countries. It ran the risk that the profession in other countries 
would retaliate by restricting the activities of American CPA 
firms in their jurisdictions.
The subcommittee was asked to develop the specifications 
and procedures for a special examination. It had not been asked 
for its recommendation regarding whether use of a special 
examination was a good idea; accordingly, it carried out its task 
in spite of the objections. On September 20, 1979, the subcom­
mittee chairman made a preliminary report to the AICPA Board 
of Directors. Even though the board had received a resolution 
from the California society opposing a special examination, it 
authorized exposure of the subcommittee's report for comments. 
Before this could occur, however, an agreement was made in 
October with the California members of Council to delay expo­
sure until the spring Council meeting to give them time to 
express their views to Council members.
By May 2, 1980, the board of directors had received a request 
from the California society that exposure of the report be limited 
to members of Council. The board approved this request, and 
on May 5, 1980, Mr. Chetkovich reported to Council on the 
results of the subcommittee's efforts.
The attitudes of Council members regarding the exposure 
draft of the report were negative by a wide margin. As a result, 
the subcommittee recommended that no further action be taken, 
and the board of directors simply received a final report and 
placed it on file.
Clearly, little or no support would be given to the contemplated 
solution for dealing with foreign applicants seeking CPA certifi­
cates. Most CPAs were unfamiliar with the international aspects 
of their profession and had no present interest in practicing across 
international borders. When the issue of foreign applicants was 
raised, the domestic problem of dealing with unlicensed practi­
tioners no doubt weighed far more heavily in CPAs' minds than 
the possibility of their being restricted internationally—an outlook 
that may prove shortsighted. Increasingly, other countries are 
attempting to restrict the operations of American CPA firms
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within their borders; following a hard line in the United States 
with respect to foreign applicants is likely to accelerate this trend. 
The risks of foreign retaliation and the domestic danger of inviting 
the licensing of a second class of practitioner are both difficult to 
judge; however, they are the factors that must be weighed unless 
a new solution is devised that avoids a conflict between inter­
national and domestic interests.
At the end of 1980 most state boards had eliminated any 
concessions to foreign applicants because of the California court 
opinion in the Filipino CPA case. It remains to be seen what 
reaction this will generate abroad. Based on my conversations 
with the profession's leaders in other countries, particularly in 
Canada and England, the current state of affairs will not be 
viewed as satisfactory. All signs point toward a future confron­
tation over this issue and a renewed search for an acceptable 
solution.
A National CPA Certificate
Another important issue regarding licensing and the CPA ex­
amination cropped up in 1970 when the incoming AICPA presi­
dent, Louis M. Kessler, a top partner of Alexander Grant and 
Company, urged that a program to issue national CPA certificates 
be considered to overcome the many reciprocity problems be­
tween the state boards of accountancy. As a result, a joint 
NASBA-AICPA committee was appointed to study all aspects of 
the profession's recognition and regulation. That committee com­
pleted its work and reported to the Institute's Board of Directors 
on July 19, 1973, recommending against a national CPA certificate 
at that time but suggesting the establishment of a national registry 
of disciplinary actions. This and other suggestions for a directory 
similar to that of the legal profession and the establishment of a 
national qualification information service were not acted upon 
when it was concluded that they would not prove economically 
sound.
Following these events the idea of a national CPA certificate 
lay dormant for several years but was revived when the state 
legislatures began reviewing whether state accountancy statutes 
should be renewed. These reviews were being conducted pur­
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suant to the adoption of "sunset" laws by state legislatures, 
under which legislative approval was required for the continua­
tion of specified state agencies and programs beyond designated 
cutoff dates. Among other things, the reviews of accountancy 
statutes were leading to the appointment of more non-CPAs to 
serve on state boards of accountancy. Also, in some states the 
board powers were diluted when boards were placed under the 
authority of umbrella licensing agencies covering a wide range 
of occupations.
So-called sunset reviews began to threaten the continuation 
of the accountancy statutes and the licensing of CPAs in several 
states during the late 1970s through 1981. In answer to this 
developing threat to the licensing process, the AICPA Board of 
Directors requested and subsequently approved a policy resolu­
tion on state sunset laws prepared by the state legislation com­
mittee. The resolution did not endorse sunset legislation but 
supported periodic reviews of governmental programs through 
the use of financial and program analysis with the assistance of 
the accounting profession.
The prospects that one or more states might discontinue their 
accountancy statutes and the licensing of CPAs were sufficiently 
serious that I suggested in several speeches that consideration 
be given to a program whereby the AICPA would begin issuing 
a national CPA certificate. A fail-safe was becoming necessary, 
and the Institute was in the best position to provide a national 
certificate. Numerous examples of a national approach were in 
operation in other countries, such as Canada and the United 
Kingdom, where the "chartered accountant" designation was 
conferred by the profession's national institutes.
It was suggested that all holders of state-issued CPA certifi­
cates would be issued a national certificate by the AICPA and 
that the Institute would conduct the Uniform CPA Examination 
for applicants from any state that discontinued its licensing of 
CPAs and would grant national certificates to successful candi­
dates. To avoid conflicts with existing state laws, the AICPA's 
certificate title would have to avoid the words "certified public 
accountant." One suggested alternative title was "chartered aud­
itor." If a program of this nature were adopted, the Institute 
could eventually seek for its certificate a federal statutory under­
pinning that might be accomplished through official recognition
by federal agencies, such as the SEC or the General Accounting 
Office, or by direct legislation.
The suggestion that such an approach be considered resulted 
in the appointment of a special committee on regulating trends, 
which had not completed its work at this writing.
The concept of a national certificate issued by the Institute 
may well be viewed as too radical a departure from reliance on 
a system of state licensing or too great a risk of inviting further 
regulation by the federal government. It might also be concluded 
that the prospects of losing licensing in one or more states are 
minimal, although there were near misses in at least three states 
by early 1981. Nevertheless, the licensing of CPAs is so funda­
mental to the profession's status that the AICPA can ill afford to 
be without a well formed alternative in mind in the event that a 
state legislature decides not to renew its accountancy statute. 
Although the problems of reciprocity are probably not pressing 
enough to justify a national certificate, the possible loss of 
licensing in a state puts such a proposal in an entirely different 
perspective.
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Summary
In summary, there was a lot of action on the licensing, exami­
nation, and state legislation front during the decade, but many 
problems still remain to be resolved. The NSPA is continuing its 
efforts to achieve licensing of non-CPA practitioners. The Insti­
tute's relations with the NASBA were improved, but the potential 
for continuing disagreements about rules of conduct and model 
accountancy statutes remained. The treatment of foreign appli­
cants is a problem that remained unsolved and was almost certain 
to erupt in the future. And, finally, no contingency plan was yet 
in place in the event that state licensing is lost in one of the 
states.
Most of these problems do not lend themselves to neat and 
quick answers, yet they all involve issues of vital importance, 
and nothing less than vigilance, ingenuity, and forward planning 
is required if the profession is to deal with them on a timely and 
satisfactory basis.
CHAPTER 10
Specialization
Almost from its inception, the profession provided advice to
management on accounting and financial matters. Not until 
the 1950s, however, did the rapidly growing national firms 
develop extensive specialized management consulting capabilities 
and begin employing non-CPA specialists in significant numbers 
to provide a broad range of services. This expansion was accel­
erated by the emergence of electronic data processing and the 
growing demand by government and the business community 
for consulting assistance.
The Institute originally applied the label management services 
to all services of CPA firms that did not fall under accounting, 
auditing, or taxation. This was later changed to management 
advisory services (MAS) to stress the fact that the services were to 
be rendered only in an advisory capacity and should not involve 
the making of management decisions for clients. A management 
advisory services committee devoted much of its effort to defining 
the nature and role of MAS and developing descriptions of how 
various types of consulting engagements are performed.
The Issues Raised by Management Advisory 
Services
These developments resulted in two major issues that concerned 
the profession throughout the 1970s. One was the allegation that 
the audit independence of CPA firms is impaired by the perform­
ance of management advisory services; this issue will be covered 
in the next chapter. The second problem was the question of 
formal recognition of specialization within the profession. The
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profession's long-standing view was that a certified public ac­
countant is competent to engage in all aspects of public accounting 
practice and that formal categories of specialization, therefore, 
are unnecessary. With the growth in the range and complexity 
of services, however, this position became increasingly untenable. 
Services relating to computer systems, executive recruiting, in­
ventory and production control, compensation and benefit plans, 
and work measurement programs obviously required skills and 
expertise well beyond those of the conventionally trained CPA.
Although some CPAs acquired competence in one or more 
aspects of MAS through formal study and practical experience, 
most CPAs were too busy providing services in the traditional 
areas of practice. Even the largest firms found it difficult to 
develop their own MAS specialists from within the ranks of their 
CPA employees. As a consequence, the CPA firms, in competi­
tion with non-CPA consulting firms, recruited experienced con­
sultants. In a few instances CPA firms acquired non-CPA consulting 
firms to gain expertise in particular fields, such as actuarial 
services.
The influx of non-CPA specialists into the CPA firms added 
a new dimension to the specialization problem. It put CPA firms 
squarely in competition with non-CPA consulting firms, which 
created pressures to provide some form of professional recognition 
and status for the non-CPA specialists within the accounting 
profession. Failure to do so made it more difficult to recruit and 
retain experienced consultants.
The CPAs who coordinated the services rendered to audit 
clients generally looked upon the new class of non-CPA employ­
ees with distrust. They were not keen about risking the loss of 
recurring audit engagements for the sake of consulting services 
that might go awry. It was human nature to be suspicious of 
services that required competence that was foreign to their 
personal knowledge and experience. To make matters worse, 
some of the non-CPA specialists proved to be operating with 
false credentials, and some were overly aggressive in selling their 
services, which clashed with the CPAs' traditional constraints on 
advertising and solicitation.
The emergence of MAS also contributed to the widening gulf 
between the large, national CPA firms and the rest of the 
practicing profession. The smaller firms' lack of resources made
it difficult for them to provide formal MAS on a competitive 
basis or to absorb the costs of employing non-CPA specialists. 
As a result, many of these firms looked with disfavor on the 
broadening scope of services offered by the larger firms. They 
naturally opposed any initiative to recognize specialization of 
services or to bring non-CPA specialists into the ranks of the 
profession.
The Proposal for Non-CPA Associate Members
It was under these circumstances that the Institute tried unsuc­
cessfully to solve the specialization question during the 1970s. 
The effort began in December 1969, when the AICPA Board of 
Directors received a letter from a member requesting that it 
consider creating an associate membership classification for non- 
CPAs serving on the professional staffs of CPA firms. The board 
responded by directing that a committee be appointed to study 
the suggestion.
Before the new committee could begin work, representatives 
of the MAS committee met with the board on March 2, 1970, to 
discuss the need for recognition of specialists. They pointed out 
that the Institute of Management Consultants, recently organized 
by the non-CPA consulting firms, had started a program to 
accredit "certified management consultants." This would make 
it difficult for CPA firms to attract and retain non-CPA specialists 
unless the AICPA instituted some form of similar recognition. 
The MAS committee representatives (all CPAs) raised the fun­
damental question about the place of specialists in the profession 
and requested that a special committee be appointed to study 
the desirability of the formal recognition of specialists.
The board concurred with the request, and a new special 
committee was appointed to supersede the previously authorized 
committee on associate membership for non-CPAs. Ralph Lewis, 
a partner of Arthur Young and Company, was appointed chair­
man of the new committee.
Almost a year later, on February 25, 1971, Mr. Lewis reported 
to the AICPA Board of Directors on the preliminary conclusions 
of the committee. He stated that the committee favored the 
establishment of an associate class of membership for non-CPAs 
employed on the professional MAS staffs of CPA firms. An
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associate member would have to satisfy certain qualifications 
relating to education and experience and would have to pass an 
examination.
The board agreed in principle with the proposal and author­
ized its exposure for discussion at the next Council meeting.
Accordingly, on May 10, 1971, Mr. Lewis addressed the 
Council and distributed questionnaires to gain the views of its 
members. Even before the meeting closed, it was clear that most 
members opposed the proposal for an associate class of mem­
bership. This was confirmed when the committee tabulated the 
questionnaire responses, which revealed resistance to the inclu­
sion of non-CPAs within the ranks of the profession on any basis 
whatsoever. The comments were not just negative; they ex­
pressed vehement, emotional opposition.
In July 1971 the executive vice president, Leonard Savoie, 
urged the board to take a formal position on the issue. He 
reported that the committee had considered but rejected some 
form of separate but interlocking organization for non-CPA 
specialists as an alternative to associate membership in the 
AICPA.
The board reluctantly adopted a resolution embracing the 
position that non-CPA specialists should be brought into a 
professional relationship with the Institute. It directed the special 
committee to continue its search for acceptable ways to accomplish 
this objective.
The special committee completed its report in December 1971, 
recommending a bylaw change to provide for an associate class 
of membership. The board tentatively approved the substance of 
the report but requested that several editorial changes be made 
before its publication.
During the ensuing delay, the MAS executive committee 
voted to oppose the proposed associate class of membership on 
the grounds that it would be an inadequate solution to the 
problem of recruiting and retaining non-CPA specialists. Instead, 
the committee stated its intention of developing an alternative 
proposal for a separate organization affiliated with the AICPA. 
When it learned of the MAS committee's action, the board 
decided to table the proposed bylaw change.
This marked the end of the first round of the Institute's effort 
to solve the specialization problem.
The Special Committee on Scope and Structure
By the fall of 1972, I had replaced Mr. Savoie as executive vice 
president, and LeRoy Layton, the head of Main Lafrentz and 
Company, had been elected president of the Institute. We be­
lieved that it was urgent that the profession reach a formal 
decision about the present and future scope of accounting firm 
practice.
Wasting no time, Mr. Layton announced in his inaugural 
address in October 1972 the appointment of a special committee 
to study the scope of the profession's services. Louis M. Kessler, 
a top partner of Alexander Grant and Company and a former 
elected president of the Institute, became chairman of the new 
group. All fourteen committee members had played important 
roles in the Institute's activities and had reached prominent 
positions within their firms. Thus, a truly blue ribbon committee 
assembled early in 1973 to deliberate on the scope of practice.
That period— 1973—was a time of intense activity, much of it 
related to specialization and scope of services. The AICPA Board 
of Directors was considering a comprehensive overhaul of the 
bylaws, which had been underway for over a year. One proposed 
amendment would give the Council authority to create an asso­
ciate class of membership if it chose to do so in the future. When 
the proposed amendments were circulated to Council members 
for comment, their response to this provision was again over­
whelmingly negative. As a result, the board agreed to drop the 
proposal, although it informed the Council that it planned to 
consider associate membership at a later date as part of a review 
of the Institute's organizational structure.
In another development, legislation to require the registration 
of management consultants was introduced in the California 
legislature. The bill would have established a state board of 
registration and would have required management consultants 
to meet education and experience qualifications and to pass an 
examination. Even though CPAs were exempted under the bill, 
practitioners feared that this exemption would be deleted in the 
legislative process. The bill was strongly supported by the Insti­
tute of Management Consultants, which intended to promote 
similar legislation in other states.
This presented a clear danger that CPAs in smaller firms
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would be effectively prevented from providing management 
consulting services if there were no exemption for CPAs, and 
the California Society of CPAs aggressively opposed the pro­
posed legislation. It also asked the AICPA to object to the bill, 
but the board concluded that it would be inappropriate to 
intervene.
The board, however, did oppose the registration of manage­
ment consultants until such time as a common body of knowl­
edge had been identified and standards for practice had been 
established. Accordingly, it instructed the MAS committee to 
work with the Institute of Management Consultants and the 
Association of Consulting Management Engineers to explore the 
feasibility of examination and accreditation of MAS consultants. 
Once again the Institute faced the question of specialization.
The MAS committee, after some initial deliberations, pro­
posed that the Institute sponsor a $100,000 research study on the 
MAS body of knowledge. The board agreed with the general 
objective but was somewhat skeptical about the study. It author­
ized the project but reserved the right to cancel it at the end of 
the first phases described in the prospectus. The MASBOK study, 
as the project became known, was carried out by Edward L. 
Summers and Kenneth E. Knight of the University of Texas.
A third development that occurred in 1973 was the report of 
a special committee that had been appointed in 1971 to study 
the likely effects of the growing competition from non-CPA 
firms, particularly from commercial service bureaus and banks 
offering computer accounting services. On May 4 Marvin Stone, 
the committee chairman, reported the panel's conclusions to the 
AICPA Board of Directors. Among the recommendations was 
the suggestion that the AICPA develop criteria that would lead 
to the formal accreditation of specialists.
By this time the board had become extremely wary of pro­
moting any proposals to provide status to non-CPA specialists, 
since the necessary Council support did not exist. The board 
declined to act on the Stone committee recommendation, pend­
ing consideration of alternative staff proposals to deal with the 
specialization issue. The staff, hoping to find a solution that 
would gain general acceptance, had provided the board with an 
outline of such a plan.
The staff plan called for the establishment of divisions within
the AICPA along the natural lines of specialization: accounting 
and auditing, taxation, management advisory services, general 
practice, and management accounting (for members in govern­
ment and industry). The proposed structure was similar to 
that of the American Bar Association, which had succeeded in 
effectively relating to the special interests of lawyers. The gov­
erning bodies of each division would be senior executive com­
mittees, some of which already existed. Membership in the 
divisions would be voluntary, and modest dues would be re­
quired. Each division would hold periodic national or regional 
conferences, issue publications, and engage in other activities to 
keep members informed of new developments in the division's 
area of specialization. Non-CPA specialists meeting certain em­
ployment, education, and experience requirements would be 
permitted to become nonvoting associates of the divisions but 
not members of the AICPA.
The board authorized the plan's exposure to the senior com­
mittees and representatives of the state societies. The board also 
referred the tentative plan to the special committee on scope of 
practice, which was grappling with questions about specializa­
tion. It also expanded the name and charge of the Kessler 
committee to cover "scope and structure."
Eventually, some lukewarm responses trickled in from the 
senior committees. By that time, though, the special committee 
on scope and structure had assumed responsibility for consider­
ing the various alternatives.
On January 3, 1974, the special committee on scope and 
structure reported its tentative conclusions to the AICPA Board 
of Directors. After much soul searching, the committee had 
decided to recommend once again that an associate class of 
membership be established for non-CPA specialists.
The board was sympathetic, but it would do no more than 
allow the committee to discuss the proposal at the next meeting 
of Council. At the May 1 Council meeting the opposition was 
intense. Several members offered motions to prevent the estab­
lishment of an associate class of members, but the Council voted 
to table the motions pending receipt of the committee's final 
report.
In July 1974 the special committee released a discussion draft 
of its report and recommendations. The board authorized its
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circulation to all Institute members so that it could be discussed 
at the annual meeting in October and at meetings sponsored by 
the state societies. The draft was published and distributed in 
September 1974.
The report argued against any artificial restriction of the 
profession's scope of services. It postulated that the common 
characteristics of CPA services, which provide the foundation for 
a cohesive profession, are the expression of opinions and the 
provision of advice and assistance on accounting for, or manage­
ment of, resource use.
The report recommended that the Institute establish a program 
for the recognition of specialties. It urged that the appropriate 
senior committees should be directed to develop suitable quali­
fying processes, including examinations, for specialists in their 
areas, and that they inaugurate activities to serve the specialists' 
needs. The qualifying process for specialists would be open to 
non-CPAs employed in public practice who met certain additional 
requirements. After a period of experimentation, the AICPA 
would consider granting membership status to non-CPAs who 
successfully completed the specialist examinations and fulfilled 
the other requirements.
The discussions that followed publication of the exposure 
draft again revealed that a majority of Institute members opposed 
accrediting specialists or providing associate membership status 
to non-CPA specialists employed by CPA firms. In view of this 
reaction, the board urged the special committee to delete the 
recommendation regarding membership for non-CPA specialists. 
Indeed, the groundswell of opposition became so vocal that the 
board finally decided, on February 2 7 , 1975, to release a statement 
to the effect that it would not seek approval of the recommen­
dation for recognition of non-CPAs, although it did intend to 
seek Council approval of the committee's proposals on scope of 
services and specialization.
The committee's final report was published on July 24, 1975. 
All references to membership status for non-CPAs were deleted 
from the report. Also, the committee modified its recommenda­
tion on the accreditation of specialists to suggest merely that a 
new committee be appointed to conduct a full-scale study of 
specialization within the profession, taking into consideration 
the need for any program to ensure competence in the major
areas of specialization, the detailed operating procedures of any 
such program, and its possible impact on various elements within 
the membership.
The report urged that, by Council resolution, the profession 
formally commit itself to maintaining a broad range of services, 
with due regard for the constraints set forth by the committee. 
The Council passed such a resolution on October 11, 1975, 
bringing to a close the second major effort to deal with the issue 
of specialization.
The Special Committee on Specialization
The third effort began with the appointment of the new special 
committee on specialization in October 1975. Wilbur H. Stevens 
of Elmer Fox, Westheimer and Company agreed to serve as 
chairman of the eleven-member group. The committee was 
composed entirely of individuals who had served in leading 
positions both in AICPA activities and within their firms. For 
over two-and-one-half years the committee conducted extensive 
research on the experience of other professional groups and held 
meetings with state societies, membership groups, and others 
interested in the subject of specialization.
While this work was going on, the MASBOK research study 
neared completion. The researchers submitted their final report 
on February 19, 1976, and the board authorized its publication 
in book form. The report concluded that there was indeed an 
identifiable body of knowledge for management advisory services 
and that it would be feasible to base qualifying examinations on 
that knowledge. The MAS executive committee announced its 
intention to submit recommendations based on the research 
findings.
Approximately one year later, on March 3, 1977, the chairman 
of the MAS executive committee recommended to the board that 
a survey be conducted to determine the extent of interest in an 
MAS examination program based on the results of the MASBOK 
study. The board authorized the survey and, simultaneously, 
requested an estimate of the costs of an examination program. 
The board stipulated, however, that nothing would be imple­
mented until it received the report of the special committee on 
specialization.
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At the same meeting Mr. Stevens requested, on behalf of the 
specialization committee, that the board appropriate $55,000 to 
hire a research company to survey user attitudes toward special­
ization in the profession. The board declined this request because 
it did not believe that any useful information would be obtained. 
After all, the board was already aware of the lack of member 
support for an accreditation program. In addition, the board was 
by that time preoccupied with congressional hearings and was 
in no mood to initiate extensive new programs.
On November 3, 1977, Stanley Klion, chairman of the MAS 
committee, reported the results of the survey to determine the 
feasibility of an MAS examination. The results indicated that if 
non-CPAs were included there would initially be about 2,000 
candidates to take the examination, at a cost of $100 each. 
Thereafter, approximately 700 candidates a year would take the 
exam, at a cost of $235 each. If the examination were restricted 
to CPAs, the comparable figures would be 600 initial candidates 
at $270 each and another 220 candidates each following year at 
$700 apiece. The board again deferred action, pending receipt of 
the specialization committee's recommendations.
At that same meeting, on November 3, Mr. Stevens reported 
orally on his committee's tentative conclusions. It had decided 
that there was a need for the formal recognition of specialists 
and that the AICPA should implement an accreditation program 
that would be limited to AICPA members. The committee also 
suggested that the Institute establish specialization sections, 
which members could join voluntarily if they met certain expe­
rience and continuing professional education requirements. Those 
members passing an examination would be accredited members of 
a section, and those CPAs not taking an examination but meeting 
the other requirements would be referred to as members of a 
section. The committee had defined eighteen specialties for which 
examinations would be administered.
The board did not approve of these recommendations. It was 
opposed to the establishment of sections and was overwhelmed 
by the prospect of providing the large number of examinations 
that would be required. Some board members questioned the 
need for accreditation, and others doubted that the public would 
be able to understand the subtle distinctions between proposed 
classifications of members and accredited members.
In effect, the board had already tacitly decided not to endorse 
a program for accreditation of specialists, no matter how well 
conceived it might be. Simply, the Institute's members did not 
support such a program, and the board knew it. Even aside from 
that, the timing was all wrong. The AICPA was in the midst of 
dealing with congressional subcommittees.
Being reluctant to make an overt decision, the board instructed 
the committee to seek an opinion on the legality of restricting 
accreditation to AICPA members. Also, it requested an estimate 
of the proposal's costs, and it suggested that the committee 
consider proposing a pilot program for one specialty rather than 
embarking on a complete accreditation effort.
On January 5, 1978, Mr. Stevens returned to the board with 
a revised report. A legal opinion had been obtained, and the 
committee now proposed accrediting, at least initially, only those 
MAS specialists identified in the MASBOK study. Once again 
the board decided that the proposals were too ambitious, and it 
declined the committee's request to expose the draft of its report 
for comment. Instead, it requested the committee to prepare an 
alternative proposal, which would use the existing national 
technical conference programs as a starting point toward a 
recognition of specialization.
By this time the committee was becoming understandably 
frustrated. Nevertheless, it made a final effort by modifying its 
report in several respects. It proposed a pilot program for two 
defined specialties, one under MAS and the other under taxation. 
The program would be administered by a new senior committee 
on specialization, and approval of the board would be required 
for future accreditation of each additional specialty area. Accred­
itation would allow a member to use a descriptive title prescribed 
by the administering committee. The revised report contained no 
provision for membership in specialist sections.
Finally, on July 13, 1978, the special committee presented its 
amended report to the board for approval to expose it for 
comment. The board again declined the request and asked that 
the committee issue a final report, which it did in October of 
that year. After receiving the final report, the board decided 
against initiation of the proposed pilot program and thereafter 
discharged the special committee.
Thus, a third effort suffered the same fate as the preceding
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attempts to deal with specialization in the profession. This time, 
however, it failed even though it was unencumbered by the non- 
CPA issue.
Prohibition of Self-Designation as a Specialist
No further efforts were made to recognize specialization within 
the profession, and the Institute clung to its position that no CPA 
can claim to be a specialist in any particular service. Indeed, 
ethics interpretation 502-4 expressly forbade AICPA members 
from billing themselves as specialists. It was this very prohibition 
that caused the Institute further trouble.
During the 1970s the U.S. Department of Justice reviewed the 
Institute's rules of conduct, forcing the Institute to abandon its 
prohibitions on advertising by CPAs. During the course of the 
negotiations, the department's representatives expressed concern 
about interpretation 502-4. They withheld action, however, pend­
ing the outcome of the study being conducted by the special 
committee on specialization.
By the fall of 1978, the department's attitude had forced the 
professional ethics committee to consider the deletion of inter­
pretation 502-4. I became concerned that such action would 
enable members to designate themselves as specialists even 
though their qualifications might be questionable. Because the 
Institute had refused to establish criteria to accredit specialists, 
the ethics committee would be left to judge whether such self­
designations were false and misleading and therefore in violation 
of the modified rule 502, which prohibits false advertising. And, 
of course, no criteria existed for this purpose.
To deal with this possibility, the board approved the appoint­
ment of a special committee to develop general criteria for the 
guidance of members who might decide to designate themselves 
as specialists. The committee was chaired by Richard Guiltinan, 
a past chairman of the computer services committee and a partner 
of Arthur Andersen and Company. It began its deliberations in 
January 1979, and by December 6, 1979, it had submitted its 
report to the board. The committee indicated that it would have 
preferred to recommend a program to accredit specialists, but, 
true to its charge, it had prepared a set of broad criteria to serve
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permitted.
By the time the board received the report, the Department of 
Justice had discontinued its review of the Institute's rules of 
conduct, and interpretation 502-4 had not been modified by the 
ethics committee. In reviewing the report, the board worried 
that its publication would appear to be directed toward urging 
members to engage in self-designation as specialists, which was 
not the board's intent. Therefore, the board merely referred the 
report to the ethics committee for future use in the event that 
interpretation 502-4 was repealed.1
In taking this action the board did not intend to endorse the 
recommendation of the special committee that members be per­
mitted to designate themselves as specialists if warranted under 
the guidelines. It believed that further action should await a new 
challenge from the Department of Justice. Thus, the decade 
ended with yet another aborted action.
The Continuing Search for a Solution
The 1980s began without a solution to the twin issues of formal 
recognition of specialization and the place of non-CPA specialists 
in the profession. Many of the large, national CPA firms had 
long since sought a partial solution to the problem of non-CPA 
specialists by becoming active in the Institute of Management 
Consultants. A substantial number of CPAs practicing in smaller 
firms continued to oppose both accreditation of specialists and 
some form of affiliation for non-CPA specialists. No doubt they 
were motivated in part by the fear that these developments might 
give the large firms a further competitive advantage.
Whether the user public has any great need for the accredi­
tation of specialists remains an open question. Certainly, there 
has been no public clamor for assistance in engaging specialists 
in the consulting field. Apparently, if government officials or 
business management have had bad experiences with consult­
ants, they have been more inclined to negotiate a reduced fee 
and chalk the matter up to experience than to voice demands for 
accreditation.
1. Interpretation 502-4 was withdrawn effective September 1981.
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If there is no public need for accreditation of specialists, then 
the issue is an entirely internal matter within the profession. 
Although de facto specialization has existed for a long time, 
formal recognition is a highly sensitive political issue because of 
the possible effects on competition between the large and small 
firms. Given the internal frictions that existed, early solutions to 
the specialization questions were unlikely.
The right to advertise will lead inevitably to claims of special­
ization since this is inherent in the objective of informing users 
of one's services. Indeed, references to specialization have already 
cropped up in the advertisements of CPA firms. If the professional 
ethics executive committee attempts to impose discipline for 
making such claims, its position may not survive legal challenge. 
If the prohibition of advertising that is not false or deceptive is 
illegal, then the prohibition of claims of specialization that are 
not false or deceptive may also be illegal.
Thus, there is good reason to believe that the Institute will 
be forced to revoke its prohibition against claiming to be a 
specialist. Either a test case or renewed pressure from the 
Department of Justice is likely to occur. The revocation of inter­
pretation 502-4 might well open the floodgates to all sorts of 
dubious claims, and that development might finally produce 
general support for a program to accredit specialists in the 
accounting profession.
A form of membership status in the profession for non-CPA 
specialists is a more difficult matter, however. The issue involves 
the question of whether the profession should be comprised of 
multiple disciplines, which in turn affects preentry education 
and entry examination requirements. To serve as the test for 
entry to the profession, the CPA examination might have to be 
broadened to cover additional subjects, and postentry examina­
tions might be necessary for the various specializations.
Clearly, the profession was not ready in the 1970s for such a 
substantive change in the concept of its role. But, at the beginning 
of the 1980s the signs pointed more and more toward a broad­
ening of the profession's role and responsibilities. If this takes 
place, there will be an increasing need to employ specialists in 
other disciplines, in addition to those that have already been 
brought into CPA firms. This would increase the pressures to
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embrace such specialists as members and would lead to a more 
diversified profession.
No one can predict with complete confidence what the out­
come will or should be. It will be extremely interesting, however, 
to watch future events unfold in the area of specialization. These 
developments will provide a clear indication of whether the 
profession intends to restrict or expand its role and responsibili­
ties.
CHAPTER 11
Management Advisory Services 
and Auditor Independence
An issue that has troubled the profession over a period of nearly twenty years is the question of whether auditors' 
performance of management advisory services impairs their in­
dependence, either in fact or in appearance. In the early 1960s a 
number of articles were written, mostly by persons in the 
educational field, asserting that auditors should be prohibited 
from performing such services in order to protect their inde­
pendence. Two of the writers, Abraham Briloff and Arthur 
Schulte, surveyed various groups to elicit their views on the 
issue; the results of these surveys suggested that the profession 
did have an "appearance" problem, although there were reasons 
to believe that the questionnaires had introduced a bias in the 
responses.
Early Responses to MAS Criticism
In response to these allegations, the AICPA Management Advi­
sory Services Committee initiated a series of papers designed to 
clarify the nature and scope of management advisory services, 
the competence required for such services, and the role played 
by CPA consultants. The committee hoped that the papers would 
eliminate some of the apparent confusion.
Meanwhile, in October 1966 Manuel Cohen, chairman of the 
SEC, raised the issue in a speech before the AICPA's annual 
meeting in Boston:
However, a word of caution is in order with respect to . . . 
"consulting services which cannot be related logically either to the 
financial process or to broadly defined information and control
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systems, [such as] market surveys, factory layout, psychological 
testing, or public opinion polls." And, I am disposed to add, 
executive recruitment for a fee. An accountant who directs or assists 
in programs of this kind raises serious questions concerning his 
independence when it comes time to render to creditors, to investors 
and to the public his opinion on the results of the programs. Public 
accountants should carefully reconsider their participation in these 
activities lest their continuation and extension undermine the main 
function of the independent accountant—auditing and the rendering 
of opinions on financial statements.
Chairman Cohen's remarks gave the issue a new urgency. 
Accordingly, the AICPA Executive Committee (Board of Direc­
tors) approved the appointment of an ad hoc committee to study 
and prepare a report on the subject. The five-member committee 
was chaired by Malcolm M. Devore, a top partner of Haskins 
and Sells, and included representatives of the three major areas 
of service and the professional ethics committee.
The ad hoc committee conducted extensive research, includ­
ing interviews with user groups and the authors of articles on 
the subject. It issued an interim report on August 1, 1968, and a 
final report in 1969. The committee found no evidence that 
performance of management advisory services had resulted in 
the actual impairment of an auditor's independence, and it 
concluded that countervailing pressures would prevent any ero­
sion of auditor independence. Many observers confused com­
petence with independence, had distorted views of what 
management advisory services entailed, and failed to understand 
the role played by CPAs in providing such services. All in all, 
there was no sound rationale for proscribing certain types of 
management advisory services.
Nevertheless, the committee concluded that concern about 
the appearance of lost independence continued to exist, and 
CPAs should exercise great care in performing services that were 
not logically related either to the financial process or to broadly 
defined information and control systems. Also, CPAs providing 
management advisory services should avoid making manage­
ment decisions. If in doubt about the propriety of an engagement, 
CPAs should consult with their clients' audit committees.
The committee was discharged in October 1969 with the hope 
that its report would clarify the issue, if not lay it to rest. Only
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a few months passed, however, before a letter was received by 
the Institute, in March 1970, from Andrew Barr, chief accountant 
of the SEC, requesting a reexamination of the propriety of 
accounting firms' performance of executive recruiting on a fee 
basis for audit clients.
This led to the appointment of a new committee, composed 
of members of the AICPA Board of Directors, and chaired by 
Stanley D. Ferst, a top partner of Laventhol Krekstein Horwath 
and Horwath. The committee proceeded to prepare a white 
paper on the subject of executive recruiting for a fee. The paper 
described the CPA firm's function in the executive recruiting 
process and concluded that such services, properly practiced, 
posed no significant threat to the CPA's independence as an 
auditor. Procedures were recommended to ensure that CPAs did 
not in fact make decisions for management during the course of 
the recruitment process.
The Institute submitted the completed white paper to the SEC 
in February 1971. Within the next few months, the makeup of 
the commission and its staff changed, and the new group 
representing the commission did not pursue the issue.
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Even though the SEC took no further action, the management 
advisory services independence issue was by no means resolved. 
Academics and non-CPA consultants continued to question the 
propriety of management advisory services performed by audi­
tors. By the fall of 1972 a reexamination of the profession's scope 
of services was necessary, and President Layton appointed a 
special fourteen-member committee to study the present and 
future scope of accounting firm practice.
During its deliberations, the committee on scope of practice 
was heavily influenced by the Institute's restated code of profes­
sional ethics, which was developed and adopted during this 
period. The new code contained a dissertation on the subject of 
auditor independence and whether nonaudit services are likely 
to impair such independence. Readers interested in a full analysis 
of the concept of auditors' independence are urged to read the
pertinent portions of the "Concepts" section of the code. Certain 
passages in that document were especially cogent to the work of 
the committee on scope of practice:
When a CPA expresses an opinion on financial statements, the 
judgments involved pertain to whether the results of operating 
decisions of the client are fairly presented in the statements and not 
on the underlying wisdom of such decisions. . . .
The more important question is whether a CPA would deliber­
ately compromise his integrity by expressing an unqualified opinion 
on financial statements which were prepared in such a way as to 
cover up a poor business decision by the client and on which the 
CPA has rendered advice. The basic character traits of the CPA as 
well as the risks arising from such a compromise of integrity, 
including liability to third parties, disciplinary action and loss of 
right to practice, should preclude such action.
Providing advice or recommendations which may or may not 
involve skills logically related to a client's information and control 
system, and which may affect the client's decision-making, does 
not in itself indicate lack of independence. However, the CPA must 
be alert to the possibility that undue identification with the man­
agement of the client or involvement with a client's affairs to such 
a degree as to place him virtually in the position of being an 
employee, may impair the appearance of independence.
The committee on scope of practice worked for nearly two- 
and-a-half years before issuing a final report in July 1975. The 
report was primarily a philosophical essay, which addressed all 
aspects of the profession's scope of services and their effects on 
the independence of auditors. It is difficult to summarize the 
report, but a few excerpts illustrate the committee's reasoning:
There seems little doubt that the profession is confronted with a 
crossroads decision about its future course: does it wish to remain 
a broad-gauged profession offering a wide range of services de­
signed to benefit many users—including management, investors, 
creditors, governmental agencies, and the general public? Or should 
it adopt a more restricted view of its mission?
The latter option may be tempting. Since many of the new 
services involve matters of uncertainty and even controversy, they 
may expose the profession to criticism and possible additional legal 
liability. Moreover, if the additional responsibilities being assumed 
are not clearly delineated, a widening gap may develop between 
what the profession believes that it can feasibly do and what the 
public expects of it. Finally, as it broadens its range of services, the 
profession redefines its character—provoking, at least for a time,
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confusion about its true identity. This, in turn, may generate friction 
among those engaged in practice as well as between the profession 
and others who offer similar services.
Despite these dangers, the committee on scope and structure is 
convinced that the profession must not adopt a narrow concept of 
its role.
The report w ent on to present the com m ittee's reasoning and 
then to propose a basic rationale for the profession's scope of 
services:
It must be acknowledged, however, that the diversity of services 
provided by practitioners has raised the question of whether the 
profession is engaged in performing incompatible services and, if 
so, whether the result will be a diminution of the professional status 
of CPAs.
There have been several attempts to deal with this question. 
One of them resulted in a proposition that all matters having to do 
with information systems fall properly within the scope of services 
to be rendered by CPAs. This view implied the conclusion that 
professional status would not be endangered by engaging in at least 
some services other than the attest function. Although it endorses 
this implied conclusion, the scope and structure committee believes 
that there is a broader characteristic than information systems which 
provides a common base for the present and future services of a 
unified profession.
That characteristic is the expressing of opinions and the providing of 
advice and assistance on the accounting for, or the management of, the 
utilization of resources.
One final excerpt from the report is particularly pertinent:
The suggestion has also been advanced that one or more of the 
"peripheral" management advisory services, i.e., those which may 
appear to be only marginally related to the traditional accounting 
function, ought to be proscribed.
This may seem at first to be an inviting course of action.
The challenged services are presently performed by relatively 
few firms, and none of them constitutes a major part of the practice 
of any firm. A prohibition against one or more of these services 
would not inflict much of a hardship on the profession, but it would 
deprive the business community of convenient access to useful 
assistance. A decision to ban a particular service, however, cannot 
be justified if it is merely designed to silence those who question 
the propriety of that service. Such a gesture of appeasement, even 
if it proved effective in mollifying the critics (a dubious assumption), 
would set a dangerous precedent. If any proscription were to be
adopted, it ought to be the result of a clear determination, based 
on solid evidence, that the prohibited service was creating serious 
questions about the profession's independence in performing its 
attest function.
The committee's report induced the Council to adopt a reso­
lution on October 11, 1975, in support of a broad range of 
services and an expanding role for the profession, with due 
regard for the constraints stated by the committee.
Unfortunately, the report of the committee on scope and 
structure attracted little attention. Critics who did read the report 
dismissed it as a whitewash, and practicing CPAs continued to 
hold mixed views on the issue.
Congressional Hearings and the Commission on 
Auditors' Responsibilities
In early 1976 the independence issue again began to heat up, 
this time in connection with congressional investigations and 
hearings. In anticipation of these hearings, I drafted a white 
paper on the independence of auditors, which was later approved 
by the AICPA Board of Directors as a basis for dealing with 
governmental agencies.
The AICPA testified on June 16, 1976, before the Senate 
Commerce Committee regarding Ralph Nader's proposal for the 
federal chartering of corporations. The proposal included a sug­
gestion to require mandatory rotation of auditing firms to bolster 
their independence. The AICPA expressed its opposition to 
mandatory rotation by filing a copy of the white paper and 
testifying on the nature of the independence required of auditors.
No action resulted from the hearings, and the paper was 
relegated to the archives, both in Washington and at the AICPA. 
Once again, an effort to present the profession's stand on 
independence and scope of services received little outside atten­
tion and failed to dispose of the issue.
Then, in December 1976, the staff of Senator Lee Metcalf's 
subcommittee on reports, accounting and management published 
its report, The Accounting Establishment. The report included the 
recommendation, "Performance of management advisory serv­
ices for public or private clients are . . . activities which are 
particularly incompatible with the responsibilities of independent
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auditors, and should be prohibited by Federal standards of 
conduct." This report and the congressional hearings that fol­
lowed are described more fully in chapter 3. Suffice it to say that 
they reopened all aspects of the issue of accountants' perform­
ance of management advisory services.
Fortunately, the AICPA-sponsored, independent Commission 
on Auditors' Responsibilities released its final report in 1978. The 
scope-of-services question was among the issues studied by the 
commission, and the report concluded as follows:
There is no evidence that provision of services other than auditing 
has actually impaired the independence of auditors. However, the 
belief of a significant minority of users that independence is im­
paired creates a major problem for the profession. Decisions on the 
other services offered and used should be made by individual public 
accounting firms and boards of directors of clients.
Approximately eleven pages of the report were devoted to a 
discussion of the profession's scope of services. The commission's 
recommendations stopped short of suggesting the proscription 
of specific types of services.
Interestingly, the chairman of the Commission on Auditors' 
Responsibilities was Manuel F. Cohen, the past chairman of the 
SEC who had questioned the propriety of the profession's scope 
of services back in October 1966. He had also been instrumental 
in initiating the SEC's subsequent request that the AICPA study 
whether CPA firms should be prohibited from performing exec­
utive recruiting services for a fee.
The report of the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
and the testimony of its members played an important role in 
the congressional hearings that were held from 1977 through 
1979.
Renewal of SEC Interest
At the time the congressional inquiries got under way in 1976, 
Harold Williams became chairman of the SEC, and Clarence 
Sampson took over as acting chief accountant. Both men had 
doubts about the propriety of auditors' performance of certain 
types of management advisory services. When congressional 
subcommittees began criticizing the SEC for not exercising ade­
quate oversight of the profession, Messrs. Williams and Sampson
became especially concerned about the scope-of-services ques­
tion. This led to the publication of rulemaking proposals and 
ultimately to the commission's adoption of Accounting Series 
Releases no. 250 and 264.
The commission began by seeking comments in release no. 
5869, dated September 26, 1977, which called for proxy statement 
disclosure of audit and other fees incurred by registrants. It also 
sought comments on several questions regarding the need to 
restrict the types of services that CPAs perform for their audit 
clients.
At that time the AICPA was establishing the division for CPA 
firms, and members of the SEC practice section believed that a 
few concessions would be necessary on scope of services in order 
to gain SEC support for the new program. As a result, the SEC 
practice section's organizational document prohibited member 
firms from performing, for their SEC clients, psychological test­
ing, public opinion polls, and merger and acquisition assistance 
for a finder's fee. The section also indicated that certain aspects 
of marketing and plant layout engagements might be ruled out 
at a later date.
These steps did not deter the SEC from continuing to address 
the scope-of-services question. The pressures from Congress had 
apparently convinced the commission that it could not afford to 
rely solely on the profession's response. It became evident that 
the SEC intended to consider responses to its release and then 
take further actions to discourage the performance of manage­
ment advisory services by the auditors of registrants.
The executive committee of the new SEC practice section was 
greatly concerned, and representatives met with SEC Chairman 
Williams to request the commission to delay further action until 
the section could develop a new proposal and carry on discus­
sions with the commission's staff regarding the scope of services. 
Chairman Williams encouraged the section to pursue this course.
The section then appointed a committee to prepare a position 
paper. The committee, which was chaired by Russell Palmer, 
head of Touche Ross and Company, developed a proposed 
amendment to the section's constitution that would prohibit 
consulting engagements involving skills not related to accounting 
or auditing. It went on to rule out certain specified aspects of 
engagements involving executive recruiting, marketing consult­
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ing, plant layout and design, product design and analysis, 
insurance actuarial computations, and employee benefit plans.
These proposals caused lengthy and often heated debates 
within the executive committee of the SEC practice section. In 
the end, the executive committee reluctantly agreed to the pro­
posals.
This attempt to develop criteria that could be applied in 
resolving the scope-of-services issue did not satisfy the SEC's 
chairman and staff. Chairman Williams publicly expressed the 
view that the proposed accounting and auditing skills test was 
too broad to be acceptable.
At this point the executive committee requested the section's 
public oversight board to study the issue. It was recognized that 
this would become necessary at some point in any event, and it 
was hoped that the board's views would gain greater acceptance 
by the SEC. The board accepted this request and began imme­
diately to conduct a study, guided principally by the vice chair­
man, Ray Garrett, Jr.
In June 1978 the SEC adopted and released Accounting Series 
Release no. 250. The release required proxy statement disclosure 
of the various services furnished by a registrant's auditor during 
the year, the percentage relationship of the total fees for nonaudit 
services to the audit fee, and the percentage relationship of the 
fee for each nonaudit service exceeding 3 percent of total fees. It 
also indicated that the commission had not decided whether to 
limit the scope of services and would await the public oversight 
board's conclusions before taking further action.
On July 1, 1978, in the commission's oversight report to 
Congress, the SEC identified the scope-of-services issue as one 
of three unresolved questions.
The Report of the Public Oversight Board
These actions set the stage for the report of the public oversight 
board. The board held public hearings on August 17 and 18, 
1978, and conducted a comprehensive review of all that had been 
written on the subject. It then wrote a draft of its report, which 
it reviewed with both the SEC and the SEC practice section 
executive committee to elicit their comments. SEC Chairman
Williams and Chief Accountant Sampson expressed general sat­
isfaction with the board's conclusions and recommendations. 
This was reported in due course to the SEC practice section, and 
it appeared that the issue was finally going to be settled without 
further SEC action to impose more stringent restrictions on 
management advisory services.
Unfortunately, through a failure in communications, it was 
not made clear that Chairman Williams intended to issue some 
form of statement to cause registrants and CPA firms alike to be 
more sensitive to the need to consider the independence issue 
in each nonaudit engagement. This proved to be the cause of 
some very bitter feelings on the part of the CPA firms when the 
commission subsequently issued Accounting Series Release no. 
264.
The board's report was issued in March 1979. Like the other 
groups that previously had studied the scope of services, it found 
no evidence that the performance of management advisory serv­
ices had in fact impaired auditor independence. It suggested that 
any possible problems would become evident through the disclo­
sures required by Accounting Series Release no. 250. In the 
meantime, the board recommended against any specific proscrip­
tions of services and rejected the validity of the proposed ac­
counting and auditing-related skills test developed by the Palmer 
committee. The section's specific proscriptions of services should 
be rescinded, except for those relating to executive recruiting.
The board also recommended that members of the SEC 
practice section should be required to comply with the AICPA's 
management advisory services standards and code of profes­
sional ethics. Member firms should report their annual gross fees 
for nonaudit services as percentages of total audit fees, and this 
information should become part of the section's public files. Peer 
reviews should be expanded to determine whether management 
advisory service engagements had complied with appropriate 
role restrictions. Finally, the board recommended that auditors 
should provide only supplementary actuarial advice to insurance 
companies that they audit.
The report was favorably received by the SEC practice sec­
tion's executive committee, which proceeded to amend the sec­
tion's constitution to conform with the public oversight board's 
recommendations.
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Accounting Series Release no. 264
Unfortunately, this latest attempt to deal with the scope-of- 
services issue did not end the matter. The SEC was aware that a 
Senate subcommittee chaired by Senator Thomas Eagleton had a 
strong interest in the scope-of-services issue. Questionnaires had 
been sent to the AICPA and a number of CPA firms in April 
1978, and John Chesson, author of The Accounting Establishment, 
had become a member of the subcommittee's staff. His concerns 
about m anagem ent advisory services were reflected in the ques­
tionnaires and the subcommittee's announced intention to hold 
hearings at some future date. Thus, the SEC was under contin­
uing pressure to take a more aggressive position on scope of 
services. In addition, Chairman Williams and Chief Accountant 
Sampson truly believed that both CPA firms and their clients 
should be made more sensitive to the potential for impairment 
of auditor independence.
As a result, the commission issued Accounting Series Release 
no. 264 on June 14, 1979. The release contained the following 
summary:
In this interpretative release the Commission states its views con­
cerning certain factors which accountants should consider in as­
sessing the possible effects upon their independence of the 
performance of nonaudit services for publicly-held audit clients. In 
addition, . . . the Commission also sets forth certain factors which 
audit committees, boards of directors, and managements should 
consider in determining whether to engage their independent ac­
countants to perform nonaudit services.
The release also included a statem ent of the commission's belief 
that the report of the public oversight board did not “adequately 
sensitize the profession and its clients to the potential effects on 
the independence of accountants of performance of non-audit 
services for audit clients.'' It w ent on to state, “While the 
Commission is not proposing proscriptive rules at this time, it 
believes that continued surveillance of the potential effects of 
such services on independence is essential." The commission 
stressed such m atters as the magnitude of revenues from m an­
agem ent advisory services, the need to ensure that auditors do 
not assume a managerial role, avoidance by auditors of review  
of their own work, and the economic benefits involved. It 
specifically rejected as a valid test the accounting- and auditing-
related skills concept previously proposed by the Palmer com­
mittee. The release concluded with the following warning:
This release is not the end of the examination of the scope of 
services issue. The Commission . . . will continue its oversight of 
this area, principally through staff monitoring of the disclosures 
required under ASR No. 250 and of the profession's response to 
both the views expressed in this release and to the Public Oversight 
Board's recommendations. The Commission's staff will also continue 
to examine particular cases in which questions arise concerning the 
independence of accountants who practice before the Commission, 
and compilations of such inquiries will be published from time to 
time.
Although the commission had implied in its July 1978 report 
to Congress that it would take a position after receipt of the 
public oversight board's report, the issuance of ASR no. 264 
caught the profession by surprise. The SEC practice section 
believed the commission to be satisfied with the board's report, 
and it expected that no further releases on the scope-of-services 
issue would be forthcoming.
Thus, when ASR no. 264 was issued, without prior warning 
or discussion with the AICPA, there was an immediate and 
angry outcry from the CPA firms. The negative tone of the 
release and the implied threat of staff inquiries regarding specific 
filings with the SEC were seen as a clever attempt by the 
commission to proscribe management advisory services indi­
rectly, even as it expressed the decision not to do so directly. 
Several CPA firms reported that SEC releases no. 250 and 264 
were having a very chilling effect on their clients and that 
prospective management advisory service engagements were 
being lost. A few firms seriously considered bringing legal action 
against the commission on the grounds that it had effectively 
proscribed management advisory services without the due proc­
ess required by the Administrative Procedures Act.
The AICPA's officers shared the belief that ASR no. 264 would 
do great damage to the profession's scope of services and that 
strong objections to the release were in order. Accordingly, a 
special committee, chaired by Henry Gunders, chairman of the 
management advisory services executive committee, was ap­
pointed to prepare a letter of comment to the SEC.
The resulting letter, dated August 3, 1979, was one of the 
most sharply worded communications ever conveyed by the
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AICPA to the commission. The tone was characterized by the 
following sentences:
In our opinion, ASR 264 will have, and was intended to have, a 
chilling and depressing effect on the use of a CPA firm's manage­
ment advisory services by the firm's audit clients.
By issuing ASR 264 [the commission] attempts to substitute the 
rule of men for the rule of law.
The letter, which had the full approval of the AICPA Board of 
Directors, urged the commission either to withdraw the release 
or to issue a clarifying release “to assure that it does not achieve 
what would otherwise require compliance with the Administra­
tive Procedures Act."
Neither of these actions was subsequently taken by the 
commission, despite a number of additional verbal protests that 
were made in the following months.
At approximately this same time the long-promised public 
hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Governmental Efficiency 
and the District of Columbia, chaired by Senator Eagleton, were 
scheduled. One of the principal subjects covered during the 
hearings was scope of services. Senator Eagleton expressed grave 
doubts about the propriety of the auditors' performance of such 
services, and he was visibly irritated when SEC Chairman Wil­
liams did not fully support his views. However, Ray Garrett, Jr., 
representing the public oversight board, later seemed to have a 
calming effect on Senator Eagleton when he provided an expla­
nation of the board's conclusions on the subject.
A report on the hearings was never issued. Shortly afterward 
Mr. Chesson left the subcommittee's staff for other employment, 
and Senator Eagleton turned his attention to more urgent prob­
lems. This left the profession and the SEC to deal with the issue 
on their own, although the specter of further congressional 
interest remained.
Because there were indications that the SEC would not at­
tempt to clarify ASR no. 264 at an early date, the AICPA Board 
of Directors authorized the publication of a brochure aimed at 
audit committees and boards of directors. The AICPA hoped 
that, by explaining the SEC's positions in more positive tones 
and by making the case in support of management advisory 
services performed by auditors, it could mitigate some of the 
damage caused by ASR no. 264.
During this same period, John Biegler, head of Price Water­
house and Company, appeared on the same speakers' platform 
with SEC Chairman Williams at the annual meeting of the 
American Accounting Association. Mr. Biegler used the occasion 
to blast the SEC for failing to provide definitive guidance on the 
scope-of-services issue. When this apparently failed to goad the 
SEC into action, Price Waterhouse and Company published a 
proposal, Breaking the Deadlock Over Management Advisory Services.
The proposal, which came as a surprise to the AICPA, urged 
adoption of the concept that "the development of information systems 
for audit clients, as well as marshalling and analyzing specific infor­
mation for management decisions with respect to economic alternatives, 
are permissible areas of activity and raise no independence 
issues." It further recommended that a list of permissible man­
agement advisory services, grounded on the proposed concept, 
be developed by the AICPA. It also suggested that auditors 
provide their clients with written representations regarding their 
independence to demonstrate that the scope-of-services question 
had been fully considered. The authors hoped that such a "positive 
tack" would resolve the scope-of-services issue.
The AICPA appointed a special committee to consider these 
proposals and to monitor the impact of ASR no. 264 on the 
profession. That committee rejected the Price Waterhouse pro­
posals, primarily on the grounds that they were not substantially 
different from concepts that had been proposed previously, and 
it offered little hope for resolution of the issue. The committee 
also opposed the preparation of a list of permissible services, 
which would, by implication, rule out all other services. The 
committee had no objection to a representation of the auditor's 
independence, although it observed that independence was al­
ready implied by the auditor's issuance of an unqualified audi­
tor's opinion.
Nothing further came of the Price Waterhouse proposals, and 
the SEC continued to defer any clarification of ASR no. 264. 
Even a letter from the public oversight board to the effect that 
the SEC had partially misrepresented the board's conclusions 
failed to bring about a new statement from the commission.
As time went by, CPA firms became less vocal about the 
issue, and some even feared that a clarifying statement by the 
SEC might do more harm than good. The actual damage was
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proving to be less than initially anticipated, and some firms told 
SEC Chairman Williams in private conversations that they had 
not suffered serious losses of management advisory service 
engagements following the issuance of ASR no. 264.
Finally, on January 3, 1980, Chairman Williams publicly stated 
that the commission had not intended to proscribe the perform­
ance of management advisory services by CPA firms. His com­
ments were obviously meant to clear up any misunderstandings 
caused by ASR no. 264 and to allay the fears of accountants and 
their clients. The speech was not as satisfactory as a formal 
statement by the commission, but it served to quiet the already 
muted controversy.
The profession's initial belief that the SEC was attempting to 
proscribe management advisory services indirectly was probably 
wrong. More likely, the commission failed to realize that the 
tone and wording of ASR no. 264 might result in an overreaction 
on the part of the profession's clients. This interpretation is more 
consistent with Chairman Williams' often expressed agreement 
that the profession's auditing capability might suffer if CPAs 
were precluded from performing management advisory services.
By the end of 1980 the SEC staff was doing no more than 
monitoring the disclosures under ASR no. 250. Then, in 1981, 
there were changes in the members of the commission, and John 
Shad became the new chairman. In August 1981, in keeping with 
the new federal program for deregulation, the commission an­
nounced that it was rescinding releases no. 250 and 264. There 
is no indication that the issue will flare up again in the near 
future.
It is not likely, however, that the issue has been permanently 
resolved. There is still no agreement on a conceptual basis for 
proscribing particular types of services. Even the public oversight 
board's conclusions were less than consistent in their supporting 
logic and seemed to be more influenced by practical considera­
tions than by any underlying conceptual guidelines.
This is not a criticism of the board but simply a recognition 
that, except where services are legally reserved for other groups, 
no valid basis exists for restricting CPAs' services. Surely, the 
forces of competition in the marketplace are capable of preventing 
any profession from straying too far from the mission that 
provides the overwhelming portion of its revenues. Even if other
services were to become predominant, such a development 
would indicate a significant public need that ought to be fulfilled.
It is significant that most suggestions for the proscription of 
CPA services have come from people who offer such services in 
competition with the profession. One cannot help suspecting 
that such critics may be motivated more by self-interest than by 
a desire to protect the public interest. Because such individuals 
will continue in their efforts to impose limitations on CPAs, the 
scope-of-services issue is almost certain to arise again and again. 
The profession would be foolish not to resist these attempts to 
impose artificial restrictions and would be well advised to resist 
the temptation to satisfy its critics by agreeing to piecemeal 
prohibitions.
In the end, the profession's best defense will be to diligently 
maintain a position of strict objectivity and integrity in the 
performance of the whole range of its services.
222 MANAGEMENT ADVISORY SERVICES AND AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
CHAPTER 12
The Establishment of 
International Organizations
Du r i n g  the 1960s many American corporations expanded their operations by establishing facilities and subsidiaries in other 
countries. The rapid emergence of huge multinational companies 
made it necessary for auditors, in turn, to expand their operations 
worldwide.
This created an urgent need for the profession to organize 
internationally in order to develop uniform accounting and au­
diting standards and to cope with national barriers to interna­
tional practice. Because the United States was in the forefront of 
world trade, the AICPA had to assume a leadership role. Ac­
cordingly, during the 1970s the AICPA, in cooperation with the 
institutes of other countries, devoted a great deal of effort toward 
establishing new organizations to achieve international harmo­
nization within the profession.
The Report of the Working Party
The international organizations that were formed in the 1970s 
had their genesis in a working party that was established at the 
Ninth International Congress of Accountants in Paris in 1967. 
The working party was organized to consider the international 
needs of the profession and to present recommendations to the 
Tenth International Congress of Accountants to be held in Syd­
ney, Australia, in 1972. Serving on the working party at its first 
two annual meetings were representatives from France, Great 
Britain, the Netherlands, the United States, and Australia; rep­
resentatives from India and Mexico were added to the group for 
the 1970 and 1971 meetings. The AICPA was represented by
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Clifford V. Heimbucher, a past president of the Institute, and 
Leonard M. Savoie, the Institute's executive vice president.
One of the principal issues discussed by the working party 
was whether a permanent secretariat should be established to 
help speed up international cooperation and the harmonization 
of auditing and accounting standards. The AICPA was very 
much in favor of this, but other members objected strongly. The 
English institute felt that the main emphasis should be on the 
development of standards within each country; eventually, the 
most appropriate standards would gain international acceptance. 
It argued that the main role of the working party and any 
successor body should be to encourage and assist the develop­
ment of regional professional organizations.
The AICPA position reflected the fact that many American 
companies had expanded their operations worldwide and were 
struggling to cope with the variety of accounting practices in 
different countries. The English position, on the other hand, 
reflected that institute's desire to achieve a leadership role in the 
Union Européenne des Experts Comptables, Economiques et 
Financiers (UEC). The UEC was a European regional accounting 
group. For years the English institute had been indifferent to the 
UEC, but its interest had increased now that the United Kingdom 
was joining the European Economic Community (EEC or Com­
mon Market).
The working party presented its conclusions and recommen­
dations in a final report to the Tenth International Congress of 
Accountants in October 1972. The report largely reflected the 
position taken by the representatives of the English institute. It 
recommended against a secretariat, urged the strengthening of 
existing regional organizations, and suggested that the interna­
tional congresses concentrate on ways to harmonize auditing 
and accounting standards.
The report did, however, take a small step toward creating 
an international professional organization. It recommended that 
the working party be restructured and renamed the Interna­
tional Coordination Committee for the Accountancy Profession 
(ICCAP). The new body would consist of five members serving 
for fifteen years and an additional five members serving for five 
years and eligible for reappointment thereafter. The ICCAP would 
select the host country for international congresses, maintain
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liaison with all bodies participating in the congresses, and monitor 
and assist the progress of regional organizations. The body would 
recommend changes for widening or amending its work, and it 
would continue to review the need for an international secretariat.
The leaders of the congress did not request a vote on the 
report, and none was taken. Since there was no groundswell of 
objection from the delegates, it was presumed that the recom­
mendations had their approval.
One delegate, Walter J. Oliphant of the AICPA, did rise to 
urge more aggressive action toward the international harmoni­
zation of auditing and accounting standards. Mr. Oliphant com­
plained that the report did not go far enough toward setting up 
an effective international organization.
The congress, without a vote, established the new body and 
approved the composition that the working group had suggested. 
The fifteen-year members were Australia, France, the Nether­
lands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The first five- 
year members were Canada, West Germany, India, Mexico, and 
the Philippines.
The delegates of the Japanese Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants insisted that Japan should be included as a member 
of the new ICCAP. Japan, after all, had become a leader in world 
trade, and its accounting profession was developing very rapidly. 
Although no action was taken at the congress, subsequently, at 
its first meeting, the ICCAP voted to seat the Japanese delegation. 
The Japanese representatives participated in the balance of the 
meeting, and the ICCAP became an eleven-member body.
The ICCAP would continue to function through October 1977.
The Formation of the International Accounting 
Standards Committee
The other important event that occurred at the Tenth Interna­
tional Congress of Accountants was not part of the official 
proceedings. Sir Henry Benson of the United Kingdom invited 
delegates from the Canadian and American institutes to meet 
with him regarding a very important proposal for setting inter­
national accounting standards.
The five institutes in England and Wales, Scotland, Ireland,
Canada, and the United States had previously formed a group 
known as the Accountants International Study Group (AISG), 
which worked for several years to achieve greater uniformity in 
those countries' accounting standards. This body had issued 
nineteen publications on accounting and auditing matters over 
the period of its existence. It was a natural starting point for any 
new initiative in the field of international accounting standards.
At the meeting, Sir Henry suggested that, because of its 
limited membership, the AISG was not adequate to meet the 
urgent need for the international harmonization of accounting 
standards. He proposed that a new body be created to set "basic" 
international accounting standards. The new body, as he envi­
sioned it, would be composed of representatives from the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, Canada, France, West Germany, 
the Netherlands, and the United States.
It later became apparent that the proposal was motivated at 
least partially by a desire to gain greater influence over the 
standards to be set by the EEC, which would become mandatory 
for its members, including the United Kingdom. At that time the 
West German institute was generally recognized as being the 
leading influence in the EEC deliberations of accounting, and 
English practitioners feared that the standards adopted by the 
EEC would be incompatible with their own procedures.
At the meeting President Leroy Layton and I represented the 
AICPA. We had several reservations about the proposal. For 
instance, we pressed for an explanation of what Sir Henry meant 
by "basic" standards, but we received no clear answer. Also, the 
proposed membership seemed to be designed to allow England 
to dominate the organization: The Common Market countries 
would control four of the seven votes, and two of the other three 
votes would go to Canada and Australia, both members of the 
Commonwealth. More important, we believed that any truly 
international standard-setting body should include representa­
tion from Asia and Latin America. Japan and Mexico were 
obvious candidates, and we pressed for their inclusion; Sir Henry 
grudgingly agreed to include Mexico but resisted any further 
expansion. Finally, we insisted that the proposed standard- 
setting body should be established as a part of the ICCAP, albeit 
with complete autonomy in the development of standards.
Sir Henry would not hear of placing the new body under the
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aegis of the ICCAP. He believed that this would guarantee failure 
because it would subject the standard-setting body to all the 
conflicting political pressures of the larger organization. The 
ICCAP represented more than ninety different groups, among 
which the degree of professional development differed widely. 
Sir Henry maintained that the profession in the advanced coun­
tries should agree on "basic" standards, which would then very 
likely be adopted by accountants in the rest of the world.
Despite these differences in opinion, everyone agreed that 
we should hold another meeting to develop a more detailed 
plan. Leroy Layton and I recognized that U.S. interests coincided 
with those of the United Kingdom in regard to the type of 
accounting standards that might be mandated by the Common 
Market. To avoid a potential collision between the standards of 
English-speaking countries and those of the Common Market, 
we were prepared to recommend that the AICPA support the 
proposal for a new body.
The AICPA Board of Directors agreed. It authorized us to 
seek Japan's inclusion as a member, to press for the location of 
the secretariat in New York City, and to continue arguing that 
the new body should be established as a part of the ICCAP.
The participants at the Sydney meeting assembled again in 
London on December 3, 1972. A major portion of the discussion 
was devoted to reviewing and modifying a proposed constitu­
tion, which had been prepared by Douglas S. Morpeth and Sir 
Henry Benson in behalf of the English institute. We reached 
agreement on most issues with little difficulty, but the three 
AICPA proposals were hotly debated. Finally, we agreed on a 
compromise, whereby the Japanese institute would be invited to 
join the new International Accounting Standards Committee 
(IASC), the secretariat would be permanently located in London, 
and the constitution would include language that acknowledged 
the IASC to be a part of the ICCAP but not under its control. 
Clarification of this ambiguous relationship was left for future 
consideration.
None of the parties represented at the meeting were happy 
with all aspects of the compromise, but we all agreed that the 
IASC should be established. By the end of January 1973, the 
institutes in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
had approved the tentative proposal, and a meeting was sched­
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uled in London for March 19 to explain the plan to officials of 
the institutes in Australia, France, West Germany, Japan, Mexico, 
and the Netherlands.
The participants at this meeting strongly supported the pro­
posed IASC, but they were skeptical about how the new body's 
pronouncements might be enforced. Most of the participants 
indicated that their institutes would not initially be able to enforce 
international standards that were at variance with their domestic 
standards. I pointed out that the AICPA was unlikely to assign 
the IASC pronouncements a status higher than that of the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board. Sir Henry, however, 
insisted that each institute should require its members to demand 
that variations from international standards be disclosed in finan­
cial statements, or to make such disclosures in their audit reports, 
when international financial reports were involved.
This was a fundamental issue that could not be resolved in a 
short time. To get around this hurdle, language was adopted 
whereby the member institutes would pledge
to use their best endeavors:
(i) to ensure that published accounts comply with these standards 
or that there is disclosure of the extent to which they do not and 
to persuade governments, the authorities controlling securities 
markets and the industrial and business community that pub­
lished accounts should comply with these standards;
(ii) to ensure that the auditors satisfy themselves that the accounts 
comply with these standards. If the accounts do not comply 
with these standards the audit report should either refer to the 
disclosure of non-compliance in the accounts, or should state 
the extent to which they do not comply;
(iii) to ensure that, as soon as practicable, appropriate action is taken 
in respect of auditors whose audit reports do not meet the 
requirements of (ii) above.
On this basis the institutes represented at the meeting agreed 
to establish the IASC. In due course all the arrangements were 
made, and an agreement and a constitution were signed in 
London on June 29, 1973, followed by a press conference and 
press releases in the nine founding countries.
Joseph P. Cummings was appointed as the AICPA's first 
voting representative on the IASC, to be accompanied by Robert 
Sempier, the Institute's director of international relations. Mr.
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Cummings was the deputy senior partner of Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell and Co. and had previously served for several years on 
the Accounting Principles Board.
At the suggestion of the Canadian representatives, the AICPA 
was asked to provide the first secretary of the IASC. Paul 
Rosenfield, a member of the AICPA's technical staff, agreed to 
serve in this capacity for a two-year period and immediately took 
up residence in London.
It was unanimously agreed that Sir Henry Benson should be 
the first chairman of the new body. He believed passionately in 
the need for international accounting standards, and under his 
leadership, which some people viewed as autocratic, the IASC 
made rapid progress. Sir Henry remained chairman until June
1976, when he was succeeded by Joseph P. Cummings of the 
United States. Mr. Rosenfield was replaced as secretary in 1975 
by John Brennan, a Canadian accounting professor; thus, the 
terms of the chairman and secretary were staggered to avoid the 
disruption that would be caused by simultaneous changes in 
both positions.
Other changes also took place as time went on. The AICPA 
appointed Eugene Minahan, an officer of Atlantic Richfield Com­
pany, to serve as one of the two U.S. representatives on the 
IASC, reflecting the Institute's belief that its members in industry 
should participate in the development of accounting standards, 
since they were responsible for the issuance of financial state­
ments.
A revised agreement and constitution were signed in Munich 
in 1977, at which time the original standard-setting committee 
was redesignated the International Accounting Standards Com­
mittee Board. The purpose of this change was to permit sup­
porting bodies to become members of the IASC even though 
they might not be voting members of the standard-setting body.
The IASC made remarkable progress. By the end of 1980 it 
had published thirteen International Accounting Standards and 
had issued exposure drafts for eight additional standards. Many 
observers were pleasantly surprised that agreements were reached 
with a minimum of nationalistic intransigence.
Although the standards were gaining recognition by the end 
of the decade, there continued to be no effective means of 
enforcing compliance with them. Fortunately, there were few
differences between the IASC standards and the domestic stand­
ards of the major developed countries. Thus, for the time being, 
a confrontation had been avoided.
When it became apparent that IASC had become well estab­
lished there was no longer a need for the Accountants' Interna­
tional Study Group (AISG), which included Canada, the United 
States and the United Kingdom. By mutual agreement it was 
discontinued in 1976 after having produced a series of excellent 
studies of the standards differences in the participants' respective 
countries.
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The First Meeting of the ICCAP
At the same time that the IASC was being established, the new 
ICCAP was also getting under way. Since West Germany had 
been selected as the host country for the next congress in 1977, 
the new president of its institute, Dr. Reinhard Goerdeler, had 
the task of chairing the ICCAP. At his instigation the first meeting 
of the ICCAP was scheduled for April 26 and 27, 1973.
Prior to the meeting, the AICPA appointed Michael Chetkovich, 
head of Deloitte, Haskins and Sells and the chairman of the 
AICPA International Relations Committee, to serve as its voting 
representative on the ICCAP. He would be joined at the meeting 
by Robert Sempier, the AICPA's director of international practice, 
and by me.
The AICPA decided to push immediately for the establish­
ment of an international organization with a more formal struc­
ture and greater substance. We visualized some form of an 
international institute to achieve an organized profession on the 
international level. To further this end, Mr. Chetkovich requested 
that the agenda for the first meeting provide for discussion of a 
broader role for the ICCAP. The secretary of the English institute 
suggested that it would help to know specifically what the AICPA 
had in mind, so we developed an outline of a proposed inter­
national institute and sent the outline to all ICCAP members.
When the first meeting of the ICCAP convened on April 26, 
Douglas E. Morpeth, representing the United Kingdom, vigor­
ously opposed the AICPA's proposal. He urged that the role of
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the ICCAP should be limited to encouraging regional organiza­
tions and overseeing the international congresses every fifth year. 
All the other members supported the general concept of an 
expanded international organization, but they had varying views 
about the nature and timing of the changes to be made. Realist­
ically, they recognized that progress would be difficult unless the 
United States and the United Kingdom could reconcile their 
fundamental differences.
Adding to the problem were sharp differences of views about 
the nature of the relationship between the ICCAP and the IASC. 
The United Kingdom preferred mere recognition that close co­
operation was desirable. All other members felt that the IASC 
should be a part of the ICCAP structure, although most agreed 
that the IASC should be free of any interference in the setting of 
accounting standards.
For a time it appeared that the opposing viewpoints could 
not be reconciled; but, to the great credit of Chairman Goerdeler, 
a way was found to break the impasse. A working party was 
appointed to reconsider the role and structure of the ICCAP and 
to determine a reasonable timetable for implementing any pro­
posed changes. Serving on the working party would be Australia, 
Canada, the United States, France, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, and West Germany. In addition to taking this action, 
the delegates adopted the following resolution without dissent:
ICCAP endorses the endeavors that have resulted in the formation 
of IASC.
ICCAP formally invites IASC to be part of the world attempt to 
develop the accountancy profession.
ICCAP requests IASC to recognize in its charter that it is part of 
the ICCAP organization although it is autonomous in its issuance 
of exposure drafts and recommendations.
ICCAP further agrees that IASC's basic charter shall not be 
reviewed until the end of 1976 without the agreement of IASC and 
ICCAP.
A paragraph containing the substance of this resolution was 
subsequently included in the IASC constitution. The words part 
of remained subject to interpretation, however, since no structural 
ties existed between the two organizations other than sharing of 
the same group of sponsoring institutes.
The Evolution of the International 
Federation of Accountants
Although these actions prevented a total breakdown in the 
discussions, a fundamental conflict between the United Kingdom 
and the United States remained. Their basic differences were the 
subject of continuing discussions during the next four years. Six 
more plenary meetings of the ICCAP, two meetings of the ICCAP 
Working Party on the Future Role and Structure of ICCAP, six 
meetings of a subcommittee on future organizational structure, 
and numerous unofficial meetings between key representatives 
of the United Kingdom and the United States were held between 
1973 and 1977. Slowly and painstakingly, differences were rec­
onciled, and the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) 
evolved from the discussions and negotiations at these meetings.
The working party appointed at the ICCAP meeting held its 
first session in Paris on August 9 and 10, 1973. The group 
concluded that the ICCAP should adopt a formal statement of 
objectives and that ICCAP committees should be appointed to 
deal with ethics, education, regional organizations, and promo­
tion of the ICCAP. Another committee should study the need 
for a formal international body with a written constitution. The 
preparation of background papers on each of these subjects was 
assigned to individual members of the working party. The United 
Kingdom and the United States were given joint responsibility 
to develop proposals regarding a constitution.
The results of these assignments were reviewed by the work­
ing party on the day preceding the next ICCAP plenary meeting 
in October 1973. The American and English delegates had jointly 
prepared a summary of the working party's conclusions in the 
form of a report to the ICCAP, to which the other papers could 
be attached. This approach won the approval of the working 
party, and the report was presented on the following day.
The report urged the ICCAP to appoint the committees agreed 
upon at the Paris meeting. It also recommended that a constitu­
tion for an international federation of accountants be developed 
and submitted at the next international congress in Munich in 
1977. An outline for such a constitution, prepared by the Amer­
ican and English delegates, accompanied the report.
The ICCAP approved the recommendations without dissent
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and appointed the suggested committees. The new subcommittee 
on future organizational structure, cochaired by the delegates 
from the United Kingdom and the United States, included 
delegates from Canada, France, West Germany, and the Neth­
erlands; this subcommittee bore the brunt of the planning and 
negotiations that led to the establishment of the International 
Federation of Accountants.
The subcommittee spent 1974 preparing and reviewing suc­
cessive drafts of a constitution for the International Federation 
of Accountants. Robert Sempier, Douglas Morpeth, Philip Carrel 
(director of overseas relations for the English institute), and I 
drafted the original document at meetings in London and New 
York. The subcommittee and the ICCAP held meetings to resolve 
details of the proposed constitution. Everything went quite 
smoothly because the decision to establish a formal federation in 
1977 seemed to have unanimous support.
Unfortunately, at a subcommittee meeting in New York on 
January 2 4 ,  1975, the apparent consensus fell apart. The Canadian 
representative, Gordon Cowperthwaite, expressed the belief that 
the constituent bodies would not agree to establish a federation 
unless the ICCAP had produced some solid achievements by
1977. Otherwise, there would be little enthusiasm for paying 
dues to a new organization. He also worried about the lack of 
progress being made by the other ICCAP subcommittees. If the 
member institutes could not complete the work assigned to them 
by the ICCAP, then they would have trouble performing the 
many chores needed to establish the new organization. With 
these problems in mind, Mr. Cowperthwaite prepared a paper 
proposing that the ICCAP engage a small staff. He suggested 
raising the necessary funds by seeking contributions from the 
large CPA firms, which had the greatest interest in international 
developments.
The English representative, Mr. Morpeth, responded with a 
swift, firm rejection of the proposal. More significantly, he also 
reported that the United Kingdom institutes had reconsidered 
the need for a federation and were no longer prepared to provide 
financial support for such a body.
This announcement threw the meeting into disarray. The 
session ended, however, with an agreement that Canada and 
West Germany, in consultation with the United States, would
develop a more complete proposal for an ICCAP staff. The 
participants still hoped that somehow the United Kingdom could 
be convinced to change its position since all the other members 
of the ICCAP solidly backed the concept of a strong federation.
The AICPA's representatives supported the proposal to en­
gage a staff before 1977, and on February 6, 1975, I sent a letter 
to the heads of the large firms seeking funds for this purpose. 
The response was mixed. A few firms agreed to provide funds; 
some took a wait-and-see position, and one firm stated its 
opposition to a new federation. Given this response and a vigorous 
campaign mounted against the proposal by the large British firms, 
it was clear that funds for an interim ICCAP staff could not be 
raised from the firms.
Thus, in their definitive proposal, Messrs. Cowperthwaite 
and Goerdeler stated that funds for the staff would have to come 
from the member institutes. The proposal was mailed to the 
subcommittee on April 9, 1975.
The reaction of the United Kingdom was almost immediate. 
On April 30 Mr. Morpeth sent a long letter to the subcommittee, 
with copies to all the other members of the ICCAP. He repeated 
the British opposition to a strong, central body and urged that 
virtually all international harmonization efforts should be carried 
on through regional organizations. He did, however, support a 
federation with a £30,000 (approximately $60,000) annual budget 
and a role confined to coordination of work by other bodies and 
oversight of the international congresses. The letter stated em­
phatically that the United Kingdom institutes would not provide 
funds for an interim staff and argued that the lack of a defined 
work program for a central body and the minimal achievements 
of the ICCAP demonstrated that a strong federation was not 
needed.
The message left no room for doubt. The United Kingdom 
would support only a federation with little substance, and the 
stage was set for yet another confrontation on the fundamental 
issue that had been argued since the international congress in 
1967.
On June 11, 1975, the subcommittee met in Amsterdam to 
discuss the paper that had been circulated on April 9. The 
discussion was acrimonious, and in the end the subcommittee
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agreed only to report to the ICCAP that it supported the rec­
ommendations but that the United Kingdom remained opposed.
The ICCAP met on the following day. The meeting began 
with a discussion of the subcommittee's report and the Morpeth 
letter. All the pro and con arguments were aired in a tense 
session. Feelings of betrayal and anger were expressed by the 
delegates, none of whom supported the position of the United 
Kingdom representatives. Since no progress was being made 
toward breaking the impasse, Chairman Goerdeler adjourned 
the discussion until the next day, when a more dispassionate 
atmosphere might prevail.
I decided that a private discussion with Mr. Morpeth might 
produce a compromise on the diametrically opposed positions of 
the United States and the United Kingdom. In a candid exchange 
over breakfast the following morning, we both conceded that 
our constituents distrusted each other's motives. We agreed that 
effective progress could not be achieved on an international level 
unless the United Kingdom and the United States were in 
agreement. Either country could block effective action simply by 
refusing to agree.
Mr. Morpeth explained the British perception that the United 
States would want to spend large sums on a federation. Many 
people feared that the United Kingdom would be asked to pay 
more dues than it could comfortably afford. He cited the large 
budget of the Financial Accounting Standards Board as the basis 
for this concern.
An additional worry seemed to be the U.K. desire to retain 
the situs of the IASC in London. Apparently, the United King­
dom feared that the United States might urge that the IASC be 
moved to New York.
With these considerations in mind, I made a very frank 
proposal. The secretariat of the proposed federation would be 
located in New York, and that of the IASC in London. The two 
countries would jointly provide staff for the two secretariats so 
that there would be mutual surveillance. The United States would 
agree that the ICCAP should not hire a staff before 1977 and 
would do its best to confine the budget of the proposed federation 
to only what was necessary to carry out substantive projects at 
the international level. In return, the United Kingdom would
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agree to support a stronger federation with a secretariat begin­
ning in 1977. Mr. Morpeth agreed to these proposals.
When the ICCAP meeting resumed that morning, a more 
harmonious atmosphere prevailed. The members unanimously 
adopted motions authorizing the subcommittee on future orga­
nizational structure to prepare an interim report to all the con­
stituent bodies represented by the ICCAP seeking approval of 
the establishment of an International Federation of Accountants 
(IFAC) and a secretariat in 1977. Included in the report would 
be a proposed constitution, a proposed work program for the 
IFAC, a proposed method of financing the IFAC, a recommen­
dation on the location of the secretariat, a definition of the 
relationship between the IFAC and the IASC, a definition of the 
roles of regional bodies and their relationship to the IFAC, and 
a timetable and program for presenting the federation proposal 
to the congress in 1977.
When the meeting closed, the effort to create a new federation 
was back on track. The delegates departed with the hope that 
the ICCAP's primary objective finally would be achieved.
The period from July 1975 through March 1976 was devoted 
to preparing, reviewing, and revising drafts of an interim report. 
Although there were debates about many of the details, the only 
serious disagreements were in regard to the relationship between 
the IASC and the IFAC.
Defining the relationship proved particularly troublesome. 
Most delegates urged that the IASC be a "part of" the IFAC as 
an autonomous committee with authority to issue pronounce­
ments in its own name. A few delegates insisted that both bodies 
should share a single secretariat at one location. The United 
Kingdom's delegates argued that the IASC should be a separate 
body with its own membership, financing, and secretariat but 
closely related to the IFAC.
Representatives of the ICCAP met with the chairman and 
other representatives of the IASC in an attempt to reach agree­
ment on a definition of the relationship. Even though the prin­
cipal sponsors of the IFAC and the IASC would be identical— 
the institutes from the major countries—it was believed that 
obtaining the agreement of the individuals serving on the IASC 
would avoid any bruised feelings. The IASC constitution stated 
that it was a "part of" the ICCAP; the strict constructionists now
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said that the ICCAP had no right to assign this relationship to a 
new federation without the IASC's consent. Others suggested 
that this was nonsense because the principal sponsoring bodies 
were identical and were in effect dealing with themselves.
The issue was temporarily resolved when a final version of 
an interim report was approved in February 1976. The report 
included the following wording:
ICCAP believes that its existing relationship with IASC should be 
carried forward to IFAC on the same general basis and recommends 
that IASC should continue as the body designated to have respon­
sibility and authority to issue, in its own name, pronouncements 
on international accounting standards. As such, IASC would be 
autonomous and have its own constitution, secretariat and system 
of financing its activities.
ICCAP recognizes that the objectives of IFAC and IASC are 
interdependent. The closest relationship is clearly to the advantage 
of both IASC and IFAC particularly since some member bodies of 
IASC will also be members of IFAC. Therefore, arrangements should 
be made to establish and maintain a continuing liaison between the 
two bodies.
This wording was mirrored in a revised IASC constitution, 
which was adopted on October 10, 1977. The description was 
sufficiently ambiguous to allow agreement, but in fact there 
continued to be little substance to the concept that the IASC was 
a “part of" the IFAC. The issue would arise again at a later time.
The interim report requested the constituent bodies to re­
spond, stating whether they would join the proposed federation 
and providing their reactions to the provisions of the constitution. 
A large number of responses were received, and the subcommit­
tee and the ICCAP held several meetings during the months 
preceding the October 1977 congress. A final report and consti­
tution were drafted, agendas were prepared, and all the neces­
sary arrangements were made to launch the IFAC at the congress. 
Agreement was reached to nominate Dr. Goerdeler as president 
and Mr. Cowperthwaite as deputy president of the new federa­
tion. It was also agreed that the secretariat would be located in 
New York, that the AICPA would provide office facilities at no 
cost to the IFAC, and that Robert Sempier would be employed 
as the executive director.
The final ICCAP report was mailed to the constituent bodies 
in March 1977. The heads of delegations to the congress approved
238 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
the report on the morning of October 7, and that afternoon a 
founding meeting of the IFAC constituent assembly was con­
vened to approve and sign the constitution.
The assembly then elected four countries to serve on the 
council along with the eleven countries designated in the consti­
tution. The fifteen countries that composed the initial council 
were Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, West Germany, France, 
India, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, 
the Philippines, the United Kingdom (and Ireland), and the 
United States.
The newly formed council held its first meeting on October 
8. Officers were elected, auditors were appointed, a budget was 
approved, standing committees were appointed, and Mr. Sempier 
was appointed executive director. The two elected vice presidents 
were Gabriel Mancera of Mexico and B. L. Kabra of India. The 
budget for the first year projected expenditures of $145,500.
The conclusion of the council meeting marked the culmination 
of five years of effort to establish a formal international organi­
zation. It had been a difficult struggle at times, but in the end 
there was broad support for the federation. A total of sixty-three 
bodies from fifty-one countries had signed the constitution.
The Relationship Between the IFAC and the IASC
The second meeting of the IFAC Council was held in May 1978, 
and on the agenda was the matter of how to implement the 
provision in the constitution whereby "the closest relationship 
should be maintained between IFAC and IASC." IASC Chairman 
Joseph Cummings addressed the meeting on May 3. He urged 
the appointment of a small joint committee to develop a plan for 
merger of the two bodies. He expressed the view that eventually 
the duplication of secretariat, funds, and membership should be 
resolved.
This immediately rekindled the United Kingdom suspicions 
that the Americans were determined to consolidate all interna­
tional activities into a single secretariat located in New York. Past 
wounds were reopened, and the ensuing negotiations continued 
into 1981.
At the IASC meeting in Perth, Australia, in June 1978, IFAC 
President Goerdeler discussed the subject of merger with repre­
sentatives of the two bodies. They agreed to hold an informal 
meeting in London on November 6 to explore the merger issue 
further.
The London meeting was attended by the president, deputy 
president, and executive director of the IFAC and the chairman 
and staff of the IASC. John Grenside, a past president of the 
English institute and a member of the IASC, also attended. The 
participants agreed that they should continue to act as a joint 
working group to examine the problems and benefits of merging 
by October 1982. It was also agreed that the AICPA representatives 
should be added to the working group and that the two staffs 
should jointly prepare a draft proposal for the next meeting.
During the next year the individuals serving on the IASC 
began to raise objections to a possible merger with the IFAC. 
They feared that such action would hinder them from bringing 
other interested parties into the standard-setting process. This 
was viewed by some as necessary to gain the recognition and 
support of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop­
ment, which were threatening to set their own accounting and 
financial reporting standards for multinational corporations.
The members of the joint working group expected these 
concerns to prove troublesome at its next meeting in June 1979. 
Early in the meeting, however, I proposed a series of parallel 
amendments to the constitutions of the two bodies that would 
effectively integrate them without disturbing the autonomy of 
the IASC in the setting of accounting standards. The proposal 
quickly won unanimous agreement, and the two staff heads were 
instructed to draft the necessary documents for presentation to 
the IASC and the IFAC Council. Agreement had been reached 
in less than two hours of discussions.
The euphoria was short-lived, however. After reviewing a 
joint draft, Mr. Chetkovich and I were troubled by the ambiguity 
created by the continuation of a separate IASC constitution. We 
believed that this strongly implied that the IASC was a separate 
body rather than a division of the IFAC. To correct this problem, 
we suggested an alternative approach consisting of the following 
documents: an agreement of integration to be signed by the
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members of both organizations, "Terms of Reference and Oper­
ating Procedures" to be appended to the agreement of integra­
tion, and an amended IFAC constitution. (The word integration 
had been substituted for merger in the discussions of the joint 
working group because it was believed to be less objectionable 
to opponents of a merger.)
The suggested alternative was adopted, and subsequent drafts 
were prepared in the form of a preamble, an integration agree­
ment, and amendments to the IFAC constitution. These were 
circulated to members of the joint working party, modified on 
the basis of comments received from them, and then incorporated 
in a report to the IASC and the IFAC Council.
Neither body found the report acceptable. IASC members 
had various objections to the proposed integration, and a major­
ity of the IFAC Council expressed dissatisfaction that the proposal 
did not provide for a forthright merger of the two bodies. In 
addition, at the urging of Washington SyCip of the Philippines, 
the council suggested that membership on the IASC board should 
be subject to rotation so that the nine founding countries would 
not have perpetual representation. Such a change would bring 
the IASC into harmony with the provisions of the IFAC consti­
tution.
The joint working group met to consider objections that had 
been raised. After extensive discussions, agreement was reached 
in principle on the changes to be made in the proposed integra­
tion documents. A revised draft was mailed to members of the 
IASC board and the IFAC Council on January 7, 1980. It was 
hoped that by June 1980 both groups would approve the report 
for distribution to their respective constituent bodies.
These plans did not materialize. The Consultative Committee 
of Accountancy Bodies of the United Kingdom issued a letter 
urging delay in integration until questions about certain financing 
procedures and outside representation on the IASC were re­
solved. This position was reiterated by the United Kingdom 
representatives at a meeting of the IFAC Planning Committee in 
Bermuda on February 17, 1980. At the same meeting the Neth­
erlands representatives expressed their opposition to the integra­
tion proposals. It came as no surprise, therefore, when the IASC 
board decided to defer further consideration of the proposed
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integration agreement pending exploration of whether outside 
parties could be brought into its activities.
The integration discussions resumed on May 14, 1980, at a 
meeting of the IFAC Council in London. IASC Chairman Hans 
Burggraaff reported on the action of his board and expressed the 
hope that a revised agreement could be reached by the spring of 
1981. Other informal discussions were also held, which revealed 
that the United Kingdom representatives were very upset with 
the provision that would permit but not require the rotation of 
all IASC members. They believed that the principal developed 
countries should be guaranteed membership on the standard- 
setting body.
During the succeeding months Mr. Cowperthwaite, who had 
succeeded Mr. Goerdeler as president of the IFAC, had informal 
meetings with representatives of the IASC in an effort to develop 
a revised agreement that would gain acceptance. Despite these 
efforts the IASC board indicated at a meeting in November that 
the rotation issue was still a stumbling block. Also, the IASC 
had received a legal opinion on the proposed integration agree­
ment and had been advised to recast the document in the form 
of mutual commitments. In the meantime the IFAC Council 
reconfirmed its desire to allow rotation of all IASC members. 
Once again it appeared that negotiations had reached an impasse.
On January 14, 1981, the joint working group met in Toronto 
to make yet another effort to achieve an acceptable proposal for 
integration. Time was running out; if action was not taken at the 
1982 congress, a delay until 1987 would likely result. The group 
agreed to recast the relationship between the IASC and the IFAC 
in the form of mutual commitments, as suggested by the IASC's 
legal counsel. This formally recognized that there were two 
separate bodies, which effectively negated any pretension that a 
merger would be consummated. Nevertheless, the IASC would 
make two concessions: Rotation of all members would be per­
mitted after 1987, and the IFAC Council would nominate the 
members to serve on the IASC board. All other features of the 
mutual commitments would be essentially the same as those 
included in prior drafts of an integration agreement.
In February 1981 the IFAC Planning Committee gave its 
approval to the compromise. An explanation of the revised
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proposals was sent to the IFAC Council and the IASC board, 
urging their approval. At the date of this writing it appears that 
both bodies will approve the proposals and that the terms will 
be ratified at the congress in Mexico City in October 1982. If this 
occurs, the existence of two separate bodies will be institution­
alized, but more substantive ties will be created.
It remains to be seen whether being a separate body will 
make the IASC more vulnerable to pressures to divorce it from 
any control by the accounting profession. If the American expe­
rience with the FASB is any guide, it can be expected that 
eventually the international accounting profession will be forced 
to surrender all controlling ties to the standard-setting body. It 
was precisely for this reason that the AICPA's representatives 
resisted a separate status for the IASC. The AICPA's represen­
tatives supported the participation of outside parties in standard 
setting but believed that the profession should retain control over 
the process as long as possible. We believed that a takeover by 
government seemed unlikely at the international level. We were 
more concerned that a body with separate status unnecessarily 
increased the chances that other interests would gain a controlling 
influence.
The setting of financial accounting and reporting standards 
internationally is perhaps less critical than on a national level 
since there is no effective means of enforcement across national 
borders. Nevertheless, uniform standards are being adopted by 
the Common Market countries, and the United Nations is ex­
pected to seek actions by member nations to adopt a common 
set of international standards. Further evolution can be expected 
as the national economies become increasingly interdependent. 
For all these reasons, the battle over the relationship between 
the IFAC and the IASC was not an academic exercise.
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Other International Activities
Throughout the 1970s the AICPA pursued other international 
activities more limited in scope. These included membership in 
two regional organizations, the Conference of Asian and Pacific 
Accountants (CAPA) and the Interamerican Accountants' Asso­
ciation (IAA). The activities of these bodies consisted principally
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of holding periodic conferences devoted to technical subjects. 
The AICPA also invited the presidents and executive directors 
of various institutes to attend its annual meetings as guests of 
the Institute. Reciprocal invitations were also extended to repre­
sentatives of the AICPA to attend similar meetings in other 
countries. As might be expected, the relationships with the 
Canadian and Mexican Institutes were especially close and cor­
dial. In addition, the AICPA's chairman and president periodi­
cally attended various meetings in England, Scotland, Ireland, 
France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Australia, and New 
Zealand.
These visits often entailed expensive and time-consuming 
travel, but they helped build understanding and cohesiveness. 
It will be in the best interests of the AICPA and its members to 
continue such a policy of active involvement in professional 
developments around the world. All signs point toward increas­
ing interdependence of business activities across international 
borders, and the profession must continue to adapt to these 
changing circumstances.
At the beginning of the 1980s much remains to be accomplished 
before the profession can become truly harmonized internation­
ally. Technical standards, entrance requirements, rights to prac­
tice, and ethical restraints are far too disparate among the well 
developed countries and are too poorly developed in others. The 
barriers of national sovereignty guarantee that achieving uniform­
ity will be a slow and painful process.
Nevertheless, a solid foundation for working toward this 
long-range goal was laid during the 1970s. It was a period of 
difficult negotiations and compromise. Out of the controversies 
emerged a keener understanding that the profession's interests 
will be better served by setting aside national pride. The estab­
lishment of the IFAC and the IASC were impressive accomplish­
ments, and it behooves the profession's future generations to 
build on this good beginning. The profession has an opportunity 
to set an example by transcending nationalism for the common 
good.
CHAPTER 13
Professional Education
Ev e r y  profession must take an interest in the content and quality of the education available to its future members, and 
the public accounting profession is no exception. During the 
1960s and 1970s it paid a great deal of attention to the preentry 
education of future CPAs.
The Beamer Report
As early as 1963 the AICPA, together with the Carnegie Corpo­
ration of New York, sponsored a commission to study the 
common body of knowledge for CPAs. The twelve-member 
commission, chaired by Elmer G. Beamer, a Cleveland partner 
of Haskins and Sells, served in an advisory capacity to the 
study's director, Robert H. Roy, dean of the Johns Hopkins 
University School of Engineering Science, and the associate 
director, James H. MacNeill, chairman of the department of 
accounting of the Fordham University School of Business Admin­
istration. The directors conducted three years of research and 
reported their findings in a 1967 publication, Horizons for a 
Profession.
The report contained recommendations for the common body 
of knowledge for beginning CPAs. These were grouped under 
the categories of accounting, the humanities, economics and 
behavioral science, law, mathematics, statistics, probability, and 
the functional fields of business. The report was well received, 
and it provided the foundation for most of the succeeding 
developments in accounting education.
To follow up this report, the AICPA appointed a committee
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on education and experience requirements for CPAs, which was 
also chaired by Elmer G. Beamer. On May 6, 1969, Mr. Beamer 
presented the committee's conclusions and recommendations to 
the Institute's Council and moved adoption of a ten-point policy 
statement on the education and experience requirements for 
entry to the CPA profession. The committee endorsed Horizons 
for a Profession as the authoritative guideline for the common 
body of knowledge for CPAs. It recommended that the education 
requirement to obtain this knowledge should be at least five 
years of college study, and state boards of accountancy should 
adopt this requirement by 1975. Candidates meeting the five- 
year education standard should not be required to meet an 
experience qualification. The committee also recommended that 
the accreditation of academic programs should be the responsi­
bility of the academic community.
During the Council debate a motion to retain a one-year 
experience requirement for CPA candidates was defeated by a 
vote of ninety to seventy-three. The Council then adopted what 
became known as the Beamer report, and the policies that it 
presented served as a reference point throughout the 1970s.
Enunciating policies was one thing, but persuading the state 
boards of accountancy and the profession's general membership 
to implement them proved far more difficult. Indeed, almost 
immediately after the Council adopted the Beamer report, an 
earlier standing committee on accounting education, composed 
of representatives of the American Accounting Association (AAA), 
the Institute, the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of 
Business (AACSB), and the National Association of State Boards 
of Accountancy (NASBA), was reactivated. The committee con­
cluded that coverage of the common body of knowledge should 
be emphasized rather than a five-year time period. It also pro­
posed that holders of master's degrees, with a concentration in 
accounting, from AACSB programs should be presumed to have 
acquired the body of knowledge. These recommendations were 
approved by the Institute Board of Directors on December 9, 
1971.
The state boards did not rush to adopt a five-year education 
requirement; by the end of 1980 only three states had complied, 
and even in these cases the effective dates were delayed. Equally 
unpopular to the membership rank and file was the elimination
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of a qualifying experience requirement to become a CPA. Many 
state societies actively opposed implementation of this policy by 
the state boards.
The Institute could not persuade the state groups to imple­
ment these two policies; and in regard to the third major policy 
issue, that the accreditation of academic programs should be 
solely the responsibility of the academic community, the Institute 
later reversed itself. Council decided that the AICPA should 
participate actively to promote the establishment of professional 
accounting education programs and schools.
Professional Schools of Accounting
By 1970 the practicing wing of the profession began to display a 
great deal of interest in accounting education. Horizons for a 
Profession and the Beamer report did much to stimulate this 
interest, but the most important factor was CPA firms' growing 
dissatisfaction with the preentry education that their new recruits 
had received. The firms were finding it necessary to conduct 
intensive training programs to teach new employees how to 
perform their beginning duties, a necessity that led many prac­
titioners to question how well the academic community was 
preparing students for entry into the profession.
This concern, along with the desire for enhanced recognition 
as a profession, revived earlier calls for professional schools of 
accounting similar to those that existed in the fields of law and 
medicine. Pressure for the establishment of professional schools 
led the AICPA Board of Directors to explore the appointment of 
a joint committee with the American Assembly of Collegiate 
Schools of Business, which was engaged in the accreditation of 
business schools, and the American Accounting Association. The 
committee would consider the feasibility of establishing profes­
sional schools of accountancy. When a major university began, 
in late 1971, to consider the establishment of a school of account­
ing, the board expressed its general support. The board also 
considered a staff paper recommending endorsement of the 
concept of professional accounting education programs.
The board deferred action on that recommendation pending 
receipt of a report of a joint AICPA and NASBA committee
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studying all aspects of professional recognition and regulation. 
The committee was known to be considering the desirability of 
professional schools of accounting.
When it reported its conclusions to the board on July 19, 
1973, the committee recommended the establishment of schools 
of professional accounting at qualified colleges and universities. 
It also proposed the appointment of a committee to develop 
standards and a program for such schools.
At that same board meeting, Guy W. Trump, vice president 
for education, reported that the AICPA Education Executive 
Committee had proposed adoption of a policy statement on 
schools of professional accounting. He explained that the com­
mittee's major concern was that colleges and universities offer 
strong professional programs in accounting and that the estab­
lishment of professional schools would be one way of achieving 
that objective.
The board decided that it was time to adopt a formal policy 
statement on the subject. Accordingly, it adopted a resolution 
that included the following paragraph:
The Institute strongly endorses any action which provides . . . 
strong professional programs. As one way, and perhaps the pref­
erable way of achieving an increased emphasis on the professional 
dimension of the discipline, the Institute endorses and encourages 
the establishment of schools of professional accounting at qualified 
and receptive colleges and universities.
The Board on Standards for Schools of 
Professional Accounting
The first move toward implementation of this policy was the 
appointment of a Board on Standards for Schools of Professional 
Accounting. The board, as its name implies, was to establish 
standards for the evaluation of accounting programs and to 
develop procedures for applying the standards to colleges and 
universities. The twelve board members were appointed by the 
AICPA Board of Directors from among candidates nominated by 
the presidents of the AAA, the AACSB, the NASBA, and the 
AICPA. Chairing the new board was Herbert Miller, a partner 
of Arthur Andersen and Company and widely known as a strong
proponent of schools of professional accounting since his earlier 
career as a prominent professor of accounting.
While the board was drafting proposed standards, the Insti­
tute received requests for funds from two major universities: one 
for a newly established professional school of accounting and 
the other for a doctoral program in accounting. The directors 
concluded that the Institute would not be able to meet such 
requests, since it was to be expected that many more of equal 
merit would follow. Even though the AICPA declined to provide 
financial assistance to establish professional schools and pro­
grams of accounting, it was hoped that the CPA firms would 
help fill this need.
The new board drafted proposed standards, which were 
exposed for comment in February 1976, and a final report, 
published in June 1977. The standards board did not construe 
professional status as being confined to the practice of public 
accounting. Rather, it treated the accounting profession as em­
bracing a variety of career paths, including employment in 
industry and government. This was a concession to the academics, 
who had significant interests in the preparation of large numbers 
of students for careers in accounting outside public practice.
Whether accounting education should differ for different 
career paths was a question of great importance. The standards 
board stated its belief that a single set of standards was 
equally relevant to all accounting career alternatives but left the 
determination to accounting organizations other than the AICPA. 
It was clear, however, that the standards board expected the 
professional programs and schools to serve a broadly defined 
profession and that all accounting organizations would participate 
in the accreditation process.
Understandably, many practitioners felt that professional sta­
tus should be confined to public practice and that professional 
education should be devoted solely to preparing students for 
such careers. This view was unrealistic, however, since the 
majority of accounting students did not choose careers in public 
practice. Nevertheless, in accepting the final report, the AICPA 
Board of Directors stated that it understood that the use of the 
term professional accounting education was not intended to define 
the term accounting profession.
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The AICPA Seeks Accreditation of Programs
When it approved the standards board's report for exposure, the 
AICPA Board of Directors also requested that a proposal for 
accreditation of programs and schools be prepared. Acting on 
this request, Messrs. Miller and Trump contacted the AAA and 
other interested organizations to determine whether they would 
join in the development of an agency to accredit programs of 
professional accounting. It was clear at that time that the AACSB, 
which accredited schools of business, was unwilling to establish 
an accreditation program for professional programs and schools 
of accounting.
When a status report was received on April 30, 1976, the 
board of directors affirmed its full support for the establishment 
of an appropriate accreditation process and expressed the hope 
that other organizations would join the Institute in bringing this 
about. The board was subsequently reminded, however, that 
official Council policy, dating back to the adoption of the Beamer 
report, was that the Institute should leave responsibility for 
accreditation to the academic community. To remove this obsta­
cle, the directors approved a resolution, to be proposed to 
Council, which contained the sentence, "Therefore be it resolved, 
that the AICPA should encourage the development of quality 
professional programs and schools of accounting and participate 
in their accreditation." The word participate was used because it 
was not contemplated that the Institute would carry out accred­
itation by itself.
The Council unanimously approved the resolution without 
debate on October 23, 1976.
Participation of the American 
Accounting Association
The AICPA board expected that the AAA would immediately 
agree to cosponsor the establishment of an accreditation agency, 
but this proved not to be the case. Before the final report of the 
AICPA's standards board was issued, the AAA Committee on 
Accounting Education prepared its own statement of standards 
and a comparative analysis of its standards and those of the 
AICPA. One significant difference was the AAA's suggestion to
accredit four-year and MBA programs with accounting concen­
trations, not as professional accounting programs but as prepa­
ration for beginning managers. The AICPA proposed accreditation 
of only those professional accounting programs requiring a min­
imum of five years to complete.
Because of this significant difference, the AAA Executive 
Committee passed a resolution on March 26, 1976, that failed to 
commit the AAA to joint sponsorship with the AICPA of a new 
accrediting agency but that authorized continuing exploration 
with the AICPA under two conditions. They were that standards 
would be set by the accrediting agency, if it were established, 
and that all interested accounting organizations would be repre­
sented on the accrediting agency. These conditions reflected 
many educators' objections to the AICPA's proposed standards 
and the concern that the AICPA seemed to lean toward profes­
sional programs for only those students entering the practice of 
public accounting.
A further indication of the AAA's concerns was the reactiva­
tion of its committee on accreditation, which was directed to 
study the possible consequences of accreditation and to recom­
mend a position regarding joint sponsorship with the AICPA of 
an accreditation agency.
Even though AAA President Wilton T. Anderson, head of 
the Oklahoma State University School of Accounting, was strongly 
in support of joint sponsorship of accreditation, the AICPA's 
representatives had many reasons to doubt whether the AAA 
would agree to such an arrangement. The new slate of AAA 
officers that would take office in August 1976 was less than 
enthusiastic about accreditation, and even the executive commit­
tee was divided in its views. Mr. Anderson expressed the view 
that AAA endorsement must be obtained by September 1 or, 
most likely, it would never be obtained.
In view of these dim prospects, Vice President Trump and I 
discussed the strategy to be followed by the Institute. We decided 
that the best way to get positive action was to announce that the 
AICPA was prepared to establish an accrediting agency on its 
own, with provision for participation by any other accounting 
organizations that expressed a desire to do so. Accordingly, we 
drafted an outline of a proposed structure for accrediting account­
ing education and presented it to the AICPA Board of Directors
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on April 30, 1976. We also reported to the board on the status of 
the negotiations and sought a decision on whether the AICPA 
should proceed by itself, if necessary.
The board affirmed its support for establishing an appropriate 
accrediting process and expressed the hope that other organiza­
tions would join in this effort.
These actions had the intended effect of spurring the AAA to 
a decision about joint sponsorship. In August 1976 the AAA 
Executive Committee authorized cosponsorship of an accrediting 
agency to be developed by a joint committee. In doing so, the 
AAA expressed its understanding that other interested account­
ing groups would participate, that the standards would be 
established by the accrediting agency, and that accreditation 
would not be confined to any one type of program.
Following this breakthrough a joint committee was appointed. 
Consisting of three representatives from each of the two organi­
zations, the new group became known as the committee of six. 
It was cochaired by Professor Sidney Davidson of the University 
of Chicago, representing the AAA, and Herbert Miller, repre­
senting the AICPA. Mr. Miller had chaired the AICPA Board on 
Standards for Schools of Professional Accounting.
Since the accreditation agency was to serve a broadly defined 
profession, representatives of the National Association of Ac­
countants, the Financial Executives Institute, and the Association 
of Government Accountants were invited to participate in the 
committee's meetings. These groups represented accountants 
employed in industry and government.
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Confusing Signals From the AACSB
Meanwhile, the message that the Institute was prepared to act 
alone, if necessary, had also received the attention of the AACSB, 
which previously had opposed the accreditation of programs for 
individual business disciplines, such as accounting. President 
William Flewellen and President Elect John Day met with the 
AICPA's representatives on May 13, 1976. The AACSB represen­
tatives indicated that the association wanted to become involved 
in the accreditation of accounting programs. President Flewellen 
indicated that the AICPA's proposed standards presented no
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insurmountable problems and that the AACSB could probably 
accommodate in some way the accreditation of accounting pro­
grams at non-AACSB-accredited schools.
This was indeed a major shift in attitude, and the AICPA's 
representatives were greatly encouraged, although somewhat 
skeptical. Their doubts later proved well founded.
On October 27 the AACSB officially responded to the stand­
ards proposed by the AICPA. In a nine-page letter, it opposed 
the autonomy of programs and schools of accounting and con­
cluded that the proposed separate accreditation was undesirable 
and unnecessary. The letter went on to express the view that 
accreditation "should not be a discipline externally imposed on 
educators." Nevertheless, it stated that the AACSB's board 
desired "to assist all interested groups in exploring further the 
special accreditation concerns of accounting educators and alter­
native solutions which may address those concerns." In a cov­
ering transmittal letter, President Flewellen provided a small ray 
of hope:
The most important message (and one the Board asked me to 
emphasize) concerns our sincere willingness to cooperate with you 
to effect solutions that will be responsive to the needs of accounting 
students, faculty and professionals while being cognizant of the 
needs of others on whom our actions will have a secondary or 
tertiary effect.
This was indeed a confusing message. The AACSB clearly 
rejected a joint effort with the AICPA but seemed willing to 
negotiate some sort of subordinate role for the Institute and 
others in arriving at alternatives to accreditation. Perhaps this 
reflected a difference in views between the AACSB's board and 
its president, who had been so conciliatory in the meeting five 
months earlier.
The AAA's new president, Professor Charles T. Horngren, 
urged the committee of six to explore a cooperative effort with 
the AACSB. Speaking on behalf of the AAA Executive Commit­
tee, he expressed the view that the AACSB might be more 
receptive than was indicated in its letter to the AICPA.
These were the circumstances under which the committee of 
six met for the first time on December 16, 1976. The committee 
members quickly agreed that an accrediting agency for account­
ing programs must be broadly representative of the interests of
major accounting organizations. They also agreed that the agency 
would establish the necessary standards and, in doing so, would 
consider the standards being developed separately by the AICPA, 
the AAA, and others. In response to the urging of AAA President 
Horngren, the committee also decided to carry on exploratory 
talks with the AACSB about implementation of a joint accredi­
tation program.
On January 20, 1977, the committee's cochairmen and Mr. 
Trump met with Deans Flewellen and Day and William Laidlaw, 
the executive vice president of the AACSB. By the end of the 
meeting it had been agreed that a cooperative approach to the 
accrediting of accounting programs should be pursued. The AAA 
and AICPA would jointly sponsor an accounting accrediting 
agency, which would set its own standards in consultation with 
the AACSB. Accreditation reviews of individual programs or 
schools would be carried out as joint efforts, under which the 
AACSB would apply its overall standards for business schools 
and the accounting accrediting agency would apply its standards 
for accounting programs and schools. The meeting ended with 
a promise by the AACSB's officers to advise the committee of six 
of the official AACSB position regarding the results of the 
informal discussion.
During the following months the committee of six met to 
review successive drafts of a proposed structure for an Account­
ing Accreditation Council (AAC) to be jointly established by the 
AAA and AICPA. The AAC would use AACSB administrative 
facilities, and the committee sought to tie the accreditation 
process as closely as possible to that of the AACSB. The council 
would employ an accounting educator full time to administer the 
accreditation program.
Beginning on September 1, 1977, the meetings were attended 
by representatives of the AACSB, the National Association of 
Accountants, the Financial Executives Institute, and the Associ­
ation of Government Accountants. The committee agreed that, 
if they elected to do so, the latter three organizations would 
participate in the AAC, and provision was made in the proposed 
organizational structure for them to appoint representatives to 
serve on the accrediting body. It was also agreed that the AACSB 
should be represented in an advisory capacity at all AAC meet­
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ings. A first draft of a working agreement between the A AC and 
the AACSB was distributed at the September 1 meeting.
The AACSB's Accreditation Program
From this point forward it became apparent that the AACSB 
meant to impose more and more requirements as conditions for 
its cooperation. First, its representatives proposed that the AAC 
administrator be located in the AACSB's offices in St. Louis, 
Missouri, and be treated as an AACSB employee. In addition, 
Dean Day hinted that the AACSB should have veto power over 
the standards adopted by the AAC. He then objected to the 
prospect of accrediting accounting programs of schools not ac­
credited by the AACSB. In short, it appeared that the AACSB 
intended to demand substantial control over the activities of the 
AAC.
Nevertheless, the dialogue between the committee of six and 
the AACSB's representatives continued on the assumption that 
a satisfactory arrangement would be worked out. As a result, 
the committee was taken by surprise when it was learned on 
March 1 5 , 1978, that the AACSB Standards Committee had earlier 
appointed a subcommittee to address the accreditation of ac­
counting programs. Included on the four-member committee, 
without the knowledge of the AICPA, was the chairman of the 
AICPA Education Executive Committee. The subcommittee rec­
ommended that both undergraduate and graduate accounting 
programs be accredited and that the AAA and AICPA be brought 
into the accreditation process.
The subcommittee's report was rewritten by the standards 
committee to provide that the accreditation of all accounting 
programs be within the purview of the AACSB. This included 
the setting of standards. The committee also deleted all reference 
to cooperation with the AAA and AICPA. The report did ac­
knowledge, however, that the AAC might participate in the 
development of the accounting accreditation process, and it 
recommended "the full participation of the accounting profes­
sion." The standards committee proposed that the subcommittee 
should be reconstituted as the accounting accreditation planning 
committee.
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On March 27 the committee of six received a copy of the 
report, Proposal to Promote Improved Quality in Accounting Programs 
Through AACSB Accreditation, and learned that it had been ap­
proved by the AACSB Operations Committee on March 16. Mr. 
Laidlaw invited suggestions from the committee of six regarding 
the makeup of the new planning committee and ways in which 
the AAC might work with the AACSB.
The AICPA's representatives on the committee of six were 
outraged by this development, which they regarded as an act of 
bad faith. The AACSB appeared to have negotiated with the 
committee of six simply to buy time to initiate its own accredi­
tation program. Clearly, the AACSB wanted to control all accred­
itation efforts and intended to take every step necessary to 
achieve that objective.
Despite their anger, AICPA officials and the committee of six 
took comfort from the fact that they had goaded the AACSB into 
initiating a program to accredit accounting programs. This would 
be a positive result if the AACSB's program were structured to 
suit the profession and provided for the profession's active 
participation.
With this objective in mind, the committee of six sent a letter 
to the AACSB Operations Committee. The letter, dated April 3, 
1978, recommended several changes in the AACSB's proposal. 
The accounting accreditation planning committee should include 
two accounting educators (nominated by the AAA), two account­
ants in public practice (nominated by the AICPA), two account­
ants from industry (one nominated by the Financial Executives 
Institute and the other by the National Association of Account­
ants), and two deans. The planning committee's successor, the 
accounting program accreditation committee, should have similar 
representation. Finally, the committee insisted that the standards 
should recognize the significant difference between undergrad­
uate and graduate programs. The letter stated that if these changes 
were adopted the committee of six would recommend that the 
AAA and AICPA cooperate fully in the implementation of the 
AACSB's program.
The AACSB Accreditation Council approved these proposals 
in principle, along with the overall report of the operations 
committee, on April 20, 1978. Following that action the council
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invited the AAA and AICPA to nominate representatives to serve 
on the new accounting accreditation planning committee.
The AAA, AICPA, and committee of six concluded that 
implementation of its own proposed Accounting Accreditation 
Council would be duplicative and unnecessary. They decided, 
therefore, to establish the AAC corporation but not to activate it 
unless the AACSB program proved unsatisfactory. This action 
ended the work of the committee of six.
The accounting accreditation planning committee issued an 
exposure draft, Proposed AACSB Standards for Accreditation of 
Accounting Programs, in October 1979. The proposed standards 
provided that three types of programs would be accredited: 
baccalaureate degree programs with an accounting concentration, 
MBA programs with an accounting concentration, and account­
ing programs leading to master's degrees. For convenience these 
became known as A-, B-, and C-type programs respectively.
An AICPA position regarding the proposed standards proved 
difficult to formulate. Many differing views existed. The educa­
tion executive committee opposed the standards because they 
failed to distinguish between the B- and C-type programs. It 
believed that the C-type should be designated as "professional" 
accounting programs. A member of the board of directors strongly 
opposed the accreditation of B-type programs, and Herbert Miller 
believed that A-type programs should not be accredited. After 
considerable debate, we agreed that the AICPA should refuse to 
support the proposed standards unless the C-type programs 
were distinguished as professional programs whose objective 
would be to prepare students for careers as professional account­
ants. It was believed that a professional designation was vital to 
motivate educational institutions to commit resources to the 
establishment of C-type programs. We also agreed that the 
AICPA should express the belief that there was no compelling 
need to accredit B-type programs, but this point would not be 
made a condition for the AICPA's support of the proposed 
standards. There was little chance that the AACSB would agree 
to drop accreditation of the B-type programs since MBA programs 
were so important to the association's constituency and since the 
AAA, NAA, and FEI did not support the Institute's position in 
this matter.
Thus, the AICPA decided to tolerate, if need be, the accredi­
tation of A- and B-type programs if the C-type programs were 
designated as professional accounting programs. Implicit in this 
decision was the virtual abandonment of an AICPA drive for the 
establishment of separate schools of professional accounting, 
which were strongly opposed within the AACSB.
Given the difficulties that the AICPA would encounter in 
attempting to establish its own accreditation program, even this 
relatively cooperative position was viewed by some members as 
too harsh. They believed that the AICPA should support the 
standards even if the Institute's objections to them were not 
accommodated. Chairman Gregory and I believed, however, that 
reserving the option to pursue other alternatives if necessary was 
the best way to persuade the AACSB to accede to the AICPA's 
requests. We felt certain that the AACSB officials were anxious 
to have the Institute's support before proceeding with an accred­
itation program.
The Institute's official position was conveyed to the accounting 
accreditation planning committee, and Lawrence S. Dunham (the 
chairman of the education executive committee), William Gregory, 
and I represented the AICPA at a public hearing on February 15,
1980. At the hearing we made it clear that the AICPA would 
withdraw its support if the committee did not accede to our major 
objection. Even though the alternatives were not spelled out, 
most interested parties were aware that the AICPA might decide 
to activate the Accounting Accreditation Council.
If the AAA chose not to support such an effort, the Institute 
might enlist the cosponsorship of a newly formed group, the 
Federation of Schools of Accounting, which had been established 
at an October 1976 meeting attended by accounting faculty 
members from a number of schools with existing or proposed 
professional accounting programs. Following the initial meeting 
twenty-one schools joined together to form a federation to foster 
support for programs and schools of professional accounting. 
Although it disclaimed any intentions of engaging in accredita­
tion, the membership requirements under the organization's 
bylaws seemed to amount to de facto accreditation standards. 
The Federation of Schools of Accounting sought and obtained 
financial support from the large CPA firms, and by 1978 it had 
become a functioning organization. Some of its representatives
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made no secret of their interest in joining with the AICPA to 
mount an accreditation program. While this was of some interest 
to the Institute as a fall-back possibility, the federation seemed 
too new and untested to warrant top priority for this alternative. 
Nevertheless, the prospect was sufficient to convince the AACSB 
representatives that the Institute's vow to pursue other alterna­
tives, if necessary, had substance.
Following the AACSB's public hearing, the accounting ac­
creditation planning committee modified its proposed standards 
to accommodate the AICPA's proposal: that C-type programs be 
distinguished as professional accounting programs. On March 9 
Mr. Dunham and I agreed to the changes.
At the March 9 meeting Mr. Laidlaw indicated that the AACSB 
would seek financial support from the AICPA for the accredita­
tion program. While making no commitment, I expressed the 
belief that the AICPA would be willing to assume a reasonable 
share of the start-up costs, since it had been prepared to fund 
its own program through the proposed AAC.
On April 24 the AACSB Operations Committee approved the 
revised standards, and similar action was taken by the AACSB 
Accreditation Council on June 13. The stage was now set for 
accreditation of the three types of programs.
In December 1980 the AICPA Board of Directors Considered 
the AACSB's formal request for supporting funds of $50,000 
annually for three years. Some board members objected to 
provision of the funds without certain assurances from the 
AACSB. As a result, approval of the request was deferred, 
pending a discussion with the AACSB regarding the conditions 
under which the funds would be provided. On February 16,
1981, the AACSB and the AICPA agreed on the desired assur­
ances. When the results were reported to the board, however, 
several members again objected because they believed that the 
program would set back progress in accounting education for 
many years to come. Once again the board deferred a decision. 
Finally, on May 8, 1981, the board agreed to provide funds to be 
used solely to defray expenses in connection with the accredita­
tion of C-type programs.
In reaching this decision, several members of the board 
refused to support the policy decision that had been adopted by 
the AICPA in January 1980 in testifying at the AACSB's public
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hearing. Some were holdouts for accreditation of only C-type 
programs, and others objected to the accreditation of B-type 
programs. Their preferences would have required overturning 
the AICPA's official support of the AACSB's program even 
though they offered no alternative that appeared to have any 
prospects for success. As a practical matter it would be exceed­
ingly difficult for the AICPA to mount its own accreditation 
program in the face of opposition by the AACSB and without 
the support of the AAA. Apparently, the dissenters believed 
that the AICPA's influence was sufficiently strong to persuade 
the AACSB to accede to all the preferences of the Institute. This 
hardly seemed to be a realistic appraisal of the situation.
A Summary of the Decade
In the end, the AICPA did not gain all that it would have liked. 
Separate schools of professional accounting are not likely to 
proliferate at a rapid rate, given the alternative of accreditation 
of professional programs. The Institute's objectives were further 
diluted by the intent to accredit undergraduate programs and 
MBA programs with concentrations in accounting.
The concept of separate schools designed exclusively to pre­
pare candidates for careers in public practice continues to be 
viewed as preferable by many practicing CPAs. Realistically, 
however, such an objective is not likely to be achieved. Account­
ing educators must recognize the fact that more than half of all 
graduating students do not go into public practice. As a result, 
their interests are directed toward preparing students for account­
ing careers in industry and government as well as public practice. 
Deans of business schools also resist the establishment of sepa­
rate schools of accounting because accounting is basic to the 
business school curriculum. Without the enthusiastic support of 
educators, the profession cannot hope to attain its goal of separate 
schools to prepare candidates for public practice.
Therefore, the AICPA adopted a more flexible approach, 
accepting either schools or programs of professional accounting 
designed to serve industry and government as well as public 
practice. Whether the same programs can serve equally well the 
needs of different career paths in accounting is debatable, but
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the existing political climate makes this issue largely moot. In 
any event, the curriculums within single programs are likely to 
be sufficiently flexible to accommodate most of the special inter­
ests that apply to a particular career path.
Perhaps the greatest achievement resulting from the effort to 
improve accounting education was the adoption of standards 
that recognize the need for faculty with practical experience in 
accounting and that give accounting faculty a stronger voice on 
such matters as curriculum and allocation of resources. These 
standards, coupled with a program of accreditation, should go a 
substantial way toward meeting some of the criticisms that have 
been levelled at the quality of accounting education.
What they will not do is give the practicing profession the 
prestige that separate schools would provide. Professional pres­
tige will have to be won in other ways.
CHAPTER 14
Other Matters
Du r i n g  the 1970s there were many other developments worthy of mention. Although they were not necessarily interrelated, 
in many instances they had a bearing on the events discussed in 
the preceding chapters. The order in which these matters are 
discussed below does not indicate any attempt to assess their 
relative importance.
Changes in Staff Officers
After thirty-two years of outstanding leadership and service to 
the profession, John L. Carey retired in 1968 as the Institute's 
administrative vice president and secretary. To help fill the void, 
Leonard M. Savoie, a top technical partner of Price Waterhouse, 
had been hired in 1967 as executive vice president. A year later, 
when Mr. Carey retired, John Lawler, a long-time top staff 
member, was named administrative vice president and secretary. 
Under the new arrangement, Mr. Lawler devoted most of his 
attention to administrative matters, while Mr. Savoie, as chief of 
staff, mostly handled professional and technical matters. Mr. 
Savoie was particularly involved in the operations of the Account­
ing Principles Board and the setting of accounting standards.
After Mr. Savoie announced that he would leave the AICPA 
at the expiration of his contract in June 1972, I was asked to 
succeed him as chief staff officer with the understanding that the 
Council and membership would be urged to change the position's 
title to "president" and the title of the elected head of the AICPA 
to "chairman of the board of directors" (consistent with the 
recommendations of a prior committee on structure). At that
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time I was head of Alexander Grant and Company. I had been 
active in the Institute's affairs as chairman of the professional 
ethics committee and a subcommittee to develop a restated code 
of professional ethics and as a member of other committees. I 
had also served as a member of the Wheat committee, whose 
recommendations led to the establishment of the Financial Ac­
counting Standards Board. Attracted by the challenge of serving 
as head of the Institute's staff at a time when extensive changes 
in the profession seemed likely, I agreed to a five-year employ­
ment contract that began in September 1972.
Prior to my appointment three staff vice presidencies had 
been created. Guy W. Trump had become vice president for 
education; Gilbert Simonetti, Jr., was vice president for govern­
ment relations, and William C. Bruschi was technical vice presi­
dent. Mr. Trump continued to serve in his new capacity until ill 
health forced his retirement in 1977. Mr. Simonetti left the 
Institute for Price Waterhouse and Company in 1976 and was 
succeeded by Theodore A. Barreaux. Mr. Bruschi, whose respon­
sibilities have changed over the years, now serves as vice presi­
dent for review and regulation.
At the time I joined the Institute's staff, legal matters, partic­
ularly the filing of amicus curiae briefs, were assuming consid­
erable importance in the AICPA's activities. As a result, Donald 
J. Schneeman, a lawyer and director of the professional ethics 
division, was promoted to the position of general counsel and 
given responsibility for all legal matters. In 1976, when Mr. Lawler 
retired at age sixty after twenty-six years of distinguished service, 
Mr. Schneeman replaced him as AICPA secretary while retaining 
his other position.
The outstanding contribution of Mr. Lawler, who had long 
wanted to devote time to his first love, writing, was recognized 
when he received the Institute's highest award, the gold medal 
for distinguished service.
Other changes occurred over the years. Donovan Roberts, a 
former partner of Alexander Grant and Company, joined the 
staff in April 1977 as vice president for communications and 
education. Donald Adams was promoted from managing director 
of administrative services to vice president for administrative 
services. At that time he assumed the responsibilities of George 
Taylor, who for many years had served as controller in admin­
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istering the Institute's financial and accounting affairs. Douglas 
Carmichael was promoted to vice president for auditing when 
the auditing standards executive committee was restructured in
1978 as the Auditing Standards Board. Thomas Kelley was 
promoted in 1980 to technical vice president, responsible for all 
technical divisions other than auditing. Lastly, Rex Cruse was 
promoted to managing director of the continuing professional 
education division after many years of service on the staff in a 
variety of important capacities.
In 1977 I agreed to continue as chief staff officer, but I 
requested that my service be on a year-to-year basis. I did not 
want to stay in the position for another five years and hoped 
that circumstances in Washington and in the profession would 
permit my retirement by the end of the 1970s. By the spring of
1979 the pressure from Washington had abated sufficiently to 
allow a change in the presidency, and accordingly I notified 
Chairman Joseph Cummings of my desire to leave the Institute.
By May 1980 Philip Chenok, a top partner of Main, Hurdman 
and Company and a past chairman of the auditing standards 
executive committee, had been chosen by the AICPA Board of 
Directors and elected by the Council to become president effective 
July 1, 1980.
When I retired in 1980 the top staff officers reporting to the 
president were Messrs. Adams, Barreaux, Bruschi, Carmichael, 
Cruse, Kelley, Roberts, and Schneeman. They were an able 
group of individuals, and the profession was fortunate to have 
them working in its behalf.
Financial Matters
During the decade membership dues were increased twice, once 
in 1971 and again in 1975. For the remainder of the 1970s revenues 
exceeded expenses by a substantial margin in spite of back 
assessments of income taxes on the Journal of Accountancy adver­
tising revenue, which was deemed "unrelated business income."
Provisions were also made for potential tax liabilities when 
the Internal Revenue Service asserted that part-time graders of 
the Uniform CPA Examination were employees rather than 
independent contractors. These provisions were restored to in­
come when Congress forestalled any such assessments before a 
specified date, after which a more explicit definition of an 
"employee" would apply.
By 1969 the Institute had begun to outgrow its space at 666 
Fifth Avenue, and a study was initiated to consider the possible 
relocation of the headquarters. It was not until 1972, when the 
crowded office space was becoming highly inefficient, that a 
possible move was given high priority.
After careful consideration of locating in other cities or in the 
suburbs of New York City, it was decided that remaining in 
mid Manhattan was the best alternative. Although the lease on 
the Fifth Avenue space had several years to run, we concluded 
that an early move would eventually result in a substantial 
savings in rental expense. This was because at that point Man­
hattan had an excess of office space, and very favorable rentals 
were available on new premises. In November 1974 the Institute 
moved to new office space at 1211 Avenue of the Americas in 
the Celanese Building of Rockefeller Center.
Some board members were skeptical of the projections and 
opposed moving before the expiration of the old lease. However, 
a majority supported the early move—a decision that proved to 
be correct when financial projections were borne out and the 
operations of the Institute were made substantially more efficient. 
The new offices readily accommodated the Institute's increasing 
activities by providing adequate space for numerous committee 
meetings to take place at Institute headquarters and alleviated 
overcrowded working conditions.
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Bylaw Amendments
In February 1972 an ad hoc committee was appointed to make a 
comprehensive review of the bylaws. The committee reported its 
recommendations to the board on November 30, 1972, and the 
proposed changes were exposed for comment.
Based upon comments received and subsequent study, the 
board modified the proposed changes. It eliminated a proposal 
to authorize the Council to create a class of associate members. 
The membership requirements were retained in the bylaws, 
which could be changed only by a vote of the membership. The
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board also restored a provision for the annual election of three 
vice presidents in lieu of the proposal to substitute three board 
members who would serve for three-year terms. Finally, the 
board inserted proposals to change the fiscal year to one begin­
ning August 1 and to require a ninety-day delay period after 
approval by the Council before proposed changes in the bylaws 
and rules of conduct could be submitted to a vote of the 
membership.
In general, the proposed changes were designed to enable 
the Institute to act more swiftly by assigning increased authority 
to the Council and board. Also included in the proposals was a 
change in the titles of the chief staff officer and the elected head 
of the Institute to president and chairman of the board.
The modified proposals were considered by the Council on 
May 7, 1973. After several minor amendments in wording, the 
Council approved the proposed changes and authorized their 
submission to the members for a mail ballot. The proposals were 
approved by the membership.
The next change in the bylaws came about at the recommen­
dation of a committee of members in industry and government. 
The proposed change would permit members not in public 
practice to serve as Institute officers and members of the Trial 
Board. This proposal was approved by the Council on May 3, 
1976, and subsequently adopted by a vote of the membership.
The door was thereby opened to the possible election of a 
nonpractitioner as chairman of the Institute. This has become 
commonplace in Canada and England, but it has not yet hap­
pened in the AICPA. It seems inevitable, however, that a non­
practitioner will be elected to the highest office since almost half 
of the Institute's members are employed in industry or govern­
ment and that ratio is growing.
Another bylaw amendment became necessary on September 
17, 1977, when the Council approved the proposed addition of 
three public representatives to the AICPA Board of Directors. 
The proposal was approved by a vote of the membership, and 
the three new members were elected by the Council on October 
21, 1978: Barbara Hackman Franklin, former commissioner on 
the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission; Thomas C. 
Pryor, partner of the investment banking firm, White, Weld and 
Company, who had previously served on the Wheat committee;
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and John C. Sawhill, president of New York University. Mr. 
Sawhill was succeeded in 1979 by A. A. Sommer, Jr., a prominent 
securities lawyer and former commissioner of the SEC, when 
Mr. Sawhill accepted appointment as deputy secretary of the 
newly established U.S. Department of Energy.
As the decade came to a close, proposals to amend the bylaws 
were contained in a petition signed by nearly 1400 members, 
many of whom objected to the establishment of the division for 
CPA firms. They were designed primarily to allow 500 members 
to require a mail ballot of the membership on proposed changes 
in the bylaws and rules of conduct without the approval of the 
board or the Council. In addition they would eliminate life 
membership on the Council for past elected presidents and 
chairmen and would change the manner in which the Institute's 
nominating committee was elected.
Although the petitioners' proposals were not approved by 
the board or Council, they did lead to other proposed bylaw 
amendments, which were approved by a vote of the membership 
in 1981. Those amendments increased from 200 members to 5 
percent of the membership the number required to call a special 
meeting of the AICPA. They also provided that 5 percent of the 
membership could require a membership vote on proposed 
changes in the bylaws or rules of conduct without the approval 
of the board or the Council. Other clarifying and administrative 
amendments of lesser importance were also included in the 
package adopted by the members.
Meetings
During the 1970s the number, type, and format of meetings 
sponsored by the Institute changed considerably to meet the 
needs of a rapidly growing profession. One of the early changes 
began when a committee was appointed in July 1971 to reexamine 
the objectives and format of the annual meeting of the member­
ship. The committee, chaired by Wilbur H. Stevens, a partner of 
Elmer Fox and Company, recommended that the technical divi­
sions hold regular meetings in conjunction with the annual 
meeting to encourage the attendance of more members.
Although this recommendation proved impracticable and was
MEETINGS 269
not implemented, it led to the evolution of a new format for the 
annual meeting that included simultaneous technical sessions 
conducted by the various divisions of the Institute. Interspersed 
were three plenary sessions at which nationally known figures 
spoke on broad issues outside the field of accounting. These 
sessions were combined with the annual corporate meeting in a 
two-day gathering, a reduction from the prior three-day format. 
The new format was well received by the members attending the 
annual meetings, and it was continued in subsequent years.
Another innovation satisfied the committee's desire to ac­
quaint more members with the functions of the technical divi­
sions. The Institute initiated a series of national technical 
conferences, which any member could attend upon payment of 
a registration fee. Over a period of time the following annual 
conferences were introduced: SEC developments and practice, 
management advisory services, federal taxation, practice in in­
dustry and government, management of an accounting practice, 
audits of federally assisted programs, and computer develop­
ments and applications.
A number of other national conferences were held periodically 
to coordinate activities between the state societies of CPAs and 
the Institute in such areas as professional ethics, state legislation, 
continuing professional education, and public relations. Also, a 
national conference on accounting and auditing was held in 1980 
on a trial basis to determine whether there was sufficient interest 
to warrant continuing it on an annual basis.
All of these national meetings served a useful purpose in 
helping practitioners keep up to date on new developments and 
in involving a larger number of members in the profession's 
affairs. They contributed to a more informed membership and a 
greater spirit of unity.
Another important innovation, which began in December 
1975, was the holding of regional meetings of Council members 
to brief them on rapidly evolving developments and to seek their 
views on current issues. The meetings proved to be extremely 
effective in expediting action at the full Council meetings; the 
Council members arrived with a common understanding of the 
major issues and the available options. Also, Council members 
felt a greater sense of involvement in the decision-making proc­
ess. There is little doubt that these regional meetings played an
important part in enabling the AICPA to respond effectively to 
the challenges that arose during the latter 1970s.
Other types of meetings were initiated for various purposes. 
The chairmen of the senior executive committees assembled 
periodically to sort out responsibilities for projects that affected 
the jurisdictions of two or more divisions. Regional meetings of 
practitioners in local firms were held annually to solicit their 
views on various current issues and to inform them about the 
Institute's activities and services. Also, periodic meetings of 
members were organized through the state societies to discuss 
current developments in the profession. These member discus­
sion forums proved invaluable for exploring members' views on 
new programs being considered by the AICPA. In addition, on 
one occasion representatives of twelve of the principal associa­
tions of CPA firms were assembled to explore how the AICPA 
could assist them in carrying out their mission.
In another development, in 1977 certain meetings were opened 
to attendance and observation by the public. This change origi­
nated when some of the state society executive directors re­
quested permission to attend Council meetings. It was also 
stimulated by criticisms of the manner in which accounting and 
auditing standards were being established. The sessions that 
now operate "in the sunshine" are meetings of the Council, 
those portions of senior technical committee meetings that relate 
to the public interest, and certain portions of the meetings of the 
federal government relations executive committee and the Board 
of Examiners. Predictably, attendance at open meetings by non­
members and members alike was very sparse. Of greatest interest 
were the meetings of Council, which in the following years 
regularly drew a sizable gallery of observers, consisting mostly 
of AICPA members.
A matter worth mentioning was a controversy over selection 
of sites for Institute committee meetings. Many committee mem­
bers favored meeting in resort areas and other locations that 
provided the opportunity to combine business with recreation 
and short vacations. The advantages of this arrangement in­
cluded the income tax deductibility of travel costs incurred for 
the business portions of the meetings. On the other hand, the 
managing partners of many CPA firms objected to having their 
partners absent on AICPA affairs longer than necessary, and the
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officers of the Institute were concerned about the additional costs 
and lost staff time incurred by holding committee meetings at 
distant locations with poor accessibility.
To deal with this conflict in viewpoints, the AICPA Board of 
Directors instructed the president to implement a policy on 
meeting sites effective February 22, 1973, which did not rule out 
resort area sites but required a minimum of travel for a majority 
of the committee and its staff and ready accessibility from airports 
by public transportation.
Enforcement of the stricter policy raised a wave of protest. 
The most vocal was the committee on management of an ac­
counting practice, whose chairman argued before the board of 
directors that since members donate their time to committee 
service they should be permitted to meet at any site they choose. 
The board was unsympathetic and reaffirmed its policy.
The issue was aired in a debate on the final day of a three- 
day meeting, May 5, 1976, when nearly half the members of 
Council were not present. By a vote of seventy-five to fifty-six, 
Council affirmed the board's policy but adopted an amending 
resolution empowering each committee to interpret the policy by 
a two-thirds vote. The more liberalized arrangement formed the 
basis of an uneasy truce that is likely to be disturbed each time 
a committee violates the spirit of the board's policy.
Publications
Before his departure from the Institute staff, Leonard Savoie 
urged that a new weekly newsletter be published, which would 
report all the new technical developments. This proposal was 
approved by the board in February 1972 but was not implemented 
until many months later. By that time budgetary considerations 
resulted in a reexamination of both the existing general newslet­
ter, The CPA, and the proposal for a technical newsletter. After 
further study it was concluded that some portions of the general 
newsletter could be transferred to the Journal of Accountancy and 
that the balance could be combined with technical news in a new 
biweekly letter. The result was the elimination of The CPA and 
the birth of the CPA Letter.
The Journal of Accountancy was modified in several stages
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during the 1970s to make it a better magazine. The covers were 
made more attractive; more articles by practitioners were in­
cluded to improve the balance between the practical and the 
theoretical; a new "Official Releases" section was added to 
provide official texts of technical pronouncements, and the "Prac­
titioner's Forum" was enlarged to include more practical infor­
mation for practitioners in smaller firms. These changes were 
begun when William Doherty was the editor and were continued 
by his successor, Lee Berton.
Another innovation was the start of two separate looseleaf 
services, which were printed under a contractual arrangement 
with Commerce Clearing House. A Professional Standards service 
gathered in one place for the first time all of the profession's 
standards, including technical pronouncements, and the AICPA 
Code of Professional Ethics and Bylaws. The second service, 
Technical Practice Aids, was designed to provide practitioners with 
practical examples, checklists, commentaries, opinions of the 
AICPA Technical Information Division, an audit manual, and 
other nonauthoritative practice aids developed by the Institute's 
staff. These services, and the paperback editions that were a 
byproduct, proved to be very popular and resulted in substantial 
increases in the Institute's revenues.
Two other new periodicals were a newsletter that CPA firms 
could send to their clients and a special newsletter, the CPA 
Practitioner, designed to meet the needs of practitioners in 
smaller firms. The large firms were all publishing their own client 
newsletters, but the smaller firms found it difficult to compete 
because of the costs involved. To assist medium-sized and small 
firms and to avoid duplication of costs, the AICPA decided to 
produce a newsletter, which could be sent by firms to their 
clients under their own firm names, within certain ethical limi­
tations. The new service proved to be highly popular, and at last 
count subscribing firms were receiving hundreds of thousands 
of copies for distribution.
The CPA Practitioner was started in 1977, largely as a result of 
suggestions received from members attending local firm seminars 
and the urging of advisory committee A, which represented the 
interests of members in smaller CPA firms. They felt that the 
Institute's other periodicals were largely oriented toward large- 
firm practice and were not meeting the needs of smaller firms.
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As a result, the board authorized a new periodical in newsletter 
format to be sent gratis to all members in smaller firms and to 
other members upon request. The new publication, which was 
designed to provide practical technical and practice management 
information for smaller firms, was well received and became a 
permanent member of the AICPA's group of periodicals.
Meeting the disparate and often conflicting wishes of thou­
sands of members is a difficult task, and the AICPA's publications 
will continue to evolve to meet new needs as they become 
apparent.
Committees
The backbone of the AICPA's activities is the work of the many 
committees of members that deal with every aspect of the 
profession's affairs. During the decade the AICPA took several 
actions to improve the effectiveness of its committees.
As a beginner on the Institute's staff in 1972, I was often 
confused by the lack of standard terminology used in describing 
various committees. To correct this problem, we developed a 
uniform set of terms, which defined the designations of boards, 
executive committees, committees, subcommittees, task forces, 
and special committees. Over a period of two years the titles and 
structures of the existing committees were modified to fit the 
standard terminology. This action greatly facilitated the appoint­
ment and administration of committees, matters that are so 
important to the success of the AICPA's programs.
The new terminology and a functional index of committees 
was included in the annual Committee Handbook, published in all 
the years through 1980.
To improve the selection of prospective committee members, 
the AICPA developed a computer data bank containing the 
names of all members who had indicated an interest during the 
past three years in serving on an AICPA committee. State society 
officers, directors, and committee chairmen were contacted to 
determine whether they wished to be included in the data bank. 
By computerizing the lists of candidates and their qualifications, 
the Institute achieved more complete information and broadened 
the number of members considered for committee service.
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These changes caused some state society executive directors 
to complain because they mistakenly thought they would no 
longer be consulted about candidates from their respective states. 
The issue was clarified, and they were encouraged to continue 
to submit lists of candidates, whose names would be included 
in the data bank.
Although committee appointments are made as fairly as 
possible, many members feel discriminated against if they are 
not appointed. Unfortunately, explanations of the selection proc­
ess and periodic reviews by groups of members have done little 
to allay these suspicions. Since only about sixteen hundred 
committee memberships are involved (less than 1 percent of the 
total AICPA membership) there are bound to be many members 
who are disappointed each year when they are not appointed 
for service on a committee. To make matters worse, a 1966 
congressional staff study alleged that the large firms controlled 
the Institute and its committees. It was true that in a number of 
instances a majority of committee members came from the larger 
firms, but they did not enjoy voting control. Their substantial 
representation was not caused by a conspiracy in the appoint­
ment process but was a natural result of the dearth of candidates 
from smaller firms willing to devote time to Institute activities.
Even though the criticism was believed to be unfair, in 1977 
the incoming AICPA chairman, Stanley Scott, decided to limit 
the number of representatives from the eight largest firms to five 
on each of the senior committees. This action, which was ap­
proved by the AICPA Board of Directors, was intended to satisfy 
both Congress and local practitioners. The large firms grudgingly 
accepted this decision, even though they viewed it as a form of 
discrimination that would damage the Institute's ability to deal 
effectively with the profession's needs. No doubt it did weaken 
some of the major committees for a time, but it also provided a 
more balanced representation.
Minority Group Members
When Ralph E. Kent served as AICPA president in 1968 and 
1969, he began an effort to bring minority group members into 
the profession. He appointed a committee to develop recommen­
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dations on how to achieve this objective. The committee reported 
to the Council in May 1969, and a resolution was adopted urging 
a special program to aid members of disadvantaged groups to 
major in accounting and to pursue careers in accounting in order 
to integrate the profession "in fact as well as in ideal." Following 
this action, the board authorized the solicitation of contributions 
to the AICPA Foundation to provide financial aid to students 
from disadvantaged groups majoring in accounting.
The program, as administered by the committee, raised sub­
stantial sums, which were used both to provide student schol­
arships and to aid in the development of accounting faculty from 
among the disadvantaged groups. Over $2.5 million was raised 
for these purposes from 1969 through 1980. Starting in 1976, the 
Council approved annual contributions of $200,000 from the 
Institute's general funds to provide a continuing source of sup­
port.
The program helped bring an increasing number of disadvan­
taged students into the profession. The larger CPA firms were 
especially supportive by contributing funds and by employing 
the students upon graduation. Nevertheless, much remains to 
be accomplished, and the ultimate test will be how well the 
minority group members progress in the ranks of the CPA firms.
Public Issues
The profession began to involve itself further in public issues 
during Ivan Bull's term as chairman of the Institute. He had 
become very active in efforts to reduce the burden of govern­
mental paperwork requirements on business, and he believed 
that the profession should take a public stand on this and other 
issues. As a consequence, an Institute committee on public 
service was appointed to consider ways to speak out in behalf of 
the profession.
The committee concluded that the Institute should prepare 
and publish white papers on national issues. The committee 
prepared pilot drafts on several subjects and submitted them to 
the board for consideration. The board agreed with the idea of 
publishing position papers but was not favorably impressed with 
any of the drafts presented to it. There was considerable reluc­
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tance to have the AICPA express opinions about any matters 
that were not squarely within the normal expertise of CPAs.
Revised drafts were subsequently prepared by the committee 
with much the same result. Finding an approach that would win 
general approval proved to be very difficult, and an acceptable 
formula was not found. Nonetheless, the board continued to 
believe that the profession has a useful role to play in public 
affairs and would benefit by becoming known as a responsible 
group with broad-gauged interests that go beyond the fields of 
auditing and taxation.
A directly related matter involved the efforts of an organiza­
tion known as Accountants for the Public Interest (API) to enlist 
the official blessing and support of the AICPA. A group of CPAs 
in San Francisco had founded the organization to conduct finan­
cial studies in behalf of public interest groups that could not 
afford to engage CPA firms on a fee basis. Increasingly, younger 
CPAs were interested in engaging in public service activities to 
aid worthy causes, and the API offered such an opportunity. 
Parallel efforts were begun in several states, and a national 
umbrella organization was established.
The managements of CPA firms were ambivalent about how 
to deal with this development. On the one hand they contributed 
funds to support the organization and did not discourage their 
staff members from donating time to API projects. On the other 
hand, at least one firm found itself in the position of having the 
results of one of its consulting engagements critiqued by an API 
task force. There was also the question of whether the API was 
performing work that would otherwise have become fee engage­
ments for CPA firms. The potential for conflict clearly existed, 
although the API was careful to adopt policies to avoid such 
conflicts.
On several occasions during the decade the API sought the 
official endorsement of the AICPA, and on each occasion the 
board declined. Although the board approved of a public service 
role for the profession, it had to consider the possibility of 
conflict with the interests of CPA firms and the fear that the API 
might overstep appropriate boundaries.
The board's attitude toward the API once again illustrated the 
difficulty of involving the Institute in public service activities. 
There was no enthusiasm for going beyond the basic expertise
of CPAs in taking positions on public issues nor much support 
for taking positions that could conflict with the interests of CPA 
firms whose personnel are Institute members.
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Public Relations
The Institute works closely with the press to foster a better 
understanding of the profession. It issues a steady stream of 
press releases on newsworthy events, provides background in­
formation to financial writers and editors, and holds periodic 
briefing seminars for members of the press. These efforts did not 
completely forestall bad publicity or public criticism of the profes­
sion during the 1970s, but they did yield more balanced report­
ing.
One of the most frequently heard complaints about the AICPA 
over the years was that it failed to advertise the virtues of CPAs 
and their services. The state societies were particularly vocal on 
this subject, and some of them engaged in institutional advertis­
ing campaigns funded by special assessments of their members.
The Institute's officers and directors resisted the idea of 
engaging in a national advertising campaign on the grounds that 
it would be prohibitively expensive and ultimately ineffective. 
They believed that the promotion of CPA services was best left 
to practitioners and their firms, since the business community 
was unlikely to engage CPAs on the basis of general advertise­
ments describing their services.
Despite this attitude, a committee on public relations was 
appointed in 1976 to provide suggestions on how the Institute 
might promote an improved image for the profession. That 
committee recommended, among other things, that the AICPA 
place institutional advertisements in Time magazine once a month 
for three months to instill a sense of self-pride in the minds of 
CPAs. The committee thought that this would inspire CPAs to 
concentrate on public relations in their local communities.
On January 5, 1978, the board rejected this proposal and 
instead decided to engage a public relations consulting firm to 
evaluate the Institute's overall program of public relations activ­
ities. As a result, four of the leading public relations firms were
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interviewed, and Burson-Marsteller was engaged to conduct the 
survey.
Prior to this time, based upon discussions with state society 
representatives, I began to realize that what was missing was a 
well organized public relations program to be carried out at the 
local level with the assistance and oversight of the AICPA. The 
Institute had been supplying a variety of radio and television tax 
commercials and sample institutional advertisements to the state 
societies for many years; however, only a few of the societies 
were using these materials effectively, and most of them were 
expending little effort in the area of public relations. To fill the 
void, the Institute began a program to develop comprehensive 
campaign materials on individual themes and to have them 
implemented by the state societies. The Institute held a national 
conference on public relations with state society representatives 
to explain the program and to gain their support.
The results were impressive. Many of the state societies added 
members to their staffs to administer their public relations activ­
ities, and the volume of publicity about the profession throughout 
the country increased dramatically. Much of the credit belongs 
to Bradford Smith, director of the AICPA Public Relations Divi­
sion, and to his staff, which developed the materials and pro­
vided the impetus for their use.
This program was already in place when the Burson- 
Marsteller firm began its survey. This partially accounts for the 
following general conclusions, which were included in its Sep­
tember 1978 report:
AICPA's national public relations effort is professional and produc­
tive, reaching the important financial and federal legislative regu­
latory publics through major national publications.
The accounting profession is economically healthy and expand­
ing. There appears to be no real threat requiring an expanded 
national public relations effort.
Pressure from the states for more public relations help will 
continue to grow. Since state activities, with AICPA coordination, 
would provide the most cost effective public relations for the 
profession, AICPA should probably continue and upgrade its support 
of the states.
The report was most gratifying because it showed that the AICPA 
was on the right track. Indeed, the long-standing criticism by
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the state societies lessened, and a spirit of cooperation toward a 
common goal began to prevail.
Accountants' Liability Insurance
For several years the AICPA had been sponsoring a professional 
liability insurance program for CPA firms having up to fifty staff 
members. Late in 1973 the American Home Assurance Company, 
the program's underwriter, insisted on imposing several restric­
tive endorsements on the basic policy, which seemed unwar­
ranted to the legal liability committee. As a result, the Institute 
contacted other brokers and underwriters and began to sponsor 
a new program, which was administered by RBH/Reid and Carr 
and underwritten by Crum and Forster. The new coverage had 
several novel features and was significantly broader than the old 
coverage. State societies and CPA firms were urged to participate 
to provide the benefits of a national pooling of risk; however, 
some of the societies felt that the profession was better served 
by access to a number of alternative plans.
Much effort went into this program, and it attracted a sizeable 
portion of the market, despite competing plans sponsored by 
some of the state societies. In 1980 over 10,000 firms were 
participating in the AICPA plan. It represented a very valuable 
service to the profession, and both the guiding committee and 
Donald Schneeman, general counsel and secretary of the Insti­
tute, deserve credit for the program's success.
Prior to this program, the Institute actively considered the 
feasibility of establishing a captive insurance company to provide 
liability insurance to CPA firms. The idea was abandoned, 
however, on the basis of a preliminary analysis and advice 
received from an insurance consulting firm.
A Change in Law Firms
In May 1975 the Institute changed its outside legal counsel from 
Covington and Burling to Willkie, Farr and Gallagher. The 
Covington firm, based in Washington, D.C., had served the 
Institute well for many years, but beginning in 1973 the relation­
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ship began to sour. The heads of two CPA firms complained that 
the law firm was accepting engagements that conflicted with the 
interests of the Institute and the profession. These complaints 
referred to the firm's representation of a CPA firm in a lawsuit 
in which the workpapers of another CPA firm were subpoenaed 
and to the firm's engagement as special counsel to the trustees 
of Penn Central.
In May 1973 the Institute's Board of Directors discussed these 
matters with the law firm's partner responsible for the account. 
The partner's explanation seemed to indicate that conflicts did 
not exist. Nevertheless, the board requested the firm to review 
its conflict policies, which were originally set forth in a letter to 
the Institute dated March 9, 1967. Under those policies the firm 
stated that it would disqualify itself from representing an existing 
or future client in asserting any claim against an accountant- 
defendant based upon an issue of professional practice. Pursuant 
to the board's request, a letter was provided in July 1973, which 
elaborated on the earlier letter but did not change its basic 
substance.
During the next couple of years the Institute's officers came 
to feel that the law firm was representing its own special interests 
more than those of the AICPA in meetings and negotiations with 
governmental agencies. This seemed to occur especially in the 
case of the SEC, and it was apparent that bad feelings existed 
between the firm's representatives and the SEC staff. The profes­
sion was having enough problems of its own with the SEC 
without complicating them with the possible adverse relationships 
of its legal representatives.
When the problems with the firm began to emerge in 1973, 
Mr. Schneeman and I met with a senior partner of the firm to 
discuss the Institute's concerns. The meeting was cordial, and 
vague promises were made to review the situation. However, by 
the spring of 1975 it was clear that the meeting was not going to 
produce the desired improvements, and the Institute decided to 
seek a new firm, even though we recognized that the inconven­
ience and expense of a learning period for new counsel would 
be incurred.
In searching for new legal counsel, we decided that the firm 
should be located in New York, have heavy experience and a 
high reputation in securities law practice, be willing to devote
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top partner attention to the Institute, and not be involved in 
extensive representation of CPA firms or plaintiffs bringing suits 
against CPAs. The firm of Willkie, Farr and Gallagher met all of 
these specifications, and it was engaged to replace the Covington 
firm. The new firm has since been invaluable in helping the 
AICPA deal with the greatly expanded volume of legal matters 
that confronted it in the latter half of the 1970s.
Information Retrieval
In 1970 the Institute began an assessment of the profession's 
information needs for the purpose of developing a computer- 
based information retrieval system. By February 1972 the survey 
had been completed, committees had been appointed, and rec­
ommendations were made to the board for a six-month pilot 
program. The program was to be mounted with Mead Data 
Central of Dayton, Ohio, which would absorb $150,000 of the 
estimated total cost of $200,000. The balance would be borne by 
a group of participating accounting firms. The data bank would 
consist of the full text of 500 annual reports of New York Stock 
Exchange companies and 1,000 financial statement notes dealing 
with accounting matters of special interest. This information 
could then be accessed through computer terminals located in 
participants' offices.
The board approved the proposal, and in October 1973 it 
decided to continue the program on an operational basis. By that 
time twelve CPA firms, the FASB, and the SEC had agreed to 
participate, and several other firms and organizations had ex­
pressed interest.
As the program, guided by AICPA staff Vice President Wil­
liam Bruschi, continued, the data base was greatly expanded, 
and the introduction of new equipment made the information 
more accessible. The number of participants also grew, reflecting 
the success of the cooperative effort by CPA firms and the 
Institute to fulfill a need that otherwise would have had to be 
met by firms individually.
The cooperation in developing a system of information re­
trieval was further expanded in 1976 when Price Waterhouse 
made available to the AICPA a system for indexing authoritative
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accounting and auditing literature. As a result, the Institute was 
able to begin providing CPA firms with a periodically updated 
index in the form of computer tapes and paperback publications. 
It was a generous gesture by the firm, which will be of continuing 
benefit to the entire profession.
Continuing Professional Education
The Institute began developing and providing continuing profes­
sional education programs to its members early in the 1960s. 
During the formative stages this activity was not self-sustaining 
even on a direct cost basis. When the deficit reached a record 
level, the Council became alarmed and directed that henceforth 
the division “be operated on a business basis and revenues from 
the program cover all direct and allocated costs." As a result, 
the board resolved on March 2, 1970, that the division bear a full 
share of management and service charges and that the pricing 
structure be modified to permit a break-even basis in the 1972-
1973 fiscal year.
Improvements were made, and the program was self-sustain­
ing for the remainder of the decade. Indeed, the Institute's CPE 
program matured into a big business in the 1970s. In 1980 the 
division produced gross revenues of nearly $10 million, over 27 
percent of the Institute's total revenues.
This substantial growth was largely the result of a resolution 
adopted by the Council on May 12, 1971, urging the state boards 
of accountancy to adopt, by legislation or regulation, a mandatory 
continuing professional education requirement for all practicing 
CPAs. This resolution was implemented by the combined efforts 
of the AICPA, the state societies of CPAs, the National Associa­
tion of State Boards of Accountancy, state legislatures, and state 
boards of accountancy. By 1980 thirty-seven states had adopted 
mandatory requirements.
The program got a second boost when the division for CPA 
firms was established in 1977. The division required member 
firms to provide specified amounts of continuing professional 
education not only for their CPAs but for all other members of 
their professional staffs.
As the volume of courses and the number of groups providing 
continuing professional education grew, it became apparent that
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standards were necessary to ensure an acceptable level of quality. 
After both the AICPA and the National Association of State 
Boards of Accountancy adopted standards, the question of ac­
creditation of courses arose, and a special committee was ap­
pointed in November 1977 to study this issue. That committee 
concluded in a report dated April 4, 1979, that the costs of an 
accreditation program would be prohibitive in relation to the 
benefits to be derived. It believed that market forces would weed 
out poor courses through low enrollment, making a formal 
system of accreditation unnecessary. As an alternative, the com­
mittee recommended that the providers, sponsors, and enforcers 
of continuing professional education be urged to agree to comply 
with the Institute's standards.
These conclusions were probably right, but they leave the 
individual CPA to find out the hard way whether or not a course 
is worth attending. The quality of available courses is very 
uneven, and many CPAs complain that they have attended 
courses that proved to be worthless. This problem will require 
more attention in the future.
Overall, the rapidly expanding market for CPE proved to be 
a bonanza for the state societies of CPAs. Some acted only as 
sponsors, while the larger state societies developed and provided 
courses through educational foundations.
As might be expected, friction between the AICPA and the 
state societies arose over pricing policies, the sharing of revenues 
from jointly sponsored courses, and the fact that they were in 
direct competition with each other. The tensions were kept within 
reasonable bounds by constant efforts to coordinate activities 
and by the inclusion of state society executive directors on the 
AICPA's CPE committees.
Mandatory continuing professional education for practicing 
CPAs has very likely raised the quality of practice, but measure­
ment of the benefits is extremely difficult, if not impossible. 
Nevertheless, experience has demonstrated that a voluntary 
approach is unsatisfactory as a way to remain up to date.
General Standards
In 1974 the management advisory services division developed 
and exposed for comment a set of proposed practice standards,
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some of which overlapped with generally accepted auditing 
standards and certain portions of the code of professional ethics. 
This worried the AICPA's officers because they foresaw the 
possibility that various technical divisions might issue separate 
standards that dealt differently with the same matters.
To eliminate this possibility, I proposed that the Institute 
consider a set of general professional standards applicable to all 
public accounting services. The AICPA's senior technical com­
mittees responded favorably, and a special committee was ap­
pointed to develop a specific set of general standards. The 
committee produced a report, which was exposed for comment 
late in 1976. Following further modifications, the committee 
submitted a final report to the board on April 20, 1977. The board 
approved the final report on May 6, and three days later the 
Council authorized a mail ballot of the membership on the 
proposed changes in the code of professional ethics. Surprisingly, 
there was little controversy about this significant step, which for 
the first time would bring all areas of practice under a set of 
general standards.
The proposal substituted a new Rule of Conduct 201, "General 
Standards," for the existing Rule 201, "Competence." The revised 
rule read as follows:
A member shall comply with the following general standards as
interpreted by bodies designated by Council, and must justify any
departures therefrom.
A. Professional competence. A member shall undertake only those 
engagements which he or his firm can reasonably expect to 
complete with professional competence.
B. Due professional care. A member shall exercise due professional 
care in the performance of an engagement.
C. Planning and supervision. A member shall adequately plan and 
supervise an engagement.
D. Sufficient relevant data. A member shall obtain sufficient rele­
vant data to afford a reasonable basis for conclusions or recom­
mendations in relation to an engagement.
E. Forecasts. A member shall not permit his name to be used in 
conjunction with any forecast of future transactions in a manner 
which may lead to the belief that the member vouches for the 
achievability of the forecast.
Item E had previously been included in a separate rule 204. 
A new Rule 204, "Other Technical Standards," replaced it:
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A member shall comply with other technical standards promulgated 
by bodies designated by Council to establish such standards, and 
departures therefrom must be justified by those who do not follow 
them.
A footnote explained the references to "bodies designated by 
Council":
For purposes of this Rule, it is expected that Council will consider 
designating the auditing standards executive committee, the man­
agement advisory services executive committee, and the federal 
taxation executive committee.
The intent of this construction was that the general standards 
under rule 201 would apply to all areas of public practice, and 
the senior technical committees would promulgate interpretative 
standards peculiar to their respective areas of services.
The proposed changes were adopted by a vote of the mem­
bership, and a few months later the management advisory 
services executive committee sought and obtained designation 
by the Council to promulgate standards under the new rule 204. 
The implementing resolution contained the following qualifica­
tion:
provided, however, that such standards do not deal with the broad 
question of what, if any, services should be proscribed, and pro­
vided further that any such statements are subject to review by 
affected senior technical committees of the Institute prior to issu­
ance.
In May 1979 the Council brought the pronouncements of the 
new accounting and review services executive committee under 
the rule and designated the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board as the body to establish standards for the disclosure of 
financial information outside of financial statements in published 
financial reports containing financial statements.
Early in 1980 the federal taxation executive committee also 
sought the approval of the AICPA Board of Directors to request 
designation by the Council under rule 204. In this instance, the 
board deferred action because the committee had no current 
plans for making its Statements on Tax Responsibilities enforce­
able under rule 204.
The general standards adopted under the revised rule 201 of 
the code of professional ethics were of considerable significance,
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but the new rule 204 received all the early attention. It proved 
to be a convenient means of dealing with new developments in 
professional standards.
The framework provided by the two rules should help to 
avoid unnecessary duplication and conflicting standards, pro­
vided that the pronouncements and interpretations of the senior 
technical committees are confined to subjects unique to their 
respective jurisdictions. This may prove difficult to do, however, 
and time will tell whether further modifications are necessary to 
rationalize the profession's body of standards.
CHAPTER 15
Conclusion
Th e  period covered by this volume was a turbulent time within the profession. The forces that were growing throughout the business world in the 1960s formed into a full-blown challenge 
to the credibility of independent auditors during the 1970s. 
Essentially, the 1970s produced the first comprehensive appraisal 
of how well the profession was meeting the responsibilities 
assigned to it by the SEC under the 1933 and 1934 federal 
securities statutes, and the consensus seemed to be that the 
profession was not performing as well as it should. Paradoxically, 
at this same time the reputation of the business community had 
become so tarnished that government officials, legislators, and 
independent observers sought to expand the responsibilities of 
independent auditors as part of a program to achieve improved 
corporate accountability.
The problems faced by the profession were not new. They 
were chronicled in John L. Carey's history of the profession 
through 1969, The Rise of the Accounting Profession. What was new 
was the degree of attention paid to the profession in the public 
press and in Congress. Moreover, for the first time CPAs en­
countered corporate managers who took advantage of accounting 
alternatives to inflate the market values of the equity securities 
issued by their corporations. The profession was slow to recog­
nize the full implications of the changes that were taking place 
in the business world.
Once the challenges were fully recognized, however, the 
profession met them with a speed and thoroughness that was 
unprecedented among the major professions. New structures 
were established to promulgate and enforce accounting and 
auditing standards and to enhance the profession's system of
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self-regulation. Peer reviews of the quality controls of firms were 
introduced to ensure a high level of performance. In addition, 
the Institute worked to sharpen the public's understanding of 
the public accounting profession and to improve its ability to 
present its case before Congress and government officials.
The changes made by the profession exacted a heavy price in 
the form of internal disharmony. The criticisms of the profes­
sion's performance were directed almost exclusively at CPAs 
practicing before the SEC, and these were a minority of account­
ants in public practice. As a result, CPAs had little enthusiasm 
for the imposition of new requirements on the entire profession; 
yet, these practitioners generally did not wish to have distinctions 
drawn between CPAs based on practice before the SEC. This 
posed a dilemma. It remains to be seen whether the profession 
can come to accept without continuing turmoil distinctions that 
external demands have made necessary.
In serving CPAs throughout this troubled period, the Institute 
was constantly faced with questions about which courses of 
action would best meet the interests of the profession and society, 
which, in the long run, must be identical. To carry out its 
responsibilities properly, the AICPA found it necessary to be 
both a leader and a follower of its constituents.
With the cooperation and interaction of its officers, governing 
bodies, and members, the Institute will continue to serve the 
profession as spokesman, counselor, and conscience in helping 
the profession fulfill its vital role in society.
APPENDIX 1
Board of Directors 1971-1982
Presidents/Chairmen of the Board
Marshall S. Armstrong President 1970-71*
Walter J. Oliphant President 1971-72
LeRoy Layton President 1972-73
Samuel A. Derieux President/
Chairman 1973-74
Philip L. Defliese Chairman 1974-75
Ivan O. Bull Chairman 1975-76
Michael N. Chetkovich Chairman 1976-77
Stanley J. Scott Chairman 1977-78
Joseph P. Cummings Chairman 1978-79
William R. Gregory Chairman 1979-80
William S. Kanaga Chairman 1980-81
George D. Anderson Chairman 1981-82
* Since 1972, the President/Chairman has served as a member of the Board in the year 
preceding his election and in the year immediately following his term as President or 
Chairman.
Officers
Arthur L. Breakstone 
Gordon Ford 
Wilbur H. Stevens
E. Palmer Tang 
Harry F. Reiss, Jr. 
William T. Barnes 
Edward A. DeMiller, Jr. 
Max Myers 
James E. Seitz 
Albert J. Bows
Vice President 
Vice President 
Vice President 
Vice President 
Treasurer 
Vice President 
Vice President 
Vice President 
Vice President 
Vice President
1971-72
1971-72
1971-72
1971-72
1971-74
1972-73 
1972-73 
1972-73
1972-73
1973-74
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Albert H. Cohen 
George H. Horn 
Lorin H. Wilson 
David M. Culp 
Arnold I. Levine 
A. Waldo Sowell, Jr. 
John W. Zick 
James M. Arnett 
Robert Bernstein 
Don J. Summa 
Peter E. Arnstein 
George R. Catlett 
Frank B. Hill, Jr.
Robert M. Coffman 
Andrew P. Marincovich 
Robert D. May 
Harry R. Mancher 
John L. Fox 
Bernard Z. Lee 
John L. Ricketts 
Raymond C. Lauver 
Robert A. Liberty 
Richard D. Thorsen 
A. Marvin Strait 
John J. van Benten 
Arthur R. Wyatt 
William B. Keast 
Rholan E. Larson 
Sam I. Diamond, Jr. 
Gerald W. Hepp 
George E. Tornwall, Jr.
Board Members
Paul Lambert, Jr. 1969-72
Gordon L. Murray 1969-72
Stanley J. Scott 1969-72
John C. Biegler 1970-73
Winston Brooke 1970-73
Norton M. Bedford 1971-73
Ivan O. Bull 1971-74
Walter E. Hanson 1971-74
Vice President 1973-74
Vice President 1973-74
Vice President 1973-74
Vice President 1974-75
Vice President 1974-75
Vice President 1974-75
Treasurer 1974-77
Vice President 1975-76
Vice President 1975-76
Vice President 1975-76
Vice President 1976-77
Vice President 1976-77
Vice President 1976-77
Vice President 1977-78
Vice President 1977-78
Vice President 1977-78
Treasurer 1977-80
Vice President 1978-79
Vice President 1978-79
Vice President 1978-79
Vice President 1979-80
Vice President 1979-80
Vice President 1979-80
Vice President 1980-81
Vice President 1980-81
Vice President 1980-81
Treasurer 1980-82
Vice Chairman 1981-82
Vice President 1981-82
Vice President 1981-82
Vice President 1981-82
Oral L. Luper 1971-74
George E. Doty 1972-75
William B. Nicol 1972-75
Wilbur H. Stevens 1972-75
Willard G. Bowen 1973-76
James E. Seitz 1973-76 
Charles T. Zlatkovich 1973-76
Richard T. Baker 1974- 77
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Board Members (cont.)
Michael N. Chetkovich 1974-75
William R. Gregory 1974-77
Robert Boyer 1975-78
Rholan E. Larson 1975-78
John R. Meinert 1975-78
A. Waldo Sowell, Jr. 1975- 76
Wilton T. Anderson 1976-79
Joseph P. Cummings 1976-77
William S. Kanaga 1976-79
Harry R. Mancher 1976-77
Robert F. Isler 1977-80
Bert N. Mitchell 1977-80
Russell E. Palmer, Jr. 1977-80
George R. Catlett 1977-79 
Barbara Hackman
Franklin, Public Member 1978-83
Archibald E. MacKay 1978-79
Robert D. May 1978-81
Robert A. Mellin 1978-81 
Thomas C. Pryor,
Public Member 1978-82 
John C. Sawhill,
Public Member 1978-81
James Don Edwards 1979-82
John L. Fox 1979-82
Bernard Z. Lee 1979-82
William C. Rescorla 1979-81
Ray J. Groves 1980-83
Raymond C. Lauver 1980-83
Herman J. Lowe 1980-83 
A. A. Summer, Jr.,
Public Member 1980-84
George L. Bernstein 1981-84 
Andrew P. Marincovich 1981-84
Arthur R. Wyatt 1981-84
Staff Officers Serving as Members of the Board of Directors
Leonard M. Savoie Executive Vice
President 1971-72
Wallace E. Olson Executive Vice
President 1972-74
Wallace E. Olson President 1974-80
Philip B. Chenok President 1980-82
John Lawler Administrative Vice
President 1971-74
John Lawler Senior Vice President
and Secretary 1974-76
Donald J. Schneeman General Counsel
and Secretary 1976-82
APPENDIX 2
AICPA Gold Medal Awards
1970 Weldon Powell 
(posthumously) 
Thomas D. Flynn 
Elmer G. Beamer
1971 Robert M. Trueblood
1972 Philip L. Defliese
1973 Ralph E. Kent
1974 Oscar S. Gellein 
Marvin L. Stone
1975 LeRoy Layton 
Louis M. Kessler
Medal of Honor—1980
Elmer B. Staats
1976 Louis H. Pilie 
John Lawler
1977 Marshall S. Armstrong
1978 Samuel A. Derieux
1979 Robert K. Mautz 
Stanley J. Scott
1980 Wallace E. Olson
1981 Herbert Miller 
Walter J. Oliphant
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AAA Executive Committee, 251-253 
AAC—See Accounting Accreditation Coun­
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AACSB Accreditation Council, 256, 259 
AACSB Operations Committee, 256, 259 
AACSB Standards Committee, 255 
Aaron, Peter E . ,  30
Academic community, 246-247, 250, 261 
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SEC proposal to require audit commit­
tees, 100
Study of federal regulatory authorities, 
37-38
Accountants for the Public Interest, 276 
Accountants International Study Group, 226, 
230
Accounting Accreditation Council, 254-259 
Accounting and Review Services Executive 
Committee, 18, 103-104, 285 
Accounting changes preferability require­
ment, 72-72, 84-85, 102 
Accounting Establishment, The, 5, 43, 45, 57,
132, 212, 217 
Accounting guides (AICPA), 84-85 
Accounting Principles Board, 229, 263 
Broad principles v. detailed rules, 61-64 
Credibility, 64-65
Lack of consensus on objectives, 61 
Opinion no. 2, 62 
Opinion no. 4, 62 
Opinion no. 15, 80 
Opinion no. 20, 85 
Opinion no. 31, 68 
Rules of Conduct, 109 
Substantial authoritative support, 62-63 
Successor to Committee on Accounting 
Procedure, 2-3 
Termination of existence, 68 
Accounting profession 
Credibility, 145, 287 
Education of future CPAs, 245 
Examination by federal government, 33- 
59
Legal liability, 1-2, 15-31, 100 
Accounting Series Releases, 4, 70 
No. 4, 62, 70 
No. 96, 62
No. 150, 70-72
No. 153, 26, 250
No. 153A, 26
No. 166, 74
No. 173, 150
No. 177, 72 , 102, 106
No. 250, 9, 214-216, 218, 221
No. 253, 76
No. 264, 9, 214, 216-221 
Accounting standards—See Financial ac­
counting standards 
Accounting Standards Executive Commit­
tee, 69, 72-74, 78, 80, 84-85, 94-95, 107 
Accreditation 
Programs of professional accounting ed­
ucation, 20, 246-247, 249-261, 283 
Specialists, 1 0 , 1 9 6 , 198, 200-201, 203-204 
AcSEC—See Accounting Standards Execu­
tive Committee 
Adams, Donald, 89, 264-265 
Adams et al. v. Standard Knitting Mills, 28-29 
Administrative Procedures Act, 218-219 
Adverse opinion, 62 
Advertising 
Journal o f Accountancy advertising reve­
nue, 265
Prohibition, 8, 50-52, 58, 109, 192, 202 
Revision of Code of Ethics, 111, 113 
A. H. Robins Company, Inc., 30 
AICPA—See American Institute of CPAs 
AISG—See Accountants International Study 
Group 
Alam, Joseph, 53 
Alam, Morris & Company, 53 
Alaska CPA Society, 272 
Alcoa, 138
Alexander Grant & Co., 46, 66, 188, 195 
ALI—See American Law Institute 
American Accounting Association, 10, 46,
65, 220, 246-248, 250-252, 254-258 
American Assembly of Collegiate Schools 
of Business, 10, 246-248, 250, 252-260 
American Bar Association, 99, 205, 297 
American Home Assurance Company, 279 
American Institute of Architects, 111 
American Institute of CPAs 
Accounting guides, 84-85 
Accounting Standards Executive Com­
mittee, 72-73 
Audit guides, 84-85
Commission on Auditors' Responsibili­
ties, 5-6, 9, 47, 92, 98, 120, 212-213
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American Institute of CPAs (continued) 
Committees, 273-274 
Disciplinary procedures, 119 
Division of CPA Firms— See CPA Firms, 
Division of 
Eagleton subcommittee hearings, 57-58 
Education— See Education 
Ethics— See Ethics, Code of Professional 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 41, 106 
Foundation, 275 
Institute Responds, The, 45 
International organizations, 223-243 
Legal counsel, 279-281 
Members not in practice, 12, 131 
Metcalf subcommittee hearings, 42-52 
Moss subcommittee hearings, 52-57 
Opposition to rotation of auditors, 40 
Professional specialization, 10, 128, 191- 
205
Relations with SEC, 280 
Relocation of headquarters, 266 
Restructuring the Institute, 128-146 
Role in litigation against auditors, 15-31 
Small v. large firms, 123-126 
Washington office, 33-35 
American Law Institute, 17, 99-100 
American Society of Civil Engineers, 111 
Amicus curiae briefs, 16-19, 21-24, 28-30 
A. M. Pullen and Company, 35 
Andersen, Gordon, 46 
Anderson, Wilton T., 251 
Andrews, Fred, 152 
Anthony, Robert, 82
Antitrust laws, 8, 25, 44, 111-113, 116, 126 
API—See Accountants for the Public Inter­
est
Arenberg, J. T., Jr., 89 
Armstrong, Marshall S., 34, 38, 46, 65, 68, 
74, 77, 120, 173 
Arnold & Porter, 46
Arthur Andersen & Company, 23, 46-47,
49, 52-53, 71-72, 74, 89, 96 
Arthur Young and Company, 17, 47, 66,
88, 152, 156, 193 
Asia, 226
Associated Accounting Firms International, 
46
Associate members (non-CPAs), 193-199 
Association of Government Accountants, 
252, 254
Atlantic Richfield Company, 229 
Audit committees, 51, 53, 55, 94-95, 100, 
102, 133, 208, 217, 219 
Audit fees, 224-226 
Audit guides (AICPA), 81, 84-85 
Auditing standards 
Confused with accounting standards, 37- 
38
Generally accepted— See Generally ac­
cepted auditing standards 
National Society of Public Accountants, 
174
Standard setting, 38-39, 43, 51, 54, 88, 
96-99
Auditing Standards Advisory Council, 98 
Auditing Standards Board, 29, 77-78, 97- 
98, 105, 265 
Auditing Standards Executive Committee, 
92-93, 96, 103-107, 125, 150-151, 156, 
265, 285 
Auditor, independent 
Change in auditors, 202 
Investigation of auditor performance, 5 -  
6, 33-59
Third-party liability, 1-2 , 15-31, 51, 55,
57-58, 126-127, 152-153 
AudSEC— See Auditing Standards Execu­
tive Committee 
Auerbach, Norman, 47, 53-54 
Australia, 185, 223, 225-226, 228, 231, 238- 
239, 243
Baker, Richard, 68 
Bankruptcy 
Brokerage firms, 39 
CPA firms, 1 7 ,  31, 148 
Equity Funding, 39 
Four Seasons Nursing Homes, 39 
Legal liability of auditors, 19 
National Student Marketing, 39 
Penn Central, 4, 39 
Real estate ventures, 73 
Banks
Accounting services, 128, 196 
Federal Reserve, 74 
Valuation of equity securities, 73-74 
Barr, Andrew, 35, 89, 209 
Barreaux, Theodore A., 35, 37, 46, 264-265 
Barry, Theodore, 46 
Bates, James, 180 
Baucus, Max, 47 
Beamer, Elmer G., 245-246 
Benson, Henry, 225-229 
Berton, Lee, 272 
Bevis, Herman W., 177 
Biegler, John C., 46, 49, 66, 68, 127, 220 
Board of Examiners (AICPA), 169, 178-179,
186, 270
Board on Standards for Schools of Profes­
sional Accounting (AICPA), 248-249, 
252 
Brazil, 238
Breaking the Deadlock Over Management Ad­
visory Services, 220 
Brennan, John, 229
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Briloff, Abraham J., 37-38, 207 
Brooke, Freeman, Berry and McBrayer, 68 
Brooke, Winston, 68 
Brout, Alan, 53, 137 
Brout & Company, 53 
Bruschi, William C., 264-265, 281 
Bull, Ivan O., 91, 96, 275 
Burger, Leo, 89 
Burggraaff, Hans, 241 
Burmester, Robert W., 256 
Burns, Arthur, 74 
Burson-Marsteller, 278 
Burton, John C., 35, 53, 70, 99, 126, 147- 
148
Bylaws of the Institute 
Amendments, 266-268 
Associate class of membership, 194- 
195
Division for CPA Firms, 136, 141-143 
Firms not subject to peer reviews, 265 
Members not in practice, 22, 232 
Publications, 272
California Department of Consumer Af­
fairs, 184-185 
California legislature, 195-196 
California Society of CPAs, 186-187, 196 
California State Board of Accountancy, 184- 
186
California Superior Court, 185 
Canada, 159, 183-185, 188-189, 225-227, 
230-231, 233, 238, 267 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accoun­
tants, 184, 225, 243 
CAPA— See Conference of Asian and Pa­
cific Accountants 
Carey, John L., 147, 263, 287 
Carmichael, Douglas R., 92, 265 
Carnegie Corporation of New York, 245 
Carnegie-Mellon University, 66 
Carrel, Philip, 233 
Carter, Jimmy, 36, 55 
Casey, William, 70 
Catlett, George, 233 
Certiorari, writ of, 26, 20, 23, 28-30 
Chatov, Robert, 46 
Chenok, Philip, 246, 265 
Chesson, John, 57-58, 217, 219 
Chetkovich, Michael N., 46, 50, 232, 186-
187, 230, 239 
Chicago, University of, 66, 252 
C.I.T. Financial Corporation, 92 
Clarence Rainess and Company, 144 
Closely held companies, 78-81,-143-144 
Cohen, Manuel F., 47, 92, 207-208, 213 
Colorado State Board of Accountancy, 250 
Columbia University, 53 
Commerce Clearing House, 272
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities, 
5, 9, 47, 92, 98, 120, 212-213 
Committee Handbook, 273 
Committee on Accounting Education (AAA), 
250
Committee on Accounting Procedure, 2, 61, 
87
Committee on Accreditation (AAA), 251 
Committee on Auditing Procedure, 89 
Committee on Education and Experience 
Requirements for CPAs, 245-246 
Committee on Governmental Accounting 
and Auditing, 81 
Committee on Management of an Account­
ing Practice, 271 
Committee on Professional Ethics (AICPA), 
110, 112, 119 
Committee on Public Relations (AICPA), 
277
Committee on Scope and Structure, 209- 
212, 263
Committee on State Legislation (AICPA), 
169-171
Common Market— See European Economic 
Community 
Competition, professional, 8-9, 44, 48, 54,
58-59, 101-102, 109-110, 113, 117,123-
125, 140, 144-146, 170, 173, 178, 192, 
204, 221-222 
Compilation of financial statements 
State accountancy statutes, 175-176 
Unaudited financial statements, 22, 203 
Concepts of professional ethics, 111, 210 
Conceptual framework (FASB project), 3,
66, 82
Conference of Asian and Pacific Accoun­
tants, 242 
Confidential relationship with clients 
Income tax accruals, 22 
Peer reviews, 111, 159, 162 
Connecticut Society of CPAs, 103 
Consultative Committee of Accountancy 
Bodies of the United Kingdom, 240 
Consulting— See Management advisory 
services
Consumer Product Safety Commission 
(U.S.), 267 
Continental Vending, 16 -17 
Continuing professional education— See 
Education 
Cook, Bradford, 88
Coopers and Lybrand, 16, 22-23, 25, 47,
53, 65, 114, 125, 178 
Cost Accounting Standards Board, 33, 43, 
47, 64 
Council of the Institute 
Amendment of ethics code, 64, 111-115 
Approval of Wheat committee report, 68
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Council of the Institute (continued) 
Associate members, 194-199, 266 
Beamer report, 246-247, 250 
Commission on Auditors' Responsibili­
ties, 93, 97 
Continuing professional education re­
quirements, 120-121 
Designation of FASB as standard-setting 
body, 69, 285 
Equity Funding investigation, 89 
Establishment of division for CPA firms,
50, 134-136, 140, 142-143 
Experience requirement for CPA certifi­
cate, 175
Formation of the Auditing Standards 
Board, 98 
Inclusion of public members, 59 
Model Accountancy Bill, 175-177 
Peer review, 164
Public disciplinary hearings, 120-121 
Resolution on departure from APB opin­
ions, 61-62 
Resolution on technical standards, 104 
Revision of ethics code, 110-111 
Scope of practice, 212 
Small v. large firms, 123, 143-144 
State legislation, 171-172 
Title of chief Institute officer, 263 
Court of Appeals (U.S.), 16, 21-23, 25-27, 
29-30
Covington and Burling, 89, 99, 279, 281 
Cowperthwaite, Gordon, 233-234, 237, 241 
CPA associates, 164 
CPA certificates 
Experience requirement, 175-176 
Licensing of foreign applicants, 182-188 
National— See National CPA certificate 
Separation of issuance from license to 
practice, 175 
Suspension or revocation, 119 
Uniform CPA Examination, 177 
CPA examination— See Uniform CPA Ex­
amination 
CPA firms 
Antitrust legislation, 8, 44 
Audit committee requirement, 101-102 
Compliance with audit and accounting 
guides, 84 
Compliance with NCGA standards, 81 
Control of profession, 48, 59, 68 
Disciplinary proceedings, 121 
Division—See CPA Firms, Division for 
Executive recruiting, 209, 213-214, 216 
Financial statements, 44, 49, 54 
Funding for education, 249, 258, 275 
Funding for ICCAP, 233 
Funding for NASBA, 177-178 
Guidance on emerging problems, 72-74
Liability insurance program, 279 
Licensing of foreign applicants for CPAs, 
187-188
Metcalf subcommittee report, 51 
Moss bill, 55
Moss subcommittee hearings, 54 
Peer reviews, 147-167 
Professional corporations, 110 
Relations with SEC, 126-127, 218 
Restructuring of the Institute, 132 
Small v. large firms, 123-126, 129-130, 204 
Specialists, 192-194, 203-204 
Support for the FASB, 68 
Training programs, 247 
CPA Firms, Division for, 7, 15, 50, 53, 119, 
123-146, 165-166, 214, 268 
CPA Journal, 131 
CPA Letter, 271 
CPA Newsletter, 147 
CPA Practitioner, 272 
Credibility 
Accounting Principles Board, 64-65 
Accounting profession, 145, 287 
Effect of business failures, 88, 96 
Effect of litigation, 31 
Peer reviews, 53, 149, 153, 164 
Crum and Forster, 279 
Cruse, Rex, 265
Cummings, Joseph, 141, 159, 186, 228-229,
238, 265
Cummins Engine Company, Inc., 47 
Cyert, Richard M., 66
Davidson, Sidney, 66, 252 
Day, John, 252, 254-255 
Defalcation, 17-18
Defliese, Philip L., 65, 90, 96, 114-115, 125-
126, 131, 153, 173 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 66, 92, 148, 150, 
157, 208, 230, 245 
Denmark, 238 
Deregulation 
Reagan philosophy, 59 
Recodification of securities statutes, 100 
Scope of services, 221 
Withdrawal of ASRs, 9 
Derieux, Samuel A., 91, 93, 96, 127, 137, 
144, 151, 153 
Devore, Malcolm M., 208 
Disciplinary proceedings 
AICPA, 94, 118, 121 
NOSECA, 55
Public oversight board, 139, 144-145 
SEC, 6, 15, 51, 54, 102, 118-119, 132, 148, 
157
State boards of accountancy, 120 
Disclosure of supplementary information, 
106-107
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Displacement problem, 102 
District of Columbia, 57, 219 
District of Columbia CPA Society, 171 
Dixon, Arthur, 129 
Doherty, William, 272 
Dresselhaus, J . B., 46 
Duff, Anderson & Clark, Inc., 66, 92 
Dunham, Lawrence S., 258-259
Eagleton subcommittee, 57, 138 
Eagleton, Thomas, 21, 57-58, 2 1 7 , 219 
Eckhardt, Bob, 40-41
Economic and Social Council of the United 
Nations, 239 
Edelstein, David N., 25 
Education 
Beamer report, 245-247 
Continuing professional education, 120,
133, 137, 171, 175, 200, 282-283 
Foreign applicants for CPA certificates, 
183-186
Professional schools of accounting, 10,
51, 247-249, 253-261 
Education Advisory Committee, 232 
Education Executive Committee (AICPA), 
248, 255, 257-258 
Edwards, James Don, 66 
EEC— See European Economic Community 
Egger, Roscoe, 23 
Eiger, David, 164 
1136 Tenants Corporation, 27 
Elliott, Norman J., 46 
Ellyson, Robert, 178-179 
Elmer Fox, Westheimer and Company, 199, 
268
Emigh, Carolyn, 37-38 
Energy Conservation and Oil Policy Act of 
1975, 4, 36-37, 39, 76 
Energy crisis, 4, 26, 55 
Energy Department (U.S.), 268 
Engagement letters, 18 
England, 159, 243, 267 
English Chartered Accountants, 185 
Equity Funding, 4, 39, 88-90, 105 
Ernst and Ernst—See Ernst and Whinney 
Ernst and Whinney, 22, 68, 89, 101, 143 
Ethics, Code of Professional, 274 
APB Opinions, 110 
Competitive bidding, 113 
General standards, 283-286 
Names of violators published, 50 
Petition by NCCPAP, 140-143 
Publications, 272
Revision of code, 3, 64, 69, 110-111, 116, 
264
Rules— See Rules of Conduct 
Scope of practice, 209-210
Ethics Interpretations 
No. 502-3, 114 
No. 502-4, 202-204 
European Economic Community, 224, 226, 
242
Evans, John, 47
Experience requirement, 246-247 
Expert witness, 25
FAF— See Financial Accounting Foundation 
Fair presentation 
Definition of auditors' responsibilities, 44 
Meaning in auditor's opinion, 17, 72, 87 
Unaudited financial statements, 20 
FASB— See Financial Accounting Standards 
Board
Federal Chartering of Corporations, 40, 212 
Federal government
Accounting Standards Board, 82 
Antitrust actions, 8, 44, 111-116, 126 
Examination of the profession, 33-59 
White House— See White House 
Federal Government Relations Executive 
Committee, 34, 270 
Federal Regulation and Regulatory Reforms, 38 
Federal Reserve Bank, 74 
Federal Taxation Division, 34 
Federal Taxation Executive Committee, 22, 
285
Federal Trade Commission, 33, 44, 58, 113- 
115, 178-179 
Federation of Schools of Accounting, 258 
Ferst, Stanley D., 209 
Financial Accounting Foundation, 3, 45-46,
54, 67-68, 71, 74, 82-84 
Financial Accounting Foundation Structure 
Committee, 82 
Financial accounting standards 
Broad principles v. detailed rules, 62-64 
Conformity with income tax rules, 72 
Confused with auditing standards, 37- 
38, 87
Oil and gas industry, 36-37 
Standard setting, 2-5, 38, 43, 54, 58, 61- 
85, 109, 263 
State and local governments, 58, 81-84 
Financial Accounting Standards Advisory 
Council, 3 , 67, 74-75, 83-84 
Financial Accounting Standards Board, 3,
15, 37-38, 46, 67-69, 70-74, 76-78, 82- 
85, 95, 120, 131, 228, 235, 242, 264, 285 
Financial Analysts Federation, 46 
Financial Executives Institute, 46, 73, 252, 
254, 256-257 
Financial statements 
CPA firms, 44, 49, 54 
Management responsibility, 94 
Findley, Barry, 175
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182
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Foreign accountants, 182-188 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 41, 
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Four Seasons Nursing Homes, 39
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Fulbright and Jaworski, 98
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43-4A, 47, 76, 81-83, 117-118, 131, 174, 
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Enforceability, 110 
Misleading financial statements, 94 
Substantial authoritative support, 62-63 
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Auditors charged for noncompliance, 21, 
28
Enforceable under Rules of Conduct, 111, 
284
General Motors Corp., 66
General standards, 283-286
George S. Olive and Company, 68, 92
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Glenn Ingram & C o., 129
Goerdeler, Reinhard, 230-231, 234-235, 237,
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Nonaudit services, 9-10, 51, 5 8 ,  1 3 8 , 191- 
193
Uninvited solicitation, 115 
India, 185, 223, 225, 238 
Information retrieval, 281-282 
Ingram, Glenn, Jr., 129 
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Brokerage firm customers, 27-28 
Financial forecasts, 107 
Interim financial statements, 125
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